i  m  i 


KB     | 

MM 


UCSB   LIBKAKY 


LESSONS  FROM   NATURE, 


AS  MANIFESTED  IN 


MIND  AND  MATTER. 


BY 


ST.  GEORGE  MIYART,  Pn.D.,  F.R.S., 

SEC.  L.8.,  F.Z.S. ; 
CORRESPONDING    MEMBER    OF    THE    ACADEMY    OF    NATURAL    SCIENCES,    PHILADELPHIA 

PROFESSOR   OF   BIOLOGY   AT    UNIVEKSITY  COLLEGE,   KENSINGTON; 
AND  LECTURER  ON  ZOOLOGY  AND  COMPARATIVE  ANATOMY  AT  ST.  MAKY'S   UOSPITAL. 


NEW  YOEK: 
D.    APPLETON    AND    COMPANY, 

549    AND    661    BROADWAY. 

1876. 


To  the  Very  Eeverend  FATHER  NEWMAN,  D.D. 

MY  DEAR  DR.  NEWMAN, 

IT  is  with  a  special  gladness  that  I  avail  myself 
of  your  kind  permission  to  dedicate  to  you,  who  love  the 
natural  world  so  keenly,  the  following  chapters  on  Nature 
considered  as  one  whole  whereof  rational  man  forms  a  part. 
A  tribute  of  respectful  gratitude  is  indeed  due  from  one  so 
indebted  as  I  am.  Among  the  many  obligations  I  owe  to 
you,  is  the  ability  to  unite  in  one  the  Theistic  and  the 
Naturalistic  conceptions  of  the  world  about  us — conceptions 
a  divorce  between  which  is  the  calamity  of  our  age.  To 
former  obligations  however  you  have  now  added  yet  another. 
As  an  Englishman  and  a  Catholic,  I  thank  you  with  all  my 
heart  for  your  recent  noble  vindication  of  the  rights  of  con- 
science— a  vindication  to  which  reference  an'd  appeal  will, 
I  am  persuaded,  bo  made  again  and  again  in  the  times 
which  are  to  come.  That  that  voice  which  so  lately  stilled 
the  storm  may  long  be  spared  to  speak  words  of  peace  and 
wisdom — disarming  prejudice  and  calming  passion — is  the 
most  earnest  hope  and  prayer  of 

Yours  most  respectfully  and  affectionately, 

ST.  GEORGE  MIVAET. 


WlLMSHURST,    UCKFTELD, 

Decemlier  8t)i,  1875. 


PREFACE. 


OBSERVATION  and  experience  have  convinced  me  of  the 
narrowing  and  misleading  effects  upon  the  mind  of  an  in- 
complete conception  of  what  is  meant  by  the  term  "Nature." 

It  is  too  generally  taken  as  denoting  the  assemblage  of 
phenomena  external  to  and  apart  from  the  human  mind, 
which  none  the  less  is  one  of  the  most  important  objects 
which  presents  itself  to  our  perception.  Hence  arises  a 
necessary  imperfection.  But  a  worse  evil  follows.  "  Nature," 
taken  in  this  limited  sense,  is  often  made  use  of  to  explain 
that  which  has  been  tacitly  excluded  from  it.  Thus  it  is 
that  the  facts  and  processes  of  Eeason  are  apt  to  be  first 
ignored  in  order  that  they  may  be  afterwards  treated  as  if 
the  mere  phenomena  of  irrational  nature  were  sufficient  to 
explain  them. 

Impressed  with  this  conviction  it  has  been  my  endeavour 
to  point  out  in  the  following  chapters  (in  however  imperfect 
and  fragmentary  a  manner)  what  I  deem  the  most  important 
lessons  to  be  derived  from  "  Nature,"  in  the  broad  sense  of 
that  word  as  a  great  whole  of  which  the  mind  of  man  forms 
part  For  us  indeed  the  facts  of  mind  form  the  inevitable 
starting-point  from  which  we  must  set  out  in  order  to  study, 


VHl  PEEFACE. 

logically,  the  phenomena  of  irrational  nature,  and  to  investi- 
gate, if  we  may,  their  cause  and  purpose.  There  is  no 
doubt,  in  thus  proceeding,  a  danger  of  Anthropomorphism — 
of  attributing  to  the  First  Cause  merely  human  charac- 
teristics, and  projecting  as  it  were  our  personality,  as  in  the 
Brocken  shadow,  far  beyond  its  proper  limits ;  but  the 
danger  of  Antanthropomorphism  is  at  present  much  greater 
— the  danger,  that  is,  of  allowing  the  facts  of  reason  to  be 
obscured  and  overshadowed  by  an  analogously  enlarged  dis- 
tortion of  the  world  of  sense,  which  ever  so  clamorously 
reiterates  its  claims  on  our  attention  and  regard. 

The  following  chapters  are  mainly  reprints  from  articles 
which  have  from  time  to  time  appeared  in  the  '  Quarterly,' 
'Dublin,'  'Contemporary,'  and  'Fortnightly'  Reviews  be- 
tween June  1871  and  November  1875.  These  various 
articles,  however,  were  originally  written  with  the  intention 
that  they  should  be  augmented,  re-arranged  and  repub- 
lished  in  an  assemblage  of  consecutive  chapters  as  they 
now  appear. 


ANALYTICAL  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE   STARTING-POINT. 

"  Our  own  continued  existence  is  a  primary  truth  known  to  us  with  supreme 
certainty,  and  this  certainty  cannot  be  denied  without  involving  the  destruction 
of  all  knowledge  whatever." 

Reasons  why  the  contemplation  of  nature  has  become  a  passion — Specula- 
tive activity  of  our  age — Our  need  of  a  starting-point  which  cannot 
be  gainsaid — The  study  of  miud  an  experimental  science — The  two 
dangers  of  popular  discussions — Authority  has  no  place  in  philosophy 
— Doubt  only  to  be  cured  by  investigation — Bewildering  effect  of  the 
present  conflict  of  opinion — Expediency  of  stimulating  a  thorough  in- 
quiry— The  Agnostic  philosophy — Every  philosophy  of  nescience  stulti- 
fies itself— Yet  is  to  be  directly  encountered — On  condition  of  admitting 
three  preliminary  propositions — The  first  proposition — The  second  pro- 
position— The  third  proposition — The  teaching  of  a  leading  Agnostic  as 
to  our  knowledge  of  our  own  existence — His  analysis  incomplete — His 
system  can  be  destroyed  by  his  own  weapons — As  considered  in  its 
parts — And  considered  as  a  whole — Self-existence  known  primarily — 
Self-existence  implied  in  "  certainty  "  itself — The  refutation  of  nescience 
not  to  be  evaded  on  the  ground  of  the  inadequacy  of  language — A  further 
consequence — What  the  word  "  thought "  implies — What  truth  is — 
"  Necessary  "  truth — The  Agnostics'  assertion,  if  valid,  implies  many 
truths  they  deny — Logical  consequences — What  is  implied  in  asserting 
the  trustworthiness  of  memory — A  curious  fallacy — Mr.  Spencer's  view 
as  to  our  knowledge  of  our  own  existence — He  asserts  a  truism  or  an 
absurdity — An  illustration — An  argumentum  ad  hominem — What  he 
asserts  implies  the  existence  of  what  he  denies — Conclusion  arrived  at — 
The  first  lesson  from  nature  ......  pp.  1 — 28 


X  ANALYTICAL  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  II. 

FIRST  TRUTHS. 

"  Knowledge  must  be  based  on  the  study  of  mental  facts,  and  on  undemon- 
strable  truths  which  declare  their  own  absolute  certainty,  and  are  seen  by  the 
mind  to  be  positively  and  necessarily  true." 

Self-knowledge  shows  we  can  have  absolute  certainty  without  proof — 
Reasons  why  we  should  begin  with  a  study  of  mind  before  studying 
external  nature — And  endeavour  to  harmonize  our  thoughts  and  feelings 
— Some  differences  between  these — Thought,  not  feeling,  the  test  ol 
truth — Balmes  and  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  as  to  the  necessity  of  starting 
with  undemonstrable  truths — Mr.  Spencer's  test  of  ultimate  truths, 
false  because  merely  negative — Two  distinct  classes  of  unimaginable 
propositions — A  fallacy  of  Professor  Helmholtz — Mr.  Spencer's  example 
of  absolute  inconceivability — Our  perception  of  necessary  truth  not 
limited  by  experience — Propositions  positively  seen  to  be  necessarily 
true — Summary  of  the  propositions  here  arrived  at — Mr.  Bain's  ulti- 
mate criterion  of  truth — The  principle  of  contradiction  denied  by  Mr. 
Spencer,  and  the  highest  faculties  of  the  human  mind  ignored — As  also 
by  Mr.  Lewes — The  validity  of  our  reasoning  faculty — Mr.  Lewes  con- 
founds reasoning  with  sensible  association — Summary  and  conclusion. 

pp.  29—54 


CHAPTER  HI. 

THE  EXTERNAL  WORLD. 

"  The  real  existence  of  an  external  world  made  up  of  objects  possessing 
qualities  such  as  our  faculties  declare  to  us  they  do  possess,  cannot  be  logically 
denied  and  may  rationally  be  affirmed." 

A  justification  of  our  belief  in  the  external  world  here  logically  required 
— Prevalent  scepticism  on  this  subject  amongst  modern  philosophers, 
and  its  cause — Mr.  John  Stuart  Mill — Mr.  Spencer's  Transfigured  Eealism 
— His  justification  of  it — Outcome  of  it — His  reply  to  criticism — Its 
insufficiency — His  proof-case  as  to  sound — The  truth  of  his  affirmations 
denied — Mr.  Spencer's  reply  to  the  charge  of  fundamental  incoherence 
— Rejoinder  to  such  reply — Need  of  a  more  detailed  sifrvey  of  his 
positions — His  observations  on  the  relativity  of  our  feelings — The 
impossibility  of  logically  denying  the  objective  validity  of  our  perceptions 
as  to  even  the  secondary  qualities  of  objects — Mr.  Spencer  on  the  rela- 
tivity of  our  relations  between  feelings — On  the  effects  of  structure, 


ANALYTICAL  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS.  xi 

age,  and  state  on  relations  of  sequence — On  the  relation  between  our 
perception  of  sequence,  co-existence  and  difference,  and  their  sensible 
accompaniments — Mr.  Spencer's  view  as  to  nervous  relations — As  to 
the  reality  of  an  ontological  order  and  nexus — Mr.  Spencer's  confusion 
of  the  intellect  with  the  sensible  occasions  of  its  activity — Mr.  Lewes's 
position^Agrees  with  Mr.  Spencer  fundamentally — Recapitulation — 
Conclusion,  that  we  may  securely  repose  on  the  declarations  of  our 
senses  as  to  the  existence  and  properties  of  external  objects  pp.  55 — 81 


CHAPTER  IV. 

LANGUAGE. 

"  Rational    language  is  a  bond  of  connexion  between  the  mental  and  materia. 
worlds  which  is  absolutely  peculiar  to  man." 

language  the  bond  between  mind  and  matter — Language  emotional  and 
rational — Rational  language  mental  and  bodily — Different  categories 
of  language — External  expression  a  necessary  accompaniment  of  rational 
animality — Prevalent  confusion  on  the  subject — Deaf  mutes — Mr.  Tylor 
on  savages — Sir  John  Lubbock — Conclusion  .  .  pp.  82 — 94 


CHAPTER  V. 

DUTY   AND   PLEASURE. 

"  Perceptions  of  right  and  wrong,  and  of  our  power  of  choice,  and  consequent 
responsibility,  are  universally  diffused  amongst  mankind,  and  constitute  an  absolute 
character  separating  man  from  all  other  animals." 

The  existence  of  moral  conceptions  a  fact  of  nature — Are  such  conceptions 
universal  amongst  mankind  ? — A  definition  of  morality — The  distinctness 
of  the  conception  generally  admitted — Needful  cautions — Examples  of 
morality  in  savages — Mr.  Tylor  and  Sir  John  Lubbock — Do  moral 
judgments  contradict  one  another? — The  popular  modern  school  im- 
plicitly denies  morality — Mr.  John  Stuart  Mill's  self-contradiction  in 
this  matter — The  origin  of  the  conception  "  right " — Materially  and 
formally  moral  acts — Mr.  Darwin's  view — That  moral  perceptions  are 
simply  the  more  enduring  instincts — Mr.  Darwin's  instances — Mr. 
Huxley's  reply  to  Mr.  Darwin's  critics — Free-will — Mr.  Herbert  Spencer's 
views— Conclusion  .......  pp.  95 — 127 


ANALYTICAL  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 


CHAPTER  VI. 

MAN. 

"  The  study  of  religious  beliefs,  of  progress,  or  degradation,  and  of  the  community 
of  nature  found  in  the  most  diverse  races  of  men,  show  (together  with  language  and 
moral  perception)  that  man  difiers  fundamentally  from  brutes,  while  the  anatomical 
resemblances  to  animals  which  his  frame  exhibits  in  no  way  invalidate  the 
argument  drawn  from  the  study  of  mind,  that  his  origin  (like  his  nature)  is 
peculiar  and  distinct." 

Other  human  characteristics  to  be  studied  besides  language  and  moral  per- 
ception— Special  call  now  for  this  study — Two  conflicting  hypotheses — 
Test  questions  for  these — Three  new  subjects  of  inquiry  — Preliminary 
note — First  new  subject,  religion — Prejudices — Mistakes — Savage  faiths 
— Australians — Are  the  rudest  religious  ideas  fundamentally  like  higher 
ones  ? — Sacrifice — Second  new  subject,  progress — Mr.  Mott's  remarks — 
Mr.  Herbert  Spencer's — Mr.  Darwin's — Degradation  certain — Adam — 
His  descendants — Rude  people  may  be  moral — Third  new  subject,  com- 
munity of  nature — Conclusions — Man's  body — His  embryonic  develop- 
ment— Superficiality  of  Mr.  Darwin's  remarks  on  these  subjects — 
Necessary  physical  conditions  of  animal  rationality,  as  to  structure — 
Man's  resemblance  to  apes — As  to  development — Bearing  of  these  matters 
on  man's  origin — Mistakes  as  to  reversion — Othermistakes — Mr.  Darwin's 
remarks  as  to  insects — Man  forms  a  kingdom  by  himself — Unity  of  human 
races — What  shall  be  the  verdict  as  to  man's  origin  ? — Mr.  Wallace's  views 
— Free-will — Conclusion  .....  pp.  128 — 101 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE   BRUTE. 

"The  highest  psychical  powers  of  animals  resemble  the  lower  psychical  faculties 
of  man.  The  brute  is  devoid  of  reason,  and  instinct  is  a  peculiar  function  of  the 
material  organism,  automatic  and  blind." 

Necessity  of  some  recapitulation — Instinct,  mode  of  studying  it — The  mode 
in  use  generally  defective — Reason  for  this — Results  of  introspection — 
Organic  and  intellectual  memory — List  of  the  mind's  higher  powers — 
Which  are  common  to  all  mankind — Danger  of  a  special  fallacy — Instinct 
cannot  perform  rational  acts — But  can  do  what  reason  cannot  do — Mr. 
Herbert  Spencer's  admissions — Mr.  Darwin's  anecdotes — As  to  brute  ra- 
tionality— Parity  of  psychical  nature  between  very  different  animals — 
Professor  Huxley  on  animal  rationality — Mr.  Lewes's  admissions — John 
Miiller — Man's  lower  psychical  faculties — List  of  them — Their  relation 
to  the  psychical  faculties  of  brutes — The  development  of  the  individual 


ANALYTICAL  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS.  xiii 

— Human  automatism — Curious  views  as  to  the  nature  of  instinct — 
What  is  instinct? — What  it  is — Unity  of  each  organism — Definition  of 
instinct — Energy  of  matter — A  new  energy  in  man — Grounds  of  this 
decision — Stupidity  of  animals — Conclusion  .  .  pp.  192 — 243 


CHAPTER  VIII. 

LIKENESSES   IX   ANIMALS   AND   PLANTS. 

"  The  facts  of  mimicry  and  of  the  various  kinds  of  homology  as  exhibited  in 
comparative  anatomy,  teratology  and  pathology,  reveal  an  internal  force  and 
dynamic  agency,  the  soul,  in  each  animal,  which  forms  one  indissoluble  unity  with 
its  material  frame." 

Two  kinds  of  likeness  to  be  considered — Mimicry — Not  to  be  explained  by 
accidental  variations — This  shown  by  plants — Second  order  of  likenesses 
— The  number  of  these  perceived  varies  with  the  direction  of  our  attention 
— Natural  classification — Of  parts  and  organs — Philosophical  anatomists 
— The  vertebral  theory  of  the  skull — Analogous  and  homologous  parts — 
Likenesses  not  due  to  inheritance — Mr.  Spencer's  explanations — Indepen- 
dent similarities — Homoplasts  and  homoplasy — Catalogue  of  homologies 
— Not  due  to  the  survival  of  the  fittest — Evidences  from  comparative 
anatomy — From  teratology — From  pathology — Teleology — A  resurrec- 
tion— Development — Are  there  cranial  vertebra)  ? — Amphioxus — The 
answer — A  deeper  question— Homology  reveals  internal  forces — Or 
"  soul "  in  each  animal — Mr.  Lewes — Conclusion  .  pp.  244 — 279 


CHAPTER  IX. 

NATUUAL   SELECTION. 

•'  The  hypothesis  of  natural  selection  originally  put  forward  as  the  origin  of 
species,  has  been  really  abandoned  by  Mr.  Darwin  himselfj  and  is  untenable.  It 
is  a  misleading  positive  term  denoting  negative  effects,  and,  as  made  use  of  by  those 
who  would  attribute  to  it  the  origin  of  Mail,  is  an  irrational  conception." 

Futility  of  attempts  to  ignore  internal  forces — Origin  of  species,  the  author's 
view — Mr.  Darwin's  original  view — His  laterviews — And  admitted  errors 
— Consequent  need  of  careful  criticism — Professor  Huxley's  defence — 
Points  contended  for  by  the  author — Differ  from  Mr.  Darwin's  view — 
What  is  and  is  not  implied  in  man's  animality — Mr.  Wallace's  claims 
to  originality — Mr.  Francis  Gallon's  view — Mr.  Darwin's  style — He  begs 
the  question  he  argues — Conclusion  as  to  "  natural  selection." 

pp.  280—301 


XIV  ANALYTICAL  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

CHAPTER  X. 

SEXUAL    SELECTION. 

"Sexual  selection  is  an  hypothesis  which  neither  has  been  nor  can  be  proved 
true,  but  the  falsehood  of  which  is  demonstrated  by  a  mass  of  zoological  data." 

Sexual  selection,  an  accessory  hypothesis — Has  been  made  to  include  two 
distinct  things — Marked  characters  certainly  arise  independently  of  it 
— Insects — Fishes  and  reptiles — Beasts — Birds — Voice — Mr.  Wallace 
opposes  Mr.  Darwin — His  hypothesis  as  to  colour — Mr.  Darwin  opposes 
Mr.  Wallace's  hypothesis — Need  of  an  internal  force — Its  sufficiency — 
Mr.  Darwin  influenced  by  a  priori  views — An  illustration — Uncertain- 
ties of  the  hypothesis — Sexual  selection  and  man — Mr.  Darwin's  style 
— Ancillary  hypotheses  needed — Conclusion  as  to  sexual  selection. 

pp.  302—331 

CHAPTER  XI. 

AN   EPISODE. 

"  Mr.  Chauncey  Wright's  criticism  of  the  author's  views  having  been  repub- 
lished  and  widely  circulated  by  Mr.  Darwin,  the  reply  to  that  criticism  is  here 
reproduced." 

A  digression  induced  by  special  circumstances — May  be  passed  over  without 
detriment  to  the  general  argument — Mr.  Chauncey  Wright's  criticism — 
Mainly  addressed  to  two  points — The  first  of  these — Sudden  adaptive 
modifications — Improper  interpretations — Mr.  Wright's  second  point — 
Design  and  accident— Innate  force — The  inductive  philosophy — Mr. 
Wright  on  intellectual  genius — The  giraffe's  neck — An  advantage  pos- 
sessed by  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  which  does  not  properly  belong  to  it — 
Critical  details — An  objection  singular  in  a  mathematician — An  illustra- 
tion in  the  growth  of  a  tree — Vital  forces — Verbal  criticisms — Conclusion. 

pp.  332—355 

CHAPTER  XII. 

CAUSES. 

"  Truths  vouched  for  by  the  intellect  as  positively  necessary  truths,  compel  our 
acceptance  of  a  First  Cause  with  power,  knowledge,  wisdom  and  goodness,  and 
therefore  prove  the  existence  of  final  causes  also — the  existence  of  a  personal 
God  being  the  ultimate  lesson  taught  by  Nature,  that  as  to  its  own  cause." 

The  axiom  of  causation — Science  points  to  no  beginning — But  either  to  a 
Pantheistic  first  cause — Or  one  distinct  from  the  universe — Together  with 
final  causation — Thus  supplying  a  key  to  evolution — Mr.  Spencer's 
evolutionary  formula — "  Purpose  "  as  shown  in  Nature — Formal  law  of 


ANALYTICAL  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS.  xv 

evolution — Non-theistic  views — Mr.  Spencer's — Professor  Huxley's — The 
unknowable — Five  objections  to  theism — First  objection,  prodigality  of 
Nature — An  old  answer — Second  objection — Third  objection,  pain  and 
death — Sufferings  of  brutes — Apparently  unworthy  phenomena — Fourth 
objection,  evolution  negatives  creation — Fifth  objection,  anthropomor- 
phism— Conclusion  .  .  .  .  .  pp.  356 — 376 

CHAPTER  XIII. 

CONSEQUENCES. 

"The  consequences  which  flow  from  the  acceptance  or  rejection  of  the  teach- 
ing here  advocated  are  and  must  be  most  momentous  both  to  individuals  and 
the  community.  Those  who  reject  it  are  logically  driven  into  extreme  and 
irrational  negation.  Its  bearing  upon  conduct  is  direct,  and  must  necessarily 
powerfully  affect  the  future  through  popular  education.  Such  consequences  may 
rationally  serve  to  reinforce  conclusions  before  arrived  at  on  other  grounds." 

Various  consequences,  speculative  and  practical — Consequences  of  contro- 
versies before  noticed — As  to  the  Ego — As  to  the  will — As  to  God — The 
immortality  of  the  soul — Two  phraseologies — Peculiar  nature  of  man's 
soul — Consequences  of  rejecting  Theism — Professor  Tyndall's  teaching — 
Mr.  Spencer's  teaching — Professor  Huxley's  teaching— Other  declarations 
— General  result — Intolerance  of  modern  infidels — Atheism  inconsistent 
with  toleration — Practical  consequences — Is  truth  necessarily  desirable  ? 
— Some  propositions  with  ethical  applications — Purity  of  intention — 
Sexual  relations — Conduct  in  public  men  less  influential  than  teaching 
—  An  objection  to  legal  restrictions  on  marriage  —  Consequences  as 
regards  popular  education — The  Rev.  William  Mackintosh — A  positive 
compromise — Need  of  a  belief  in  future  rewards  and  punishments — Two 
ambiguities — Education  should  stimulate  the  highest  powers — Motives 
which  move  men  to  act — M.  Le  Play — Responsibility  of  public  teachers 
— Characters  of  the  Agnostic  philosophy — Dislike  of  religion  sometimes 
induces  the  acceptance  of  that  philosophy — Conclusion,  pp.  377 — 421 

CHAPTEE  XIV. 

A  POSTSCRIPT. 

"  This  postscript  is  called  for  by  an  unamended  republication  by  Professor 
Huxley  of  his  criticism  on  the  '  Genesis  of  Species,'  of  which  he  in  part  misappre- 
hends, in  part  misrepresents  the  arguments.  A  Theist  should  anticipate  a 
revelation.  The  Christian  revelation  asserts  creation,  but  at  the  same  time  lays 
down  principles  which  so  harmonize  with  Evolution  that  no  contradiction  cac 
arise  in  this  respect  between  its  doctrines  and  physical  science.  This  harmony 
must  be  preordained." 

This  postscript  specially  called  for — Reason  expects  revelation — Modern 
philosophy  has  diverged  from  this  attitude — Mr.  Spencer  and  evolution 
— Evolution  welcomed  by  Antichristians — Rational  attitude  of  a  Theist 


XVI  ANALYTICAL  TABLE  OF  CONTENTS. 

towards  religious  systems — Christianity  asserts  creation — The  Genesis 
of  Species — And  Professor  Huxley — A  misapprehension — His  astonish- 
ment— Another  misapprehension — An  explanation — Suarez — The  fact 
of  creation — Another  misapprehension — Want  of  acquaintance  with 
theology — Authorities — An  utter  mistake — Solvitur  ambulando — Chris- 
tianity and  reason — Mode  of  controversy — Restatement  of  issue— A 
retrospect  and  conclusion  ;  .  pp.  422 — 449 


INDEX p.  451 


LESSONS  FROM  NATURE. 


CHAPTER  I. 

THE   STARTING-POINT. 

"  Our  own  continued  existence  is  a  primary  truth  naturally  mado 
known  to  us  with  supreme  certainty,  and  this  certainty  cannot  be 
denied  without  involving  the  destruction  of  all  knowledge  whatever." 

THE  philosophic  contemplation  of  nature  may  be  said  to 
be  a  passion  of  the  age  in  which  we  live.  Nor  is  R^ng  why 
the  reason  why,  far  to  seek.  Every  physical  science,  p^onT" 
when  once-  its  study  is  fairly  begun,  never  fails  berome^18 
to  excite  much  interest,  and  in  our  day  a  certain  ^aasion- 
knowledge  of  physical  science  has  become  widely  diffused. 
Most  popular  sciences,  zoology,  botany,  and  geology,  &c., 
can  be  followed  with  ease  by  all  commonly  gifted  minds,  and 
the  beauty,  variety,  and  inexhaustible  multitude  of  the  facts 
and  relations  they  disclose  are  such  as  may  well  make  that 
interest  become  intense  and  absorbing.  But  when  it  is  re- 
collected that  to  the  attraction  these  sciences  possess  in  them- 
selves there  is  now  added  the  interest  called  forth  by  the 
generally  diffused  belief  (whether  rightly  or  wrongly  enter- 
tained) that  by  these  much  light  may  be  thrown  upon  the 
deepest  problems  and  the  most  important  questions  which 
can  occupy  men's  minds,  it  becomes  easy  to  understand 
why  a  very  large  part  of  our  popular  lectures  and  of  our 
periodical  literature  should  be  devoted  to  subjects  of  natural 
history,  so  treated  as  to  bear,  directly  or  by  implication, 


LfcSSONS  FKOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  I. 

upon  questions  of  origin  and  agency  and  purpose ;  devoted, 
in  short,  to  physical  philosophy.  The  problem  of  the  true 
relation  subsisting  between  irrational  and  rational  nature  is 
the  problem  of  the  clay.  An  endeavour  then  will  here  be  made 
to  elucidate  what  are  the  lessons  taught  us  by  a  combined 
study  of  nature  in  its  two  aspects,  rational  and  irrational. 

It  is  probable  that  the  last  quarter  of  a  century  has,  in 
speculative  England,  seen  a  more  quickly  growing  and  more 

activity  of  °  '  ~L  J    I 

our  age.  wide-spread  crop  of  speculative  questioning  than 
any  former  period  of  like  duration.  More  than  this,  it  is 
doubtful  whether  any  period  of  the  world's  past  history  has 
witnessed  a  more  general  uncertainty,  not  only  respecting  the 
solution  of  particular  problems,  but  as  to  the  possibility  of 
satisfactorily  and  certainly  answering  any  one  of  them. 

Thus  it  has  come  about  that  from  increased  speculative 
activity,  and  the  inability  of  physical  science  to  satisfy  the 
questions  raised,  men  devoted  to  physical  science  have  been 
forced  into  philosophy.  "  Metaphysics,"  which  had  become 
(especially  in  this  country)  a  byword  of  reproach,  are  again 
avowedly  pursued.  A  reaction  has  set  in,  and  the  importance 
of  philosophy,  indeed  its  absolute  necessity  as -a  basis  for 
science,  is  made  manifest  by  the  most  popular  teachers  of 
physical  knowledge.  On  the  Continent,  Buchner,  Vogt, 
Hartmann,  and  Strauss  have  powerfully  aided  in  directing 
popular  attention  to  philosophical  problems.  In  England,  in 
spite  of  the  oft-repeated  assertions  of  the  unprogressiveness 
of  metaphysics,  and  the  comparisons  drawn  between  the 
efforts  of  metaphysicians  and  those  of  Sisyphus,  our  book- 
shelves teem  with  evidence  that  devotion  to  philosophy  is  on 
the  increase  amongst  us,  and  physicists  such  as  Carpenter, 
Bence  Jones,  Bastian,  Huxley,  Tyndall,  Darwin,  Wallace, 
with  many  more,  have  all,  in  various  degrees,  wandered 
beyond  the  domain  which  is  specially  their  own  into  the 
metaphysical  region.  Even  that  annual  national  congress, 
which  was  instituted  expressly  for  the  promotion  of  physical 
science,  had  its  session  of  1872  inaugurated  by  an  address  on 
"  the  mental  processes  by  which  are  formed  those  fundamental 


CHAP.  I.]  THE  STARTING-POINT.  3 

conceptions  of  matter  and  force,  of  cause  and  effect,  of  law 
and  order,  which  form  the  basis  of  all  reasoning ; "  while,  at 
Belfast,  in  1874  it  was  opened  by  what  may  be  fitly  termed 
a  sermon  advocating  the  deliberate  substitution  of  a  religion 
of  emotion  for  one  of  reason.  Professor  Huxley,  some  years 
ago,*  bore  witness  to  the  needfulness  of  attending  "  to  those 
philosophical  questions  which  underlie  all  physical  science ; " 
and  he  has  again  and  again  availed  himself  of  his  well-earned 
popularity  to  press  upon  his  hearers  metaphysical  considera- 
tions, and  to  endeavour  to  make  plain  to  them  that  the 
questions  of  really  supreme  importance  are  such  as  are 
philosophical. 

In  entering  upon  an  inquiry  which  professes,  as  does 
this,  to  take    nothing  for  granted  unnecessarily  our  need  of  a 

.  ...  /.   i      i  Btarting- 

or  without  criticism,  we  must  be  careful  that  our  point  which 

.  /.  i  cannot  be 

starting-point,  in  our  investigation  of  nature,  shall  gainsaid. 
be  thoroughly  satisfactory — containing  truth  which  is  ab- 
solutely unquestionable.  Such  a  starting-point  is  supplied 
us  by  our  passing  mental  states — the  facts  of  consciousness 
itself.  It  is  conceivable  that  the  whole  external  world,  and 
all  existences  external  to  ourselves,  might  be  delusions,  but 
everybody  can  see  that  while  we  actually  have  a  feeling 
we  must  have  it,  and  that  no  supernatural  being  could  cause 
us  to  be  thinking  that  which  we  at  the  same  time  do  not 
think,  or  not  to  think  anything  while  we  are  actually  con- 
tinuing to  think  it.  Here,  then,  in  consciousness  itself  we 
have  a  perfectly  satisfactory  starting-point,  a  firm  rock 
which  may  serve  as  the  corner-stone  of  a  future  edifice. 
Such  an  edifice  we  may  find  it  possible  to  raise  by  inquiring" 
into  the  activity  of  our  own  mind,  by  finding  what  it  declares 
to  be  ultimate  and  certain  truths  (if  it  declares  any  to  be  such), 
by  criticising  the  tests  given  as  to  such  truths  being  certain 
and  ultimate,  and  by  examining  the  grounds  on  which  we  are, 
if  at  all,  to  accept  such  declarations  as  true,  having,  at  the 
same  time,  seen  what  truth  itself  really  is. 


'Contemporary  Review,'  November  1871,  pp.  443,  444. 


4  LESSONS  FBOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  I. 

Tin's  task  may  appear  a  difficult  and  tedious  one,  but  after 
The  study  of  all  it  is  one  which  comes  strictly  within  the  field  of 
£erimentaT  the  experimental  sciences,  and  is  actually  the  most 
certain  science  of  them  all.  Its  inductions  repose 
upon  the  most  direct  of  observations,  and  its  deductions  are 
tested  by  experiments  of  the  most  decisive  kind.  Whether 
"  metaphysics"  be  or  be  not  a  cloud-land,  this  particular 
inquiry  is  at  least  to  be  made  on  firm  ground,  under  a  clear 
sky,  and  in  bright  sunlight.  Before,  however,  entering  upon 
the  first  inquiry,  a  preliminary  caution  may.  not  be  out  of 
place.  A  widely  extended  discussion  of  philosophical  ques- 
Thetwodan-  tions  such  as  that  which  now  obtains  is  manifestly 
Ki'scuT1"  open  to  two  dangers,  the  one,  a  "  hasty  dogmatism," 
the  other,  an  "  irrational  scepticism."  It  is  common 
enough  to  find  writers  (such,  e.g.,  as  Professor  Clifford)  speak- 
ing in  so  dogmatic  a  tone  that  the  unwary  are  in  danger  of 
mistaking  confident  assertion  for  proof,  while  the  many,  ever 
prone  jurare  in  verba  magistri,  are  but  too  apt  to  adopt  them- 
selves the  dogmatic  style  merely  on  the  authority  of  their 
chosen  masters.  For  such,  a  judicious  scepticism  is  the 
necessary  remedy. 

More  common,  however,  is  the  danger  of  "  irrational 
scepticism."  And  here  a  word  of  explanation  may  be  ad- 
dressed to  those  who  may  be  offended  by  this  phrase,  fancy- 
ing (in  spite  of  the  concluding  phrase  of  the  last  paragraph) 
that  I  may  deem  "scepticism"  to  be  generally  "irrational." 
But  it  is  manifest  that  in  philosophy,  reason,  and  reason  only, 
Authority  *8  an^  mus*  be  the  supreme  and  ultimate  arbiter. 
'uTphi^06  For  all  those  who  are  convinced  that  truth  is 
phy>  necessarily  good,  it  is  even  wrong  to  accept  any- 

thing whatever  as  true  which  has  not  been  made  evident  to 
the  intellect.  For  such,  no  authority,  however  venerable,  no 
consequences,  however  calamitous,  as  long  as  they  do  not  in- 
volve a  contradiction,  can  or  ought  to  stand  in  the 

Doubt  only  to  .      .  .     £ 

ba  cured  by    Way  of  pitiless  logic  in  following  out  to  their  final 

investiga-  •  * 

tion.  results  the, processes  of  reason.     As  a  consequence, 

when  any  man  has  become  a  victim  to  doubt,  he  has  no 


CHAP.  I.J  THE  STARTING-POINT.  5 

rational  choice,  as  lie  has  no  duty,  but  to  reason  out  his 
doubts  to  the  end:  to  seek  to  escape  them  by  diverting 
his  attention,  or  to  obscure  them  by  calling  up  a  cloud 
of  emotion,  is  not  only  useless  but  blameworthy.  As  it  is 
for  an  individual  so  is  it  for  a  people.  And  if,  as  in  England 
in  the  present  day,  we  see  a  generation  restlessly  seeking  on 
all  sides,  in  a  night  of  doubt,  for  the  first  glimmerings  of  a 
coining  dawn,  surely  hearty  sympathy  and  ready  aid  are 
called  for  in  favour  of  men  who  show  by  such  restlessness  and 
questioning  how  they  are  seeking  to  gain  a  knowledge  of 
truth  which  was  at  least  never  lost  through  any  act  or  deed 
of  theirs. 

Now  at  the  present  time  Englishmen  are  again  and  again 
called  upon  to  treat  as  open  questions  the  very  first  Bewildering 

•       •    i          *     ll  •          f       J  ±    1  A      Al-  effect  of  the 

principles  ot  all  reasoning,  fundamental  truths  upon  present  con- 
which  the  whole  fabric  of  science  reposes.  And  as  opinion, 
but  a  small  minority  of  the  lecture-hearing,  magazine-reading 
public  can  be  supposed  to  have  seriously  taken  up  the  study 
of  philosophy,  it  follows  that  a  certain  number  will  fail  to 
distinguish  accurately  between  a  healthy  and  an  unhealthy 
scepticism.  Not  being  accustomed  to  sound  the  depths  of 
their  own  minds,  and  puzzled  by  the  paradoxes  of  the  sophists 
who  now  and  again  address  them,  some  lose  their  hold  upon 
all  certainty  and  fall  into  a  state  of  general  doubt  which  is 
so  undefined  that  it  does  not  formulate  itself  in  distinct  pro- 
positions. Hence  we  too  often  encounter  a  vague  and  hazy 
scepticism,  producing  a  languid  and  otiose  state  of  mind  which 
is,  indeed,  a  symptom  of  incipient  intellectual  paralysia 

But  since  our  object  is  to  seek  for  certain  positive  truth,- 
and  to  build  up  logically  on  such  certain  basis,  it  is  Expediency 
needful  to  rouse  attention,  as  far  as  may  be,  to  this  ingatho- 
enfeebling  disease — a  mental  falling-sickness.     In  quiry. 
the  presence  of  this  evil  it  is  surely  well  to  try  and  drive 
such  loiterers  along  the  philosophic  road,  and  to  force  on 
them  an  earnest  and   resolute   questioning  of  themselves, 
so   that  they  may  know  clearly  that  they  do  know  what 
they  know,  and  that  they  may  not  be  persuaded  unawares 


0  LESSONS  FKOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  I. 

out  of  their  rational  birthright.  It  is,  of  course,  important 
that  men  should  not  be  permitted  to  build  upon  a  fancied 
knowledge  which  lias  not  enough  solidity  to  sustain  the 
philosophical  edifice;  but  it  is  certainly  no  less  important 
that  men  should  not  be  led  to  follow  unsuspectingly  an  ignis 
fatuus  till  it  plunges  them  into  a  quagmire  of  "  universal 
doubt."  To  exaggerate  our  powers  is  dangerous,  but  to  be 
possessed  by  a  feeling  of  our  utter  impotence  is  fatal. 

Now  there  is  a  school  of  philosophy  (by  courtesy  so  called) 
The  Agnostic  of  considerable  popularity,  which  is  called  by  its 
philosophy.  Opp0nents  the  "  philosophy  of  nescience  " — a  name, 
however,  which  its  supporters  would  hardly  disclaim.  They 
would  hardly  disclaim  it  because  some  of  them  willingly 
style  themselves  "  Agnostics,"  or  "  know-nothings ;"  meaning 
thereby  that  they  know  and  can  know  nothing  but  appear- 
ances, and  that  nothing  whatever  can  be  really  and  absolutely 
known.  Yet,  very  irrationally  these  know-nothings  or 
Agnostics  at  the  same  time  very  confidently  affirm  that 
they,  by  their  ignorance,  absolutely  and  infallibly  know  that 
the  healthy  common  sense  of  mankind  has  gone  all  wrong, 
and,  what  is  more  extraordinary  still,  that  the  greatest 
philosophers  have  perversely  joined  in  accepting  the  common- 
sense  delusions  of  the  vulgar,  and  gone  wrong  too.  Such 
.  philosophers  have,  indeed,  agreed  with  the  rest  of  mankind 
in  affirming  the  certainty  of  their  own  continued  existence 
and  that  of  their  fellow-men,  together  with  an  external  world, 
the  shape,  number,  and  extent  of  the  parts  of  which  they 
declare  they  can  really  and  absolutely  know,  in  so  far  as  such 
parts  can  be  brought  under  the  observation  of  their  senses. 

The  Agnostics  form  a  section  of  that  school  (including 
Hamilton,  Mansel,  Mill,  Lewes,  Spencer,  Huxley,  and  Bain) 
which  asserts  the  relativity — i.e.,  the  merely  phenomenal 
character — of  all  our  knowledge. 

But  every  philosophy,  every  system  of  knoivledge,  must  start 
Every  phiio-  with  the  assumption  (implied  or  expressed)  that 
n^dence  something  is  really  "  knowable  " — that  something  is 
betf. '  °  "  absolutely  true ;"  and  by  this  Agnostic  school  it  is 


CHAP.  1.1  THE  STAETING-POINT.  7 

evidently  taught  that  the  doctrine  of  the  "  relativity  of  all 
our  knowledge  "  is  a  doctrine  which  is  really  and  absolutely 
true.  But  if  nothing  that  we  can  know  corresponds  with 
reality,  if  nothing  we  can  assert  has  a  more  than  relative  or 
phenomenal  value,  this  character  must  also  appertain  to  the 
doctrine  of  the  relativity  of  all  our  knowledge.  Either  this 
system  of  philosophy  itself  is  relative  and  phenomenal  only, 
or  it  is  absolutely  and  objectively  true.  But  it  must  be 
merely  phenomenal  if  everything  known  is  merely  pheno- 
menal. Its  value,  then,  can  be  only  relative  and  pheno- 
menal ;  that  is,  it  has  no  absolute  value,  does  not  correspond 
with  objective  reality,  and  is  therefore  false.  But  if  it  is 
false  that  our  knowledge  is  only  relative,  then  some  of  our 
knowledge  must  be  absolute ;  but  this  negatives  the  funda- 
mental position  of  the  whole  philosophy.  Any  philosophy, 
then,  which  starts  with  the  assertion  that  all  our  knowledge 
is  merely  phenomenal  refutes  itself,  and  is  necessarily 
suicidal.  Every  assertor  of  such  a  philosophy  must  be  in 
the  position  of  a  man  who  saws  across  the  branch  of  a  tree, 
on  which  he  actually  sits,  at  a  point  between  himself  and  the 
trunk.  If  he  would  save  himself  he  must  refrain  from 
destroying  that  which  alone  sustains  him  in  his  elevated 
position. 

Waiving,  however,  this  objection,  it  is  proposed  to  examine 

here  some  of  the  assertions  of  the  know-nothing  Yet  is  to  be 
iM        i          -i  •         /»         •         i          TT        r>  direc'iyen- 

philosophy,  with  a  view  of  testing  the  validity  of  countered. 

its  fundamental  assertions  and  seeing  how  far  some  of  its 
so-called  "  explanations  "  are  really  explanatory  or  instructive. 
This  examination,  however,  is  not  undertaken  with  the 
barren  purpose  of  refuting  an  irrational  brain-puzzle,  but 
with  the  hope  and  intention  of  bringing  out  clearly  a  primary 
fact  of  consciousness  in  its  most  important  bearings,  and  so 
establishing  a  good  starting-point  for  our  whole  treatise — a 
foundation  revealed  to  us  by  the  study  of  nature  as  it  exists 
in  us,  in  our  own  mind. 

Before,  however,  consenting  to  enter  the  arena  with  the 
Agnostics,  it  will  be  well  to  notice  shortly  three  preliminary 


8  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  I. 

considerations  in  order  to  maintain  three  propositions,  assent 
on  condition  to  which  must  be  a  sine  qua  non  to  further  dis- 

of  admitting  .  IT 

three  pre-      cussion,  as  without  such  assent  discussion  would  be 

limmary  pro- 
positions.      an  aimless  and  futile  waste  of  time. 

The  first  of  these  considerations  relates  to  "  absolute  scepti- 
cism ;"  and  the  first  proposition  is  that  such  scepticism,  with 
every  position  which  necessarily  involves  it,  is  to  be  regarded 
as  an  absurdity.  The  second  consideration  relates  to  good 
faith  and  economy  of  time  in  controversy ;  and  the  second 
proposition  is  that  no  position  is  to  be  defended  which  cannot 
be  believed  to  be  really  and  seriously  maintained  by  some 
one.  The  third  consideration  refers  to  language;  and  the 
third  proposition  is  that  what  is  distinctly  and  clearly  con- 
ceived by  the  mind  can  be  expressed  by  terms  practically 
adequate  to  convey  such  conceptions  to  other  minds. 

The  first  preliminary  consideration  to  be  insisted  on  may 
be  stated  thus : — 

I.  Absolute  scepticism,  with  every  position  that  necessarily 
involves  it,  is  to  le  rejected  as  an  absurdity. 

The  truth  contained  in  this  assertion  serves  to  clear  away 
The  first  pro-  a  hinderance  which  otherwise  might  at  first,  and 
position.  indeed  continually,  impede  our  progress.  This 
hinderance  consists  in  a  haziness  as  to  the  necessary  limits 
of  all  discussion,  hiding  the  point  at  which  all  controversy 
becomes  unmeaning — nay,  logically  impossible.  Before  dis- 
cussing any  fundamental  questions,  the  truth  that  discussion 
is,  as  a  fact,  possible  should  be  clearly  recognised,  as  also 
that  there  is  such  a  thing  as  truth,  and  that  some  conclusions 
are  true.  Without  this  recognition,  whatever  conclusions 
we  arrive  at  may  be  vitiated  by  a  latent  doubt  whether  any 
conclusion  on  any  subject  can  under  any  circumstances  be 
ever  valid.  If  nothing  is  certain,  if  there  is  no  real  dis- 
tinction between  truth  and  falsehood,  there  can,  of.  course,  be 
no  useful  discussion.  If  any  man  is  not  certain,  absolutely 
certain,  that  he  is  not  a  tree  or  the  rustle  of  its  leaves ;  if  he 
is  not  certain  that  there  are  such  things  as  thoughts  and 


CHAP.  I.]  THE  STAKTING-POINT.  9 

words,  and  that  the  same  word  can  be  employed  twice  with 
the  same  meaning,  as  also  that  he  is  the  same  person  when 
he  ends  a  sentence  as  he  was  when  he  began  it,  he  cannot 
carry  on  even  a  rational  monologue ;  and  if  he  really  doubts 
as  to  whether  an  opponent  has  substantially  the  same  powers 
of  understanding  and  expression  as  he  has  himself — no  con- 
troversy can  be  reasonably  undertaken.  If  our  life  may  be 
a  dream  within  a  dream,  if  we  may  not  be  supremely  sure 
that  a  thing  cannot  both  be  and  not  be — at  the  same  time  and 
in  the  same  sense — then  thinking  may  indeed  be  affirmed  to 
be  an  idle  waste  of  thought,  were  it  not  impossible  to  affirm 
that  anything  is  or  is  not  anything,  and  as  impossible  to 
affirm  such  impossibility.  Such  scepticism  is,  of  -course,  as 
practically  impossible  as  it  is  absurd.  Doubt  may  be 
expressed  as  to  the  validity  of  all  intellectual  acts,  but  any 
attempt  to  defend  the  sceptical  position  thereby  actually 
demonstrates  a  belief  in  such  validity  on  the  very  part  of 
him  who  would  verbally  deny  it.  Familiar  as  will  be  these 
reflections,  it  seems  nevertheless  desirable  to  dwell  upon 
them,  that  their  truth  may  be  clearly  brought  home.  For 
it  follows  (and  this  is  an  important  consequence)  that  if 
any  premisses  logically  and  necessarily  result  in  such  absolute 
scepticism  they  may  be  disproved  by  a  reductio  ad  absurdum. 
This  is  so  because  absolute  scepticism  cannot  be  even 
believed  (since  to  believe  it  would  be  ipso  facto  to  deny  it 
by  asserting  the  certainty  of  uncertainty),  and  is  absurd,  and 
no  reasoning  which  necessarily  leads  to  absurdity  can  be 
valid  in  the  eyes  of  those  who,  not  being  themselves  absolute 
sceptics,  are  certain  that  utter  absurdity  and  absolute  truth 
are  not  one  and  the  same. 

The  second  preliminary  assertion  is  as  follows : — 

IT.  Propositions  are  not  to  be  defended  which  cannot  be  even 
conceived  to  be  seriously  entertained  by  some  one. 

This  assertion   serves   to   discriminate   between  real  and 
verbal  doubt.     There  is,  of  course,  nothing  which  The  second 
cannot  1,.;  culled  in  question  verbally.     The  exist-  Pr°P°8iti"IU 


10  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  I. 

ence  of  "self"  has  been  declared  to  be  a  thing  which  may  be 
doubted  but  not  the  existence  of  "  thought."  It  is  just  as 
easy,  however,  to  sat/,  "  I  doubt  whether  thought  exists,"  as 
to  say,  "  I  doubt  whether  I  exist ;"  but  it  is  as  impossible 
for  any  one  to  believe  that  his  existence  is  doubtful  as  to 
believe  that  the  existence  of  thought  is  doubtful.  The  limits 
of  rational  discussion,  then,  we  must  insist,  are  facts  which 
cannot  be  really  doubted — are  truths  which  no  one  can  ac- 
tually ignore.  To  attempt  to  go  beyond  such  limits  is  to 
fall  into  mere  puerility  and  verbiage.  Merely  verbal  doubts 
are  as  trifling  as  endless.  We  have  a  right  to  demand  that 
we  should  only  be  challenged  by  doubts  which  are  really  and 
truly  entertained  by  those  who  propose  them,  or  are  regarded 
by  them  as  at  least  possibly  real — in  fact,  that  our  time 
should  not  be  taken  up  by  answering  the  ingenious  cavils  of 
merely  pretended  sceptics.  Can  we  believe  that  any  one  of 
our  opponents  has  any  real  and  serious  doubt  as  to  his  own 
true  and  objective  personal  existence  and  his  own  personal 
identity?  Each  may  certainly  be  credited  with  a  total 
absence  of  any  such  absurd  dubitation,  and  this  because  no  one 
out  of  Bedlam  doubts  really  as  to  his  own  being  and  personal 
identity,  however  much  he  may  amuse  himself  by  professing 
to  distrust  such  declarations  of  his  consciousness  and  memory. 
Will  any  such  opponent  seriously  affirm  that  he  is  not  certain 
that  he  was  not  last  year  the  Emperor  of  Eussia,  or  the  boiler 
of  the  Great  Eastern,  or  that  he  is  not  absolutely  sure  that 
he  has  not  actually  been  all  the  various  people  or  things 
which  have  from  time  to  time  presented  themselves  to  his 
imagination  ? 

And  here  perhaps  a  protest  may  be  permitted  against  a 
mode  of  representing  thought  which  is  eminently  misleading. 
Messrs.  Mill,  Bain,  and  Herbert  Spencer  agree  in  represent- 
ing that  men  are  only  conscious  of  a  succession  of  feelings. 
Now,  in  limine,  an  objection  may  be  made  to  the  term  "feeling" 
as  the  one  generic  name  for  all  states  of  consciousness.  It 
may  be  so  because  the  word  "  feeling  "  is  intimately  associated 
in  ordinary  language  with  sensation.  Thus  to  assert  or 


CHAP.  I.J  THE  STARTING-POINT.  1 1 

imply  that  all  onr  states  of  consciousness  are  feelings,  tends 
to  insinuate  a  belief  that  we  have  no  faculty  but  "  sensation." 
This  is  not  the  precise  meaning  of  the  above-mentioned 
writers,  but  it  is  a  meaning  likely  to  be  given  to  their  words 
by  very  many,  and  it  is  therefore  an  abuse  of  language.  To 
say  that  we  have  a  feeling  that  two  sides  of  a  triangle  are 
greater  than  the  third  side,  is  to  use  the  word  not  only  in  a 
non-natural  but  in  a  misleading  sense. 

The  third  preliminary  operation  will  stand  thus : — 

III.   Whatever  can  be  distinctly  conceived  by  the  mind  can  be 
communicated  to  others  by  articulate  speech. 

At  the  end  of  a  controversy  with  Agnostics  they  may  turn 
round  upon  their  opponents  and  deny  the  validity  The  third 
of  any  conclusions  arrived  at  on  the  ground  of  the  prop"81 
inadequacy  of  articulate  speech  to  express  their  deepest — 
their  primary — conceptions  and  convictions.  To  avoid  this 
denial,  it  is  desirable  to  point  out  that  unless  Agnostics  are 
prepared  to  admit  the  validity  of  '•  oral  words"  as  used  in 
their  discussions  and  investigations,  they  should  abstain  alto- 
gether from  such  discussions.  They  should  so  abstain,  since, 
unless  the  "  spoken  word  "  can  be  made  to  correspond  in  a 
practically  sufficient  manner  with  the  thoughts  conceived, 
there  can  be  no  communication  of  such  thoughts,  and  every 
man  is  bound  not  to  tax  the  time  and  attention  of  hearers  or 
readers  by  arguments  which  he  knows  are  necessarily  absurd 
and  futile,  and  by  phrases  and  expressions  which  he  is  aware 
cannot  but  be  empty  and  unmeaning — a  necessarily  resultless 
logomachy.  It  may  be  confidently  affirmed  that  no  sane 
man  really  believes  that  what  he  distinctly  conceives  he  can 
in  no  way  articulately  convey  to  others  with  practical  accu- 
racy and  sufficiency;  but  should  any  men  profess  to  believe 
in  such  impotence  of  verbal  expression,  then  they  are  clearly 
bound  to  abstain  from  controversy  altogether,  and  not  inflict 
en  us  expressions  of  opinion  which  are  in  the  opinion  of  their 
very  uttercrs,  necessarily  misleading,  and  verbal  judgments 


12  LESSONS  FftOM  NATURE.  [CIIAP.  I. 

which  are  inevitably  false — nay,  avowed  inanities.  Of  course 
it  is  open  to  any  Agnostic  to  employ  language  for  the  purpose 
of  showing  that  the  use  of  language  leads  us  inevitably  to 
necessary  contradictions ;  but  the  effect  of  such  a  demonstra- 
tion, if  it  could  be  made,  would  be  not  to  establish  any  positive 
system  whatever,  but  to  land  us  in  utter  and  hopeless  scepti- 
cism, and  to  invalidate  every  argument  even  of  the  Agnostic 
himself.  Every  writer,  then,  who  professes  seriously  to 
dispute  concerning  metaphysical  problems,  thereby  tacitly 
avows  that  his  mental  conceptions  can  be  validly  expressed 
by  his  spoken  (or  written)  words.  He  shows  by  his  invita- 
tion to  discussion,  not  only  that  he  believes  himself  to  have 
attained  philosophical  conceptions  which  seem  to  him  sound 
and  true,  but  also  that  he  believes  himself  capable  of  con- 
veying those  truths,  by  language,  to  the  apprehensions  of  his 
fellow-men — since  any  one  who  invites  to  any  inquiry  is 
bound  to  have  first  satisfied  himself  that  such  inquiry  can 
in  fact  be  made.  An  argumentum  ad  hominem  may  then  be 
well  addressed  to  any  Agnostic  who  objects  to  his  own  refuta- 
tion on  the  ground  of  the  necessary  inadequacy  of  language. 
Having,  then,  noticed  these  three  preliminary  considera- 
The  teaching  tions,  we  may  proceed  to  test  some  of  the  utterances 
Agnostic  as  of  prominent  leaders  of  the  philosophy  of  nescience 

ledge  of  our    on  a  point  of  the  highest  importance  to  us,  namely, 

ownexist-  •-*  T>    f         TT     i          *T  * 

ence.  our  own  existence.    Jrroiessor  Huxley  not  long  ago  * 

expressed  himself  as  follows : — "  Now,  is  our  knowledge  of 
anything  we  know  or  feel,  more  or  less  than  a  knowledge  of 
states  of  consciousness  ?  And  our  whole  life  is  made  up  of 
such  states.  Some  of  these  states  we  refer  to  a  cause  we  call 
'self;'  others  to  a  cause  or  causes  which  may  be  compre- 
hended under  the  title  '  not-self.'  But  neither  of  the  exist- 
ence of  '  self,'  nor  of  that  of  *  not-self,'  have  we,  or  can  we  by 
any  possibility  have,  any  such  unquestionable  and  immediate 
certainty  as  we  have  of  the  states  of  consciousness  which  we  con- 
sider to  be  their  effects."  They  are  "  hypothetical  assumptions 


*  '  Lay  Sermons,'  Descartes,  p.  359. 


CHAP.  I.]  THE  STARTING-POINT.  13 

which  cannot  be  proved  or  known  with  the  highest  degree  of 
certainty  which  is  given  by  immediate  consciousness." 

Now  it  may,  in  the  first  place,  be  contended  that  the  pro- 
cess of  analysis  is  incomplete.  It  may  be  denied  HIS  analysis 
altogether  that  in  the  primary  direct  act  of  con-  ir 
sciousness  we  recognise  the  truth  of  the  existence  of  the 
"  state  "  one  bit  more  than  of  the  "  self."  Professor  Huxley 
fails  to  discriminate  between  the  "self"  as  recognised  deli- 
berately by  reflection,  and  the  "self"  as  directly  perceived 
in  the  momentary  act  of  consciousness.  The  "self"  indeed, 
the  substantial  continuous  being  as  deliberately  perceived,  is 
only  explicitly  recognised  by  reflection,  and  in  so  far  as  he 
may  mean  this,  Professor  Huxley  is  right.  But  the  "  Ego " 
of  each  instant  is  given  by  consciousness  simultaneously  w-ith 
its  "  state,"  and  just  as  vividly.  If,  therefore,  the  "  continuous 
self"  is  thus  admitted  to  be  secondary,  nothing  is  thereby 
conceded.  For  though  the  continuous  substantial  "self"  is 
not  given  in  the  momentary  act  of  consciousness  explicitly, 
it  is  there  implicitly. 

Our  immediate  direct  co;  sciousness  is  neither  the  act  of 
judgment,  "mental  state  exists,"  nor  the  judgment,  "self 
exists;"  but  is  the  simple  apprehension  of  self-action,  or 
(self -f-  state),  and  both  "self"  and  "  state"  require  reflection 
for  their  EXPLICIT  recognition.  To  say  that  the  explicit 
recognition  of  the  existence  of  the  "  state  "  is  prior  to  or 
more  certain  than  the  explicit  recognition  of  the  existence  of 
the  "  Ego  "  is  false  in  fad,  and  contradicts  the  affirmations 
of  our  own  consciousness. 

But  not  only  does  Professor  Huxley  fail  to  reach  the  true 

dicta  of  consciousness,  he  also  fails  entirely  in  his  ms  system 

11.   .1  />  can  be  de- 

endeavour  to  construct  an  intelligible  statement  of  sir..y«iby 

his  own 

primary  truth,  even  according  to  his  own  concep-  weapons, 
tions.  As  will,  it  is  believed,  shortly  appear,  instead  of 
presenting  us  with  a  more  intelligible  system  than  that  tra- 
ditionally taught  us,  he  ends  by  presenting  for  our  accept- 
ance what  is  strictly  and  absolutely  non-sense.  He  appears 
to  consider  he  has  done  away  with  baseless  philosophical 


1 1  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  I. 

dogmas,  and  substituted  for  them  an  exposition  of  simple 
truth ;  but,  in  fact,  he  presents  us  with  dogmas  of  his  own 
fully  as  mysterious  as  any.  he  conceives  he  has  destroyed.  The 
old  system,  baseless  or  not,  threw  light  upon-  the  facts  of 
psychology,  of  which  it  afforded  an  intelligible  explanation. 
Professor  Huxley's  dogmas  are  not  only,  to  say  the  least, 
as  open  to  attack,  but,  if  admitted,  fail  to  be  of  any  service 
in  interpreting  or  making  intelligible  to  us  the  phenomena 
presented^to  us  by  our  own  intellectual  activity. 

Mr.  John  Stuart  Mill  admits*  the  existence  of  the  mind 
in  the  form  of  a  "  thread  of  consciousness,"  "  aware  of  itself 
as  past  and  future,"  and  possessing  a  conviction  of  the  simul- 
taneous existence  of  other  "  threads  of  consciousness "  and 
of  numerous  "  permanent  possibilities  of  sensation." 

Professor  Huxley  seems  to  agree  with  the  last-named 
writer  as  to  the  certainty  of  the  existence  of  a  series  of  states 
of  consciousness. 

It  seems,  however,  that  the  proposition  which  Professor 
Huxley  affirms  is  to  the  full  as  assailable  as  the  position 
which  the  Professor  attacks.  He  appears  to  think  he  has 
entrenched  himself  behind  bulwarks  impregnable  against 
the  assaults  of  others  still  more  sceptical  than  he  is 
himself.  His  ultimate  citadel  is  not,  however,  a  bit  more 
tenable  by  its  defenders  than  the  fortresses  which  they 
profess  to  have  reduced.  If  we  may  legitimately  call  in 
question  the  existence  of  "self"  and  "not-self" — to  say 
nothing  of  mind,  matter,  and  a  real  external  world — then  the 
very  same  weapons  which  are  believed  to  have  been  success- 
fully employed  to  demolish  the  necessary  objective  validity 
of  those  conceptions,  may  be  employed  with  not  less  force  to 
shatter  this  last  refuge  of  "  philosophical  dogmatism."  For 
what  is  the  meaning  of  the  proposition,  the  truth  of  which 
all  these  writers  agree  in  regarding  as  unquestionable? — "a 
series  of  states  of  consciousness  exists." 

Before   examining   this   proposition  as    a   whole,   let  us 


'  Mill  upon  Hamilton,'  p.  212. 


CHAP.  I.]  THE  STAKTING-POINT.  15 

consider  its  several  parts.     Writers  of  the  school  we  combat 
— the  Agnostics  —  are  exceedingly  apt  quietly  to  AS  con- 

'  fo  J .       *     '  :»  J  sideredin  its 

slip   into  the  terms  of  a  proposition   those  very  parts, 
conceptions  and  beliefs  the  validity  of  which   they  deny. 
Let  us,  then,  see  what  is  the  meaning  of  the  expressions,  "  a 
series,"  "  states  of  consciousness,"  and  "  exists." 

1.  A  "series"  means  a  succession  of  entities,  in  time  or 
space ;  but  consciousness  is  of  the  present.*    Let  us  be  ever  so 
persuaded  of  the  existence  of  a  past  series  of  events,  all  that 
consciousness  can  by  any  possibility  tell  us  is  that  we  have 
now  such  persuasion,  and  this  persuasion — for  all  conscious- 
ness by  itself  can  vouch — may  be  the  merest  delusion.     But, 
again,  "  succession  "  implies  "  permanence."     It  is  a  relation 
of  which  permanence  is  a  necessary  term.     Things  cannot 
succeed   except    by  relation    to    something  which  endures. 
Much,  therefore,  _  is  implied  in  the  mere  exclamation,  "  a 
series!"  without  the  conception  of,  and  a  belief  in,  more 
than  momentary   "states  of  consciousness,"  this  very  first 
term  of  the  proposition  is  without  meaning. 

2.  "  States  of  consciousness !"     What  can  be  the  meaning 
of  this  undecipherable  hieroglyphic — for  such  it  is  if  we 
may   employ  nothing  but  direct  states  of  consciousness  to 
unravel   it?     How  can   a   "state"  be   conscious  of  itself? 
It  cannot,  for  by   so  doing,  it  ipso  facto  becomes  another 
state.     We  may  ask  Nescients  what  they  can  mean  on  their 
hypothesis,  even  by  the  naked  term  "consciousness"  itself, 
a  fortiori,    by  what  right  they  assume   the   actual    being 
of  this  abstract  entity,  and  attribute  to  it  an  existence  both 


*  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  denies  that  consciousness  is  of  the  actual  present, 
but  of  the  moment  just  passed.  This  contradicts  at  least  what  my  own  mind 
tells  me,  when  I  concentrate  my  attention  on  any  object.  However,  con- 
ccdiiig  the  truth  of  Mr.  Spencer's  dictum,  my  argument  is  equally  valid,  for 
without  question  if  consciousness  is  not  of  the  actual  present,  it  is  of  such  an 
immediate.  p;i>t  as  to  persuade  most  persons  that  it  is  of  the  actual  present. 
I !nt  Mr.  II.  Spencer's  position,  fir  from  weakening  my  general  argument  as 
to  the  conscious  enduiance  of  the  Ego,  strengthens  it.  For  it'  each  state  is 
p"8-.ed  l«'fi»re  it  is  recognised,  then  a  fortiori  the  Ego  must  persist,  and  have 
the  power  of  certainly  knowing  that  of  which  it  is  not  immediately  conscious, 
or  how  could  it  ever  recognii-e  the  various  states  as  belonging  to  it,  and  say 
with  perfect  certainty,  "now  I  aui  thinking?" 


16  LESSONS  FKOM  NATUKE.  [CiiAP.  I. 

capable  of  modification  and  actually  modified.  We  must 
surely  go  outside  of  mere  direct  states  of  consciousness — we 
must  assume  the  existence  of  the  substantial  self,  in  order 
to  be  able  to  give  any  sort  of  intelligible  meaning  to  this 
second  term  of  the  proposition. 

3.  "  Exists ! "  Finally,  let  us  consider  this  last  word  of 
the  proposition.  It  asserts  the  existence  of  something,  and 
necessarily  implies  a  judgment  as  to  that  something  by  a 
mind  which  perceives  such  existence.  The  necessity  of 
these  implied  relations  is  just  as  certain  as  is  that  of  the 
existence  predicated,  whatever  it  may  be. 

But  if  difficulties  arise  even  with  regard  to  the  component 
And  con-  members  of  the  proposition,  "a  series  of  states  of 

sideredasa  .  .         ,          ,  in 

whole.  consciousness  exists,  what  snail  we  say  to  that 
judgment  as  a  whole  ?  Surely  no  metaphysical  formula  was 
ever  more  open  to  objection. 

How  can  "a  series"  be  conscious  of  itself  as  a  series?* 
The  proposition  is  absolute  "non-sense."  A  state  of  con- 
sciousness is  a  state  of  consciousness,  and  no  more.  We, 
indeed,  may  be  aware  of  our  own  past  states,  but  such  states 
cannot  themselves  be  conscious,  for  direct  consciousness  is  of 
the  present,  or  if  of  the  immediate  past,  then  only  through 
and  by  means  of  a  persistent,  enduring  Ego.  The  writers 
named,  therefore,  are  guilty  of  what,  on  their  principles,  is 
an  utterly  unjustifiable  dogmatism  in  asserting  that  a  series 
of  states  of  consciousness  exists.  All  they  can  be  justified  in 
individually  asserting  is  "thought  exists;"  but  no  jot  or 
tittle  will  pitiless  logic  allow  them  to  proceed  beyond  this 
without  falling  into  the  most  flagrant  petitio  principii,  passing 
into  a  transcendentalism  of  their  own,  and  a  positive  supersti- 
tion. Though  each  one  may  assert  "thought  exists,"  he  is 
unable  to  affirm  thought  existed.  All  he  can  be  warranted 
in  saying  is,  "a  thought  exists  of  a  past  thought  having 
existed ;"  but  no  guarantee  can  be  devised  for  the  truth  of 
such  thoughts,  except  upon  principles  the  validity  of  which 


*  Mr.  Mill  fully  admits  this  difficulty.   See  his  work  on  '  Hamilton,'  p.  213. 


CHAP.  I.]  THE  STARTING-POINT.  17 

the  writers  referred  to  deny.  "  Self  "  and  "  not-self,"  therefore, 
do  not  fall  alone,  but  with  them  every  train  of  thought  and 
every  process  of  reasoning,  for  no  one  thought  can  guarantee 
the  existence  of  a  process  of  reasoning,  still  less  its  validity. 
Thus  absolute  scepticism  is  the  logical  and  inevitable  fate  of 
all  professing  Agnosticism,  unless  they  abandon  their  un- 
tenable and  anti-rational  principles.  It  may,  however,  be 
said  that  certainty  is  not  denied  as  to  the  existence  of  "self," 
but  only  "  the  highest  degree  of  certainty." 

Professor  Huxley  tells  us  this  certainty  is  not  of  "the 
highest  degree,"  inasmuch  as  it  is  not  "given"  to  us  by 
"immediate  consciousness."  Something,  however,  may  be 
said  in  direct  contradiction  to  this,  and  in  support  of  the 
assertion  that  though  both  the  existence  of  "  a  state  of  con- 
sciousness "  and  the  existence  of  "  self"  are  known  seif-exist- 
with  complete  certainty,  yet  that  the  existence  of  primarily"" 
self  is  known  primarily,  and  therefore  with  a  higher  degree 
of  certainty.  Both  are,  indeed,  directly  perceived  by  the 
mind  implicitly  in  the  cognition  "thinking  self;"  both  are 
explicitly  recognised  only  by  a  reflex  act.  Nevertheless,  the 
"self"  can  be  known  in  the  order  of  reflection  purely  as  an 
existing  entity ;  but  "  a  state  of  consciousness "  cannot  be 
known  in  that  order  but  as  appertaining  to.  some  existing 
mind,  which,  in  the  metaphysical  order,  is  primary  to  it. 
The  primary  act  of  reflex  knowledge  reveals  "self"  to  us, 
whereas  the  reflex  recognition  of"  mental  states  "  shows  them 
to  us  as  states  and  modifications  of  the  yet  more  primarily 
(in  the  reflex  order)  and  thoroughly  known  "  self."  I  there- 
fore join  issue  with  Professor  Huxley,  and  affirm  the  direct 
contradictory  to  his  assertions.  I  maintain  that  we  know 
ourselves  with  supreme  certainty,  and  that  we  know  our 
several  mental  modifications  (though  we  know  them  with 
certainty)  with  a  certainty  which  is  subordinate  and 
secondary  in  degree.  But  waiving  this  reply,  it  may  be 
affirmed  that  if  so  much  certainty  be  allowed  as  to  eliminate 
all  doubt,  and  to  rationally  require  unhesitating  acquiescence 
on  our  part  in  all  we  do  and  say  and  think,  all  is  conceded 


18  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  L 

which  we  need  demand.  No\v,  whatever  be  its  validity, 
certainty  as  a  fact  exists,  and  no  fact  is  a  more  sure  one 
for  each  of  us  than  that  of  his  own  continued  personal 
identity.  No  conviction  is  more  constantly  and  uniformly 
acted  on  by  us.  As  full  and  complete  a  practical  acquiescence 
is  given  to  the  conception,  "  self  exists,"  as  to  the  belief  that 
"  a  series  of  states  of  consciousness  exists ;"  and  were  any  one 
to  refuse  this  practical  acquiescence,  then,  unable  to  act,  dis- 
course, or  reason,  he  would  be  shut  up  in  his  sterile  and 
solitary  direct  thought. 

But  what  is  this  certainty  of  which  they  speak  ?  Is  it 
self-exist-  itself  a  thought  ?  And  if  so,  what  does  one  thought 

ence  implied  »      «  i      i  •   »      i 

in  «cer-        know  about  another  thought  ?  and  winch  thought  of 

tainty  "  it- 
self- the  two  is  it  which  has  the  knowledge  ?    Thoughts 

are  not  permanent,  but  progressive.  To  say  that  thought 
exists  is  itself  a  figure  of  speech.  It  really  means,  "  some- 
thing exists  which  thinks."  To  know  is  not  to  be  knowledge, 
but  to  acquire  and  possess  it.  To  have  implies  two  factors, 
not  one  alone.  Certainty,  again,  without  an  "  I "  who  is 
certain,  is  as  impossible  as  doubt  without  a  doubter. 

As  before  observed,  however,  it  will  perhaps  be  rejoined  that 
Therefuta-  a^  tne  foregoing  objections  to  Agnosticism  are  only 
clenc^f'to  possible  on  account  of  the  exigencies  of  language  ; 
the^MdTf  and  though  it  is  impossible  for  advocates  of  nesri- 
q^acy^f"  ence  to  enunciate  verbally  their  principles,  yet  that 
language.  these  principles  are  none  the  less  true  for  all  that, 
and  that  it  is  grammar,  and  not  reality  and  reason,  which 
reduces  them  to  this  impotence.  To  this  it  may  be  once 
more  replied  that  the  spoken  word  is  but  the  expression  of 
the  mental  concept ;  and  that  there  is  nothing  which  can  be 
clearly  and  distinctly  perceived  which  cannot  be  articulately 
expressed  and  conveyed  to  other  minds  by  language  good 
and  sufficient  for  the  purposes  to  which  it  is  applied.  What 
was  said  in  the  opening  of  this  paper,  however,  demonstrates 
to  what  this  objection  amounts.  It  amounts  simply  to  the 
assertion  that  fundamental  truth  is  what  can  neither  be  con- 
ceived by  the  mind  nor  expressed  by  words,  and  consequently 


CHAP.  I.]  THE  STARTING-POINT.  J  D 

that  everything  on  this  subject  which  can  be  either  said  or 
thought  is  necessarily  and  inevitably  fundamentally  untrue. 
In  other  words,  Nescients  are  thus  again  reduced  to  absolute 
scepticism  by  another  road  ;  and,  indeed,  that  inevitable  gulf 
yawns  to  receive  them  by  whatever  path  they  seek  to  escape 
from  their  position,  save  and  except  that  one  road  which  they 
refuse  to  follow,  and  to  follow  which  is  to  vindicate  the  truth 
and  validity  of  human  reason.  Thus  I  venture  to  think  the 
real  scope  and  meaning  of  the  philosophy  of  nescience  may  be 
made  plain.  Denying  the  necessary  validity  and  objective 
truth  of  our  cognitions  of  "self"  and  "  not-self/'  Nescients 
may  logically  be  reduced  to  one  present  thought,  and  ren- 
dered incapable,  logically,  of  -attack  or  defence,  uncertain 
whether  reason  and  memory  may  not  be  the  most  baseless  of 
chimeras,  their  whole  life  "  a  dream  within  a  dream,"  or  even 
their  very  consciousness  the  sport  of  a  deceptive  and  malig- 
nant demon.  Such  indeed  is,  I  venture  to  believe,  the 
necessary  ultimate  outcome  of  the  philosophy  of  all  those 
who,  following  the  example  of  Descartes,  abandon  the  high 
road  of  philosophy,  properly  so  called,  for  the  lonely  by-paths 
of  individual  eccentricity.  Let  them  grant,  on  the  other 
hand,  that  our  spontaneous  belief  in  our  own  existence  is  the 
perception  of  a  real,  objective  truth,  which  is  made  evident 
to  our  minds  by  its  owrn  intrinsic  light,  and  the  silly 
cavils  which  "common  sense"  justly  despises  are  at  once 
annihilated. 

The  value,  then,  of  the  nescient  philosophic  doubts,  as  put 
forth  by  Professor  Huxley  and  his  school,  may,  I  venture  to 
think,  be  shown  to  be  nil — first,  because  they  are  not  real 
doubts,  but  merely  verbal  ones ;  and,  secondly,  because  they 
contradict  the  primary  and  fundamental  dicta  of  consciousness 
itself. 

Something  further,  however,  may  yet  be  urged. 

Even  what  is  called  "necessary  truth"  is,  in  fact,  conceded 
by  some  Agnostics ;  *  and  they  would  generally  admit  that 

*  It  admits  of  "  no  doubt  that  a/7  our  knowledge  is  a  knowledge  of  states  of 
consciousness." — Professor  Huxley  :  '  Lay  Sermons,'  p.  37o. 


"20  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  \Vu\i\  i. 

to    each  one  wlio  thinks,  while  he  thinks,  the  proposition 
A  further       "  thought  is,"  is  a  necessary  truth.    I  maintain,  how- 


consequence.  eyer>  |]ia|;  this  proposition  can  be  proved  to  carry 
with  it  (if  it  is  to  have  any  meaning}  a  store  of  objective 
truth,  amply  sufficient  to  establish  the  validity  of  all  first 
truths.  I  further  maintain  that  it  is  impossible  intelligently 
to  utter  the  monosyllable  "thought"  without  thereby  lay- 
ing implicitly  the  foundations  of  the  whole  of  philosophy, 
a  whole  system  of  universal  and  necessary  truth. 

For  the  word  "  thought,"  intelligently  uttered,  must  at  the 
what  the  very  least  contain  the  conception  of  "  existence," 
thought"  and  involve  a  psychological  judgment  which,  ex- 
impues.  piicity  evolved,  is  the  judgment  "  thought  is."  But 
a  "judgment"  has  no  meaning  without  both  a  "subject"  and 
an  "  object,"  and  the  first  of  these  two  words  is  meaningless 
without  the  conception  of  an  "  Ego"  and  "  its  states,"  and  the 
term  "  object  "  necessarily  carries  with  it  the  conception  of 
the  "  non-Ego  —  actual  or  possible."  Again,  the  exclamation 
"  thought,"  since  it  necessarily  involves  the  conception  of  ex- 
istence or  being,  carries  with  it,  by  necessary  correlation,  the 
conception  "not  being;"  and  this,  again,  necessarily  involves 
"relation"  and  the  principle  of  contradiction,  an  1  therefore 
the  idea  "truth;"  and  "truth"  is  meaningless,  unless  we 
accept  the  co-existence  of  "  objective  being  "  and  "  an  intel- 
lect," together  with  a  relation  of  conformity  between  the  two. 
What  For  "  truth  "  is  nothing  else  but  a  relation  of  con- 
3  formity  between  some  existence  and  some  being  that 
knows  such  existence.  To  say  that  anything  is  true,  as,  e.g., 
that  "  Mr.  Disraeli  is  our  Prime  Minister,"  is  to  assert  a  con- 
formity between  the  mental  judgment  so  expressed  and  the 
really  existing  external  facts  signified  by  that  proposition. 

Quite  lately  *  indeed  truth  has  been  defined  as  "  the  equi- 
valence of  the  terms  of  a  proposition,"  but  this  definition  seems 
a  defective  one.  When  a  proposition  is  declared  to  be  true, 
it  is  not  its  "  terms  "  only  which  are  referred  to,  but  what  those 


*  See  Lewes's  '  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,'  vol.  ii.  p. 


CHAP.  I.]  THE  STARTING-POINT.  21 

terms  denote,  and  the  conformity  existing  between  the  inter- 
relations of  the  things  so  denoted  as  they  actually  exist  exter- 
nally and  the  mental  judgment  verbally  expressed  respecting 
tiiem.  If  reference  is  not  expressly  made  to  the  truth  of  a 
true  proposition,  its  truth  none  the  less  consists  in  that  con- 
formity, and  reposes  not  on  the  "terms"  but  the  objective 
realities  they  denote.  There  is  no  equivalence  between  the 
terms  "  Mr.  Disraeli "  and  "  England's  Prime  Minister,"  and 
there  is  no  truth  between  "  London  Bridge "  and  "  a  way 
across  the  river  Thames."  There  is,  however,  equivalence  in 
what  is  denoted  by  the  terms,  and  there  is  truth  in  the  pro- 
position, "  London  Bridge  is  a  way  across  the  river  Thames:" 
that  is  to  say,  the  objective  facts  conform  to  the  mental  judg- 
ment so  expressed  concerning  them — in  other  words,  in  the 
relation  between  objective  existences  and  the  intellect. 

To  return,  however,  to  our  argument :  every  Nescient 
will  admit  that  the  real  existence  of  a  present  actual  -Necessary- 
state  of  consciousness  is  an  absolute  and  necessary  truth" 
truth  to  that  consciousness ;  so  much  so,  that  no  malevolent 
being,  however  powerful,  could  in  this  deceive.  Were  our 
existence  made  up  of  a  succession  of  shifting  deceits,  yet 
that  a  thought  or  feeling  exists  at  the  moment  we  actually 
experience  its  existence,  is  what,  by  universal  consent,  is 
Ix-yond  question.  That  "a  state  of  consciousness  is,"  is 
therefore  a  "  necessary  truth."  But  as  to  "  truth,"  we  have 
just  seen  its  implications ;  and  with  regard  to  the  word 
"  necessary,"  it  can  have  no  meaning,  except  we  apprehend 
"  causation,"  together  with  "  possibility  "  and  "  impossibility," 
revealing  to  us  a  difference  between  actual  being  and  merely 
possible  being,  as  also  between  the  necessary  and  contingent 
categories  of  actual  being. 

If,  then,  the  above  proposition, "  a  state  of  consciousness  is," 
i<  necessarily  true,  it  follows  that  a  whole  world  of  TbeAgnos- 
necessary  truth  is  thereby  and  therein  implied.     If,  ifMv«a^[m-n 
on  the  contrary,  it  be  asserted  that  these  impli-  fmumThey 
cations,  or  any  of  them,  are  untrue  or  invalid —    tny' 
not  objectively  true — then  the  proposition  is  unmeaning,  and 


.22  LESSONS  FIIOM  NATURE.  [CiiAr.  I. 

we  can  'not  affirm  that  a  demon  could  not  deceive  us  as  to  the 
existence  of  a  passing  thought.  If  however  we  cannot  so 
affirm,  then  the  Agnostics  are  wrong  (for  they,  the  Agnostics, 
say  that  to  this  extent  there  is  certainty),  and  we  are  landed 
in  utter  scepticism.  If  they  choose  the  other  horn  of  the 
dilemma,  and  assert  the  necessary  impotence  of  thought  or 
of  language,  then,  as  we  have  seen,  they  thereby  assert  that 
everything  which  can  be  thought  or  said  is  necessarily  uncer- 
tain ;  and  this,  again,  implies  certainty  ;  so  that  the  Agnostics 
are  inextricably  inclosed  in  a  vicious  circle.  They  cannot 
even  speak  interrogatively ;  they  cannot  say,  "  How  do  yon 
know  that  thought  is  not  self-existent?"  for  the  use  or 
implication  of  one  personal  pronoun  ipso  facto  removes  them 
from  their  own  chosen  position,  and  lands  them  in  that  world 
of  objectivity  and  reality  they  would  so  insanely  and  so 
inconsequently  disown. 

We  come  now  to  the  last  matter  which  it  is  here  suggested 
Logical  con-  should  be  pressed  upon  Agnostics.  It  is  the  result 
sequences.  ftn(j  ou^come  of  ^  foregoing  observations — namely, 
that  they  (the  Agnostics)  are  logically  driven  to  admit  and 
accept  the  following  affirmation,  under  pain  of  utter  scep- 
ticism : — 

That  our  persuasion  and  spontaneous  belief  as  to  the  exist- 
ence of  a  continuously  enduring  self  underlying  the  changing 
series  of  phenomena  we  term  "  states  of  consciousness  "  are 
valid,  and  the  results  of  a  true  perception  of  our  own  ob- 
jective existence.  We  are  forced  to  admit  that  the  think- 
ing being  I  call  myself  at  this  moment  is  substantially 
one  and  identical  with  the  agent  who  carried  on  the  long 
series  of  acts  and  endurances  I  call  my  past  life.  We  are 
driven  to  affirm  that  we  have  indeed  a  direct  intuition  of 
passing  modifications,  but  that  we  have  a  no  less  clear,  no 
less  certain  intuition  of  a  mysterious,  substantial  unity,  which 
reason  tells  us,  if  we  can  be  certain  of  anything,  is  due  to  a 
peculiar  faculty  of  perceiving  truth,  which  faculty  we  term 
the  intellect.  I  say  "  of  perceiving  truth,"  for  if  what  is  per- 
ceived as  necessarily  true  (not  merely  passively  unthinkable) 


CHAP.  I.]  THE  STAETING-POINT.  23 

is  not  truth,  then  there  is  no  truth  at  all  for  us,  and  we 
must  fall  into  "  absolute  scepticism,"  where  all  intellectual 
conflict  becomes  an  absurdity.  If  we  may  make  any  affirma- 
tion whatever,  it  is  the  affirmation  of  our  own  existence, 
and  yet  that  cannot  be  made  without  accepting  the  trust- 
worthiness of  memory.  But  what  do  we  not  admit  in 
admitting  so  much  ? 

It  is  in  vain  that  we  try  to  get  rid  of  the  mysterious.  Mr. 
Herbert  Spencer  himself  is  quite  unable  to  get  rid  of  "  mys- 
tery." He  says,*  there  is  "  a  warrant  higher  than  that  which 
any  argument  can  give,  for  asserting  an  objective  existence. 
Mysterious  as  seems  the  consciousness  of  something  which  is 
yet  out  of  consciousness,  he  finds  that  he  alleges  the  reality 
of  this  something  in  virtue  of  the  ultimate  law — he  is  obliged 
to  think  it." 

Speaking  on  this  subject,  Professor  Huxley  has  fallen  into 
one  of  the  strangest  fallacies  it  bas  been  our  lot  to  A  curiOUs 
encounter.  He  says t  that  the  "general  trustworthi-  falUcy< 
ness  of  memory  "  and  "  the  general  constancy  of  the  order  of 
nature  "  "  are  of  the  highest  practical  value,  inasmuch  as  the 
conclusions  logically  drawn  from  them  are  always  verified  by 
experience !"  As  if  experience  itself  was  possible,  unless 
memory  could  be  relied  on  as  trustworthy.  My  "experience" 
would  be  of  little  value  to  me  if  I  could  not  be  certain  it  was 
mine,  and  not  that  of  somebody  else.  As  to  this  fallacy,  a 
writer  in  the  '  Dublin  Review '  observes  : — | 

"  To  this  singular  piece  of  reasoning  we  put  forth  (p.  46)  an  obvious 
reply.  You  tell  us  that  you  trust  your  present  act  of  memory,  because 
in  innumerable  past  instances  the  avouchments  of  memory  have  been 
true.  How  do  you  know — -how  can  you  even  guess — that  there  has 
been  one  such  instance?  Because  you  trust  your  present  act  of 
memory ;  no  other  answer  can  possibly  be  given.  Never  was  there  so 
audacious  an  instance  of  arguing  in  a  circle.  You  know  forsooth  that 
your  present  act  of  memory  can  be  trusted,  because  in  innumerable 
past  instances  the  avouchment  of  memory  has  been  true;  and  you 

*  '  Essays'  (btercotyped  edition),  vol.  ii.  p.  407. 

*  '  Lay  Sermons,'  p.  359. 

j  See  in  '  Dublin  llcview,'  July  1873,  the  article  on  Mr.  Mill's  reply  to  tlio 
'  Dublin  lleview." 


24  LESSONS  FllOM  NATUEE.  [CIIAP.  I. 

know  that  in  innumerable  past  instances  the  avouchment  of  memory 
has  been  true,  because  you  trust  your  present  act  of  memory.  The 
blind  man  leads  the  blind  round  a  '  circle '  incurably  '  vicious.' 

"  Let  us  observe  the  Professor's  philosophical  position.  It  is  his 
principle,  that  men  know  nothing  with  certitude,  except  their  present 
consciousness.  Now,  on  this  principle,  it  is  just  as  absurd  to  say  that 
the  facts  testified  by  memory  are  probably,  as  that  they  are  certainly 
true.  What  can  be  more  violently  unscientific,  we  asked  (p.  50, 
note) — from  the  stand-point  of  experimental  science — than  to  assume 
without  grounds  as  ever  so  faintly  probable  the  very  singular  pro- 
position, that  mental  phenomena  (by  some  entirely  unknown  law) 
have  proceeded  in  such  a  fashion,  that  my  clear  impression  of  the  past 
corresponds  with  my  past  experience  ?  Professor  Huxley  possesses  no 
doubt  signal  ability  in  his  own  line ;  but  surely  as  a  metaphysician  he 
exhibits  a  sorry  spectacle.  He  busies  himself  in  his  latter  capacity 
with  diligently  overthrowing  the  only  principle  on  which  his  researches 
as  a  physicist  can  have  value  or  even  meaning." 

The  trustworthiness  of  memory  is  as  mysterious  and  exact- 
what  is  im-  ing  a  dogma  as  the  trustworthiness  of  our  percep- 
serthi'g  thse"  tions  of  universally  necessary  objective  truth — nay, 
iSs'of'me-"  it  is  as  mysterious  as  any  of  the  dogmas  which  the 
objectivist  philosophy  enunciates,  and  yet  without 
admitting  this  trustworthiness  we  cannot  advance  one  step. 
By  admitting  it,  we  allow  to  our  intellect  the  faculty  of  per- 
ceiving objective  existence,  of  which  the  senses  can  give  no 
account,  and  which  is  altogether  removed  from  the  field  of 
sensible  experience.  If  we  admit  the  validity  of  such  cog- 
nitions, on  what  ground  are  we  to  deny  the  validity  of  other 
intellectual  cognitions  which  are  no  less  an  object  of  cer- 
tainty ?  If  the  mind  has  the  power  now  of  cognizing  acts 
performed  by  it,  but  removed  by  half  a  century's  interval 
from  the  domain  of  present  experience,  why  may  it  not  per- 
ceive the  *  necessary  properties  of  all  possible  triangles, 
though  experience  can  give  us  cognizance  of  but  a  few  actual 
triangles  ? 

Here,  then,  we  may  firmly  take  our  stand,  and  assert  that 


*  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  himself  well  observes:  "  Is  it,  1hen,  that  tbe  trust- 
worthiness of  memory  is  less  open  to  doubt  than  the  immediate  consciousness 
that  the  quantities  must  be  unequal  if  they  differ  from  a  third  quantity  in 
unequal  degress  ?" — '  Essays'  (stereotyped  edition),  vol.  ii.  p.  411. 


CHAP.  L,  THE  STARTING-POINT.  25 

the  intellect  shows  us  its  own  objective  validity.  Let  him 
who  denies  it  beware  ;  for  the  denial  of  any  certainty  as  to 
his  own  existence  follows  logically  and  necessarily  from  such 
negation,  and  thus  fails  all  certainty  whatever,  even  the  cer- 
tainty that  there  is  no  certainty,  or  that  the  words  certainty 
and  uncertainty  have  any  difference  of  signification,  or  that 
any  words  have  any  meaning,  or  that  meaning  or  being  of 
any  kind  can  exist,  or  even  be  really  thought. 

Reference  has   been  just   above   made   to   Mr.   Herbert 
Spencer,  and  as  he  has  a  different  but  more  im-  Mr  Spenccr.8 
portant  band   of  philosophical  disciples  than  has  ou7k^w°- 
Professor  Huxley,  and  as  Mr.  Darwin  has  bestowed  owrfexLt-' 
on  him  the  title  "  our  great  philosopher,"  it  would  ence> 
be  interesting  to  learn  precisely  his  view  concerning  our 
knowledge  of  our  o\vn  existence. 

Unfortunately,  Mr.  Spencer  is  hardly  clear  in  his  enuncia- 
tions respecting  our  knowledge  of  our  own  continued  personal 
existence. 

In  his  chapter  on  "  The  Substance  of  Mind  "  *  he  remarks : 
— "  If  by  the  phrase  '  substance  of  mind '  is  to  be  understood 
mind  as  qualitatively  differentiated  in  each  portion  that  is 
separable  by  introspection  but  seems  homogeneous  and  un- 
decomposable ;  then  we  do  know  something  about  the  sub- 
stance of  Mind,  and  may  eventually  know  more.  Assumingf 
an  underlying  something,  it  is  possible  in  some  cases  to  see, 
and  in  the  rest  to  conceive,  how  these  multitudinous  modifi- 
cations of  it  arise.  But  if  the  phrase  is  taken  to  mean  the 
underlying  something  of  which  these  distinguishable  portions 
are  formed,  or  of  which  they  are  modifications ;  then  we  know 
nothing  about  it,  and  never  can  know  anything  about  it." 

Now,  if  by  this  Mr.  Spencer  means  we  cannot  know  our 
o\\n  soul  otherwise  than  in  and  by  its  acts,  he  only  He  asserts  a 

111  11111  truism  or  an 

asserts  what  lias  been  ever  taught  by  the  schools  to  absurdity, 
which  he  is  most  opposed.     No  rational  metaphysician  ever 

*  '  Psychology,'  vol.  i.  p.  145. 

t  It  may  be  well  asked,  on  what  ground  shall  wo  make  this  assumption  ? 
Unless  he  grants  a  w •li'con.-cionsiic.-.s,  which  lie  does  not  grant,  such  an 
assumption  will  Ix:  both  groundless  and  unvurifiablu. 


26  LESSONS  FKOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  I. 

taught  that  the  soul  could  be  known  by  us  in  its  essence  or 
otherwise  than  by  its  acts. 

But  if  by  the  passage  quoted  he  would  deny  that  we  have 
direct  consciousness  of  an  enduring  and  persistent  self, 
known  to  us  by  its  acts  as  the  author  of  our  volitions  and 
the  subject  of  our  feelings  and  cognitions,  then  we  might 
equally  deny  that  Mr.  Spencer  has,  or  ever  can  have,  any 
knowledge  of  any  friend  as,  e.g.,  Professor  Tyndall. 

If  by  Professor  Tyndall  is  to  be  understood  a  plexus  of 
An  iiiustra-  sensible  accidents — an  entity  "  qualitatively  differ- 
entiated in  each  portion  that  is  separable  by 
thought " — then  Mr.  Spencer  may  "  know  something  "  about 
Professor  Tyndall,  "and  may  eventually  know  more."  But 
if  the  name  is  taken  to  mean  the  underlying  something 
which  is  now  speaking,  now  silent,  now  in  the  Alps,  now  at 
the  Koyal  Institution,  at  one  time  a  boy,  at  another  a  man, 
which  has  a  certain  expression  of  face,  a  certain  habit  of 
dress,  a  certain  mode  of  carriage,  a  certain  cast  of  thought — 
then  Mr.  Spencer  knows  "nothing  about  it,  and  never  can 
know  anything  about  it :"  since  he  can  never  know  his  friend 
but  by  and  through  some  act,  were  it  only  by  action  on  the 
retina  of  Mr.  Spencer,  or  by  some  active  impressions  on  his 
auditory  nerves. 

But  we  have  said  Mr.  Spencer  is  hardly  clear  in  this 
An  argu-  matter,  and  we  may  add,  he  is  hardly  consistent. 

mentumad       ^      .  .    .  •,  -p  .1  ' 

hominem.  He  is  not  consistent ;  because  11  there  is  one  promi- 
nent feature  of  his  teaching,  it  is  the  supreme  certainty 
borne  in  on  us  of  the  existence  of  what  he  calls  the  absolute 
and  unmodified  "  unknowable." 

Yet  all  that  Mr.  Spencer  brings  against  our  consciousness 
of  the  Ego  may  be  brought  against  his  unknowable.  If 
everything  that  we  know  is  a  form  of  the  unknowable,  then 
the  unknowable  is  modified,  and  the  absolute  or  unmodified 
unknowable  is  an  absurdity. 

Similarly,  that  we  cannot  know  the  Ego  except  as  quali- 
tatively differentiated  is  most  true,  but  it  is  true  for  the  very 
simple  reason  that  it  never  exists  except  in  some  state.  A 


CHAP.  I.]  THE  STABTING-POINT.  27 

qualitatively  undifferentiated.  Ego  is  a  pure  absurdity  and  an 
impossibility.  No  wonder,  then,  our  intellects  do  not  appre- 
hend it. 

He  tens  us  that  the  substance  of  mind   cannot  possibly 
be  known,  because  since  "  every  state  of  mind   is  What  he 
some    modification    of  this    substance  of  mind,"  ^Jthe^L 
in  no  state   of  mind  can  the   substance  of  mind  w^anthef 
be  present  unmodified.      But  this  does  not  prove  denle8' 
that  the  continuance  of  mind  is  unknowable,  but  only  that 
it  is  not  knowable  except  in  its  modifications. 

3Ir.  Spencer  talks  of  stales  of  mind  known  as  "states  of 
mind,"  or  "  modifications  of  mind."  But  there  cannot  be  a 
consciousness  of  difference  without  a  comparison,  and  two 
things  cannot  be  compared  if  one  is  unknown  and  unknow- 
able. Therefore  these  "  states  "  and  "  modifications  "  can  only 
be  known  as  such  by  comparison  with  a  "  persistent  sub- 
stance "  of  mind,  and  therefore  this  must  be  known  in  order 
that  we  may  know  "  stetes  of  mind  "  as  "  states  of  mind." 

But  an  attempt  to  deny  our  knowledge  of  the  substan- 
tial Ego,  without  at  the  same  time  implicitly  asserting  that 
knowledge,  is  really  an  effort  to  escape  self-consciousness, 
which  can  be  but  very  inadequately  represented  by  the 
conception  of  a  man  trying  to  jump  away  from  his  own 
shadow. 

We  may  then  conclude  that  in  affirming  our  certain 
knowledge  of  our  own  continued  existence  we  hold  a  conclusion 
position  we  can  maintain  against  all  assailants.  a 
We  have  in  that  certainty  a  starting-point  of  knowledge 
such  as  we  set  out  to  seek,  namely,  one  that  is  thoroughly 
satisfactory.  If  indeed  we  have  not  with  respect  to  that 
self-existence  the  highest  degree  of  certainty,  then  the  intel- 
lect is  deprived  of  any  firm  foundation  whereon  to  raise  a 
rational  system  of  co-ordinated  knowledge.  But  it  is  hoped 
that  the  cavils  of  the  Agnostics  have  been  here  met  by  argu- 
ments sufficient  to  enable  even  the  most  timid  and  deferential 
readers  and  hearers  of  our  modern  Sophists  to  hold  their 
own  rational  convictions,  and  to  maintain  they  know  what 


LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  I. 

they  are  convinced  they  do  know,  and  not  to  give  up  a  certain 
and  absolute  truth  (their  intellectual  birthright)  at  the  bid- 
ding of  those  who  would  illogically  make  use  of  such  negation 
as  a  ground  for  affirming  the  relativity  of  all  our  knowledge, 
and  consequently  for  denying  all  such  truths  as,  for  whatever 
reason,  they  may  desire  to  deny. 

Such,  then,  is  the  first  lesson  we  may  draw  from  the  in- 
xbe  first  IPS-  vestigation  of  nature  as  revealed  to  us  in  and  by 
toe.rw  '"  our  own  minds.  Our  continued  personal  existence 
is  a  certainty  absolute  and  irresistible,  directly  known  to 
us  as  a  particular  contingent  fact  by  means  of  conscious- 
ness itself.  Our  supreme  certainty  of  this  truth  has,  as  wo 
have  seen,  been  denied  on  grounds  which,  it  is  here  con- 
tended, plainly  show  a  want  of  accurate  analysis  and  of  careful 
introspection  on  the  part  of  the  deniers.  Their  denial,  how- 
ever, serves  to  bring  out  still  more  clearly  the  supreme  im- 
portance of  our  recognition  of  our  own  self-consciousness,  and 
of  all  that  our  knowledge  of  the  Ego  implies  and  contains. 
Each  man  who  for  the  first  time  has  his  eyes  thus  opened  to 
the  marvellous  nature  of  his  present  knowledge  of  his  own 
past  existence  will  see  in  this  necessarily  postulated  "  veracity 
of  memory  "  the  evidence  of  his  possession  of  real  objective 
truth  and  of  knowledge  other  than  phenomenal.  That  is  to 
say,  he  will  see  that  his  own  mind  has  the  power  (however 
acquired  and  however  mysterious)  of  penetrating  beyond  the 
appearances  of  things,  beyond  mere  feelings,  and  the  con- 
stant changes  of  nature,  and  of  attaining  a  direct  knowledge 
of  a  persistent  and  real  being — namely,  himself,  as  both 
past  and  present — learning  through  his  passing  states  and 
feelings  the  fact  of  his  own  persistent  and  enduring  being. 
We  may  now  seek  to  learn  whether  this  first  lesson  taught 
us  by  nature  can  aid  towards  the  acquirement  of  further 
certainty. 


CHAPTER  II. 

FIRST  TRUTHS. 

"  Knowledge  must  be  based  on  the  study  of  mental  facts  and  on 
undemonstrable  truths  which  declare  their  own  absolute  certainty,  and 
are  seen  by  the  mind  to  be  positively  and  necessarily  true." 

THE  first  lesson  we  have  gathered  from  nature,  one  which 
is  certain  and  indisputable,  is  the  fact  of  our  own  Self.know. 
continued  personal  existence  revealed  to  us  by  ^^hTv^ 
consciousness  and  by  memory.  This  certainty,  tlhuy  wiTh- 
though  absolute,  rests  upon  an  immediately  known  outProof- 
fact,  and  not  upon  evidence ;  neither  is  it  capable  of  proof, 
being  above  and  beyond  all  proof  of  whatever  kind.  It 
is  thus  manifest  that  we  may  have  absolute  certainty  without 
proof,  and  a  moment's  reflection  suffices  to  show  that  there 
must  be  truths  of  this  order — truths  as  certain  as  they  are 
undemonstrable.  For  demonstration  can  but  proceed  by 
proving  some  propositions  by  the  help  of  others  which  will 
not  be  denied ;  and  this  process,  unless  it  is  to  go  on  for 
ever,  must  stop  at  truths  which  can  be  at  once  seen  to  be 
self-evident  and  indisputable.  If  no  such  truths  can  possibly 
be  found,  then  the  mind  can  have  no  secure  basis  whatever 
upon  which  to  rear  a  fabric  of  reasoned  and  coherent  truth. 

And  here  it  might  be  expected  that  in  gathering  lessons 
from  nature  our  course  should  be  to  start  from  a  ^^^  why 
consideration  of  external  objects,  proceeding  from  g^0^1'" 
the  lower  and  more  simple  to  the  higher  and  more  „'"$ before 
complex,  till  we  reach,  at  last,  the  highest  nature  Su'^-*" 
which  our  senses  make  known  to  us,  namely,  our  ture- 


HO  LESSONS  FHOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  II. 

own.  It  might  be  expected  that,  in  our  study  of  life,  we 
should  ascend  from  a  consideration  of  mere  nutrition,  growth, 
and  reproduction,  through  locomotion  and  feeling,  up  to  the 
most  abstract  intellectual  action,  according  to  the  great 
example  left  us  by  Aristotle. 

To  begin  with  the  external  world  would  also  be  the  more 
reasonable  and  consistent  course,  seeing  that  with  each  of  us, 
as  we  develop  from  earliest  infancy,  the  external  becomes 
noticed  by  us  before  the  internal,  and  the  consideration  of 
surrounding  objects  takes  up  a  much  larger  part  of  our  mental 
activity  than  self-contemplation.  And  such  an  objective 
ascending  course  would  indeed  be  the  one  here  followed  were 
it  not  for  the  various  cavils  against  human  intelligence  which 
prevail  amongst  us  to-day.  But  when  idealists  deny  the 
existence  of  an  external  world  at  all ;  when  sensists  proclaim 
our  highest  thoughts  to  be  but  transformed  sensations; 
when  the  assertors  of  absolute  identity  declare  both  self  and 
not-self  to  be  modes  of  an  unknowable  entity,  which  is 
neither,  yet  both — under  these  conditions  our  treatment 
must  be  modified  accordingly.  To  follow  the  more  natural 
method  would  now  be  to  fall  into  a  petitio  principii.  For 
it  has  become  necessary  first  to  justify  our  judgments  con- 
cerning our  perceptions  and  our  reasonings,  and  only  after 
this  can  we  logically  proceed  to  investigate  the  world  of 
objective  being  around  us.  As  long  as  the  objective  validity 
of  subjective  conceptions  is  in  dispute,  objective  truths  must 
not  appear  first  in  the  field.  In  a  controversy  in  which 
"  states  of  consciousness  "  have  become  the  ultimate  criterion, 
it  would  be  a  mistake  to  begin  with  considering  facts  of 
anatomy  and  physiology.  I  fully  agree,  then,  with  Mr. 
Spencer  when  he  says  that  the  metaphysician's  first  step 
must  be  to  exclude  from  his  investigation  everything  objective ; 
not  taking  for  granted  the  existence  of  anything  external 
corresponding  to  his  ideas,  until  he  has  ascertained  what 
it  is  he  predicates  in  calling  his  ideas  true. 

It  seems  plain  that  our  first  duty  here  is  to  settle,  if 
we  may,  an  ultimate  criterion  on  a  subjective  basis,  arid  by 


CHAP.  II.]  FIRST  TRUTHS.  31 

means  of  it  to  endeavour  to  show  what  must  necessarily  be 
postulated  if  we  would  rise  above  utter  scepticism. 

^'e  have  therefore  taken  immediate  consciousness  as  our 
fundamental  fact — as  that  which  is  to  form,  and  must  form, 
part  of  that  foundation  on  which  alone  any  durable  philo- 
sophic edifice  can  now  be  raised. 

Next  to  the  fact  of  our  own  continued  personal  existence, 
onr  attention  may  be  recalled  and  directed  to  the  And  endea- 

i  11     vour  to  har- 

certamty  that  we  not  only  exist,  but  that  we  both  momseour 

•  •  thoughts  and 

think  and  feel — that  we  have  a  faculty  both  of  think-  feelings, 
ing  and  feeling.    These  truths  are  unquestionable — whatever 
cavils  may  be  made  as  to  the  world  external  to  our  own  minds. 

If  our  thoughts  and  feelings  can  be  so  coadjusted  as  to 
result  in  order  and  harmony,  if  they  can  be  arranged  in 
an  orderly  and  reciprocally  supporting  collocation,  we  thereby 
attain  to  a  stable  system  of  philosophy.  And  that  system 
of  philosophy  must  be  the  best  which  harmonises  the 
whole  universe  of  facts  with  least  strain  and  most  stability. 

If  contradiction  and  discord  necessarily  result  from  every 
attempt  at  such  coadjustment,  if  our  mental  activity  cannot 
but  end  in  contradictions,  then  we  have  no  possible  refuge 
from  utter  scepticism. 

But  these  two  entities  of  which  we  are  conscious, 
"thoughts"  and  "feelings,"  may  be  seen  by  intro-  somediffer- 

to  *  cncesbe- 

spection  to  have  a  very  different  range.  Our  feel-  twecn  these, 
ings,  of  course,  as  present  feelings,  are  infallible,  but  they 
refer  only  to  what  we  deem  present  here  and  now,  or  to  the 
recent  past.  Our  thoughts,  on  the  other  hand,  can  range 
over  all  conceivable  time  and  space,  and  with  equal  infallibi- 
lity affirm  such  propositions  as,  e.g.,  that  always  and  every- 
\\hore  "the  whole  is  greater  than  its  part,"  "whatever 
thinks,  exists."  Moreover,  looking  into  our  own  minds 
shows  us  that  thought  exercised  about  feelings  does  not 
attain  to  the  same  degree  of  certainty  and  conviction 
which  it  can  attain  to  when  exercised  about  certain  other 
thoughts.  We  see  that  there  may  be  possible  sources  of 
error.  Thus,  e.g.,  when  we  say,  "  I  see  that  chair,"  we  have 


32  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  II. 

an  internal  mental  state  of  conviction,  but  one  less  forcible 
and  certain,  than  the  roental  state  of  conviction  we  have 
when  we  say,  "  whatever  thinks,  exists." 

Again,  looking  into  our  own  mind  shows  us  the  strange 
power  it  has  of  seeing  a  necessary  universality  in  a  single 
experience.  Let  the  three  angles  of  any  triangle  be  once 
clearly  understood  to  be  equal  to  two  right  angles,  and  we 
also  see  immediately  that  in  all  space,  such  as  the  space  we 
know,  the  three  angles  within  any  possible  figure  bounded  by 
three  straight  lines  must  also  be  equal  to  two  right  angles. 

Mr.  Lewes  indeed  tells  us  *  that :  "  Ideas  can  be  valid  only 
Thought,  not  as  representatives  of  sensations ;"  and  from  a  certain 

feeling,  the  .    *  .  .       .  . 

test  oi  truth,  point  oi  view  this  is  true,  since  all  our  ideas  arise 
through  and  by  means  of  sensations.  But  there  are  ideas 
which  are  not  and  never  were  representatives  of  sensation, 
but  of  what  is  or  has  been  suggested  to  our  intellect  by 
means  of  sensations.  Such  ideas  are,  e.g.,  those  of  substance, 
ratio,  cause,  &c.  These  ideas  when  expressed  by  us  in  words 
are  deemed  and  believed,  through  what  we  take  to  be  ex- 
perience, to  be  capable  of  suggesting  to  others  these  similar 
supra-sensible  cognitions,  and  we  think  (assuming  men  like 
ourselves  to  exist)  that  if  any  one  denies  this  he  is  not  as 
other  men  are. 

Mr.  Lewes  adds :  t  "  All  sensation  is  certain,  indisputable. 
The  test  and  measure  of  certitude  is  therefore  sensation." 
Now  this  is  bad  logic ;  such  a  conclusion  would  follow  only  if 
nothing  was  certain  but  sensation.  All  he  can  logically  con- 
clude is  that  sensation  is  "  a  test  and  measure  of  certitude." 
In  one  sense  it  is  such  a  test — not  the  test.  Moreover,  it  is 
a  test  used  by  the  intellect.  In  feeling  itself  there  is  neither 
certainty  nor  doubt;  these  are  the  attributes  of  "thought" 
only.  To  say  that  certitude  is  in  even  any  one  case  to  be 
tested  by  sensation  is  an  incomplete  and  misleading  expression. 

Certainty,  we  see  by  introspection,  does  not  exist  at  all  in 
feelings,  any  more  than  doubt.  Both  belong  to  thought  only. 

*  '  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,'  vol.  i.  p.  181. 
t  Op.  cit.  p.  257. 


CHAP.  II.J  FIEST  TEUTHS.  33 

"  Feelings "  are  but  the  materials  of  certainty,  and  though 
we  can  be  perfectly  certain  about  our  feelings,  that  certainty 
belongs  to  thought,  and  to  thought  only.  Thought,  therefore, 
is  our  ultimate  and  absolute  criterion,  that  to  which  we  can 
alone  appeal.  It  is  by  self-eonscious  thought  only  that  we 
know  we  have  any  feelings  at  all.  Without  thought,  indeed, 
we  might  feel,  but  we  could  not  know  that  we  felt,  or  know 
ourselves  as  feeling. 

We  have  then  self-consciousness  and  thought,  called  into 
action  through  sensation,  from  which  to  build  up,  as  we  may, 
our  fabric  of  knowledge,  and  these  faculties,  as  we  shall  shortly 
see,  imply  much  more,  and  in  fact  suffice  by  themselves  to 
carry  us  out  from  our  internal  world  of  thought  into  an 
external  universe  of  real  existence.  Indeed,  our  subjective 
knowledge  of  our  own  past  existence,  which  is  to  us  now  an 
objective  fact,  suffices  to  enable  us  at  once  to  cross  the  bridge 
(provided  for  us  by  nature)  spanning  the  bottomless  abyss 
separating  subjectivity  from  objectivity ;  separating,  that  is, 
the  world  of  existence  outside  our  consciousness  from,  the 
world  of  our  conscious  existence. 

But  it  is  time  to  return  to  the  question  of  first  truths,  and 
to  the  question  respecting  the  ultimate  foundation  of  philo- 
sophy and  the  true  basis  of  certitude,  and  the  necessity  of 
our  intellect  finding  and  possessing  undemonstrated  and 
undeinonstrable  certainties  by  which  all  other  truths  may  be 
proved,  if  truth  is  to  exist  for  us  at  all. 

Balmes  *  has  well  said :   "  Not  only  are  not  all  things 
demonstrated,  but  it  may  even  be  demonstrated  that  some 
things  are  undeinonstrable.    Demonstration  is  a  ratiocination, 
in  which  we  infer  from  evident  propositions  a  pro-  n^e,,  and 
position  evidently  connected  with  them.      If  the  ^^^"0 
premisses  are  of  themselves  evident,  they  do  not  ofe8tortmjlity 
admit  of  demonstration;    if  we  suppose  them   in  ™™tr°bTe 
their  turn  demonstrable,  we  shall  have  the  same  " 
difficulty  with  respect  to  those  on  which  the  new  demon- 


'  Fundamental  Philosophy'  (translated  by  Brownson),  vol.  i.  p.  106. 
3 


34  LESSONS  FKOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  II. 

stration  is  founded ;  therefore  we  must  either  stop  at  an 
indemonstrable  point,  or  proceed  to  infinity,  which  would  be 
never  to  finish  the  demonstration." 

Although,  to  be  perfectly  consistent,  Mr.  Spencer  ought  to 
deny  the  existence  of  any  basis  of  certitude,  or  of  any  abso- 
lute and  fundamental  truth,  yet,  by  a  happy  inconsistency, 
lie  lays  down  the  necessity  of  primary  underaonstrable  truths 
underlying  the  whole  fabric  of  knowledge. 

I  cite  with  pleasure  the  following  statements,  which  seem 
as  true  and  valid  as  they  are  admirably  expressed.  In 
criticising  '  Empiricism '  or  '  Experientialism,'  he  says  :  — * 

"  Throughout  its  argument  there  runs  the  tacit  assumption  that 
there  may  be  a  philosophy  in  which  nothing  is  asserted  but  what  is 
proved.  It  proposes  to  admit  into  the  coherent  fabric  of  its  conclu- 
sions, no  conclusion  that  is  incapable  of  being  established  by  evidence ; 
and  thus  it  takes  for  granted  that  not  only  may  all  derivative  truths 
be  proved,  but  also  that  proof  may  be  given  of  the  truths  from  which 
they  are  derived,  down  to  the  very  deepest.  The  consequence  of  this 
refusal  to  recognise  some  fundamental  unproved  truth  is  that  its  fabric 
of  conclusions  is  left  without  a  base.  Giving  proof  of  any  special  pro- 
position, is  assimilating  it  to  some  class  of  propositions  known  to  be 
true.  If  any  doubt  arises  respecting  the  general  proposition  cited  in 
justification  of  this  special  proposition,  the  course  is  to  show  that  this 
general  proposition  is  deducible  from  a  proposition  of  still  greater 
generality ;  and  if  pressed  for  proof  of  such  still  more  general  proposi- 
tion, the  only  resource  is  to  repeat  the  process.  Is  this  process  endless? 
If  so,  nothing  can  be  proved — the  whole  series  of  propositions  depends 
on  some  unassignable  proposition.  Has  the  process  an  end  ?  If  so, 
there  must  eventually  be  reached  a  widest  proposition — one  which 
cannot  be  justified  by  showing  that  it  is  included  by  any  wider — one 
which  cannot  be  proved.  Or  to  put  the  argument  otherwise : — Every 
inference  depends  on  premises ;  every  premise,  if  it  admits  of  proof, 
depends  on  other  premises;  and  if  the  proof  of  the  proof  be  continually 
demanded,  it  must  either  end  in  an  unproved  premise,  or  in  the 
acknowledgment  that  there  cannot  be  reached  any  premise  on  which 
the  entire  series  of  proofs  depends. 

"  Hence  Philosophy,  if  it  does  not  avowedly  stand  on  some  datum 
underlying  reason,  must  acknowledge  that  it  has  nothing  on  which  to 
stand — must  confess  itself  to  be  baseless." 

But  the  question  immediately  arises,  "  How  are  unproved 

*  'Psychology,'  vol.  ii.  p.  391. 


CHAP.  II.]  FIRST  TRUTHS.  35 

and  improvable  self-evident  truths  to  be  sought?"  Mani- 
festly by  introspection  alone — the  careful  analysis  of  con- 
sciousness by  each  one  for  himself. 

In  order  successfully  to  combat  with  those  who  accept 
idealism  we  must,  for  the  sake  of  those  who  do  not  accept  the 
nature-given  bridge  between  object  and  subject,  begin  from 
a  purely  subjective  basis. 

This,  as  has  been  said,  is  the  method  declared  necessary  by 
Mr.  Spencer  himself,  and  he  also  tells  us  *  to  the  same  effect : — 

"  The  first  step  in  a  metaphysical  argument,  rightly  carried  on, 
must  be  an  examination  of  propositions  for  the  purpose  of  ascertaining 
what  character  is  common  to  those  which  we  call  unquestionably  true, 
and  is  implied  by  asserting  their  unquestionable  truth.  Further,  to 
carry  on  this  inquiry  legitimately,  we  must  restrict  our  analysis  rigor- 
ously to  states  of  consciousness  considered  in  their  relations  to  one 
another:  wholly  ignoring  anything  beyond  consciousness  to  which 
these  states  and  their  relations  may  be  supposed  to  refer.  For,  if,  before 
we  have  ascertained  by  comparing  propositions  wha"t  is  the  trait  that 
leads  us  to  class  some  of  them  as  certainly  true,  we  avowedly  or  tacitly 
take  for  granted  the  existence  of  something  beyond  consciousness; 
then,  a  particular  proposition  is  assumed  to  be  certainly  true  before  we 
have  ascertained  what  is  the  distinctive  character  of  the  propositions 
which  we  call  certainly  true,  and  the  analysis  is  vitiated.  If  we  cannot 
transcend  consciousness — if,  therefore,  what  we  know  as  truth  must  be 
some  mental  state,  or  some  combination  of  mental  states ;  it  must  be 
possible  for  us  to  say  in  what  way  we  distinguish  this  state  or  these 
states.  The  definition  of  truth  must  be  expressible  in  terms  of  con- 
sciousness; and,  indeed,  cannot  otherwise  be  expressed  if  conscious- 
ness cannot  be  transcended.  Clearly,  then,  the  metaphysician's  first 
step  must  be  to  shut  out  from  his  investigation  everything  but  what  is 
subjective ;  not  taking  for  granted  the  existence  of  anything  objective 
corresponding  to  his  ideas,  until  he  has  ascertained  what  property  of 
his  ideas  it  is  which  he  predicates  by  calling  them  true." 

Now,  although  I  have  the  good  fortune  to  agree,  to  a 
certain  extent,  with  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  as  to  the  limits  and 
necessary  conditions  of  inquiry,  yet  my  view  as  to  the  ulti- 
mate and  final  test  of  all  truth  whatever  differs  profoundly 
and  fundamentally  from  his. 

I  differ  from  him,  and  deem  his  conception  of  this  test  to 


1  Essays,'  vol.  ii.  p.  400  (stereotyped  edition). 


36  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [Ciur.  II. 

be  iuadequate  and  false,  because  he  makes  that  test  a  purely 
negative   one.      He   asserts   that  "inconceivability"  is   the 
ultimate  and  supreme  test  of  truth. 
He  tells  us  : — * 

"A  discussion  in  consciousness  proves  to  be  simply  a  trial  of 
strength  between  different  connexions  in  consciousness — a  systematized 
struggle  serving  to  determine  which  are  the  least  coherent  states  of 
consciousness.  And  the  result  of  the  struggle  is,  that  the  least  coherent 
states  of  consciousness  separate,  while  the  most  coherent  remain  toge- 
ther ;  forming  a  proposition  of  which  the  predicate  persists  in  the  mind 
along  with  its  subject.  ...  If  there  are  any  indissoluble  connexions, 
he  is  compelled  to  accept  them.  If  certain  states  of  consciousness 
absolutely  cohere  in  certain  ways,  he  is  obliged  to  think  them  in  those 
ways.  .  .  .  Here,  then,  the  inquirer  comes  down  to  an  ultimate 
uniformity — a  universal  law  of  thinking." 

As  I  have  said,  I  consider  Mr.  Spencer's  test  inadequate, 
Mr.  sponcer-s  an(l  **&  convinced  that  his  analysis  of  consciousness 
mate°truth8  i§  incomplete  and  misleading.  He  fails  to  distin- 
nferci^nega6-  guish  between  two  distinct  classes  of  ultimate  psy- 
chical phenomena,  and  consequently  does  not  really 
accept,  as  he  professes  to  do,  the  absolute  dicta  of  con- 
sciousness for  the  basis  of  his  philosophy.  He  fails  to  dis- 
tinguish between  merely  negative  mental  impotencies  or 
simple  inconceivabilities  on  the  one  hand  and  positive  per- 
ceptions or  intuitions  on  the  other.  He  fails  to  note  the 
utterly  different  classes  of  judgments  which  severally  affirm 
either  that  they  simply  cannot  conceive  a  given  proposition 
to  be  true,  or  that  they  positively  do  see  that  the  opposite  of 
a  given  proposition  cannot  be  true.  Negative  perceptions 
of  simple  inconceivability  are  reflex,  but  positive  intuitions 
(as  when  I  gaze  at  a  picture  on  the  wall  before  me)  are 
direct. 

Mr.  Spencer  distinguishes  between  two  classes  of  unbeliev- 
able propositions,  namely  :  (1)  the  simply  unbelievable  or  in- 
credible,  and  (2)  the  inconceivable.  He  defines  f  the  former 
as  a  proposition  "  which  admits  of  being  framed  in  thought, 


*  '  Psychology,'  vol.  ii.  p.  450. 
t  Ibid.  vol.  ii.  p.  408. 


CHAP.  II.]  FIRST  TRUTHS.  37 

but  is  so  much  at  variance  with  experience  "  "  that  its  terms 
cannot  be  put  in  the  alleged  relation  without  effort ; "  and 
he  gives  us  an  example — -a.  caunon-ball  fired  from  England 
to  America.  An  inconceivable  proposition  is  defined  by  him 
as  "  one  of  which  the  terms  cannot,  by  any  effort,  be  brought 
before  consciousness  in  that  relation  which  the  proposition 
asserts  between  them : "  and  he  gives  as  examples  of  in- 
conceivability "that  one  side  of  a  triangle  is  equal  to  the 
sum  of  the  other  two  sides ; "  and  *  the  idea  of  resistance, 
disconnected  from  the  idea  of  extension  in  the  resisting 
object. 

Now,  in  the  first  place,  it  must  be  presumed  that  with  Mr. 
Herbert  Spencer  the  term  "  framed  in  thought "  is  equiva- 
lent to  "  represented  in  imagination,"  and  the  distinction  ho 
draws  is  as  true  as  obvious,  between  propositions  which  can 
be  imagined  but  are  not  to  be  believed,  and  those  which 
cannot  be  imagined  at  all.  He  does  not,  however,  as  has  been 
said,  distinguish  sufficiently  between  propositions,  as  a  little 
introspection  will  convince  any  unprejudiced  experimenter. 

There  are,  in  fact,  not  one,  but  two  distinct  classes  of  un- 
imaginable propositions,  and  it  is  the  second  of  these  TWO  distinct 
(ignored  by  him)  which  alone  compels  the  mind  to  unimagin- 

'  ableproposi- 

absolute,    unconditional,   universal,   and   necessary  twns- 
assent  to  their  contradictories,  because  their  contradictories 
are  seen  to  be  absolutely,  unconditionally,  universally,  and 
necessarily  true. 

There  are  altogether  four  kinds  of  propositions  in  con- 
sciousness : — 

1.  Those  which  can  be  both  imagined  and  believed. 

2.  Those  which  can  be  imagined  but  cannot  be  believed, 
o.  Those  which  cannot  be  imagined  but  can  be  believed. 
4.  Those  which  cannot  be  imagined  and  are  not  believed, 

l.i 'cause  they  are  positively  known  to  be  absolutely  impossible. 

We  need  not  occupy  time  with  a  consideration  of  the 

first  two  kinds,  but  the  latter  two  require  careful  discrimi- 


'  Psychology,'  vol.  ii.  pp.  406,  407. 


LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  II. 

nation.  It  is  surely  somewhat  surprising  that  Mr.  Spencer 
does  not  discuss  the  two  meanings  of  the  word  "  inconceivable,'' 
pointed  out  long  ago  in  the  controversy  between  Mill  and 
Whewell,  and  fully  admitted  by  Mr.  G.  H.  Lewes,  who 
observes:*  "That  which  is  unpicturable  maybe  conceivable; 
and  the  abstraction  which  is  impossible  to  ....  imagination 
is  easy  to  conception."  The  word  "inconceivable"  is  some- 
times taken  to  denote  simply  that  which  the  mind  cannot 
picture  in  a  distinct  mental  image.  At  other  times  it  is 
made  use  of  to  signify  that  which  is  "  unintelligible "  or 
"  unthinkable."  But  a  great  number  of  things  which 
cannot  be  pictured  to  the  imagination  can  most  certainly 
be  thought  and  understood,  and  none  of  those  who  uphold 
the  validity  of  our  intuitions  of  objective  necessary  truth  pre- 
tend that  that  which  cannot  be  imagined  is  necessarily  untrue. 
Fortunately,  in  this  matter  of  the  declarations  of  conscious- 
ness, the  appeal  is  to  facts  and  experiments — facts  that  can 
be  observed,  experiments  that  can  be  carried  on  by  every  one 
a  little  advanced  in  philosophy,  and  therefore  possessing  that 
which  is  a  necessary  condition  of  such  advance,  namely,  a 
habit  of  careful  introspection.  I  venture  confidently  to 
affirm  that  we  have  as  certain  evidence  for  this  distinction  of 
kind  between  our  own  thoughts  as  we  have  for  the  very  being 
of  those  thoughts  themselves.  The  existence  of  this  distinc- 
tion as  a  fact  is  incontrovertible,  and  the  fact  of  this  declara- 
tion of  consciousness  should  be  first  carefully  noted;  its 
validity  may  be  considered  afterwards. 

The  first  class  of  Mr.  Spencer  s  inconceivable  propositions 
(our  simply  unimaginable  ones)  are,  or,  for  all  we  see,  may 
be,  the  mere  results  of  mental  impotence;  they  are  but 
negatively  and  passively  inconceivable.  The  second  class  of 
inconceivable  propositions  (our  necessarily  false  ones)  are 
those  which  are  positively  and  actively  inconceivable,  because 
they  are  clearly  known  by  the  mind  to  be  absolutely  and 
universally  impossible.  At  present  we  have  not  to  consider 


1  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,'  vol.  i.  p.  420. 


CHAP.  II. J  FIEST  TEUTIIS.  39 

whether  such  perceptions  are  objectively  true  and  valid,  but 
to  point  out  that,  as  a  fact,  they  subjectively  exist. 

Let  us,  then,  first  note  certain  propositions  which  the  mind 
seems  impotent  to  imagine,  but  which  the  intellect  can  both 
understand  and  believe.  The  intellect  clearly  conceives  a 
force  varying  inversely  as  the  square  of  the  distance  between 
two  bodies  it  reciprocally  affects ;  yet  this  variation  cannot 
be  adequately  represented  by  any  image  to  the  imagination. 
We  can,  again,  conceive  an  infinite  addition  of  fractions, 
which  shall  yet  never  attain  to  unity  ;  but  such  a  conception 
is  utterly  beyond  the  power  of  the  imagination.  Again,  we 
can  not  only  conceive  but  it  is  evidently  a  necessary  truth 
that  (a?  -f-  a  6  +  «)  +  (a  6  -  x  -f  62)  =  (a  -f  6)  x  (a  +  6),  let 
a,  6,  and  x,  represent  whatever  whole  numbers  they  may ;  yet 
this  can  by  no  means  be  directly  represented  by  the 
imagination. 

But  conceptions  may  be  formed  as  to  modes  of  existence 
of  which  we  have  had  no  experience  whatever,  and  A  fallacy  of 

c  Professor 

necessary  deductions  can  even  be  drawn  from  such  Heimiwitz. 
deductions.  Thus  Professor  Helmholtz  has  conceived  * 
"  beings  living  and  moving  along  the  surface  of  a  solid  body, 
who  are  able  to  perceive  nothing  but  what  exists  on  this 
surface,  and  insensible  to  all  beyond  it ;  "  and  he  adds,  "  if 
such  beings  lived  on  the  surface  of  a  sphere,  their  space  would 
be  without  a  limit,  but  it  would  not  be  infinitely  extended ; 
and  the  axioms  of  geometry  would  turn  out  very  different 
from  ours,  and  from  those  of  the  inhabitants  of  a  plane.  The 
shortest  lines  which  the  inhabitants  of  a  spherical  surface 
could  draw  would  be  arcs  of  greater  circles ; "  also  there 
would  be  many  shorter  lines  between  the  same  two  points  if 
there  were  two  poles.  Moreover,  he  tells  us,  such  beings 
"  would  not  be  able  to  form  the  notion  of  parallel  geodetical 
lines,  because  every  pair  of  their  geodetical  lines,  when  suffi- 
ciently prolonged,  would  intersect  in  two  points,"  &c.  This 
passage  is  not  only  interesting  as  demonstrating  our  power  of 


*  '  The  Academy,'  vol.  i.  p.  128. 


40  LESSONS  FKOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  II. 

transcending  experience  by  conception,  but  even  more  so  as 
the  solemn  enunciation  of  a  transparent  fallacy  by  a  man  of 
eminence.  Professor  Helmholtz  concludes :  "  We  may  resume 
the  results  of  these  investigations  by  saying  that  tlie  axioms 
on  which  our  geometrical  system  is  based  are  no  necessary 
truths."  And  Professor  Clifford  *  cites  with  approval  the 
article  here  quoted,  and  adopts  its  conclusions.  Nevertheless 
the  fallacy  is  surely  transparent.  Unless  geometrical  axioms 
were  necessary  truths,  it  would  be  impossible  for  these  pro- 
fessors to  declare  what  would  or  would  not  be  the  necessary 
results  attending  such  imaginary  conditions.  And  "  other 
systems"  could  not,  as  Professor  Helmholtz  admits  t  they 
may,  "  be  developed  analytically  with  perfect  logical  con- 
sistency." If  such  beings  as  are  supposed  called  the  lines  re- 
ferred to  "  straight,"  they  would  mean  by  that  word  what  we 
should  call  "  arcs  of  great  circles."  Whether  such  beings 
could  conceive  parallel  lines  or  not,  there  is  no  evidence  to 
show,  but  there  is  no  shadow  of  foundation  for  asserting  that, 
if  they  could  conceive  them,  they  would  not  perceive  the  im- 
possibility of  their  ever  meeting,  as  we  can  perceive  the 
necessary  relations  of  their  supposed  space  conditions  which, 
by  the  hypothesis,  are  not  ours. 

On  this  subject  Mr.  Lewes  has  observed :  \  "  In  a  space  of 
two  or  of  four  dimensions  many  geometrical  propositions 
which  relate  to  a  space  of  three  dimensions  would  not  be  true. 
Who  doubts  it  ?  Who  expects  that  the  same  results  can  be 
the  product  of  different  factors  ?  " 

Mr.  Spencer,  as  we  have  seen,  deems  it  absolutely  in- 
Mr. spencer's  conceivable  that  an  unextended  object  can  offer 

example  of  .  .  ,T  .     ,  , 

absolute        resistance  or  exercise  pressure.      Nevertheless,  he 

inconcpiv-  .        ,  . 

ability.  himselt  is  able  to  conceive  '  body,  as  really  apart 
from  extension,  and  in  terms  of  force  only — since  that  which 
is  described  must  be  conceived;  and  he  tells  us§  it  is 


*  '  Macruillan's  Magazine,'  October  1872,  p.  504. 
t  '  The  Academy,'  vol.  i.  p.  130. 
t  '  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,'  vol.  i.  p.  378. 
§  '  First  Principles'  (2nd  edition),  p.  1G7. 


CHAP.  II.]  FIEST  TEDTHS.  41 

'•  manifest  that  our  experience  of  force  is  that  out  of  which 
the  idea  of  matter  is  built.  Matter  as  opposing  our  mus- 
cular energies,  being  immediately  present  to  consciousness 
in  terms  of  force ;  and  its  occupancy  of  space  being  known 
by  an  abstract  of  experiences  originally  given  in  terms 
of  force ;  it  follows  that  forces,  standing  in  certain  cor- 
relations, form  the  whole  content  of  our  idea  of  matter." 
But  it  is  undeniably  true  that  very  many  persons  who  con- 
ceive a  pure  spirit  to  be  unextended  and  not  to  occupy  space, 
yet  at  the  same  time  find  no  difficulty  in  very  distinctly 
converting  in  thought  that  which  to  Mr.  Spencer  is  incon- 
ceivable. That  this  is  so  a  multitude  of  believers  in  spiritism 
will  attest,  and  their  evidence  to  the  fact  of  "  conceivability  " 
is  equally  valuable,  whether  they  are  or  are  not  deceived  as 
to  facts.  Again,  the  doctrine  that  the  soul  is  whole  and 
entire  in  every  part  of  the  body  is  a  conception  utterly 
transcending  imagination,  but  one  which  has  been  and  is 
accepted,  believed,  and  reasoned  about  by  thousands  of  the 
most  acute  and  cultivated  intellects.  Some  not  only  avo\v 
their  power  of  conceiving  that  space  may  be  bounded,  but 
even  announce  that  we  may  be  shortly  enabled  to  assert  its 
actual  extent.* 

]>ut  that  our  perception  of  necessary  truth  is  not  limited 
l>y  experience  may  be  shown  by  the  fact  that  we  are  ourpcroep- 
not  compelled  to  conceive  that  of  which  we  have,  ^frmhT" 
and  our  ancestors,  however  remote,  have  ever  had,  byVx™ii-d 
uniform  and  unvarying  experience.     We  have  ever 
seen  with  our  eyes  and   heard   with   our  ears,  yet  we  can 
conceive  of  vision  and  audition  taking  place  in  quite  other 
parts  of  the  body  instead.     We  have  experience  but  of  the 
live  senses',  apart  from  the  muscular  sense,  yet  we  can  not 
only  believe  in  the  possibility  of  other  senses,  but  conceive 
the  existence  of  a  sense  directly  revealing  to  us  the  actinic 
properties  of  light,  or  the  chemical  composition  of  crystals, 


*  See  Professor  Clifford's  article  in  '  Macmillan's  Magazine '  of  Oct.  1872, 
p.  511. 


42  LESSONS  FKOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  II. 

by  special  modifications  of  consciousness,  which  modifications 
are  now,  of  course,  unimaginable  to  us.  We  have  never 
experienced  colour  apart  from  extension,  nor  an  extended 
object  not  coloured,  and  yet  these  properties  can  be  con- 
ceived as  distinct  though  they  cannot  be  so  imagined.  JUit 
an  effective  argumentum,  ad  hominem  may  be  addressed  to 
Mr.  Mill,  who  tells  us  he  can  conceive  that  2  and  2  may 
make  5,  for  most  assuredly  such  a  power  transcends  the 
experience  of  all  his  ancestors,  and  will  transcend  that  of  his 
successors  to  their  latest  posterity.  Indeed,  as  Mr.  Martineau 
observes,*  "  Experience  proceeds  and  intellect  is  trained,  not 
by  association  but  by  Dissociation,  not  by  reduction  of  plu- 
ralities of  impression  to  one,  but  by  the  opening  out  of  one 
into  many  ;  and  a  true  psychological  history  must  expound 
itself  in  analytic  rather  than  synthetic  terms."  But  what  is 
experience?  A  stone  cannot  "experience,"  nor  can  expe- 
rience be  taken  as  ultimate.  The  very  acquisition  of  ex- 
perience implies  innate  laws  or  principles.  Instead  of  ex- 
perience being  able  to  account  for  innate  principles,  innate 
principles  are  needed  to  explain  the  acquisition  of  experience. 
As  Mr.  Mott  observes,!  the  defect  of  the  materialistic  view 
generally,  *'  is  that  it  confounds  the  physical  conditions  of 
experience  with  experience  itself,  which  is  nothing  but  mental 
change;  and  that  it  tacitly  assumes,  in  defiance  of  the 
evidence,  that  consciousness  depends  on  nothing  but  physical 
change." 

Let  us  now  consider  those  propositions  which  are  deemed 
Propositions    by  the  mind  to  be  necessary  and  universal,  not  from 

positively  J  *. 

seen  to  be      a  passive   impotence   to  disassociate   two   mental 

necessarily  L  * 

true.  images  (such  as  those  of  colour  and  extension),  but 

from  an  active  power  of  positive  perception  of  which  the 
intellect  is  self-conscious.  It  requires  but  a  little  candid 
introspection  to  see  how  different  is  the  mental  declaration 
with  regard  to  those  unimaginable  conceivabilities  we  have 


*  « Essays,'  p.  271. 

t  '  On  the  Materialism  of  Modern  Science,'  an  opening  address  read  before 
the  Literary  and  Philosophical  Society  of  Liverpool,  October  5th,  1871,  p.  15, 


CHAP.  II.]  FIEST  TRUTHS.  43 

noticed,  and  such  propositions  as  that  "  things  which  are 
equal  to  the  same  thing  are  equal  to  one  another;"  "  a  thing 
cannot  both  be  and  not  be  at  the  same  time  in  the  same 
sense."  The  subjective  difference  is  surely  plain  enough. 
Every  sane  man  must  admit  that  he  clearly  sees — sees  borne 
in  on  him  as  necessary  truths — that  two  straight  lines  can 
never  enclose  a  space ;  that  twice  five  must  always  be  ten ; 
and  that  ingratitude  can  under  no  circumstances  be  a  virtue. 
If  he  denies  that  he  perceives  these  judgments  as  neces- 
sarily true  in  any  conceivable  case  as  it  arises,  then  he  either 
does  not  understand  the  real  meaning  of  such  judgments — 
in  Mr.  Spencer's  words,  "  they  have  not  clearly  represented 
to  themselves  the  propositions  they  assert " — or  his  mental 
condition  is  pathological. 

The  judgment  that  the  three  angles  of  a  triangle  should 
be  together  equal  to  two  right  angles,  I  perceive  to  be  a 
mental  fact  of  quite  a  different  kind  from  my  inability  to 
imagine  unextended  colour  or  a  boundary  to  space.  Such  a 
judgment  I  see,  if  I  can  see  anything,  to  be  one  the  false- 
hood of  which  is.  not  negatively  unthinkable,  but  absolutely 
and  positively  impossible  even  to  Omnipotence  itself,  and 
this  because  I  see  the  affirmative  to  be  absolutely  and  neces- 
sarily true. 

Moreover,  of  all  my  subjective  certainties  none  are  to  me 
so  certain  as  that  which  affirms  those  judgments  which 
(rightly  or  wrongly)  I  deem  absolutely  and  universally  neces- 
sary. If  then  subjective  certainty  is  our  ultimate  test,  such 
judgments  override  all  others ;  and  to  deny  them  invalidates 
every  possible  judgment,  and  logically  plunges  the  doubter, 
if  he  is  consistent,  into  absolute,  unqualified  scepticism.  The 
existence  then,  as  a  fact,  of  these  supreme  and  active  per- 
ceptions as  to  necessity  and  impossibility  (the  existence  of 
which  as  distinguished  from  negative  inconceivabilities  is 
ignored  by  Mr.  Spencer)  may  be  taken  as  one  of  the  most 
certain  and  indubitable  facts  of  consciousness. 

If  there  was  but  the  one  kind  of  inconceivable  propo- 
sitions— namely,  those  negatively  inconceivable,  we  should 


41  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  II. 

be  driven,  as  Mr.  Spencer  says,  to  accept  them  as  limits  for 
us  whether  objectively  and  universally  valid  or  not.  But  the 
recognition  of  the  quite  other  kind  of  active,  positive  percep- 
tions of  inconceivability  (of  perceived  universal  impossibility), 
together  with  the  recognition  that  these  looked  at  from  the 
point  of  view  of  pure  subjectivity  assert  themselves  as  supreme, 
gives  us  full  warrant  to  assert  universally  necessary  truth  or 
logically  forces  us,  if  we  decline  to  accept  such  truth,  into 
the  quagmire  of  universal  doubt. 

Mr.  Spencer  has  justly  observed  that  the  passive  incon- 
ceivabilities are  necessities  of  thought  to  us,  and  that  by 
refusing  to  accept  them  we  pass  into  a  state  of  mental  con- 
fusion, and  even  more  or  less  physical  impotence  must  result 
from  a  refusal  to  act  as  if  they  were  valid.  This  confusion 
and  this  impotence  can  be  remedied  alone  by  a  practical 
acceptance  of  their  objective  validity.  In  the  same  way  the 
necessities  given  to  us  by  our  supreme  intuitions  as  to  im- 
possibility and  necessity  are  practically  active  necessities  of 
thought.  Every  man  is  spontaneously  convinced  of  their 
necessary  truth,  and  acts  on  such  conviction  in  every  case 
as  it  arises  seriatim  by  a  corresponding  spontaneous  judg- 
ment. If  in  reflecting  on  such  spontaneous  judgments  we 
begin  to  doubt  as  to  their  objective  validity,  we  begin  ipso 
facto  to  undergo  a  process  of  mental  disintegration  and  in- 
tellectual paralysis,  only  to  be  remedied  by  the  acceptance 
of  the  objective  validity  of  such  truths.  The  objective 
validity  of  these  perceptions  is  given  in  the  very  substance 
of  each  such  perception  itself.  To  doubt  of  the  objective 
truth  of  each  is  to  doubt  that  of  which  we  are  directly  and 
supremely  certain.  If  two  straight  lines  can  enclose  a  space, 
if  a  whole  may  be  less  than  its  part,  then  we  have  no  cer- 
tainty but  that  the  same  thing  cannot  both  "  be  "  and  "  not 
be "  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same  sense,  and  we  are 
landed  in  complete  scepticism.  But  Mr.  Spencer  himself 
has  implicitly  admitted  this  very  distinction  which  he  ex- 
plicitly ignores,  and  not  only  recognises  an  active  power  of 
positively  perceiving  necessary  truths,  but  also  the  distinction 


CIIAI-.  II. J  FIRST  TEUTHS.  45 

between  actual  and  possible  being.  He  says* — speaking  of 
the  inquiry  after  fundamental  truth — "Hence  he  has  no 
appeal  from  this  ultimate  dictum  [i.e.,  inconceivability]  ;  and 
seeing  this,  he  SEES  that  THE  ONLY  POSSIBLE  further  achieve- 
ment is  the  reconciliation  of  the  dicta  of  consciousness  with 
one  another."  Any  one,  however,  who  should  deny  that  we 
have,  as  a  fact,  an  intuition  of  "  objective,  universal,  and 
absolute  necessity,"  may  be  confuted  by  bringing  forward 
the  simple  fact  that  some  men  assert  that  they  have  that 
idea,  and  that  the  very  opponents  of  such  assertors  must 
themselves  have  it  also,  since  they  could  not  argue  against 
and  controvert  that  of  which  they  have  no  knowledge. 
Mr.  J.  Marti neau,  in  criticising  Mr.  Mill,  observes: — | 

"  When  he  "  [Mr.  Mill]  "  says  outright  that  a  priori  beliefs  really 
inherent  in  the  mind  are  totally  unworthy  of  trust,  however  imperi- 
ously they  may  compel  submission ;  and  when  he  casts  about  for  some 
appeal  against  them — either  from  thought  to  '  fact '  or  from  faculty  to 
faculty — he  seems  to  lose  all  his  logical  bearings,  and  forget  the  base 
he  had  measured.  What  security  can  there  be  for  any  truth — of  'fad ' 
or  of  thought — a  posteriori  or  a  priori — if  the  positive  and  primary 
affirmations  of  our  mental  nature  may  be  suspected  of  making  fools  of 
us  ?  The  assumption  of  unveracity  once  made,  cannot  arbitrarily  stop 
with  the  province  which  Mr.  Mill  wishes  to  discredit.  He  himself  also 
must,  somewhere  or  other,  come  to  an  end  of  his  'evidence'  and 
'  proof,'  and  be  landed  on  principles  nut  derivative  but  primary :  and 
thru  he  must  either  accept  their  coercion  '  because  there  is  no  u*e  in 
appealing  from  it/  or  unconditionally  rely  on  them  as  the  report  of 
truthful  faculties;  and  in  either  case  is  on  the  same  footing  as  his 
it  prior*' neighbour.  Be  the  'proof  what  it  may  which  authenticates 
the  belief,  it  is  the  faculty  which,  in  the  last  resort,  authenticates  the 
proof." 

In  the  controversy,  therefore,  between  Mr.  Spencer  and 
.ALi-.  31  ill  it  appears  to  us  to  be  clear  that  both  are  right  and 
both  are  wrong.  Mr.  Mill  is  right  in  affirming  that  there 
an;  inconceivabilities  which  may  yet  be  believed,  but  wrong 
in  denying  that  our  subjective  judgments  as  to  impossibility 
and  necessity  are  both  objectively  valid  and  supreme  criteria 


'  Essays,'  vol.  ii.  p.  407.  t  Ibid.  p.  103. 


46  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [CiiAr.  II. 

of  truth.  Mr.  Spencer  is  riglit  in  affirming  that  the  ultimate 
declarations  of  our  intellect  are  such  supreme  criteria  of 
truth,  but  wrong  in  declining  to  attribute  to  such  declarations 
absolute  necessity  and  universal  objective  validity.  But  both 
Mr.  Mill  and  Mr.  Spencer  err  in  failing  to  distinguish  be- 
tween (1)  that  negative  inconceivability  which  comes  from 
impotence  or  lack  of  experience ;  and  (2)  that  positive,  active, 
perception  of  impossibility  which  comes,  from  intellectual 
power  and  light.  It  is  this  active  perception  which  reveals 
summary  of  to  us  truths,  neither  the  result  of  mere  experience 
tons  hm^r-  nor  °f  logical  ratiocination  ;  since  they  are  no  sooner 
thought  of  than  we  assent  to  them,  and  the  validity 
of  all  generalisation  and  deduction  rests  upon  them  as  upon 
original  and  fundamental  principles. 

The  following  propositions  seem,  then,  to  be  incontro- 
vertible : — 

1.  Knowledge  must  rest  on  truths  which  are  incapable  of 
being  proved,  but  are  evident  by  their  own  intrinsic  light, 
otherwise  we  have  either  absolute  scepticism  or  a  reyressus 
ad  infinitum. 

2.  These  fundamental  truths  must  be  subjectively  evident. 

3.  Such  fundamental  subjective  truths  declare  their  ob- 
jective, absolute,  and  universal  truth. 

4.  The  intellect   is  thus  carried  by  its   own    force   from 
subjectivity  to  objectivity. 

From  this  it  follows  that  we  have  a  supreme  degree  of 
certainty  as  regards  a  variety  of  objective  truths  which  the 
intellect  has  the  power  of  apprehending  by  the  aid  of  sen- 
sible phenomena.  Our  rational  nature  is  thus  seen  to  be 
capable  of  knowing  truly  what  is  within  its  range,  and  is 
justified  in  its  conviction  as  to  metaphysical  certainty. 

The  same  degree  of  inevitable  certainty,  guarded  by  the 
same  penalty  of  absolute  scepticism,  attends  other  dicta. 
That  "  whatever  thinks  exists  "  is  known  to  us  as  a  necessary 
a  priori  truth  by  its  own  evidence ;  but  that  I  myself  exist  is 
known  to  me  not  by  evidence  of  any  kind,  but  by  conscious- 
ness, to  be  a  particular  contingent  fact  of  supreme  certainty. 


CHAP.  II.]  FIKST  TEUTHS.  47 

Mr.  Bain,  instead  of,  with  Mr.  Spencer,  taking  mental  im- 
potence as  the  ultimate  criterion  of  truth,  lays  down  Mr  ^Ws 
two  postulates,   (1)  the  absence  of  contradiction,  {^1™^"' 
and  (2)  the  uniformity  of  nature,  as  his  basis. 

As  to  the  first  postulate,  such  a  test  is  evidently  quite  un- 
fitted for  its  purpose ;  since  to  accept  without  question  the 
fact  that  we  have  had  past  experiences  is  at  once  to  assume 
that  very  objectivity  the  acceptance  of  which  has  yet  to  be 
justified.  Accordingly  we  find  Mr.  Bain  somewhat  naively 
further  postulating  "  trust  in  memory  "  as  one  of  the 
guarantees  of  his  ultimate  postulates. 

As  to  the  second  postulate,  he  tells  us  :*  "  The  fact  gene- 
rally expressed  of  nature's  uniformity,  is  the  guarantee,  the 
ultimate  major  premiss  of  all  induction."  ....  "We  can 
give  no  reason,  no  evidence,  for  this  uniformity  ;  and,  there- 
fore, the  course  seems  to  be  to  adopt  this  as  the  finishing 
postulate."  A  glance  inwards  will,  I  think,  convince  most 
unprejudiced  readers  that  their  subjective  certainty  as  to  the 
"  uniformity  of  nature,"  considered  by  itself,  is  slight  indeed, 
compared  with  their  conviction  that  "  what  thinks  exists," 
or  that  "  the  whole  is  greater  than  its  part." 

Mr.  Lewes's  ultimate  postulate  and  foundation  of  all  truth 
is  "  the  equivalence  of  the  terms  of  a  proposition ;"  and  he 
endeavours  to  reduce  the  logical  principles  of  identity,  con- 
tradiction, and  excluded  middle  to  his  "principle  of  equi- 
valence." But  his  principle  is  only  to  be  tested  by  the 
principle  of  identity  itself;  and  the  very  application  of  this 
test  assumes  objectivity  (as  it  involves  memory  and  the 
substantial  l^go),  and  the  action  of  an  intellect  which  sees 
the  necessity  that  whatever  is  must  be  that  which  it  mo- 
mentarily is — that  nothing  can  both  be  and  not  be  at  the 
same  time  and  in  the  same  sense. 

Here  a  few  words  may  be  added  respecting  Mr.  Spencer 
and  the  principle  of  contradiction.  One  would  have  The  principle 
thought  that  this  law  would  have  been  fully  ad-  tion. 


;  Logic,'  vol.  i.  p.  273. 


48  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  II. 

initted  by  Mr.  Spencer,  as  it  has  been  by  almost  every  other 
philosopher.  It  is  strange  that  any  one  should  think  that 
the  law  of  contradiction  is  derivative,  or  that  it  reposes  on 
anything  stronger  and  more  fundamental  than  itself.  Yet 
this  is  what  Mr.  Spencer  appears  to  do.  That  the  same  thing 
cannot  both  "be"  and  "not  be"  at  the  same  time,  and  in 
the  same  sense  (i.e.  the  law  of  contradiction),  we  maintain  to 
be  an  a  priori  necessity  of  thought — not  negative,  the  mere 
result  of  a  mental  impotence,  but  positive  and  known  to  us 
as  such  by  its  own  evidence.  Yet  though  Mr.  Spencer 
denies*  the  validity,  as  an  ultimate  truth,  of  the  principle 
of  contradiction,  he  unconsciously  affirms  it.  He  affirms  it, 
moreover,  in  that  which  he  represents  to  be  absolutely 
fundamental  and  ultimate,  namely,  our  inability  to  dissever 
certain  conceptions.  For,  supposing  we  know  that  we  have 
tried  to  dissever  such  conceptions  and  failed,  how  can  we 
be  certain  that  we  have  not  at  the  same  time  not  tried  and 
yet  succeeded — except  upon  that  very  principle  of  contra- 
diction itself? 

Yet,  again,  it  is  nothing  less  than  marvellous  to  note  how 
And  the        completely   Mr.  Spencer   ignores  all   the   highest 

highest  focal-  f  '       ,  *  «  °. 

ties  of  the      faculties  ot  the  soul.     We  have  the  most  ingenious 

human  mind,  .  . 

ignored.  and  interesting  constructions  of  sensible  perceptions 
of  increasing  degrees  of  complexity  wrought  out  with  an 
abundance  of  illustration  and  a  facility  of  research  truly 
admirable.  But  what  is  the  outcome  ?  We  feel,  indeed,  we 
have  an  insight  into  the  power  of  mere  sensation,  and  the 
consequent  faculties  of  brutes,  such  as  Ave  never  had  before, 
as  also  into  the  materials  of  our  own  thoughts ;  but  we  have 
no  increased  knowledge  of  our  own  intelligence  itself.  Our 
cat's  mind  is  indeed  made  clear  to  us,  but  not  our  own. 
Those  supreme  conceptions  and  perceptions  of  our  minds — 
Truth  and  Goodness — reflexly  contemplated  as  Truth  and 
Goodness,  are  simply  passed  over.  Even  the  same  thing 
must  be  said  of  "  relation."  The  relativity  of  our  knowledge 


*  'Psychology,'  vol.  ii  pp.  424,  425,  from  "But  even"  to  ''invalidity." 


CHAP.  II.]  FIRST  TRUTHS.  49 

is  indeed  a  constant  theme,  and  the  "  relativity  of  feelings  " 
and  "  of  relations "  occupies,  as  before  said,  two  chapters ; 
yet  of  our  perceptions  of  relations  as  relations,  we  have  not 
one  word. 

Mr.  Lewes  also  shows  a  strange  want  of  appreciation  of 
our  intellectual  faculties,  and  he  and  Mr.  Spencer  AS  also  by 
are  by  no  means  the  only  instances  of  this.  Indeed,  Mr' Lcwes' 
the  most  remarkable  circumstance  connected  with  living 
English  writers  on  questions  such  as  these,  is  the  con- 
spicuous absence  in  them  of  any  manifest  comprehension 
of  those  very  powers  which  they  so  continually  exercise, 
and  their  apparent  want  of  appreciation  of  that  reason  to 
which  they  verbally  appeal.  "  Hamlet"  with  "the  Prince  of 
Denmark"  omitted,  may  well  serve  as  a  symbol  of  the 
curious  psychology  of  the  school  to  which  reference  is  here 
made,  namely,  that  of  the  Agnostics. 

The  next  fact  which  reflection,  combined  with  what  we 
at  least  take  to  be  external  observation,  shows  us,  The  validity 

of  our  reason- 
IS  the  validity  of  our  reasoning  processes.    When  to  ing  faculty. 

the  proposition,  "All  equilateral  triangles  are  equiangular," 
we  add,  "  The  triangle  A  B  C  is  equilateral,"  we  see  that  a 
third  truth  is  implicitly  contained  in  the  two  propositions 
which  truth  explicitly  stated  is  the  conclusion,  "  The  tri- 
angle A  B  C  is  equiangular."  The  nature  of  this  process  of 
inference  is  expressed  by  the  word  " therefore"  and  a  little 
introspection  shows  us  that  it  is  something  widely  different 
from  the  association  of  different  things  together  in  the  ima- 
gination, so  that  the  recurrence  of  one  induces  the  recurrence 
of  a  group  of  others,  as  when  the  recurrence  of  a  smell  oc- 
casions the  revival  in  imagination  of  places,  persons,  and 
circumstances  of  various  kinds.  Moreover,  in  this  conclusion 
there  is  no  freedom  of  choice.  We  are  compelled  to  admit 
any  conclusion  logically  contained  in  admitted  premises,  just 
us  we  are  compelled  to  admit  the  truth  of  the  self-evident 
proposition,  "  What  thinks,  exists."  But  it  should  be  noted 
that  though  our  reason  is  necessitated,  and  acts  fatally  as 
regards  the  explicit  evolution  of  implicit  truth,  and  as 


50  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  II. 

regards  the  immediate  apprehension  of  self-evident  truth, 
yet  it  is  not  Hind;  it  sees  both  the  objective  truths,  and  their 
necessity.  Our  intellectual  perception  of  necessary  truth  is 
not  a  passive  impotence  of  imagining  two  things  apart  (such 
as  our  inability  to  imagine  uncoloured  extension),  but  is  an 
active  power  of  perceiving  what  is  positively  and  necessarily 
true.  Thus  it  sees  that  if  we  deny  in  a  conclusion  truth  latent 
in  admitted  premises,  or  refuse  to  accept  both  terms  of  a  self- 
evident  proposition,  we  thereby  violate  the  principle  of  con- 
tradiction and  the  primary  truth  that  what  is,  is.  As  to  the 
principle  of  contradiction — that  anything  cannot  both  be 
and  not  be,  at  the  same  time  and  in  the  same  sense — our 
perception  of  its  force  is  plainly  no  mere  mental  impotence, 
but  is  positively  known  to  us  by  its  own  evidence.  The 
denial  or  doubt  of  this  principle,  or  the  denial  or  doubt  of 
our  process  of  inference,  results  necessarily,  like  our  doubt 
as  to  our  own  existence,  in  absolute  scepticism  and  mental 
imbecility.  If  anything  may  both  be  and  not  be  at  the 
same  time,  then  the  intellectual  world  becomes  at  once  a 
chaos,  and  all  argument  unmeaning.  Nay,  it  is  even  im- 
possible to  really  deny  its  truth,  for  if  it  is  not  true,  we 
cannot  be  certain  that  in  denying  it  we  are  not  actually 
affirming  it,  or  that  a  doubt  respecting  it  is  not  the  same  as 
absolute  certainty  that  it  is  true. 

Mr.  Lewes  altogether  confounds  "  reasoning  "  with  sensible 
Mr.  Lewes     association,    and   entirely   ignores   our   intellectual 

confounds  1  .  /»       i  •       •         t  •     i     • 

reasoning      apprehension  of  what  is  implied  in  the  pregnant 

with  sensible 

association,  word  "  therefore."  He  tells  us  :*  "  Inference  lies  at 
the  very  root  of  mental  life ;  for  the  very  combination  of 
present  feelings  with  past  feelings,  and  the  consequent  infer- 
ence that  what  was  formerly  felt  in  conjunction  with  one 
group  of  feelings,  will  again  be  felt  if  the  conditions  are  re- 
instated— this  act  of  inference  is  necessary  to  the  perception 
of  the  object  'apple,'  and  is  like  in  kind  to  all  other  judg- 
ments. Inference  is  'seeing  with  the  mind's  eye,' — rein- 


'  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,'  vol.  i.  p.  257. 


CHAP.  IL]  FIEST  TRUTHS.  51 

stating  what  Las  been,  but  now  is  not,  present  to  sense." 
This  is  an  excellent  exposition  of  what  may  be,  and  probably 
is,  that  complex  association  of  sensations  which  takes  place  in 
brutes,  and  causes  some  of  their  actions  to  simulate  inference. 
It  quite  fails,  however,  to  recognise  that  active  light  of  the  in- 
tellect by  which  we  know  we  see  a  conclusion  in  the  premisses 
which  we  express  by  the  word  "therefore,"  and  which  we 
recognise  as  something  fundamentally  different  from  the  re- 
currence of  one  set  of  sensations  with  another  with  which  habit 
has  previously  associated  them.  Hence  the  curious  passage,* 
in  which  Mr.  Lewes,  addressing  self-conscious  men,  says : 
"  To  understand  what  reasoning  is,  we  must  first  see  it  in 
animals."  And  yet  he  admits  :f  "  that  although  a  conclusion 
is  always  implicitly  in  its  premisses,  it  is  not  always  explicitly 
there,  and  a  middle  term  may  be  used  to  point  out  this 
inconspicuous  relation."  But  all  that  rational  logicians  assert 
of  syllogistic  reasoning  is,  that  it  is  a  process  serving  to 
make  implicit  truth  explicit  to  us.  He  continues  :J  "Could 
we  realise  all  the  links  in  the  chain  "  (of  reasoning)  "  by  re- 
ducing conceptions  to  perceptions,  and  perceptions  to  sen- 
.sibles  (and  this  would  be  effected  by  placing  the  correspond- 
ing objects  in  their  actual  order  as  a  sensible  series),  our 
most  abstract  reasonings  would  be  a  succession  of  sensations." 
This  is  confused  and  misleading.  Such  a  process,  if  possible, 
would  make  us  dispense  with  reasoning,  in  the  case  supposed, 
but  it  would  not  make  our  "  reasonings  "  into  "  successions 
of  sensations,"  the  reasonings  would  cease.  Reasonings  are 
also  represented  by  philosophy  as  having  no  place  in  intel- 
ligences higher  than  our  own — in  pure  intelligences — but  for 
another  reason,  namely,  the  power  of  such  intelligences  to  see 
directly,  truth  which  to  us  is  implicit,  i.e.,  to  see  it  without  the 
need  of  any  process  such  as  we  require  to  render  it  explicit. 

In  this  and  the  preceding  chapter  it  has  been  endeavoured, 
very  imperfectly,  to  take  for  granted  nothing  not  vouched  for 


*  'Problems  of  Life  and  Miml,'  vol.  ii.  p.  162. 
t  Op.  cit.  p.  1(]5.  J  Op.  cit.  p.  1G9. 


52  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  II. 

by  the  acts  of  our  own  minds ;  though  it  has  been  impossible 
(owing,  at  least  in  part,  to  the  force  of  nature  and  natural 
reason)  not  to  use  language  implying  the  acceptance  of  the 
ordinary  beliefs  respecting  the  existence  of  a  real  objective 
world  external  to  our  own  minds. 

The  facts  referred  to  in  these  first  two  chapters  may  be 
summary  summed  up  as  follows : — 

and  conclu-  A  . 

Bion.  The  consideration  of  our  own  continued  existence 

reveals  to  us  objective  truth  and  our  possession  of  it. 

Our  self-consciousness  also  reveals  to  us  that,  similarly, 
there  are  universal,  necessary,  undernonstrable  truths  (as,  e.g., 
"  What  thinks  exists  "),  and  that  we  can  know  them. 

Similarly,  our  intellect  shows  us  the  validity  of  our  own 
reason,  and  the  objective  validity  of  the  syllogism  which 
renders  implicit  truth  explicit  to  us.  We  see  that  the 
ultimate  criterion  of  truth  is  a  mental  state  of  conviction 
produced  by  our  clearly  perceiving  that  a  given  proposition 
is  positively  true  necessarily,  and  not  that  we  are  in  a  state  of 
mere  impotence  not  to  think  it.  Such  a  test  constitutes  the 
principle  of  certitude.  This  principle,  those  of  identity  and 
contradiction,  together  with  the  validity  of  the  reasoning 
process  and  our  intuition  of  enduring  self-existence,  are  five 
elements  which  together  constitute  a  firm  foundation  upon 
which  may  be  raised  the  logical  edifice  of  coherent  truths. 
All  these  truths  have  our  self-consciousness,  our  knowledge 
of  the  enduring  Ego,  as  their  starting-point,  and  are  involved 
in  that  knowledge  and  flow  from  it. 

Other  consequences  also  necessarily  follow  from  the  truths 
here  maintained.  If  our  certainty  as  to  our  own  con- 
tinuous past  existence  is  valid  (and  we  have  seen  at  what  a 
price  it  can  alone  be  denied),  we  may  be  equally  certain 
that,  if  there  are  other  beings  like  ourselves  who  can  know 
us,  the  present  existence  of  each  of  us  is  an  objective  truth 
to  such  other  beings,  and  our  intellect  carries  us  at  once  also 
in  this  way  from  subjectivity  to  objectivity ;  to  the  world  of 
existences  outside  our  consciousness  from  the  world  of  our 
conscious  bein£. 


CHAP.  II.]  FIRST  TRUTHS.  53 

We  may  here  a  second  time  insist  upon  the  validity  of 
our  intuitions  as  the  properties  of  space  and  number,  that 
they  are  truths  to  which  no  possible  exception  can  ever 
exist  at  any  time  or  in  any  place ;  even  Omnipotence  itself 
being  unable  to  make  two  right  lines  inclose  a  space,  or  the 
cube  of  3  to  be  other  than  27.  But  consequences  follow 
which  are  yet  more  important.  To  anticipate  what  will  be 
treated  of  later,  it  may  be  even  now  affirmed  that  the 
element  of  moral  worth  which  our  intellect  declares  to 
attach  to  certain  actions  under  certain  conditions,  is  justified 
by  our  recognition  of  necessary  truth  and  our  perception  of 
it  as  universally  and  necessarily  valid — an  objective  truth, 
not  a  mere  subjective  impression.  Thus  that  faculty  of  cog- 
nizing objective  truth  which  is  called  the  intellect,  informs 
us  not  only  of  the  existence  of  a  persistent  self,  the  Ego,  but 
also  of  a  persistent  not-self,  the  non-Ego ;  of  objective  rela- 
tions in  the  order  of  intellectual  truths  and  of  objective  rela- 
tions in  the  order  of  moral  worth.  All  these  intuitions  and 
cognitions  hang  together  as  necessarily  connected.  To  inva- 
lidate one  is  to  invalidate  all.  To  assert  one  is,  virtually, 
to  assert  all.  They  cannot  be  denied  without  falling  into 
scepticism  which  invalidates  its  very  self  by  its  own  doubt  as 
to  the  existence  of  the  doubter  who  doubts  it.  To  conclude, 
men  have  absolute  certainty  of  the  very  highest  degree  as  to 
their  own  existence ;  and  yet  this  certainty  cannot  be  logi- 
cally asserted  without  implying  the  existence  of  a  whole 
sphere  of  objective  truths  which  the  intellect  has  the 
faculty  of  perceiving  by  the  very  light  by  which  those  truths 
manifest  themselves  to  the  intellect. 

These  views  being  accepted,  we  cease  to  be  confined  within 
a  narrow  sphere  of  mere  subjective  feelings,  with  our  highest 
intellectual  efforts  resulting  in  a  mere  recognition  of  our 
"  Xescience."  On  the  contrary,  the  nobility  of  man's  intel- 
lectual nature  reappears  more  distinctly  and  grandly  than 
before  its  temporary  eclipse  occasioned  by  self-refuting 
doubts  and  a  shallow  psychological  analysis.  The  intellect  is, 
indeed,  still  seen  to  be  limited — to  be  capable,  in  its  present 


54  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  II 

condition,  of  learning  but  in  part  and  through  sensible  expe- 
rience ;  yet  it  is  seen  to  be  furnished  with  perceptions  which 
are  true  and  valid,  and  with  a  power  of  learning  accurately 
what  comes  within  its  range — the  endowment  of  a  truly 
intellectual  nature,  though  at  the  same  time  of  a  corporeal 
organism,  in  other  words  the  property  of  a  rational  animal, 
that  is,  of  man. 


CHAPTER  III. 

THE   EXTEKNAL   WORLD. 

"  The  real  existence  of  an  external  world  made  up  of  objects  possess- 
ing qualities  such  as  our  faculties  declare  they  do  possess,  cannot 
be  logically  denied,  and  may  rationally  be  affirmed. " 

IN  the  two  preceding  chapters  the  endeavour  has  been  made 
to  take  for  granted  as  little  as  might  be  possible  Ajustmca. 

.       .  ,.     .  .  tionofour 

such  facts  as  are  not  given  in  immediate  conscious-  belief  in  the 
ness.     It  has,  indeed,  been  sought  to   show  that  world  here 

.  ,  .         logically  re- 

our  very  consciousness  itself  demands,  at  the  price  quired, 
of  utter  scepticism,  the  recognition  of  the  validity  of  our 
conviction  that  something  beyond  consciousness  really  exists. 
But  the  very  title  of  this  work  implies  the  belief  of  its 
author  in  the  real  existence  of  external,  material  nature, 
and  its  purpose  cannot  further  be  pursued  consistently  with- 
out an  attempt  to  justify  such  belief. 

Fortunately,  that  justification  is  as  little  really  required 
for  the  mass  of  even  the  most  cultivated  part  of  mankind, 
as  is  the  justification  of  our  conviction  of  our  own  con- 
tinued existence.  As,  however,  to  be  logical,  it  was  necessary 
for  us  to  start  by  justifying  the  latter  conviction,  it  is 
similarly  needful  that  the  more  or  less  sceptical  cavils  pre- 
valent with  respect  to  our  real  knowledge  of  the  material 
world  should  be  disposed  of -in  order  that  the  subsequently 
treated  matters  may  not  come  before  us  out  of  their  logical 
order. 

Ever  since  Descartes  and  Locke,  more  or  less  scepticism, 
more  or  less  uncertainty  respecting  the  truth  of  our  conviction 
as  to  a  really  existing  material  world  has  prevailed  amongst 


56  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  III. 

the  metaphysical  writers  most  popularly  known  in  England, 
Prevalent  such  as,  e.g.,  Berkeley,  Hume.  Mill,  Bain,  Spencer, 

scepticism  *' 

on  this  sub-    &c.,  &c.     Starting  with   the  conception  that  the 

ject  amongst  .  .     °  . 

modem  phi-    obiects    immediately   known    are    sensations,    and 

losophere,  »  * 

and  its  cause,  that  the  objects  of  perception  are  but  mediately 
known  by  inference  from  such  sensations,  they  have,  with 
more  or  less  accord,  naturally  arrived  at  the  conclusion 
that  as  inferences  are  liable  to  error  there  can  be  no 
certain  truth  but  in  feelings.  Yet  examination  of  that 
which  self-consciousness  tells  us  takes  place  in  our  own 
minds  shows  that  when  we  look  at  anything,  as,  e.g.,  at  a 
tree,  we  do  not  perceive  sensations,  and  infer  from  them 
that  we  have  before  us  a  single,  solid,  enduring  object 
of  a  certain  shape  and  colour  which  we  call  a  tree ;  but 
that  our  intellect  at  once  and  instantaneously  in  the  very 
act  of  feeling  immediately  and  directly  perceives  the  tree 
itself.  This  is  what  my  mind  declares  to  me  to  be  here 
and  now  the  case.  It  says  that  it  does  not  perceive  an 
image  of  the  tree,  either  in  the  eye  or  elsewhere ;  that 
the  tree  is  not  presented  to  it  by  any  intermediate  agency 
whatever,  but  that  the  mind,  in  the  act  of  sensation,  di- 
rectly makes  the  very  tree  itself  present  before  it,  while 
at  the  same  time  it  equally  declares  that  the  sensations 
themselves  are  not  the  tree  but  are  caused  by  the  action  of 
my  sensitive  nature  (my  various  organs  of  sense)  and  the 
tree  perceived. 

It  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  our  inquiry  we  are 
compelled  to  start  from  subjectivity,  and  that  our  supreme 
test  is  what  the  mind  declares  here  and  now  to  be  its  clear, 
positive,  and  absolute  conviction.  Appeals,  then,  from  that 
conviction  to  the  infant  mind,  or  to  theoretical  notions  as  to 
the  development  of  reason,  are  quite  out  of  court.  Never- 
theless, lest  we  should  seem  to  shirk  a  familiar  objection, 
we  may  here  note  that  as  soon  as  the  infant's  mind  knows 
colours,  smells,  shapes,  &c.,  it  also  knows  the  coloured, 
odorous,  extended  objects  themselves.  Even  the  infant  never 
infers  from  sensations  to  objects,  its  intellect  recognises  the 


CHAP.  III.]  THE  EXTERNAL  WOELD.  57 

one  as  soon  as  the  other,  though  at  first  it  can  of  course 
recognise  neither. 

He  who  is  often  spoken  of  as  the  parent  of  idealism, 
Berkeley,  taught  that  nothing  existed  outside  us  but  other 
minds,  and  that  the  apparently  existing  external  world  was 
but  the  action  of  the  Divine  mind  upon  created  minds ;  and 
some  modification  of  idealism,  of  a  less  pious  nature,  is-prolessed 
by  most  of  the  writers  on  philosophy  popular  in  England 
to-day — by  Tyndall  and  by  Huxley  equally  with  Bain  and  Mill. 

John  Stuart  Mill  conceived  the  material  world  as  made 
up  of  "  permanent  possibilities  of  sensation,"  but  Mr.  John 
admitted  the  reasonableness  of  the  belief  in  some  Sl 
kind  of  an  external  world  beyond  consciousness,  and  in  the 
existence  of  other  "  threads  of  consciousness "  besides  our 
own.  Mill,  for  a  logician,  had  a  singular  tendency  to  con- 
tradict and  refute  himself,  and  Mr.  Martineau  has  pointed 
out  *  how,  by  Mill's  system,  "  we  are  landed  in  this  singular 
result ;  our  only  sphere  of  cognisable  reality  is  subjective : 
and  that  is  generated  from  an  objective  world  which  we  have 
no  reason  to  believe  exists.  In  our  author's  theory  of 
cognition,  the  non-ego  disappears  in  the  ego ;  in  the  theory 
of  Iteing,  the  ego  lapses  back  into  the  non-ego.  Idealist  in 
the  former,  he  is  materialist  in  the  latter." 

But  if  Mill'  is  open  to  this  charge  of  inconsistency,  a 
fortiori  are  those  teachers  of  physical  science  or  psychology 
open  to  it,  who,  professing  idealism,  teach  what  is  practically 
materialism — keeping  "  the  word  of  promise  to  our  ear  to 
break  it  to  our  hope."  As  to  such  teachers,  Mr.  Sterling 
remarks t  (referring  immediately  to  Mr.  Bain):  "is  not 
materialism  all  that  is  for  them  fundamental  ?  and  is  not  the 
idealism  but,  profanely  to  say  it,  the  tongue  in  the  cheek — 
to  the  priest,  who  incontinently  sinks  silent,  dumbfounded  ?" 

Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  differs  notably  from  the  general  run 
of  thinkers  of  the  school  of  Mill  in  that  he  asserts  Mr.spcncer'8 
himself  to  be  not  an  Idealist  but  a  Realist,  and  Realism. 


.i\s,'  p.  101.  t  '  Aa  regards  Protoplasm,'  p.  62. 

4 


58  LESSONS  FROM  NATUKE.  [CHAP.  III. 

even  actively  combats  idealism.  To  his  own  system  he  gives 
the  title  of  "  Transfigured  Kealism." 

In  the  seventh  part  of  his  Psychology,  Mr.  Spencer  justifies 
in  several  ways  what  he  thus  calls  "  realism,"  that  is,  his 
belief  that  the  external,  material  world  really  exists  objec- 
tively, "  and  in  such  a  way  that  each  change  in  the  objective 
reality  causes  in  the  subjective  state  a  change  exactly 
answering  to  it — so  answering  as  to  constitute  a  cognition 
of  it"*  ' 

This  view  he  justifies  by  an  argument  from  "  priority,"  i.e., 

ins  justifica-  from  the  fact  that  the  realistic  conception  is  prior 

lllt'      to  the  idealistic  conception,  so  that t  "in  no  mind 

whatever  can  the   idealistic  conception  be  reached  except 

through  the  realistic  one." 

lie  also  justifies  it  by  an  "  argument  from  simplicity," 
which  consists  of  a  demonstration  that,  if  our  conviction  of 
the  world's  existence  is  not  an  intuition  but  an  inference, 
then  the  system  of  idealism  is  an  inference  indefinitely  more 
cumbrous  and  complex,  and  therefore  more  liable  to  error. 
He  says : — % 

"  While  the  first  involves  but  a  single  mediate  act,  the  second  in- 
volves a  succession  of  mediate  acts,  each  of  which  is  itself  made  up  of 
several  mediate  acts.  Hence,  if  the  one  mediate  act  of  Realism  is  to 
be  invalidated  by  the  multitudinous  acts  of  Idealism,  it  must  be  on 
the  supposition  that  if  there  is  doubtfulness  in  a  single  step  of  a  given 
kind,  there  is  less  doubtfulness  in  many  steps  of  this  kind." 

Finally,  he  advances  an  "argument  from  distinctness," 
which  reposes  on  the  far  greater  vividness  of  sensations  than 
of  ideas  which,  according  to  Mr.  Spencer,  are  but  plexuses  of 
faint  sensations. 

He  also§  contends  against  thinkers  of  the  schools  of 
Hume,  Berkeley,  and  Kant,  that  their  very  expositions  of 
idealism  cannot  be  made  without  the  use  of  terms  which 
imply  that  very  realism  they  deny. 


*  '  Psychology,'  vol.  ii.  p.  41)7.    The  italics  are  ours. 

t  Op.  cit.  p.  374. 

j  Op.  cit.  p.  S78. 

§  Op.  cit.  pp.  312-3G6. 


CHAP.  III.]  THE  EXTERNAL  WOELD.  59 

Here,  then,  we  are  led  to  infer  that  the  common  belief 
is  valid,  and  that  space,  time,  figure,  number,  extension, 
motion,  &c.,  really  exist  objectively  as  they  are  subjectively 
apprehended.  It  must  be  so,  since  no  system  can  be  deemed 
either  primitive,  simple,  or  distinct,  which  asserte  that  neither 
extension,  nor  figure,  nor  number  is  in  reality  what  it  appears, 
or  that  the  objective  connexions  amongst  these  properties 
are  what  they  seem  to  us  to  be,  or  that  *  "  what  we  are  con- 
scious of  as  properties  of  matter,  even  down  to  its  weight 
and  resistance,  are  ,but  subjective  affections  produced  by 
objective  agencies  which  are  unknown  and  unknowable." 

Yet  this  is  the  outcome  actually  arrived  at  by  our  author — 
a  result  which  to  most  will  appear  little  distin-  0^,^,, 
guished  from  scepticism,  since  it  is  admitted  by  ollt- 
him  to  agree  with  idealism  and  scepticism  in  affirming  that 
the  subjective  modification  of  consciousness  in  the  perception 
of  any  external  body  "  contains  no  element,  relation,  or  law 
that  is  like  any  element, relation,  or  law,"  in  such  external  body. 

Thus  the  universe,  as  we  know  it,  disappears  not  merely 
from  our  gaze,  but  from  our  very  thought.  Not  only  the 
song  of  the  nightingale,  the  brilliancy  of  the  diamond,  the 
perfume  of  the  rose,  and  the  savour  of  the  peach  lose  for  us 
all  objective  reality — these  we  might  spare  and  live — but 
the  solidity  of  the  very  ground  we  tread  on,  nay,  even  the 
coherence  and  integrity  of  our  own  material  frame,  dissolve 
from  us,  and  leave  us  vaguely  floating  in  an  insensible  ocean 
of  unknowable  potentiality.  And  this  is  EEALISM;  this  is 
what  is  justified  to  us  by  being  primitive,  simple,  and 
distinct,  as  being  prior  to  idealism,  "  everywhere  and  always, 
in  child,  in  savage,  in  rustic,  in  the  metaphysician  himself."  t 

Mr.  Spencer  may  well  call  this  "  Transfigured  Kealism." 
If  he  were  to  invite  hungry  men  to  a  feast,  and  having  dis- 
coursed to  them  on  the  digestibility  of  sauces  and  meats,  the 
relations  of  appetite,  digestion,  and  nutrition,  then  led  them 
into  a  room  not  furnished  with  tables  supporting  the  meats 

*  '  Psychology,'  vol.  ii.  p.  493. 
t  Op.  cit  Tol.  ii.  p.  374. 


60  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  in. 

themselves,  but  hung  round  instead  with  tables  of  the 
chemical  formulae  of  animal  substances,  the  disappointment 
of  his  guests  would  hardly  be  less  than  that  of  many  readers 
who,  having  read  his  arguments  from  priority,  simplicity, 
and  distinctness,  come  finally  upon  "  transfigured  realism  "  as 
the  result. 

I  am,  of  course,  quite  aware  of  the  distinctions  drawn  by 
Mr.  Spencer  between  what  he  calls  crude  realism  and  the 
realism  adopted  by  him,  but  whether  or  not  his  metaphysical 
position  be  tenable,  I  am  quite  certain  it  cannot  be  defended 
by  arguments  which  are  valid  only  to  support  that  dualism, 
that  distinctness  yet  true  correspondence  between  matter 
and  mind,  which  has  been,  and  ever  will  be,  the  natural  and 
practically  ineradicable  spontaneous  conviction  of  mankind. 

To  criticism  of  this  kind,  however,  as  made  by  Mr.  Henry 
HIS  ropiy  to  Sidgwick,  Mr.  Spencer  has  replied  at  length  in  the 
criticism.  <  Fortnightly  Keview'  for  November  1873.  In 
order,  therefore,  to  be  quite  sure  of  not  misrepresenting  him 
or  doing  him  unintentional  injustice,  I  quote  his  reply  in 
extenso.  He  tells  us : — 

"All  which  my  argument  implies  is  that  the  direct  intuition  of 
Eealism  must  be  held  of  superior  authority  to  the  arguments  of  Anti- 
Realism,  where  their  deliverances  cannot  be  reconciled.  The  one  point  on 
which  their  deliverances  cannot  be  reconciled  is  the  existence  of  an 
objective  reality.  But  while  against  this  intuition  of  Eealism  I  hold 
the  arguments  of  Anti-Eealism  to  be  powerless,  because  they  cannot  be 
carried  on  without  postulating  that  which  they  end  by  denying ;  yet, 
having  admitted  objective  existence  as  a  necessary  postulate,  it  is  pos- 
sible to  make  valid  criticisms  upon  all  those  judgments  which  Crude 
Eealism  joins  with  this  primordial  judgment :  it  is  possible  to  show 
that  a  transfigured  interpretation  of  properties  and  relations  is  more 
tenable  than  the  original  interpretation. 

"  To  elucidate  the  matter,  let  us  take  the  most  familiar  case  in 
which  the  indirect  judgments  of  Eeason  correct  the  direct  judgments 
of  Common  Sense.  The  direct  judgment  of  Common  Sense  is  that  the 
Sun  moves  round  the  Earth.  In  course  of  time,  Eeason  finds  certain 
difficulties  in  accepting  this  dictum  as  true.  Eventually,  Eeason  hits 
upon  an  hypothesis  which  explains  the  anomalies,  but  which  denies 
this  apparently-certain  dictum  of  Common  Sense.  What  is  the  recon- 
ciliation ?  It  consists  in  showing  to  Common  Sense  a  mode  of  inter- 


CHAP.  HI.]  THE  EXTERNAL  WORLD.  61 

pretation  which  equally  well  corresponds  with  direct  intuition,  while 
it  avoids  all  the  difficulties.  Common  Sense  is  reminded  that  the 
apparent  motion  of  an  object  may  be  due  either  to  its  actual  motion  or 
to  the  motion  of  the  observer ;  and  that  there  are  terrestrial  experiences 
in  which  the  observer  thinks  an  object  he  looks  at  is  moving,  when  the 
motion  is  in  himself.  Extending  the  conception  thus  given,  Reason 
shows  that  if  the  Earlh  revolves  on  its  axis  there  will  result  that  appa- 
rent motion  of  the  Sun  which  Common  Sense  interpreted  into  an  actual 
motion  of  the  Sun;  and  the  common -sense  observer  bjecomes  thereupon 
'able  to  think  of  sunrise  and  sunset  as  consequent  on  his  position  as 
spectator  on  a  vast  revolving  globe.  Now  if  the  astronomer,  setting 
out  by  recognizing  these  celestial  appearances,  and  proceeding  to 
evolve  the  various  anomalies  following  from  the  common-sense  inter- 
pretation of  them,  had  drawn  the  conclusion  that  there  externally  exist 
no  Sun  and  no  motion  at  all,  he  would  have  done  what  Idealists  do ; 
and  his  arguments  would  have  been  equally  powerless  against  the 
intuition  of  Common  Sense.  But  he  does  nothing  of  the  kind.  He 
accepts  the  intuition  of  Common  Sense  respecting  the  reality  of  the 
Sun  and  of  the  motion ;  but  replaces  the  old  interpretation  of  it  by  a 
new  interpretation  reconcilable  with  all  the  facts. 

"  Just  in  the  same  way  that  here,  acceptance  of  the  inexpugnable 
element  in  the  common-sense  judgment  by  no  means  involves  accept- 
ance of  the  accompanying  judgments;  so,  in  the  case  of  Crude  Realism, 
it  does  not  follow  that  while  against  the  consciousness  of  an  objective 
reality  the  arguments  of  Anti-Realism  are  utterly  futile,  they  aro 
therefore  futile  against  the  conceptions  which  Crude  Realism  forms  of 
the  objective  reality.  If  Anti-Realism  can  show  that,  granting  an 
objective  reality,  the  interpretation  of  Crude  Realism  contains  insuper- 
able difficulties,  the  process  is  quite  legitimate.  And,  its  primordial 
intuition  remaining  unshaken,  Realism  may,  on  reconsideration,  bo 
enabled  to  frame  a  new  conception  which  harmonizes  all  the  facts. 

"  To  show  that  there  is  not  here  the  '  mazy  inconsistency '  alleged, 
let  us  take  the  case  of  sound  as  interpreted  by  Crude  Realism,  and  as 
rc-interpretcd  by  Transfigured  Realism.  Crude  Realism  assumes  the 
sound  present  in  consciousness  to  exist  as  such  beyond  consciousness. 
Anti-Realism  proves  the  inadmissibility  of  this  assumption  in  sundry 
ways  (all  of  which,  however,  set  out  by  talking  of  sounding  bodies 
beyond  consciousness,  just  as  Realism  talks  of  them) ;  and  then  Anti- 
Itealism  concludes  that  we  know  of  no  existence  save  the  sound  as 
a  mode  of  consciousness :  which  conclusion,  and  all  kindred  conclu- 
sions, I  contend  are  vicious — first,  because  all  the  words  used  connoto 
an  objective  activity;  second,  because  the  arguments  aro  impossible 
without  postulating  at  the  outset  an  objective  activity;  and  third,  be- 
cause no  one  of  the  intuitions  out  of  which  the  arguments  are  built  is 
of  equal  validity  with  the  single  intuition  of  Realism  that  an  objective 
activity  exists.  But  now  the  Transfigured  Realism  wlu'ch  Mr.  Sidgwick 


62  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  III. 

thinks  '  has  all  the  serious  incongruity  of  an  intense  metaphysical 
dream,'  neither  affirms  the  untenable  conception  of  Crude  Eealism, 
nor,  like  Anti-Realism,  draws  unthinkable  conclusions  by  suicidal 
arguments ;  but,  accepting  that  which  is  essential  in  Crude  Realism, 
and  admitting  the  difficulties  which  Anti-Realism  insists  upon,  recon- 
ciles matters  by  a  re-interpretation  analogous  to  that  which  an  astro- 
nomer makes  of  the  solar  motion.  Continuing  all  along  to  recognize 
an  objective  activity  which  Crude  Realism  calls  sound,  it  shows  that 
the  sensation  is  produced  by  a  succession  of  separate  impacts  which,  if 
made  slowly,  may  be  separately  identified,  and  which  will,  if  progres- 
sively increased  in  rapidity,  produce  tones  higher  and  higher  in  pitch. 
It  shows  by  other  experiments  that  sounding  bodies  are  in  states  of 
vibration,  and  that  the  vibrations  may  be  made  visible.  And  it  con- 
cludes that  the  objective  activity  is  not  what  it  subjectively  seems,  but 
is  proximately  interpretable  as  a  succession  of  aerial  waves.  Thus 
Crude  Realism  is  shown  that  while  there  unquestionably  exists  an 
objective  activity  corresponding  to  the  sensation  known  as  sound,  yet 
the  facts  are  not  explicable  on  the  original  supposition  that  this  is  like 
the  sensation ;  while  they  are  explicable  by  conceiving  it  as  a  rhythmical 
mechanical  action.  Eventually  this  re-interpretation,  joined  with  kin- 
dred re-interpretations  of  other  sensations,  comes  to  be  itself  further 
transfigured  by  analysis  of  its  terms,  and  re-expression  of  them  in 
terms  of  molecular  motion;  but  however  abstract  the  interpretation 
ultimately  reached,  the  objective  activity  continues  to  be  postulated : 
the  primordial  judgment  of  Crude  Realism  remains  unchanged,  though 
it  has  to  change  the  rest  of  its  judgments." 

But,  in  spite  of  all  that  Mr.  Spencer  can  urge,  it  must  be 
its  insuffi-  affirmed,  our  reason  assures  us,  that  the  number, 
figure,  and  extension  of  objects  are  just  as  certainly 
real  as  is  the  existence  of  anything  beyond  consciousness  at  all. 
If  our  conceptions  of  solidity,  figure,  and  extension  are  delu- 
sions, scepticism  has  indeed  an  impregnable  stronghold.  But, 
as  we  shall  shortly  see,  Mr.  Spencer  goes  so  far  as  to  discredit 
the  validity  of  our  perceptions  even  as  to  difference  itself. 

Mr.  Spencer,  in  his  proof-case  just  quoted,  however,  bases 
nis  proof-  his  argument  upon  an  alleged  delusion  we  neces- 

caseas  to  °  * 

souud.  sanly  lie  under  with  respect  to  sound,  and  this  is  a 
matter  of  great  importance  in  his  psychology. 

He  says  :*  "Although  the  individual  sensations  and  emo- 
tions, real  or  ideal,  of  which  consciousness  is  built  up,  appear 


*  '  Psychology.'  vol.  i.  p  H8,  §  GO. 


CHAP.  III.]  THE  EXTEKNAL  WORLD.  63 

to  be  severally  simple,  homogeneous,  unanalysable,  or  of  in- 
scrutable natures,  yet  they  are  not  so.  There  is  at  least  one 
kind  of  feeling  which,  as  ordinarily  experienced,  seems  ele- 
mentary, that  is,  demonstrably,  not  elementary."  ..."  Mu- 
sical sound  is  the  name  we  give  to  this  seemingly  simple 
feeling,  which  is  clearly  resolvable  into  simpler  feelings." 
He  then  goes  on  to  remind  us  that  slow  taps  are  heard  as 
taps,  but  when  very  rapid  "  the  noises  are  no  longer  identi- 
fied in  separate  states  of  consciousness,  and  there  arises  in 
place  of  them  a  continuous  state  of  consciousness,  called  a 
tone ;"  that  this  rises  in  pitch  with  the  rapidity  of  the  taps, 
and  that  other  simultaneous  similar  series  produce  timbre.  This 
is  further  enforced  elsewhere  (p.  199),  by  recalling  to  mind 
how  the  same  vibrating  tuning-fork  jars  the  teeth,  and  at  the 
same  time  "  awakens "  through  the  skull  "  a  consciousness  of 
sound,"  apparently  showing  that  the  very  same  thing  is  under 
different  circumstances  '•'  feeling  of  touch  "  and  "  perception 
of  tone."  The  fallacy  which  Mr.  Spencer  has  here  fallen 
into  is  the  one  well  known  in  logic  as  the  fallacia  unius 
causes — one  fully  discussed  by  Mr.  Mill  in  his  chapter  on 
the  law  of  causation. 

But  I  deny  in  toto  the  truth  of  Mr.  Spencer's  assertions 
as  to  such  feelings.     Not  only  I  deny  that  the  The  troth  of 

J  J  his  affirma- 

"  one  kind  of  feeling  "  selected  is  "  demonstrably  ""ns  denied 
not  elementary,"  but  I  affirm  that  it  is  demonstrable  that 
what  Mr.  Spencer  terms  its  "proximate  components" 
are  no  parts  of  it  at  all.  My  position  may  be  demon- 
strated thus : — Recurring  sensations  of  beating  and  jar  do 
not  become  a  sound,  they  are  "  sound  "  at  once,  as  soon  as 
perceived  by  the  auditory  organ  at  all.  Similarly  a  musical 
note  is  not  made  up  of  rapid  audible  beats,  but  only  begins 
to  exist  when  the  beat-sounds  cease.  A  "  perception  of  mu- 
sical tone"  and  a  perception  of  "beat"  are  different  feelings. 
All  that  Mr.  Spencer  really  shows  and  proves  is  that  diverse 
conditions  result  in  the  evocation  of  diverse  simple  percep- 
tions, of  which  perceptions  such  conditions  are  the  occasions 
He  does  not  in  the  least  show  that  such  perceptions  (of  a 


C4  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  III. 

musical  note)  are  made  up  of  other  sensations  (slightly-heard, 
shocks,  or  raps).  The  first  sensations,  the  heard-raps,  cease 
entirely,  and  give  place  to  the  other  musical  note,  but  there 
is  no  evidence  that  they  constitute  the  other. 

According  to  Mr.  Spencer's  argument,  if  a  certain  number 
of  taps  produce  a  pleasant  feeling,  and  an  increased  number 
iu  the  same  time  cause  pain,  we  must  conclude  that  pleasure 
and  pain  are  the  same  feeling !  The  physical  conditions  of 
feeling  are  one  thing,  the  feelings  themselves  are  another. 
With  different  physical  conditions  we  may  have  different 
feelings.  Because  two  kinds  of  auditory  sensation  have  for 
cause  the  same  visible  object  in  different  states,  it  no  more 
follows  that  they  are  the  same  than  that  seeing  and  hearing 
are  the  same  because  a  vibrating  cord  is  seen  by  the  eye  as 
\vell  as  heard  by  the  ear. 

To  an  objection  of  Mr.  Sidgwick's,  that  "  Mr.  Spencer,  for 
Mr. spcnce^  the  purposes  of  objective  psychology,  apparently 
charge ofhe  professes  to  know  matter  and  motion  really,  while, 
tauncoher-"  as  a  result  of  subjective  analysis,  he  concludes  that 
they  cannot  be  known,"  Mr.  Spencer  himself  replies 
as  follows : — 

'"Doubtless  there  seems  here  to  be  what  he  calls  'a  fundamental 
incoherence.'  But  I  think  it  exists,  not  between  my  two  expositions, 
but  between  the  two  consciousnesses  of  subjective  and  objective  exist- 
ence, which  we  cannot  suppress  and  yet  cannot  put  into  definite  forms. 
The  alleged  incoherence  I  take  to  be  but  another  name  for  the  inscru- 
tability of  the  relation  between  subjective  feeling  and  its  objective 
correlate  which  is  not  feeling — an  inscrutability  which  meets  us  at  the 
bottom  of  all  our  analyses.  An.  exposition  of  this  inscrutability  I  have 
elsewhere  summed  up  thus : — 

"  See,  then,  our  predicament.  We  can  think  of  Matter  only  in  terms 
of  Mind.  We  can  think  of  Mind  only  in  terms  of  Matter.  When  we 
have  pushed  our  explorations  of  the  first  to  the  uttermost  limit,  we 
are  referred  to  the  second  for  a  final  answer ;  and  when  we  have  got 
the  final  answer  of  the  second,  we  are  referred  back  to  the  first  for  an 

•interpretation  of  it.  We  find  the  value  of  x  in  terms  of  y;  then  we  find 
the  value  of  y  in  terms  of  x ;  and  so  on  we  may  continue  for  ever 

.  without  coming  nearer  to  a  solution." — Prin.  of  Psy.,  §  272. 

"  Carrying  a'  little  further  this  simile,  will,  I  think,  show  where  lies 
the  insuperable  difficulty  felt  by  Mr.  Sidgwick.  Taking  x  and  y  as 


CHAP.  III.]  THE  EXTERNAL  WORLD.  65 

the  subjective  and  objective  activities,  unknown  in  their  natures  and 
known  only  as  phenomenally  manifested ;  and  recognizing  the  fact 
that  every  state  of  consciousness  implies,  immediately  or  remotely,  tho 
action  of  object  on  subject  or  subject  on  object,  or  both ;  we  may  say 
that  every  state  of  consciousness  will  be  symbolized  by  some  modifica- 
tion of  x  y — the  phenomenally-known  product  of  the  two  unknown 
factors.  In  other  words,  xy',  x'y,  x'y',  x"y',  x'y",  &c.,  &c.,  will  represent 
all  perceptions  and  thoughts.  Suppose,  now,  that  these  are  thoughts 
about  the  object ;  composing  some  hypothesis  respecting  its  characters 
as  analyzed  by  physicists.  Clearly,  all  such  thoughts,  be  they  abotit 
shapes,  resistances,  momenta,  molecules,  molecular  motions,  or  what 
not,  will  contain  some  form  of  the  subjective  activity  x.  Now  let  the 
thoughts  be  concerning  mental  processes.  It  must  similarly  happen 
that  some  mode  of  the  unknown  objective  activity  y  will  be  in  every 
case  a  component.  Now  suppose  that  the  problem  is  the  genesis  of 
mental  phenomena ;  and  that  in  the  course  of  the  inquiry  bodily  organi- 
zation and  the  functions  of  the  nervous  system  are  brought  into  tho 
explanation.  It  will  happen,  as  before,  that  these,  considered  as  ob- 
jective, have  to  be  described  and  thought  about  in  modes  of  x  y.  And 
when  by  the  actions  of  such  a  nervous  system,  conceived  objectively  in 
modes  of  x  y,  and  acted  upon  by  physical  forces  which  are  conceived  in 
other  modes  of  x  y,  we  endeavour  to  explain  the  genesis  of  sensations, 
perceptions,  and  ideas,  which  we  can  think  of  only  in  other  modes  of 
x  y,  we  find  that  all  our  factors,  and  therefore  all  our  interpretations, 
contain  the  two  unknown  terms,  and  that  no  interpretation  is  imaginable 
that  will  not  contain  the  two  unknown  terms. 

"  What  is  the  defence  for  this  apparently  circular  process  ?  Simply 
that  it  is  a  process  of  establishing  congruity  among  our  symbols.  It  is 
finding  a  mode  of  so  symbolizing  the  unknown  activities,  subjective 
and  objective,  and  so  operating  with  our  symbols,  that  all  our  acts 
may  be  rightly  guided — guided,  that  is,  in  such  ways  that  we  can  anti- 
cipate, when,  where,  and  in  what  quantity  one  of  our  symbols  will  bo 
found.  Mr.  Sidgwick's  difficulty  arises,  I  think,  from  having  insuffi- 
ciently borne  in  mind  the  statements  made  at  the  outset,  in  '  Tho  Data 
of  Philosophy,'  that  such  conceptions  as  '  are  vital,  or  cannot  bo 
separated  from  the  rest  without  mental  dissolution,  must  be  assumed 
as  true  provisionally;'  that  there  is  no  mode  of  establishing  the  validity 
of  any  belief  except  that  of  showing  its  entire  congruity  with  all  other 
beliefs,  and  that  '  Philosophy,  compelled  to  make  those  fundamental 
assumptions  without  which  thought  is  impossible,  has  to  justify  them 
by  showing  their  congruity  with  all  other  dicta  of  consciousness. 
In  pursuance  of  this  distinctly-avowed  mode  of  procedure,  I  assume 
as  true,  provisionally,  certain  modes  of  formulating  the  manifestations 
of  the  unknown  objective  activity,  certain  modes  of  formulating  the 
manifestations  of  the  unknown  subjective  activity,  and  certain  result- 
ing modes  of  conceiving  the  operations  of  the  one  on  tho  other.  These 


60  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  III. 

provisional  assumptions,  having  been  carried  out  to  all  their  conse- 
quences, and  these  consequences  proved  to  be  congruous  with  one 
another  and  with  the  original  assumptions,  these  original  assumptions 
are  justified;  and  if,  finally,  I  assert,  as  I  have  repeatedly  asserted, 
that  the  terms  in  which  I  express  my  assumptions  and  carry  on  my 
operations  are  but  symbolic,  and  that  all  I  have  done  is  to  show  that 
by  certain  ways  of  symbolizing,  perfect  harmony  results — invariable 
agreement  between  the  symbols  in  which  I  frame  my  expectations,  and 
the  symbols  which  occur  in  experience — I  cannot  be  blamed  for  inco- 
herence. Lastly,  should  it  be  said  that  this  regarding  of  everything 
constituting  experience  and  thought  as  symbolic  has  a  very  shadowy 
aspect,  I  reply  that  these  which  I  speak  of  as  symbols  are  real  re- 
latively to  our  consciousness ;  and  are  symbolic  only  in  their  relation 
to  the  ultimate  reality." 

So  much  for  Mr.  Spencer's  reply,  which  I  have  been 
Rejoinder  to  anxious  to  represent  completely  and  in  extenso.  And 

1  reply-  no  doubt,  as  might  be  expected  in  a  thinker  of  his 
repute,  the  incoherence  referred  to  must  be  attributed  less  to 
him  than  to  the  unfortunate  system  he  adopts.  But  inco- 
herence there  none  the  less  really  is  ;  and  if  such  incoherence 
results,  as  he  says  it  does,  from  his  theory  of  consciousness, 
so  much  the  worse  for  that  theory.  We  who  are  absolutely 
certain  that  our  intellect  has  the  power  (however  and  whence- 
soever  obtained)  of  knowing  both  mind  and  matter  as  real, 
objective,  persisting  existences,  are  not  driven  into  any  such 
inconsistency  and  incoherence;  and  if  incoherence  of  the 
mind  be,  as  Mr.  Spencer  himself  asserts  it  to  be,  a  necessary 
consequence  of  his  system,  it  amounts,  in  fact,  to  a  redudio 
ad  dbsurdum  of  that  system  itself. 

Before  however  considering  that  climax  of  negation,  Mr. 
Need  of  a  Spencer's  denial  of  the  objective  validity  of  our 
sun^of'ias  ^ery  perception  of  "  difference  "  itself,  it  will  be 
ons>  well  to  review  carefully,  and  in  some  detail,  one  or 
two  of  his  anterior  assertions  and  inferences  with  regard  to 
the  mind,  and  its  relation  to  existences  external  to  it. 

Indeed,  Mr.  Spencer's  views,  as  expressed  by  him  in  his 

.  ins  observa-   '  Psychology,'   merit  a   more    careful    exposition, 

rl°iat8ivftyhoef   that  the  reader  may  be  able  to  estimate  fairly  his 

our  feelings. 


CIIAP.  III.]  THE  EXTERNAL  WOELD.  G7 

Therein  he  also  urges,  in  advocacy  of  the  relativity  of  our 
feelings,  that  certain  oscillations  produce  an  auditory  feel- 
ing, but  only  in  one  organ,  and  that  the  same  oscillations 
produce  other  feelings  in  other  organs ;   whence,  he  says, 
we  may  become  fully  convinced  that  the  form  of  objective 
action  we   call  "  sound "  has  not  the  slightest  kinship  in 
nature  with  the  sensation  of  sound  which  it  arouses  in  us. 
He  argues  similarly  with  respect  to  the  other  senses,  de- 
claring that  "the  subjective  state  no  more  resembles"  its 
objective  cause  "  than  the  pressure  which  moves  the  trigger 
of  a  gun  resembles  the  explosion  which  follows."    So  also,  he 
says,  we  may  conclude  with  respect  to  tension  and  other  sen- 
sations of  mechanical  force ;  "  thus  we  are  brought  to  the 
conclusion  that  what  we  are  conscious  of  as  properties  of 
matter,  even  down  to  its  weight  and  resistance,  are  but  sub- 
jective affections  produced  by  objective  agencies  that  are 
unknown  and  unknowable.     All  the  sensations  produced  in 
us  by  environing  things  are  but  symbols  of  actions  out  of 
ourselves,  the  natures  of  which  we  cannot  even  conceive." 
Ikit  here  he  is  too  liasty.     Though  all  sensations  would  of 
course  vanish  in  an  insentient  universe,  qualities  these  senses 
make  known  might  nevertheless  be  known  by  pure  intellect, 
and  thus  all  the  objectivity  in  sensations  which  the  greatest 
"  realist"  would  desire  will  have  existed  in  the  world  for  all 
time.     It  is  the  ego  which  perceives  that  the  violet  is  sweet, 
though  it  is  the  nose  which  smells  it ;  and  though,  of  course, 
we  cannot  conceive  (because  the  elementary  experience  is 
lacking)  how  such  sweetness  could  become  known  without 
a   sense-organ,  can  we  really  understand  how  it  is  known 
to  us  with   one  ?      No   one  ever    supposed   a   mechanical 
force  to  resemble  a  sensation,  but  to  become  manifested  to 
us   through   sensations.     The  senses   are  inadequate  to  ex- 
haustively reveal  all  objectivity,  but  they  are  not  menda- 
cious.   Our  sensations  are,  as  Mr.  Spencer  says,  "symbols," 
but  they  are  symbols  by  and  through  which  the  intellect 
comes  to   know    objectivity  —  being,   substance,   extension, 
number,  form,  &c.,  things  not  to  be  expressed   except  in 


U8  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  IU. 

terms  of  sensation,   but  nevertheless  not  apprehended    as 
sensations. 

He  goes  on  to  declare  *  the  harmony  of  nervous  physiology 
with  his  view,  saying  that  when  the  structures  of  nerve- 
threads  are  considered,  it  becomes  inconceivable  that  any 
resemblance  exists  between  the  subjective  effect  and  that 
objective  cause  which  arouses  it  through  the  intermediation 
of  changes  resembling  neither.  That  it  becomes  inconceiv- 
able how  such  a  resemblance  can  be  produced,  concede  ;  that 
it  is  inconceivable  that  it  is  produced,  nego.  Moreover,  by  the 
term  "effect"  is  here  properly  meant,  not  the  sensation 
merely,  but  the  intellectual  conceptions  made  known  in  sen- 
sation. Comparatively  few  persons  will  be  ready  to  concede 
that  as  regards  the  extension,  number,  and  shape  of  objects, 
"  there  is  no  likeness  either  in  kind  or  degree "  t  between 
such  qualities  as  they  exist  objectively,  and  as  they  are  kno\vn 
to  us  subjectively  by  the  agency  of  our  bodily  organs. 

He  next!  turns  to  what  he  calls  "an  all-important  im- 
plication," namely,  the  existence  of  an  external  world — to 
our  conviction  "that  the  active  antecedent  of  each  primary 
feeling  exists  independently  of  consciousness."  But  how 
then  can  Mr.  Spencer  dare  to  affirm  dogmatically  that 
there  is  no  likeness  between  that  antecedent  as  objectively 
existing  and  that  antecedent  as  known  by  us?  We,  on 
the  contrary,  may  quite  logically  on  oilier  grounds  arrive 
at  an  independent  conclusion  that  there  is  such  a  likeness. 
"  Likeness "  I  assert ;  "  identity  "  I,  of  course-,  deny.  Pro- 
bably the  material  universe  is  clothed  in  a  splendour  of 
multitudinous  kinds,  some  few  of  which  are  partly  and  feebly 
revealed  to  us  with  varying  degrees  of  incompleteness  by 
our  senses,  though  revealed  with  ample  sufficiency  for  our 
needs.  Probably  it  everywhere  throbs  with  objective  har- 
monies, appreciated  fully  by  pure  spirits,  and  made  known 
to  us  in  a  rudimentary  and  fragmentary  way  through  vibra- 


•  Psychology,'  vol.  I.  p.  207,  §  87.  f  Op,  cit.  p.  194. 

I  Op.  cit.  §  88. 


CHAP.  III.]  THE  EXTERNAL  WORLD.  69 

tion  in  our  ears.  And  so  with  sight,  smell,  touch,  and  taste. 
"  Touch "  is  but  a  minute  acquaintance  with  surface  as  ex- 
tended and  figured ;  and  even  "  taste,"  though  to  us  known 
so  poorly  and  so  rarely  as  to  seem  unworthy  for  spiritual  en- 
joyment, may  be  conceived,  though  not  imagined,  to  be  a 
perennial  source  of  spiritual  enjoyment,  not  of  course  as 
tasted  by  an  organ,  but  as  intellectually  known  and 
apprehended. 

The  absence  of  light  subjectively  is  darkness,  and  most  of 
Mr.  Spencer's    school   would  deem   the   objective  Theimpos- 
universe  to  be  dark  and  also  silent.     But  these  gicLiiydeny- 
conceptions,  "  darkness  "  and  "  silence,"  are  really  t"ve  validity 

,  .         .        ,,  . .  ,  ,         m.          •,  ofourpcrcep- 

as  "sub  ective     as  light  and  sound.     Ihe  absence  tionsasto 

•T  >  i     i  •  i  •         •       i       even  the  se- 

oi  light   as   "sensed      by   us    is    not    objectively  condary 

*  -  .  J  J     qualities  of 

"  darkness,  but  something  which  we  cannot  con-  objects. 
ceive.  To  think  of  the  unseen  universe  as  dark  is  to  express 
objectivity  in  terms  of  the  subjective,  and  is  just  as  much  to 
attribute  objectivity  to  mere  subjective  sentiency  as  would 
be  to  adopt  the  most  vulgar  notion  of  the  reality  in  the 
external  world  of  our  own  very  feelings  of  different  kinds. 
Mr.  Spencer's  denial  of  likeness  between  the  subjective  and 
objective  is  indeed  most  unreasonable.  He  may  say  that 
from  his  point  of  view  he  sees  no  evidence,  actual  or  possible, 
of  such  likeness,  but  he  cannot  affirm,  without  irrational 
arrogance,  that  our  senses  cannot  have  been  organised  so  as, 
most  mysteriously,  to  make  us  truly  acquainted  with  objec- 
tive existences,  together  with  a  variety  of  the  powers  and 
properties  which  such  existences  possess. 

\\  hen  treating  of  the  relativity  of  relations  between  feel- 
ings, he  observes:*   "When  we  see  that  what  is,  Mr.  spencer 
objectively  considered,  the  same  connection  between  uvitylPreik 
tilings  may,  as  a  space-relation  in  consciousness,  be  pjfnlfeei- 
single  or  double ;  when  we  remember  that,  accord- 
ing as  we  are  near  or  far  off,  it  may  be  too  large  to  be 
simultaneously  perceived,  or  too  small  to  ba  perceived  at 


*  Op.  tit.  pp.  214,  215. 


70  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  III. 

all ;  it  becomes  impossible  to  suppose  any  identity  between 
this  objective  connection  and  some  one  of  the  multitudinous 
subjective  relations  answering  to  it."  But  surely  this  is  the 
very  poorest  and  shallowest  sophistry.  No  one  has  supported 
the  assertion  of  "IDENTITY"  even  between  the  intellectual 
concept  gathered  from  changing  phenomena,  and  the  object 
of  that  concept  itself ;  still  less  between  it  and  "  some  one  of 
the  multitudinous  subjective  relations  [feelings]  answering  to 
it."  But  this  absence  of  identity  does  not  even  go  one  step 
towards  invalidating  the  correspondence  between  certain  of 
the  objective  characters  of  objects  and  intellectual  cognitions 
of  such  objects  in  and  by  the  sensations  they  occasion,  which 
sensations  present  them  (in  the  sense  of  "make  them  present" 
to  the  intellect. 

Next  (p.  215,  §  91)  he  examines  compound  relations  of 
on  the  effects  sequence,  and  he  considers  that  herein  qualitative 

of  structure,      . .  i  ,,  . 

age  and  state  differences  of  apprehension  may  be  produced  by  the 

on  relations  *  r.  • 

of  sequence,  different  structures  of  different  animals,  adding, 
"  there  is  most  likely  a  marked  qualitative  difference  between 
that  undeveloped  sense  of  duration  derived  solely  from  the 
experiences  of  inner  changes,  and  that  developed  conception 
of  time  derived  mainly  from  outer  changes,  but  conceived  to 
be  a  form  of  both  outer  and  inner  changes." 

Now  as  to  qualitative  differences  in  animal  sensations,  all 
Mr.  Spencer  requires  may  be  conceded,  as  sucli  differences 
are  but  the  materials  of  intellect.  But  if  an  intellectual 
animal  could  think  by  means  of  such  materials  of  merely  in- 
ternal sensations  as  those  Mr.  Spencer  supposes,  such  an 
animal  would  perceive  time  itself  to  be  such  as  (like  in 
nature  to)  the  time  we  perceive — though  its  mode  of  arriving 
at  such  perception  would  be  different.  It  need  hardly  be 
added  that  there  is  indeed  a  difference  of  quality  between 
our  perception  of  time  and  any  feelings  of  a  polyp. 

As  to  quantitative  differences  of  perception  of  sequence 
he  remarks  (p.  216):  '''Months  to  the  old  man  appear  no 
longer  than  weeks  to.  the  young  man."  Just  so,  the  old  man 
remarks  a  changed  condition  of  sensibility,  and  he  perceives 


Cu.u>.  III.]  THE  EXTERNAL  WORLD.  71 

a  similarity  of  feeling  between  months  now  and  weeks  formerly 
as  a^  result  of  that  change ;  but  he  does  not  intellectually 
perceive  months  to  le  weeks,  though  they  feel  like  them 
to  him. 

As  to  the  effect  of  opium,  &c.,  I  readily  concede  all  Mr. 
Spencer  advances,  but  the  matter  is  of  no  moment  and  beside 
the  question. 

With  respect  to  changes  produced  by  "  change  of  position 
among  our  experiences,"  he  remarks  (p.  217),  as  to  the  re- 
collection of  an  evening  passed  somewhere  a  year  ago : 
"  There  is  a  conviction  that  it  was  several  hours  long ;  but 
when  contemplated  it  cannot  be  made  of  equal  apparent 
length  with  the  several  hours  just  passed."  I  reply  to  this 
singularly  frivolous  remark — to  the  feelings,  no !  to  the  in- 
tellect, yes !  It  would  be  inconvenient  as  well  as  useless  if  our 
feelings  did  not  change  with  distance  in  time  as  well  as  in 
place.  Mr.  Spencer  admits  a  "  CONVICTION,"  what  more  can 
we  possibly  require  ?  He  adds  (p.  218), "  life  seems  no  longer 
at  forty  than  it  did  at  twenty."  This  is  not  my  experience. 
1  can  recollect  the  leading  events  back  year  after  year  for 
thirty  years,  which  I  could  not  have  done  at  twenty.  He 
also  says  :  "  To  a  lowly-endowed  creature,  conscious  only  of 
internally-initiated  changes,  it  [time]  cannot  appear  what  it 
does  to  a  creature  chiefly  occupied  with  changes  that  are  ex- 
ternally initiated ;  since,  in  the  last,  it  is  partially  dissociated 
from  both  orders  of  changes.  Whence  it  seems  inferable  that, 
only  partially  dissociated  as  it  is,  it  cannot  have  in  consciousness 
that  qualitative  character  which  absolute  dissociation  would 
give  it,  and  which  we  must  suppose  it  to  have  objectively." 
This  he  maintains  on  account  of  the  reason  just  before  given, 
that  "time,  considered  as  an  abstract  from  relations  of 
sequence,  must  present  a  different  aspect  according  to  the 
degree  of  its  dissociation  from  particular  sequences."  But  to 
this  may  be  replied:  The  idea  of  time  is  one  thing,  the 
possibility  of  recalling  a  greater  or  lesser  number  of  more  or 
less  vivid  phantasmata  of  things  which  happened  in  a  given 
quantity  of  time,  say  a  month  or  year,  is  a  very  different  one ; 


72  LESSONS  FEOH  NATUKE.  [CnAP.  IIL 

nor,  probably,  would  even  Mr.  Spencer  have  ever  confounded 
them  together  had  not  his  theory  obliged  him  to  do  so.  . 

Mr.  Spencer  concludes  this  section  by  saying  that  "  com- 
pound relations  of  sequences  as  we  conceive  them  cannot  be 
quantitatively  like  the  connections  beyond  consciousness  to 
which  they  refer,  is  proved  by  the  facts  that  they  vary  in  their 
apparent  lengths  with  the  structure  of  the  organism,  with  its 
size,  with  its  age,  with  its  constitutional  state,  with  the 
number  and  vividness  of  the  impressions  it  receives,  and  with 
their  relative  positions  in  consciousness.  Manifestly,  as  no 
one  of  these  variously-estimated  lengths  can  be  taken  as  valid 
rather  than  the  others,  it  becomes  impossible  to  suppose 
equality  between  an  interval  of  time  as  present  to  conscious- 
ness, and  any  nexus  of  things  which  it  symbolises."  But 
these  difficulties  as  to  time  may  be  answered  in  a  way  parallel 
to  that  in  which  those  of  space  were  replied  to.  "  Feelings  " 
change,  but  do  not  necessarily  carry  with  them  changes  in 
the  intellectual  perceptions  they  occasion ;  nay,  the  very  fact 
of  the  phenomenal  changes  brings  out  yet  more  clearly  the 
objectivity  they  reveal,  and  which  is  known  by  and  to  the 
intellect  correctly,  in  spite  of  sensational  variations,  when  the 
organism  is  not  so  deranged  that  the  intellectual  faculties  are 
thereby  paralysed. 

He  then  (p.  219,  §  92)  proceeds  to  consider  the  compound 
relation  of  difference,  and  he  infers  that  (since  it  "  has  to  be 
conceived  in  terms  of  impressions  that  differ ;  and  since  the 
conception  of  difference  cannot  be  dissociated  from  the  order 
of  impressions  in  which  it  is  presented,  if  there  is  but  one 
such  order  "),  the  "  conception  of  difference  becomes  more  in- 
dependent of  particular  differences,"  "in  proportion  as  the 
impressions  become  more  multitudinous  in  their  kinds,"  "  and 
that,  therefore,  in  higher  creatures  it  is  not  qualitatively  the  same 
as  in  lower  creatures."  This  should  in  fact  be  thus  amplified, 
and  such  amplification  would  do  away  with  that  confusion 
between  intellect  and  sense  which  Mr.  Spencer  makes.  He 
should  say :  Therefore  in  higher  creatures  the  material  (the 
direct  sensitive  cognition  of  things  which  differ)  is  gradually 


CUAP.  111.]  THE  EXTERNAL  WORLD.  73 

more  and  more  elaborated,  so  that  when  taken  up  by  an  in- 
tellectual principle  it  is  far  indeed  from  being  the  same  as  in 
lower  creatures. 

He  observes  (p.  221)  "that  the  compound  relation  of 
difference,  as  we  know  it,  is  dependent  on  structure,"  size, 
and  state.  I  reply  :  As  we  "  know  it,"  meaning,  as  it  is  pre- 
sented to  us  sensibly — yes !  As  we  "  know  it,"  meaning,  as  it  is 
presented  to  us  intellectually — no  ! 

We  come  now  to  the  climax  of  negation  before  referred  to, 
namely,  Mr.  Spencer's  denial  of  the  objective  validity  On  the  rela_ 
of  our  perception  of  "  difference  "  itself — presuming  Jj^  b^**een 
Mr.  Spencer  means  "difference  "  and  not  individual  "uenceli- 
differenccs  between  sensations.  At  p.  222,  §  93,  affforenref14 
he  considers  the  pure  relations  of  co-existence,  l^\^^.' 
sequence  and  difference,  and  concludes  that  their  Pammeut8- 
relations  "as  we  know  them"  do  not  obtain  beyond  con- 
sciousness, because  they  cannot  be  thought  of  without  a 
"  tacit  recognition  "  of  concrete  existence  ultimately  derived 
from  our  feelings.  But  as  to  this  it  may  be  replied  that 
"difference"  (like  genus  and  species)  exists  formally  only 
in  mind,  though  materially  in  things.  The  abstract  is  not,  of 
course,  the  concrete.  As  to  the  "  tacit  recognition  "  of  the 
concrete,  that  is  merely  the  phantasmata  necessary  to  all 
knowledge  in  our  present  condition.  They  are  merely 
counters  made  use  of  by  the  mind.  We  understand  five 
purely ;  through  five  counters,  or  five  anythings.  WThat 
proves  that  Mr.  Spencer  can  think  of  pure  abstract  difference 
is,  that  he  can  write  about  it.  Then  as  to  this  expression 
above  quoted,  "  as  we  know  them,"  we  may  reply  :  "As,"  in 
the  sense  of  the  means  whereby  we  have  them — no !  "  As,"  in 
the  sense  of  agreeing  with  our  intellectual  apprehension  so 
obtained — yes ! 

He  next  goes  on  (for  the  sake  of  clearness!)  to  attempt  to 
simplify  the  expressions  co-existence  and  sequence  by  means 
of  terms  expressing  existences  which  in  the  first  have,  in  the 
si  c;.rnd  have  not,  differences  "  in  their  order."  Phenomena 
which  can  be  experienced  in  tliflerent  orders  of  succession  (as 


71  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CiiAp.  III. 

the  phenomena  presented  by  an  orange)  being  phenomena  of 
co-existence,  while  those  which  can  be  experienced  only  in  a 
single  order  (as  those  of  a  musical  air)  are  phenomena  of 
sequence.  But  what  is  the  meaning  of  order  if  we  have  not 
yet  got  sequence,  i.e.,  time  ?  It  may  be  contended  that  order 
as  an  intellectual  act  is  primary,  but  anyhow  it  cannot  bo 
really  understood  without  the  addition  in  thought  of  either 
space  or  time. 

Mr.  Spencer  sums  up  (p.  221)  by  reducing  all  perception  to 
shocks  accompanying  transitions  from  one  feeling  to  another. 
"  That  is,  the  relation  of  difference  as  present  in  consciousness 
is  nothing  more  than  a  change  in  consciousness.  How,  then, 
can  it  resemble,  or  be  in  any  way  akin  to,  its  sources  beyond 
consciousness?"  But  what  can  be  the  meaning  of  saying 
that  it  is  not  a/cm,  and  differs  from  its  source,  if  the  category 
of  difference  is  not  applicable  beyond  feeling  ?  If  it  is  not  so 
applicable,  then  it  no  more  differs  than  it  agrees,  there  being 
simply  no  relation.  In  fact,  however,  the  perception  of  dif- 
ference is  elicited  by  shocks  of  sensitive  change,  but  it  itself 
is  very  much  more,  and  the  intellectual  unit  is  a  perception  of 
being  and  non-being. 

He  goes  on  to  say  there  is  nothing  between  two  colours,  as 
they  objectively  exist,  "  answering  to  the  change  which  re- 
sults in  us  from  contemplating  first  one  and  then  the  other." 
I  reply :  Nothing  between  them  like  to  the  feeling  of  the 
change  in  the  sensible  perception — no!  Like  to  what  the 
intellect  apprehends  concomitantly  with  that  feeling — yes ! 
"  Their  relation  [the  two  colours]  as  we  think  it,  "being  nothing 
else  than  a  change  of  our  state,  cannot  possibly  be  parallel  to 
anything  between  them,  when  they  have  both  remained  un- 
changed." This  is  equivalent  to  saying  that  no  one  thing 
differs  from  any  other  objectively;  because  no  objective  dif- 
ference whatever  is  the  same  as  a  nervous  shock.  But  this 
extreme  position  may  be  turned  round  and  made  use  of  to 
prove  the  objectivity  of  extension,  since  the  objectivity  of 
"  difference"  is  certain,  and  yet  it  is  the  very  same  arguments 
(thus  shown  to  be  futile)  which  are  brought  against  the  ob- 


CIIAP.  HI.]  THE  EXTEENAL  WORLD.  75 

jectivity  of  extension  which  are  brought  against  the  objecti- 
vity of  "  difference."  Moreover,  if  a  subjective  relation  of 
difference  cannot  exist  without  the  momentary  co-existence 
of  its  terms,  the  objectivity  of  difference  is  most  true  on  this 
very  account,  because  an  objective  relation  cannot  exist 
without  this  momentary  existence  of  its  terms. 

He  then  (p.  224,  §  94)  tries  to  show  that  physiology  har- 
monises with  his  doctrine,  saying  that  all  relations  Mr.speneer-s 
are  composed  of  nervous  elements,  not  "  intrinsically  nerTotu  r°ia- 
different,"  and  therefore  cannot  resemble  "  intrin-  " 
sically-different  objective  connections."  But  what,  then,  is 
meant  by  usiug  the  term  "  intrinsically  different  ?"  Moreover, 
a  set  of  apparently  similar  nerves  may  be  as  truly  organized 
for  revealing  a  variety  of  objective  conditions  as  any  one  set. 
Mr.  Spencer  has  fallen  into  the  fallacy  that  the  effect  as 
such  must  resemble  its  cause. 

He  tells  us  that  "  it  needs  but  to  think  of  a  brain  as  a 
seat  of  nervous  discharges,  intermediate  between  actions  in 
the  outer  world  and  actions  in  the  world  of  thought,  to  be 
impressed  with  the  absurdity  of  supposing  that  the  connections 
among  outer  actions,  after  being  transferred  through  the  me- 
dium of  nervous  discharges,  can  reappear  in  the  world  of 
thought  in  the  forms  they  originally  had."  But  where  is  the 
"  absurdity  ?  "  It  is  indeed  true  that  it  is  most  mysterious 
how  the  nervous  system  gives  us  even  any  one  symbolical 
message  from  objectivity  such  as  Mr.  Spencer  allows  that  it 
does  give.  It  is  not  really  a  bit  more  mysterious  how  it  can 
reveal  to  us  the  objective  relations  which  the  realist  believes 
it  does  reveal  than  how  it  reveals  what  Mr.  Spencer  allows 
it  does  reveal.  Even  he  must  admit  that  it  can  never  be 
disproved  that  the  universe  has  been  so  ordered  that  real  ob- 
jective relations  become  known  to  us  through  these  "sensible 
symbols,"  provided  we  are  adult,  healthy,  and  use  all  our 
organs  and  faculties,  sensible  and  intelligent.  For  what  can 
be  more  absurd,  when  God  has  given  us  five  senses  to  make 
use  of,  to  complain  that  the  use  of  one  by  itself  leads  into 
error?  The  truthfulness  of  the  intellect's  report  as  to  the 


76  LESSONS  FEOM  NATDEE.  [CHAP.  III. 

qualities  of  the  objective  world  has  the  same  basis  as  has  its 
report  as  to  the  objective  existence  of  that  objective  world, 
and  the  latter  reposes  on  reason,  as  Mr.  Spencer  truly  repre- 
sents. He  ends  the  chapter  (p.  225,  §  95)  by  referring  to 
the  assumption  universally  made  that  "  there  exist  beyond 
consciousness,  conditions  of  objective  manifestation  which  are 
symbolised  by  relations  as  we  conceive  them."  "  The  very 
proposition  that  what  we  know  as  a  relation  ....  does  not 
resemble  any  order  or  nexus  beyond  consciousness,  implies 
that  there  exists  some  such  order  or  nexus  beyond  conscious- 
ness." But  how  can  it^  be  "some  such"  order  or  nexus  if 
there  is  no  resemblance  between  them — "no  likeness  be- 
tween them  either  in  kind  or  degree?"  (p.  194,  §  78).  The 
only  meaning  Mr.  Spencer  can  really  have  is  that  which  all 
philosophers  would,  of  course,  concede,  namely,  that  objec- 
tive conditions  are  not  identical  with  subjective  sensibilities, 
though  made  known  to  us  through  the  latter  by  a  complex 
and  indirect  process. 

He  then  concludes  by  asserting  the  reality  of  an  absolute 
AS  to  the       and  unknowable  ontological  order,  giving  rise  to 

reality  of  an 

ontoiogicai     the  phenomenal  order,  and  an  ontological  nexus 

order  aud  L  . 

nexus.  giving  rise  to  phenomenal  differences.  "  Though 
the  relation  of  difference  constituted,  as  we  have  seen,  by  a 
change  in  consciousness,  cannot  be  IDENTIFIED  with  anything 
beyond  consciousness ;  yet  that  there  is  something  beyond 
consciousness  to  which  it  is  due,  is  an  inevitable  conclusion ; 
since  to  think  otherwise  is  t6  think  of  change  taking  place 
without  an  antecedent "  (pp.  226,  227).  In  the  last  words 
we  see  Mr.  Spencer  admits  the  fundamental  nature  of  the 
law  of  causality.  But  the  word  "identified"  should  be  care- 
fully noted.  Certainly  what  he  speaks  of  cannot  be  identified, 
but  whoever  said  it  could  ?  Whoever  thought  of  identifying 
the  mechanism  of  perception  with  the  thing  perceived  ?  If 
he  had  only  contended  against  "  identity"  instead  of  against 
"  likeness "  "  either  in  kind  or  degree,"  there  would  have 
been  no  word  to  dispute,  and  no  ill  effects  would  have  been 
involved,  in  his  system.  The  ontological  order — dark  to 


CHAP.  III.]  THE  EXTEENAL  WORLD.  77 

brutes — is  revealed  to  man  by  his  sensible  experiences 
(feelings),  and  corresponding  faint  feelings  (phantasmata) 
are,  in  this  life,  the  conditions  of  its  reproduction  or  presence 
in  thought.  But  because  we  cannot  think  without  phantas- 
mata it  does  not  follow  that  those  phantasmata  THEMSELVES 
are  all  our  thoughts  in  each  case.  Consider  the  idea  ex- 
pressed by  the  term  "  any  man !"  How  can  the  phantasm 
be  all  the  meaning  of  the  term  in  such  a  case  ? 

Mr.  Spencer  always  treats  the  mere  means  and  occasions  of 
intellectual  action  as  intellectual  action  itself,  owing  Mr.  spencer's 
to  his  fundamental  confusion  of  thought  with  feel-  t£"  intellect 
ing,  which  leads  him  to  such  nonsense  as  speculating:  siweoccsi- 

,  .  .  to    sionsofits 

as  to  an  oyster  s  conception  of  time  and  space !  He  activity. 
indeed  approaches  the  truth,  but  then  stops  short  of  it.  It 
is  certainly  most  true  that  it  requires  but  a  little  change  to 
transform  his  system  (in  spite  of  its  generally  very  different 
spirit)  into  scholasticism.  His  fundamental  error  is  not 
seeing  that  imagination  and  sensible  phantasmata  suggest  to 
onr  intellect  truths  beyond  images,  not  therefore  adequately 
expressible  by  words  though  conveyed  by  words  with  prac- 
tical efficacy  to  other  minds.  Meanings  beyond  the  words 
themselves,  and  still  more  beyond  their  more  ancient  mean- 
ings, are  continually  suggested  by  language.  Who,  when  he 
hears  of  the  "  spirit  of  Shakespeare,"  thinks  of  the  pulmonary 
exhalation  from  his  lungs  ?  So  such  words  as  "  substance," 
"  cause,"  are  symbols,  and  suggest  images  through  which  the 
intellect  understands  what  is  hyper-sensible,  and  'by  such 
language  conveys  it  to  other  minds.  Men  who  do  not  really 
so  understand  them  have  either  a  mind  which  is  imperfectly 
developed  or  are  otherwise  abnormally  constituted. 

Mr.  Lewes's  position  is  somewhat  singular.  He  altogether 
dissents  from  and  protests  againsfc  Mr.  Spencer's  Mr.  Lewess 
Transfigured  Eealism,  and  maintains  that  "feel-  positioIL 
ings  "  are  the  very  "  things  in  themselves,"  as  also  that  we 
have  not,  and  cannot  have,  knowledge  of  anything  but  feel- 
ings. Thus  he  seems  a  pure  idealist,  while  yet,  at  the  same 
time,  ho  protests  against  idealism.  In  part,  however,  his 


78  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  III. 

expressions  harmonise  with  that  realism  which  is  here  main- 
tained, and  which  places  philosophy  in  harmony  with  the 
healthy  common  sense  of  mankind.  For  all  that,  he  is  really 
an  idealist,  like  Berkeley,  with  the  important  difference  that, 
instead  of  a  God,  he  makes  the  non-ego  an  inscrutably  mys- 
terious something,  of  which,  as  far  as  he  has  yet  explained 
himself,  he  declines  to  assert  anything  whatever.  He  says,* 
"  It  may  sound  an  extreme  paradox  to  say  that  things  have 
not  separate  existence  apart  from  feelings ;  but  it  is  a  paradox 
which  must  be  accepted,  when  we  consider  that  things  arc 
what  they  are  in  the  given  relations ;  and  that  in  relation  to 
the  sensitive  organism  the  so-called  '  thing '  is  what  is  pre- 
sent in  feeling."  Yet  he  goes  on  :  "  This  is  not  a  denial  of 
the  objective  factor — the  non-ego.  It  does  not  assert  that 
the  stone  lying  on  the  ground  is  not  somewhat  more  than  the 
feelings  of  it  in  you  and  me ;  all  that  is  asserted  is,  that  the 
'  somewhat '  in  this  relation  is  what  it  is  felt  to  be  ;  and  if  I 
am  asked  what  the  postulated  '  somewhat '  is,  if  not  the 
metaphysical  thing  in  itself?  I  answer:  The  'somewhat'  is 
the  abstract  possibility  of  one  factor  of  a  product  entering 
into  relation  with  some  different  factors  when  it  will  exist 
under  another  form."  But  what  is  a  "  factor  "  but  that  which 
"  does  something  ?"  and  that  which  "  does  something  "  must "  6c 
something."  There  must  be,  then,  a  real  objective  existence 
of  some  kind  external  to  the  subjective  factor.  What  Mr. 
Lewes  must  mean  is  that,  apart  from  the  subject,  there  is  an 
existence  forming  one  factor  in  every  feeling,  however  diverse 
these  feelings  may  be,  and  that  the  factor  of  all  these  different 
feelings  may  be  one  and  the  same  in  all  cases,  or  different 
in  each  different  case.  An  examination  of  the  positive  decla- 
rations of  our  own  reason  will,  however,  I  venture  to  think, 
make  plain  that  the  intellect  declares  its  perception  of  a 
stone  which  is  first  hot  and  then  cold  to  be  a  perception  of  a 
real  external  objective  existence,  which  remains  one  under 
these,  though  successively  occasioning  these  diverse  sensa- 


'  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,'  vol.  ii.  p.  438. 


CHAP.  III.]  THE  EXTERNAL  WORLD.  79 

tions.  According  to  Mr.  Lewes  (if  I  have  not  misunderstood 
his  very  obscure  expressions  on  the  siibject),  it  seems  that 
there  need  be  no  objective,  continued  connexion  between 
that  non-ego  which,  joined  with  the  ego,  is  "  a  hot  stone," 
and  that  non-ego  which,  joined  with  the  ego,  is  "  a  cold 
stone."  If  there  is  a  persistent  bond  between  these  two  non- 
egos,  which  is  not  also  a  bond  between  "the  stone"  and 
"  grass,"  or  any  other  parts  of  non-ego  factors,  then  he  must 
admit  a  real  objective  substance  known  to  the  intellect,  but 
not  to  sense,  in  the  stone. 

He  says  :  *  "  To  say  that  we  do  not  know  the  objects,  but 
only  the  feelings  they  excite  in  us,  is  simply  saying  that  we 
do  not  know  what  objects  are  in  other  relations  than  those  of 
feeling — a  truism  which  is  quite  irrelevant,  but  a  truism  on 
which  metaphysicians  have  erected  the  idle  mystery  of  the 
Ding  an  sich"  Now  I  maintain  that  our  intellect  clearly 
tells  us  that  we  do  "  know  what  objects  are  in  other  relations 
than  those  of  feeling,"  and  that,  therefore,  instead  of  a 
"truism,"  it  is  afalsism. 

But  after  all  Mr.  Lewes's  protests  against  Mr.  Spencer's 
system,  his  own  is  fundamentally  very  like  it,  for  he  Agrees  with 
tells  us|   (speaking  of  light  and  the  luminiferous  fundaST 
undulations) :  "  We  know  that  the  undulations  are  ully' 
present  beyond  the  red   and  violet  ends  of  the  spectrum. 
....  Our  cosmos  is  indeed  the  universe  of  feeling;  but 
we  postulate  an  universe  of  being ;  and  the  warrant  for  this 
postulate  is  the  experience  of  ever-fresh  accessions  from  the 
unknown  to  the  known  !"     Mr.  Lewes  indeed  can  postulate 
no  more  than  possibilities  of  fresh  feelings. 

But  if  he  knows  nothing  but  feelings,  what  can  he  mean 
by  postulating  a  universe  of  being?  for  by  that  he  must 
mean  the  "  unfelt,"  which  in  his  system  is  if  not  non-existent 
quite  inexpressible,  and  practically  equivalent  to  the  un- 
knowable of  Mr.  Spencer.  He  refrains  indeed  from  saying 
that  any  changes  in  this  being  accompany  changes  in  feeling. 

*  Op.  cit  p.  419.  t  Op.  cit.  p.  285. 


80  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  III. 

He  is  thus  less  realistic  than  Mr.  Spencer  in  one  respect, 
while  in  his  assertion  that  the  felt  is  indeed  the  real,  he 
approximates  to  the  philosophy  here  advocated,  i.e.,  to  the 
philosophy  of  Aristotle. 

It  is  impossible,  in  a  single  chapter,  to  do  more  th;m 
Rerapituia-  glance  at  a  few  points  in  the  great  controversy 
respecting  the  validity  of  our  ordinary  conceptions 
of  external  nature.  Enough,  it  is  trusted,  has  however 
here  been  said  to  justify  our  proceeding  henceforth  to  treat 
of  the  external  world  as  an  existence  known  to  us  in  thn 
way,  and  to  the  extent,  ordinarily  supposed.  Grounding  all 
our  assertions  upon  the  positive  dicta  of  our  intellect,  we 
may  affirm  that  we  are  conscious  that  in  knowing  things  we 
really  know  them,  and  not  an  amalgam  made  up  of  a  mix- 
ture of  things  with  ourselves ;  and  also  that  we  know  other 
existences  to  be  both  real  and  certain. 

If  idealism  be  true,  then  to  each  of  us  there  can  be 
but  one  existence  the  certainty  of  which  can  be  ever  con- 
fidently asserted,  namely,  our  own  ;  and  yet  our  reason  asserts 
unmistakably  that  there  really  are  many  other  creatures  of 
various  kinds,  rational  and  irrational,  about  us.  Again,  if 
the  properties  of  objects,  such  as  their  colour,  &c.,  do  not 
appertain  to  persisting  objects,  they  must  themselves  be,  as 
Mr.  Lewes  says,  the  persisting  objects — the  things  in  them- 
selves— the  true  substances.  In  that  case  a  change  in  any 
accidental  quality  is  equivalent,  to  a  substantial  change  in 
objects  themselves,  and  a  substance  dyed  another  colour  is 
no  longer  the  same  substance  as  before — a  conclusion  our 
reason  vehemently  rejects. 

In  conclusion,  our  reason  affirms  to  us  that  we  not  only 
conclusion,  know  our  own  existence,  and  that  of  other  beings, 
BecmSyre-  but  that  the  qualities  we  attribute  to  them  are 
declarations  really  theirs,  not  ours;  and  that  if  intelligences, 

of  our  senses  . 

us  to  tbe  ex-   equal  to  or  greater  than  our  own,  can  know  such 

isterice  and  x  c  . 

properties  of  obiects  without  the  aid  or  sensitive  organ.",  such 

external  ob-  J 

jccts.  intelligences  would  know,  apart  from  sense,  that 

things  are  the  very  things  which  our  senses  declare  them  to 


CHAP.  III.]  THE  EKTEENAL  WORLD.  81 

be,  although  it  is  conceivable  that  the  number  of  other  pro- 
perties they  might  also  recognise  would  indefinitely  exceed 
in  number  such  properties  as  we  are  able  to  know  by  our 
intellect  acting  through  our  sensitive  organs.  Our  percep- 
tions might  be  added  to,  but  not  contradicted. 

If  what  has  been  here  brought  forward  is  correct  —if  the 
criticisms  by  which  it  has  been  sought  to  overthrow  the 
cavils  of  those  who  would  bid  us  distrust  our  faculties  and 
the  plain  declarations  of  our  intellect  be  just — it  follows  that 
the  third  lesson  we  may  draw  from  nature  is  that  we  may 
repose  securely  in  our  spontaneous  trust  in  the  truthfulness 
of  our  natural  faculties  when  matured  and  simultaneously 
employed  in  the  quest  of  real  and  objective  truth.  In  other 
words,  that  we  may  be  certain  that  an  external  world  really 
exists,  and  that  its  various  parts  really  possess  those  very 
powers  and  properties  which  our  senses  and  our  reason  com- 
bine to  declare  to  us  such  objects  do  in  fact  possess. 


CHAPTEE  IV. 

LANGUAGE. 

"  Rational  language  is  a  bond  of  connexion  between  the  mental  p.nd 
material  world  which  is  absolutely  peculiar  to  man." 

IN  the  last  chapter,  an  endeavour  was  made  to  justify  our 
Language  spontaneous  belief  in  a  real  external  world,  pos- 
twem^i^d"  sessing  the  properties  we  attribute  to  it  in  addition 
tter'  to  our  spontaneous  belief  in  our  own  continued 
mental  existence — in  other  words,  a  belief  in  the  reality  of 
the  material  world  as  well  as  the  reality  of  the  world  of 
mind.  We  shall  be  following  a  natural  order,  therefore,  if 
we  now  consider  that  which  is  the  special  bond  and  connexion 
between  these  two  worlds,  material  and  mental — that  by 
which  our  feelings,  memories,  thoughts,  and  volitions  are 
made  manifest  to  the  senses  of  other  men,  and  that  by  which 
\ve  ourselves  come  to  learn  other  men's  feelings,  memories, 
thoughts,  and  volitions.  I  mean  language. 

But  the  word  "  language"  denotes  two  very  different  things 
Language  It  denotes  the  expression  of  the  mere  feelings  or 

emotional  "  D 

and  rational,  emotions — emotional  language,  and  it  also  denotes 
the  expression  of  thoughts — rational  language.  It  is  the 
latter  only  which  especially  merits  our  attention  here,  as  the 
language  of  mere  feeling  cannot  by  itself  be  said  to  be  a  bond 
of  union  between  external  nature  and  mind  as  revealed  in  the 
self-consciousness  we  are  interrogating. 

Hational  speech  is  evidently  made  up  of  the  union  of 
two  distinct  factors — the  one  mental,  the  other  corporeal— 
the  one  the  idea  conceived  by  the  mind,  the  other  the  bodily 


CHAP.  IV.]  LANGUAGE.  83 

action  which  gives  expression  to  that  idea.     As  in  the  over- 
whelming majority  of  instances  that  bodily  action  nati0nai 
is  vocal,  these  two  component  parts  of  speech  have  mSund 
been  distinguished  respectively  as  the  verbum  men-  b 
tale  and  the  verbum  oris  ;  but  as  such  bodily  expression  is 
not  exclusively  vocal,  they  might,  perhaps,  be  better  distin- 
guished as  the  verbum  mentale  and  the  verbum  corporis.    The 
essence  of  rational  language  is  mental — a  primary  intellec- 
tual power  and  activity  ;  while  the  secondary  part,  the  ex- 
ternal expression  (the  verbum  corporis),  follows  the  intel- 
lectual activity,  as  is  made  evident  by  our  constant  process 
of  inventing  fresh  terms  in  each  science  to  denote  new  or 
better-defined  expressions. 

Great  ambiguity  and  confusion,  however,  exists  as  to  the 
different  senses  in  which  the  term  language  may  be  Different 
used,  and  as  to  the  different  kinds  of  activity  language. 
evoked  by  it.    As  has  been  just  said,  Eatioaal  expression  is 
not  exclusively  oral,  nor  is  all  articulate   speech  rational. 
We  may  altogether  distinguish   six   different  kinds  of  lan- 
guage :— 

1.  Sounds  which  are  neither  articulate  nor  rational,  such 

as  cries  of  pain,  or  the  murmur  of  a  mother  to  her 
infant. 

2.  Sounds  which  are  articulate  but  not  rational,  such,  as 

the  talk  of  parrots,  or  of  certain  idiots,  who  will  re- 
peat, without  comprehending,  every  phrase  they  hear. 

3.  Sounds  which  are  rational  but  not  articulate,  such  as 

the  inarticulate  ejaculations  by  which  we  sometimes 
express  assent  to  or  dissent  from  given  propositions. 

4.  Sounds  which  are  both  rational  and  articulate  consti- 

tuting true  "  speech." 

5.  Gestures  which  do  not  answer  to  rational  conceptions, 

but  are   merely  the  manifestations  of  emotions  and 
feelings. 

6.  Gestures  which  do  answer  to  rational  conceptions,  and 

are  therefore  "  external "  but  not  "oral"  manifesta- 
tions of  the  verbum  mentale.     Such  are  many  of  the 


84  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  IV. 

gestures  of  deaf  mutes,  who,  being  incapable  of  articu- 
lating words,  have  invented  or  acquired  a  true  gesture- 
language. 

The  clear  understanding  of  these  distinctions  is  an  indis- 
pensable preliminary  to  the  study  of  language,  in  the  widest 
sense  of  that  term  ;  it  may  be  well,  therefore,  to  recapitulate 
the  characters  of  the  actions  which  respectively  belong  to 
the  above  six  categories,  that  they  may  be  as  clearly 
distinguished  as  possible. 

The  sounds  emitted  by  brutes,  however  complicated  or  pro- 
longed, which  denote  merely  emotions  and  bodily  sensations, 
belong  to  the  first  category.  Mere  articulate  sounds,  without 
concomitant  intellectual  activity,  such  as  those  emitted  by 
trained  parrots  or  jackdaws  (and  which,  of  course,  are  not 
"  speech  "),  belong  to  the  second  category.  The  third  category 
comprises  inarticulate  ejaculations  and  sounds  which  we 
sometimes  make  use  of  to  express  our  approval  or  disap- 
proval, our  agreement  or  our  disagreement  with  anything 
said  to  us.  Articulate  expressions  of  mental  conceptions,  or 
true  speech,  belong  only  to  the  fourth  category.  Gestures 
which  are  merely  the  manifestations  of  emotions  and  feelings 
are  not  the  equivalents  of  speech,  and  belong  to  the  fifth 
category.  But  gestures  without  sound  may  be  rational  ex- 
ternal manifestations  of  internal  thoughts,  and,  therefore,  the 
real  equivalents  of  words.  Such  may  serve  to  call  attention 
to  objects,  their  agreements  or  their  differences,  and  may 
express  approval  and  assent,  or  the  reverse,  to  observations 
made  to  us  by  others.  All  such  belong  to  the  sixth  category. 
Thus  it  is  plainly  conceivable  that  a  brute  might  manifest 
its  feelings  and  emotions  not  only  by  gestures,  but  also  by 
articulate  sounds,  without  for  all  that  possessing  even  the 
germ  of  real  language.  Similarly  it  is  evident  that  a  para- 
External  ex-  lysed  man  might  have  essentially  the  power  of 
necessary  speech  (verbum  mentale),  though  accidentally  hin- 

accompani-        -.          -i    .  n  ./».  ,         . 

mentofra-    dercd  from  externally  manifesting  that  inner  power 

tionalani-  *  .  ° 

maiity.         by  means  of  the  verbum  oms.     Normally,  the  ex- 
ternal and  internal  powers  exist  inseparably.     Oace  that  the 


CHAP.  IV.]  LANGUAGE.  85 

intellectual  activity  exists,  it  seeks  external  expression  by 
symbols — verbal,  manual,  or  what  not — the  voice  or  gesture- 
language.  Some  form,  of  symbolic  expression  is  therefore 
the  necessary  consequence  of  the  possession  of  reason  by  an 
animal  frame ;  while  it  is  impossible  that  true  speech  can  for 
a  moment  exist  without  the  co-existence  with  it  of  that  in- 
tellectual activity  of  which  it  is  the  outward  expression — as 
well  might  the  concavities  of  a  siguioid  line  be  supposed  to 
exist  without  its  convexities. 

We  have  said  that  a  rational  animal,  if  it  exists  at  all, 
must  acquire  some  form  of  expressing  by  external  bodily 
symbols  its  internal  expressions ;  and  Mr.  Tylor  has  made  some 
remarks*  respecting  deaf-mutes  which  help  to  justify  this 
assertion.  He  says,  that  though  the  existence  of  deaf-mutes 
proves  that  men  may  have  thought  without  speech,  yet  not 
without  "any  physical  expression,"  rather  "the  reverse." 
That  men,  not  altogether  paralysed,  might  have  reason  and 
yet  no  mode  of  externally  manifesting  it,  is,  however,  a 
proposition  which  no  sound  philosopher  ever  dreamed  of 
maintaining. 

However,  as  has  been  said,  the  confusion  generally  existing 
on  the  subject  of  language  is  surprising ;  and  it  Prevalent 

,          confusion  on 

must  be  admitted  that  few  recent  intellectual  phe-  the  subject. 
nomena  are  more  astounding  than  the  ignorance  of  these 
elementary  yet  fundamental  distinctions  and  principles,  ex- 
hibited even  by  conspicuous  and  widely-esteemed  writers. 
Mr.  Darwin,  for  example,  does  not  exhibit  the  faintest  indi- 
cation of  having  grasped  them ;  yet  a  clear  perception  of 
them,  and  a  direct  and  detailed  examination  of  his  facts  with 
regard  to  them,  was  a  sine  qua  non  for  attempting,  with  a 
chance  of  success,  the  solution  of  the  mystery  as  to  the 
descent  of  man.  I  actually  heard  Professor  Vogt  at  Norwich 
(at  the  British  Association  Meeting  of  1868),  in  discussing 
certain  cases  of  aphasia,  declare  before  the  whole  physiolo- 
gical section,  "  Jene  comprends  pas  la  parole  dans  un  homme 


*  '  Re.  earchi-8  inlo  the  Burly  Ilis-tory  of  Munliud,'  p.  68. 


86  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  IV. 

qui  ne  parle  pas  ;"  a  declaration  which  manifestly  showed  that 
he  was  not  qualified  to  form,  still  less  so  to  express,  any  opinion 
whatever  on  the  subject.  Again,  Professor  Oscar  Schmidt, 
in  trying  to  account  for  the  natural  origin  of  man,  quotes, 
with  approbation,  Geiger's  words :  '•'  Die  Sprache  hat  die 
Vernunft  geschaffen :  vor  ihr  war  der  Mensch  vernunftlos ;" 
not  seeing  that  he  might  as  well  attempt  to  account  for  the 
"  convexities  "  of  a  sigmoid  line  by  its  "  concavities."  As 
before  said,  the  "  concavities  "  could  as  easily  exist  before  the 
"  convexities  "  as  the  existence  of  the  verbum  oris  could  ante- 
date that  of  the  verbum  mentals.  It  is  almost  enough  to 
make  one  despair  of  progress  when  one  finds  such  real  "  non- 
sense "  solemnly  propounded  to  a  learned  audience,  and  when 
such  amazing  ignorance  shows  itself  in  men  who  are  looked 
up  to  as  teachers  !  As  Wilhelm  von  Humboldt  has  declared  : 
"  Man  is  man  only  through  speech,  but  in  order  to  invent  he 
must  be  already  man." 

Respecting  Mr.  Darwin,  that  section  of  the  second  chapter 
Mr.  Darwin-a  °f  tis  work,  the  '  Descent  of  Man,'  which  discusses 
language,  exhibits  such  a  combination  of  confused 
thought,  with  a  habit  of  assuming  as  true  the  very  point  to  be 
proved,  that  adequately  to  do  it  justice  would  require  minute 
criticism.  He  makes  use,*  by  implication,  of  the  curious 
argument,  that  because  two  things  have  certain  points  of  re- 
semblance they  cannot  be  fundamentally  different.  Thus,  as 
if  to  diminish  the  force  of  the  distinction  between  rational  and 
emotional  language,  he  tells  us  (what  no  one  would  think  of 
disputing)  that  there  are  phenomena  which  are  not  distinctive. 
He  says:  "Articulate  language  is,  however,  peculiar  to  man ; 
but  he  uses,  in  common  with  the  lower  animals,  inarticulate 
cries  to  express  his  meaning,  aided  by  gestures  and  the  move- 
ments of  the  muscles  of  the  face.  This  especially  holds  good 
with  the  more  simple  and  vivid  feelings,  which  are  but  little 
connected  with  our  higher  intelligence.  Our  cries  of  pain, 
fear,  surprise,  anger,  together  with  their  appropriate  actions, 


*  'Descent  of  Man,'  vol.  i.  p.  54. 


CHAP.  IV.]  LANGUAGE.  87 

and  the  murmur  of  a  mother  to  her  beloved  child  are  more  ex- 
pressive than  any  words."  To  this  we  may  reply :  As  stimu- 
lating to  the  emotions — yes !  But  what  has  that  to  do  with 
the  question  of  definite  signs  intelligently  given  and  under- 
stood ?  It  does  not  in  the  least  diminish  the  force  of  the  dis- 
tinction that  man  makes  use  of  these  common  instinctive  signs 
as  they  are  the  natural  consequences  of  his  being  an  animal, 
which  fact  would  naturally  lead  us  to  anticipate  that  he  would 
manifest  phenomena  of  the  kind  common  to  him  and  to  brutes, 
as  he,  as  all  admit,  shares  the  instincts  and  emotions  of  the 
latter.  That  he  has  a  nature  in  many  respects  like  theirs  is 
perfectly  compatible  with  his  having  a  superior  nature,  of 
which  latter  brutes  have  no  germ,  rudiment  or  vestige  what- 
soever. Indeed,  all  the  arguments  and  objections  in  Mr. 
Darwin's  second  chapter  may  be  met  by  the  simple  assertion, 
that  man  being  an  animal  has  all  the  faculties  of  an  animal 
which  are  subserved  by  his  rational  nature ;  and  thus,  very 
naturally,  there  results  an  external  conformity  of  appearance 
though  a  modified  one.  Here,  then,  we  have  two  quantities, 
a  and  a  -f-  x  ;  and  Mr.  Darwin,  seeing  the  two  a's,  but  neglect- 
ing the  x,  represents  the  two  quantities  as  equal.  Even  Mr. 
Darwin  himself  directly  adds :  "  It  is  not  the  mere  power  of 
articulation  that  distinguishes  man  from  other  animals ;  for,  as 
every  one  knows,  parrots  can  talk  ;  but  it  is  his  large  power  of 
connecting  definite  sounds  with  definite  ideas ;  and  this  obvi- 
ously depends  on  the  development  of  the  mental  faculties." 
This  is  most  true  in  one  sense ;  and  yet,  with  the  notable  ex- 
ception that  the  distinctive  character  of  man  does  not  consist 
in  his  having  this  power  "  largely,"  but  in  his  having  it  at  all ! 

lie  draws  (vol.  i.  p.  59)  a  parallel  between  the  vocal 
organs  of  apes  which  are  not  used  for  speech,  and  the  vocal 
organs  of  certain  birds  which  do  not  sing,  but  use  such 
organs  "  merely  for  croaking."  But  "  croaking "  is  essen- 
tially a  sort  of  song,  and  means  neither  more  nor  less.  But 
no  ape's  cries  are  essentially  rational  speech. 

Mr.  Darwin  also  misplaces  the  real  point  of  distinction 
between  emotional  and  rational  language.  He  remarks, 


88  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUKE.  [CHAP.  IV. 

with  respect  to  the  faculty  of  articulate  language,  that  of 
the  distinctively  human  characteristics,  this  has  "justly  been 
considered  as  one  of  the  chief"  (vol.  i.  p.  53).  I  cannot 
agree  in  this.  Some  brutes  can  articulate,  and  it  is  quite 
conceivable  that  brutes  might  (though  as  a  fact  they  do  not) 
so  associate  certain  sensations  and  gratifications  with  certain 
articulate  sounds  as,  in  a  certain  sense,  to  speak.  That  is 
to  say,  it  is  conceivable  that  a  parrot  might  learn  to  speak 
certain  words,  which  he  has  come  to  associate  with  some 
gratification,  just  as  a  dog  who  "  begs  "  has  associated  that 
gesture  with  "  sugar  to  follow,"  or  other  agreeable  associa- 
tion. This,  however,  would  in  no  way  even  tend  to  bridge 
over  the  chasm  which  exists  between  the  representative  reflec- 
tive faculties  and  the  merely  presentative  ones.  Articulate 
signs  associated  only  with  sensible  impressions  would  be 
fundamentally  as  distinct  as  mere  gestures  are  from  truly 
rational  speech. 

Mr.  Darwin  evades  the  question  about  language  by  in  one 
place  (vol.  i.  p.  54)  attributing  that  faculty  in  man  to  his 
having  acquired  a  higher  intellectual  nature ;  and  in  another, 
(vol.  ii.  p.  391),  by  ascribing  his  higher  intellectual  nature 
to  his  having  acquired  that  faculty. 

Our  author's  attempts  to  bridge  over  the  chasm  which,  as 
before  said,  separates  instinctive  cries  from  rational  speech 
are  remarkable  examples  of  groundless  speculation.  Thus 
he  ventures  to  say — 

"  That  primeval  man,  or  rather  some  early  progenitor  of  man,  pro- 
bally  (the  italics  are  mine)  used  his  voice  largely,  as  does  one  of  the 
gibbon-apes  at  the  present  day,  in  producing  true  musical  cadences, 
that  is  in  singing ;  we  may  conclude  from  a  widely-spread  analogy 
that  this  power  would  have  been  especially  exerted  during  the  court- 
ship of  the  sexes,  serving  to  express  various  emotions,  as  love,  jealousy, 
triumph,  and  serving  as  a  challenge  to  their  rivals.  The  imitation  by 
articulate  sounds  of  musical  cries  might  have  given  rise  to  words  ex- 
pressive of  various  complex  emotions." 

And  again : — 

"  It  does  not  appear  altogether  incredible,  that  some  unusually  wise 
ape-like  animal  should  have  thought  of  imitating  the  growl  of  a  bcas- 


CIIAP.  IV.]  LANGUAGE.  89 

of  prey,  so  as  to  indicate  to  his  fellow  monkeys  the  nature  of  tho 
expected  danger.  And  this  would  have  been  a  first  step  in  the  forma- 
tion of  a  language." — Vol.  i.  p.  56. 

But  the  question,  not  whether  it  is  incredible,  but  whether 
there  are  any  data  whatever  to  warrant  such  a  suppo- 
sition. Mr.  Darwin  brings  forward  none :  we  suspect  none 
could  be  brought  forward. 

It  is  then  rationed  language — the  external  manifestation, 
whether  by  sound  or  gesture,  of  general  conceptions — which 
has  to  be  considered.  We  have  to  ascertain  whether  or 
not  its  existence  is,  as  far  as  the  evidence  goes,  universal 
amongst  mankind ;  also  whether  the  lowest  forms  of  speech 
discoverable  are  so  much  below  the  highest  forms  as  to 
appear  transitional  steps  from  irrational  cries,  and,  conse- 
quently, whether  there  is  any  positive  evidence  for  the  origin 
of  speech  by  any  process  of  evolution.  It  is  not  emotional 
expressions  or  the  manifestations  of  sensible  impressions 
which  we  have  to  consider,  but  tho  enunciations  of  distinct 
judgments  as  to  "the  what,"  "the  how,"  and  "the  why," 
\vhether  by  sound  or  by  gesture. 

In  the  first  place,  perhaps  it  may  be  well  to  consider  those 
speechless  human  beings  now  existing — the  deaf-mutes.  As 
to  these  Mr.  Tylor  tells  us: — 

"  Even  in  a  low  state  of  education,  the  deaf-mute  seems  to  conceive 
general  ideas,  for  when  he  invents  a  sign  for  anything  he 
applies  it  to  all  other  things  of  the  same  class,  and  he  can 
also  form  abstract  ideas  in  a  certain  way,  or,  at  least,  he  knows  that 
there  is  a  quality  in  which  snow  and  milk  agree,  and  he  can  go  on 
adding  other  white  things,  such  as  the  moon  and  whitewash,  to  his 
list.  He  can  form  a  proposition,  for  he  can  make  us  understand,  and 
we  can  make  him  understand,  that  '  this  man  is  old,  that  man  is 
young.'  Nor  does  he  seem  incapable  of  reasoning  in  something  like  a 
syllogism,  even  when  he  has  no  means  of  communicating  but  the 
gesture-language;  and  certainly  as  soon  as  ho  has  learnt  to  read  that 
'  all  men  are  mortal,  John  is  a  man,  therefore  John  is  a  mortal,'  lie  will 
show  by  every  means  of  illustration  in  his  power  that  he  fully  com- 
prehends the  argument."* 


'Researches  into  the  Early  IJUtory  of  Mankind,'  p.  GO. 


00  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  IV. 

The  intellectual  activity  of  their  minds  is  indeed  evi- 
denced by  the  peculiar  construction  of  their  sentences.  Mr. 
Tylor  tells  us  (p.  25) :  "  Their  usual  construction  is  not 
'  black  horse,'  but  '  horse  black ;'  not  '  bring  a  black  hat,' 
but  '  hat  black  bring ;'  not  '  I  am  hungry,  give  me  bread,' 
but  '  hungry  me  bread  give.'  "*  Thus  we  see  how  thoroughly 
mistaken  Professor  Huxley  was  when  he  asserted  ('  Man's 
Place  in  Nature,'  p.  102,  note)  :  "  A  man  born  dumb,  not- 
withstanding his  great  cerebral  mass  and  his  inheritance  of 
strong  intellectual  instincts,  would  be  capable  of  few  higher 
intellectual  manifestations  than  an  orang  or  a  chimpanzee,  if 
he  were  confined  to  the  society  of  his  dumb  associates." 
Quite  contrary  to  this,  there  can  be  no  doubt  but  that  a 
society  of  dumb  men  would  soon  elaborate  a  gesture-language 
of  great  complexity. 

Passing  now  to  savage  men,  Mr.  Tylor  makes  some  excel- 
Mr.  Tyior  on  lent  remarks  on,  and  brings  forward  a  good  ex- 
ample of,  that  reckless  and  unjust  depreciation  of 
native  tribes  of  which  travellers  are  so  apt  to  be  guilty, 
and  of  which  we  shall  find  other  examples  when  we  come 
to  the  subject  of  religion.  A  Mr.  Mercer  having  said  of  the 
Veddah  tribes  of  Ceylon  that  their  communications  have 
little  resemblance  to  distinct  sounds  or  systematised  lan- 
guage, Mr.  Tylor  observes  (p.  78)  : — 

"  Mr.  Mercer  seems  to  have  adopted  the  common  view  of  foreigners 
about  the  Veddahs,  but  it  has  happened  here,  as  in  many  other 
accounts  of  savage  tribes,  that  closer  acquaintance  has  shown  them  to 
have  been  wrongly  accused.  Mr.  Bailey  who  has  had  good  oppor- 
tunities of  studying  them,  .  .  .  contradicts  their  supposed  deficiency 
in  language  with  the  remark, '  I  never  knew  one  of  them  at  a  loss  for 
words  sufficiently  intelligible  to  convey  his  meaning,  not  to  his  fellows 
only,  but  to  the  Singhalese  of  the  neighbourhood,  who  are  all  more  or 
less  acquainted  with  the  Veddah  patois.' " 

Again,  as  to  another  well-known  traveller  he  remarks 
(p.  79):- 

"  It  is  extremely  likely  that  Madame  Pfeiffer's  savages  suffered  the 


*  This  spontaneous  tendency  may  be  pleaded  in  mitigation  of  De  Candolle'a 
strictures  on  Latin  construction  as  unnatural. 


CHAP.  IV.]  LANGUAGE.  (J1 

penalty  of  being  set  down  as  wanting  in  language,  for  no  worse  fault 
than  using  a  combination  of  words  and  signs  in  order  to  make  what 
they  meant  as  clear  as  possible  to  her  comprehension." 

As  to  the  universality  of  the  verbum  mentale  in  man  ho 
observes  (p.  80)  : — 

"  As  the  gesture-language  is  substantially  the  same  among  savage 
tribes  all  over  the  world,  and  also  among  children  who  cannot  speak, 
so  the  picture-writings  of  savages  are  not  only  similar  to  one  another, 
but  are  like  what  children  make  untaught  even  in  civilised  countries. 
Like  the  universal  language  of  gestures,  the  art  of  picture-writing 
tends  to  prove  that  the  mind  of  the  uncultured  man  works  in  much 
the  same  way  at  all  times  and  everywhere.  .  .  .  Man  is  essentially, 
what  the  derivation  of  his  name  among  our  Aryan  race  imports,  not 
'  the  speaker,'  but  he  who  thinks,  he  who  means" 

In  other  words,  he  is  a  rational  animal.  Mr.  Tylor  rein- 
forces these  remarks  elsewhere  *  by  saying  : — 

"  It  always  happens,  in  the  study  of  the  lower  races,  that  the  more 
means  we  have  of  understanding  their  thoughts,  the  more  sense  and 
reason  do  we  find  in  them." 

A  great  deal  has  beeu  sometimes  made  of  the  alleged 
inability  of  some  savages  to  count  more  than  five,  or  even 
three,  and  this  fact  is  occasionally  advanced  as  pointing 
to  a  transition  from  the  psychical  powers  of  brutes  to  the 
intelligence  of  man.  We  shall  return  to  this  hereafter,  but 
some  fitting  remarks  by  Mr.  Tylor  may  be  here  quoted  : — 

"  Of  course,  it  no  more  follows  among  savages  than  among  ourselves, 
that  because  a  man  counts  on  his  fingers  his  language  must  bo  wanting 
in  words  to  express  the  number  he  wishes  to  reckon.  For  example,  it 
was  noticed  that  when  natives  of  Kamskatka  were  set  to  count,  they 
would  reckon  all  their  fingers,  and  then  all  their  toes,  getting  up  to 
20,  and  then  would  ask, '  What  are  we  to  do  next?'  Yet  it  was  found 
on  examination  that  numbers  up  to  100  existed  in  then-  language." 

Concerning  the  origin  of  existing  articulate  words,  Mr. 
Tylor  distinctly  repudiates  the  "bow-wow  hypothesis"  as 
insufficient.  For  instance,  with  respect  to  the  family  of 


'  Primitive  Culture,'  vol.  i.  p.  322. 


92  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CIIAP.  IV. 

words  represented  by  the  Sanskrit  vad,  to  go,  the  Latin 
vadoy  he  says  (Ibid.  p.  195) :  "  To  this  root  there  seems  no 
sufficient  ground  for  assigning  an  imitative  origin,  the  traces 
of  which  it  has  at  any  rate  lost  if  it  ever  had  them."  Again, 
as  to  early  words  he  says  (Ibid.  p.  207) :  "  It  is  obvious  that 
the  leading  principle  of  their  formation  is  not  to  adopt 
words  distinguished  by  the  expressive  character  of  their 
sound,  but  to  choose  somehow  a  fixed  word  to  answer  a  given 
purpose."  As  to  the  arbitrary  way  in  which  articulate  words 
are  used  to  express  sounds,  and  the  small  amount. of  real 
resemblance  existing  between  them,  he  tells  us  (Ibid.  p.  182) : 
"  The  Australian  imitation  of  a  spear  or  bullet  striking  is 
given  as  toop  ;  to  the  Zulu  when  a  calabash  is  beaten  it  says 
loo"  He  concludes  (Ibid.  p.  208)  :— 

"  I  do  not  think  that  the  evidence  here  adduced  justifies  the  setting 
up  of  what  is  called  the  Interjectional  and  Imitative  theory  as  a 
complete  solution  of  the  problem  of  original  language.  Valid  as  this 
theory  proves  itself  within  limits,  it  would  be  incautious  to  accept  a 
hypothesis  which  can,  perhaps,  satisfactorily  account  for  a  twentieth  of 
the  crude  forms  in  any  language,  as  a  certain  and  absolute  explanation 
of  the  nine  teen-twentieths  whose  origin  remains  doubtful.  .  .  .  .  Too 
narrow  a  theory  of  the  application  of  sound  to  sense  may  fail  to  include 
the  varied  devices  which  the  languages  of  different  regions  turn  to 
account.  It  is  thus  with  the  distinction  in  meaning  of  a  word  by  its 
musical  accent,  and  the  distinction  of  distance  by  graduated  vowels. 
These  are  ingenious  and  intelligible  [intellectual !]  contrivances,  but 
they  hardly  seem  directly  emotional  or  imitative  in  origin." 

Thus  it  seems  that  Mr.  Tylor  is  unable  to  bring  forward 
any  evidence  of  a  speechless  condition  of  man,  but  that  he  is 
constrained  to  admit  all  available  evidence  points  in  the 
opposite  direction,  and  that  it  shows  speech  to  be  universal 
amongst  existing  races.  Even  those  abnormal  and  unfor- 
tunate beings  the  deaf-mutes  are  seen  to  be  intellectually 
endowed  with  language,  so  that  they  infinitely  more  resemble 
a  man  that  is  gagged  than  they  do  an  irrational  animal. 
The  essential  community  intellectually  existing  between 
them  and  us  is  shown  by  our  occasional  use  of  what  Mr. 
Tylor  calls  "  picture  words,"  where  "  a  substantive  is  treated 


CHAP.  IV.]  LANGUAGE.  93 

us  the  root  or  crude  form  of  a  verb,"  as  e.g.,  "  to  lutler  bread, 
to  cudgel  a  man,  to  oil  machinery,  to  pepper  a  dish." 

As  to  speech,  Sir  John  Lubbock  at  once  admits  :*  "  Al- 
though it  has  been  at  various  times  stated  that  sir  John 
certain  savages  are  entirely  without  language,  none  Lubbock- 
of   these    accounts    appeared    to    be    well   authenticated." 
The  recklessness   with    which    assertions    are  made   about 
savage  tribes  is,  as  we  shall  shortly  see,  so  great,  that  no 
account  ought  to  be   fully  received  without  a  knowledge 
of  the  bias  of  the   relater  and  a   careful  criticism   of  his 
statements. 

The  assertions  and  admissions  of  Mr.  Tylor  and  Sir  John 
Lubbock  are  most  valuable  testimonies.  They  are  most 
valuable,  in  the  first  place,  on  account  of  the  industry, 
patience,  ability,  and  candour  with  which  these  writers  have 
amassed,  digested,  and  laid  before  their  readers  all  the  most 
important  facts  which  either  archaeology  or  ethnology  has 
afforded,  tending  to  throw  light  upon  the  lower  stages  of 
human  existence.  Secondly,  however,  they  are  of  especial 
value  because  their  authors  belong  to  that  school  which 
adopts  the  monistic  view  as  to  man's  origin — that  is  to  say, 
the  school  of  Lamarck,  Darwin,  Huxley,  and  Spencer.  We 
may,  therefore,  confidently  rely  upon  any  statements  or  ad- 
missions  made  by  Mr.  Tylor  and  Sir  John  Lubbock  which 
tell  against  that  view  which  would  confound  intellect  with 
emotion  ;  while  we  may  fairly  assume,  from  the  eminent 
qualities  these  authors  possess,  that  when  they  fail  to  bring 
forward  data  favourable  to  that  view  it  is  because  no  such 
data  in  reality  exist. 

It  seems  then  unquestionable  that  an  absolute  difference 
exists  in  the  matter  of  language  between  man  and  conclusion, 
all  other  animals.  While  no  brute  gives  any  evidence  of 
having  any  such  faculty,  it  seems  undeniable  that  all  men 
possess  that  special  bond  and  connexion  between  the  world 
of  mind  and  the  world  of  matter — rational  language.  On 


Origin  of  Civilisation,'  p.  275. 


94  LESSONS  FROM  NATUKE.  [CiiAr.  IV. 

the  other  hand,  the  signs  of  feelings  and  emotions,  merely 
emotional  language,  are  the  common  property  of  men  and 
animals.  Such  appears  to  be  the  lesson  we  may  gather  from 
nature  respecting  those  various  signs,  vocal,  manual,  or  of 
whatever  kind,  which  together  constitute  that  which  goes  by 
the  general  term  "  language." 


CHAPTER  V. 

DUTY  .AND   PLEASURE. 

"  Perceptions  of  right  and  wrong,  and  of  our  power  of  choice,  and 
consequent  responsibility,  are  universally  diffused  amongst  mankind, 
and  constitute  an  absolute  character  separating  man  from  all  other 
animals." 

THOSE  investigators  take  a  sadly  incomplete  view  of  nature 
who  confine  themselves  to  such  sciences  as  zoology,  The  exist. 
botany,  and  physiology,  even  though,  under  the  m^airon- 
latter,  the  mere  physical  facts  of  language  be  in-  fact'of1^ 
eluded.     The  fundamentally  distinct  primary  con-  ll 
ceptions  of  the  human  mind  form,  no  less  than  do  physical 
facts,  a  part  of  nature,  and  one  from  which  the  most  important 
lessons  may  be  derived.     Having,  in  the  last  chapter,  noted 
the  teaching  of  nature  as  respects  the  difference  between 
emotional  and  rational  language,  we  may  now  proceed  to 
ad  veil  to  a  distinction  which  seems  naturally  to  have  arisen 
in  the  minds  of  all  races  of  men,  and  to  have  expressed  itself 
unmistakably  in  their  speech.     The  distinction  referred  to  is 
that  between  duty  and  pleasure,  as  implied  in  expressions  of 
moral  reprobation,  indicating  a  conviction  of  the  existence  of 
moral   responsibility   and   therefore   of  a   power  of  choice 
exercised  by  men  in  their  actions. 

We  may  begin  by  inquiring  whether  it  is  indeed  the  case 
that  this  conception  of  moral  worth  is  as  wide-  Are  such 

, ,  ,  ...  .  conceptions 

spread  as  alleged — an  inquiry,  that  is,  concerning  universal 
the  universality  or  non-universality  amongst  man-  mankind? 
kind  of  a  power  of  apprehending  "  right "  or  "  wrong." 
And  here,  again,  it  is  necessary  to  distinguish  and  define 


M  LESSONS  FROM  NATUKE.  [CHAP.  V. 

what  is  meant  by  this  human  mental  power,  because  ambiguity 
A  definition  and  misunderstanding  respecting  this  matter  are 
iahty*  at  least  as  common  as  in  the  matter  of  language. 
J3y  this  power  is  not  meant  merely  a  feeling  of  sympathy,  a 
deference  to  the  desires  of  others,  or  some  emotional  excite- 
ment tending  to  produce  materially  kind  and  benevolent 
actions.  Still  less  is  meant  the  volitional  impulse  which  in 
all  cases  directly  produces  such  action  itself,  since  this  may  or 
may  not  be  "moral,"  according  to  the  circumstances  of  each 
case.  What  is  meant  is  an  intellectual  activity  evinced 
by  the  expression  of  definite  judgments  passed  upon  certain 
modes  of  action  abstractedly  considered.  The  existence  of 
kindly  social  customs  cannot  be  taken  as  necessarily  proving 
the  existence  of  such  intellectual  activity  in  the  absence  of 
some  intimation  by  word  or  gesture  of  a  moral  apprehension. 
No  preference  for  the  interests  of  the  tribe  over  self,  or 
anger  at  the  absence  of  such  preference,  is  moral  unless  there 
is  a  judgment  that  such  preference  is  "  right."  Similarly,  no 
amount  of  gross  or  atrocious  habits  in  any  given  tribe  can 
be  taken  to  prove  the  entire  absence  of  morality.  The  liking 
or  disliking  (and  therefore  the  frequent  practice  or  neglect) 
of  certain  actions  is  one  thing;  the  act  of  judging  that  such 
actions,  whether  pleasant  or  unpleasant,  are  "right"  or 
"  wrong  "  is  an  altogether  different  thing. 

A  man  may,  for  instance,  judge  that  he  ouglit  to  renounce 
a  tender  friendship  without  its  becoming  less  delightful  to 
him  to  continue  it.  Another  may  perceive  that  he  has  acted 
rightly  in  foregoing  a  pecuniary  advantage,  though  mentally 
suffering  acute  distress  from  the  consequences  of  his  just  act. 
Again,  differences  of  judgment  as  to  the  goodness  or  badness 
of  particular  concrete  actions  have  nothing  to  do  with  the 
point  we  have  to  consider.  Thus  the  most  revolting  act  that 
can  well  be  cited,  that  of  the  deliberate  murder  of  aged 
parents,  monstrous  as  the  act  in  itself  is,  may  really  be  one 
of  filial  piety  if,  as  is  asserted,  the  savage  perpetrators  do  it 
at  the  wish  of  such  parents  themselves  and  from  a  con- 
viction that  thereby  they  not  only  save  them  from  suffering 


CHAP.  V.]  DUTY  AND  PLEASURE.  97 

in  this  world  but  also  confer  upon  them  prolonged  happiness 
in  the  next.  Hence  we  must  judge  of  the  moral  or  non- 
moral  condition  of  savage  tribes  by  their  own  declarations 
when  these  can  be  obtained  or  by  expressive  actions  as  far 
as  possible  the  equivalent  of  such  declarations.  We  have 
already  seen  the  essential  community  of  intellectual  nature 
existing  amongst  all  living  races  of  men  as  regards  the 
faculty  of  speech.  From  the  existence  of  this  community 
of  nature,  we  may  fairly  conclude  that  deliberate  articulate 
judgments  of  lower  races  have  substantially  the  same  mean- 
ing as  those  of  our  own  race,  whatever  may  be  the  con- 
crete actions  which  occasion  the  expression  of  such  abstract 
judgments. 

We  are  all  familiar  with  the  constantly  employed  expres- 
sions denoting  moral  judgments  amongst  ourselves,  The  distinct- 

J        9  .       '    ness  of  the 

and  those  amongst  us  who  reflect  upon  the  subject  conception 

.  .      x  .  generally  ad- 

are  generally  aware  that  in  asserting  that  anything  muted. 

is  "right"  they  mean  to  make  a  judgment  altogether  dis- 
tinct from  one  asserting  the  same  thing  to  be  pleasurable 
or  advantageous.  Even  men  who,  like  the  late  John 
Stuart  Mill,  assert  that  the  principle  regulating  our  actions 
should  be  the  production  of  the  greatest  amount  of  pleasure 
to  all  sentient  beings,  must  assert  that  there  is  either  no 
obligation  at  all  to  accept  this  principle  itself,  or  that  such 
obligation  is  a  "  moral "  one.  The  distinction  being  then 
generally  and  practically  recognised  as  existing  amongst  our- 
selves, we  have  to  examine  the  following  points.  Whether 
there  is  any  evidence  that  moral  perceptions  are  wanting  in 
any  savage  tribes  ?  Whether  any  races  exist  in  a  condition 
which  may  be  considered  as  a  transitional  state  between  our 
own  and  the  non-moral  condition  of  beasts  ?  Whether  any 
peoples  have  their  moral  perceptions  so  perverted — so  remote 
from  those  of  the  highest  races — as  to  result  in  the  forma- 
tion of  abstract  judgments  directly  contradicting  the  abstract 
moral  judgments  of  such  highest  races  ? 

In  this  matter  it  is  very  necessary  to  be  greatly  on  our 
guard  against  the  involuntary  misrepresentations  and  the 


08  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [Ciur.  V. 

hasty  and  careless  misinterpretations  of  unskilled  observers 
Needful  cau-  and  inaccurate  narrators.  Sir  John  Lubbock  him- 
self observes  :*  "  We  all  know  how  difficult  it  is  to 
judge  an  individual,  and  it  must  be  much  more  so  to  judge 
a  nation.  In  fact,  whether  any  given  writer  praises  or  blames 
a  particular  race,  depends  at  least  as  much  on  the  character 
of  the  writer  as  on  that  of  the  people"  Again,  we  must  be 
careful  not  to  apply  to  savage  tribes  standards  applicable  only 
to  higher  races.  The  essence  of  morality  being  the  con- 
formity of  acts  to  an  ethical  ideal,  neither  the  worst  any 
more  than  the  best  moral  development,  whatever  be  the 
concrete  acts,  can  co-exist  with  an  undeveloped  intellectual 
condition.  If  any  tribes  are  intellectually  in  a  puerile  con- 
dition, puerile  also  must  be  their  moral  state.  Here  we  may 
again  quote  Sir  John  Lubbock  with  approval.  He  says 
(p.  340):- 

"The  lowest  moral  and  the  lowest  intellectual  condition  are  not 
only,  in  my  opinion,  not  inseparable,  they  are  not  even  compatible. 
.  .  .  The  lower  races  of  men  may  be,  and  are,  vicious ;  but  allowances 
must  be  made  for  them.  On  the  contrary  (corrupt io  optimi  pessima  esC), 
the  higher  the  mental  power,  the  more  splendid  the  intellectual  endow- 
ment, the  deeper  is  tlie  moral  degradation  of  him  wlio  wastes  the  one 
and  abuses  the  other." 

Now,  one  of  the  clearest  ethical  judgments  is  that  as  to 
Examples  of  «  iustice  "  and  "  injustice :"  and  by  common  con- 

morality  in          J  .  J  •,.,•, 

savages.  sent  the  native  Australians  are  admitted  to  be  at 
about  the  lowest  level  of  existing  social  development,  while 
as  we  have  seen,  the  Esquimaux  are  deemed  by  some  to  be 
surviving  specimens  of  the  (up  to  the  present  time  hypo- 
thetical) "miocene  men." 

Concerning  the  first  of  these  race?,  the  Australians,  Sir 
John  Lubbock  tells  us: — 

"  The  amount  of  legal  revenge,  if  I  may  so  call  it,  is  often  strictly 
regulated,  even  where  we  should  least  expect  to  find  such  limitations. 
Thus,  in  Australia,  crimes  may  be  compounded  for  by  the  criminal 
appearing  and  submitting  himself  to  the  ordeal  of  having  spears 


*  '  Origin  cf  Civilisation,'  p.  259. 


CHAP.  V.]  DUTY  AND  PLEASURE.  99 

thrown  at  him  by  all  such  persons  as  conceive  themselves  to  havo 
been  aggrieved,  or  by  permitting  spears  to  be  thrust  through  certain 
parts  of  his  body;  such  as  through  the  thigh,  or  the  calf  of  the  leg,  or 
under  the  arm.  The  part  which  is  to  be  pierced  by  a  spear  is  fixed 
for  all  common  crimes,  and  a  native  who  has  incurred  this  penalty 
sometimes  quietly  holds  out  his  leg  for  the  injured  party  to  thrust  his 
spear  through !  So  strictly  is  the  amount  of  punishment  limited,  that 
if,  in  inflicting  such  spear  wounds,  a  man,  either  through  carelessness 
or  from  any  other  cause,  exceeded  the  recognised  limits— if,  for  instance, 
he  wounded  the  femoral  artery — ho  would  in  his  turn  become  liable  to 
punishment." — Oriyin  of  Civilisation,  p.  318. 

The  next  is  a  yet  stronger  example  of  savage  refinement, 
furnished  us  by  Sir  John  Lubbock : — 

"Among  the  Greenlanders,  should  a  seal  escape  with  a  hunter's 
javelin  in  it,  and  be  killed  by  another  man  afterwards,  it  belongs  to 
the  former.  But  if  the  seal  is  struck  with  the  harpoon  and  bladder, 
and  the  string  breaks,  the  hunter  loses  his  right.  If  a  man  finds  a 
seal  dead,  with  a  harpoon  in  it,  he  keeps  the  seal  but  returns  the 
harpoon Any  man  who  finds  a  piece  of  drift-wood  can  appro- 
priate it  by  placing  a  stone  on  it,  as  a  sign  that  some  one  has  taken 
possession  of  it.  No  other  Greenlander  will  then  touch  it." — Ibid. 
p.  305. 

But  perhaps  the  recently  extinct  Tasmanians  were  at  a 
luwer  level  than  the  Australians.  If  so,  Mr.  Tylor  shows  us  by 
a  legend  which  he  relates,  that  they  had  a  strong  apprecia- 
tion of  even  male  conjugal  fidelity.  The  inhabitants  of 
Tierra  del  Fuego  are,  if  possible,  more  wretched  savages 
than  the  Australians,  yet  it  is  very  interesting  to  note  that 
even  with  respect  to  these  no  less  hostile  a  witness  than 
Mr.  Darwin  himself  informs  us  that  when  a  certain  Mr. 
Bynoe  shot  some  very  young  ducklings  as  specimens,  a 
Fuegian  declared,  in  the  most  solemn  manner,  "  Oh,  Mr. 
Bynoe!  much  rain,  snow,  blow  much!"  And  as  to  this 
declaration,  Mr.  Darwin  tells  us  that  the  anticipated  bad 
weather  "  was  evidently  a  retributive  punishment  for  wasting 
human  food,"  i.e.,  for  a  transgression  of  the  aborted  moral 
code  recognised  by  the  Fuegian  in  question. 

That  the  language  of  savage  tribes  is  capable  of  ex- 
pressing moral  conceptions  will  probably  be  contested  by  no 


100  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  V. 

one.  Similarly,  no  one  will  probably  deny  that  when  a 
savage  emphatically  calls  "bad"  an  act  of  treachery  done 
to  himself  by  one  to  whom  he  has  been  kind,  his  mind 
recognises,  at  least  in  a  rudimentary  way,  an  element  of 
ingratitude  in  such  an  action.  But,  in  fact,  that  identity 
of  intellectual  nature,  fundamentally  considered,  which  we 
have  found  to  exist  in  all  men  as  the  necessary  accompani- 
ment of  language,  at  once  establishes  a  very  strong  a  priori 
probability  in  favour  of  a  similar  universality  as  to  the 
power  of  apprehending  good  and  evil.  The  onus  probandi 
lies  clearly  with  those  who  deny  it,  and  yet  not  only  are 
even  Mr.  Tylor  and  Sir  John  Lubbock  unable  to  bring  for- 
ward facts  capable  of  establishing  the  existence  of  a  non- 
moral  race  of  men,  but  they  bring  forward  instances  and 
announce  conclusions  of  an  opposite  character.  Mr.  Tylor 
observes : — 

"  Glancing  down  the  moral  scale  amongst  mankind  at  large,  we  find 
no  tribe  standing  at  or  near  zero.  The  asserted  existence  of  savages 
so  low  as  to  have  no  moral  standard  is  too  groundless  to  be  discussed. 
Every  human  tribe  has  its  general  views  as  to  what  conduct  is  right 
and  what  wrong,  and  each  generation  hands  the  standard  on  to  the  next. 
Even  in  the  details  of  those  moral  standards,  wide  as  their  differences 

are,  there  is  a  yet  wider  agreement  throughout  the  human  race 

No  known  tribe,  however  low  and  ferocious,  has  ever  admitted  that 

men  may  kill  one  another  indiscriminately The  Sioux  Indians, 

among  themselves,  hold  manslaughter,  unless  by  way  of  blood  revenge, 
to  be  a  crime,  and  the  Dayaks  also  punish  murder." — Contemporary 
Iteview,  April  1873,  pp.  702,  714. 

In  another  place,*  Mr.  Tylor,  after  showing  different  early 
conditions  of  the  tenure  of  property  and  the  occasional 
estimation  of  the  tribe  as  the  social  unit,  &c.,  adds : — "  Their 
various  grades  of  culture  had  each  according  to  its  lights  its 
standard  of  right  and  wrong,  and  they  are  to  be  judged  on 
the  criterion  whether  they  did  well  or  ill  according  to  this 
standard."  There  being  thus  no  question  as  to  the  non- 
existence  of  any  non-moral  race  of  men,  can  we  find  evidence 


1  Contemporary  Review,'  June  1873,  p.  72. 


CHAP.  V.]  DUTY  AND  PLEAS  TOE.  101 

of  any  transitional  stage  ?  But  the  difference  between  moral 
and  non-moral  existence  is  a  difference  of  kind,  and  there- 
fore "  transitions "  are  here  no  more  possible  than  between 
articulate  sound-giving  animals  which  have  not  reason  and 
articulate  sound-giving  animals  who  have  it. 

It  may  be  replied,  however,  that  Sir  John  Lubbock  and 
Mr.  Tylor  at  least  believe  in  the  natural  and  gra-  Mr.  Tyior 

»  and  Sir  John 

dual  development  of  man  from  the  non-moral  to  Lubbock. 
the  moral  mode  of  existence,  and  that  therefore  the  facts 
cited  cannot  have  the  force  here  attributed  to  them.  To 
this  it  must  be  answered  that  the  faculty  of  accumulating 
many  facts,  or  that  of  arranging  and  presenting  them  in  a 
perspicuous  and  persuasive  manner,  by  no  means  necessarily 
carries  with  it  a  faculty  of  understanding  what  those  facts 
really  teach.  That  such  an  assertion  of  intellectual  defici- 
ency may  not  repose  upon  the  mere  ipse  dixit  of  the  present 
writer,  it  may  be  well  to  quote  the  judgment  of  one  who  is 
himself  a  master  in  those  archaeological  subjects  in  which 
Sir  John  Lubbock  is  sucli  a  proficient,  while  he  is  also  a 
most  distinguished  biologist  and  a  man  of  universal  culture. 
Professor  Rolleston  upon  this  subject  remarks*  as  follows  : — 

"  It  is  strange,  indeed,  that  Sir  John  Lubbock  does  not  see  how  his 
method  of  accounting  for  the  genesis  of  the  notions  of  right  and  wrong, 
like  that  of  all  other  utilitarians,  actually  presupposes  their  existence  I 
How  could  the  old  men  '  praise '  or  '  condemn '  except  by  reference 
to  some  pre-existing  standard  of  right  and  wrong  ?  How  could  the 
parties  injured  by  the  violation  of  a  compact '  naturally  condemn '  it 
except  by  a  tacit  or  articulate  reference  to  some  '  naturally  implanted/ 
or,  at  all  events,  to  some  already  existing,  standard  of  virtue  and  vice  ? 
Language,  which  in  matters  of  this  kind  faithfully  reproduces  the 
existence  of  feelings,  and  even  to  some  extent  the  history  of  our  race, 
will  not  lend  itself  to  the  support  of  their  theories,  and  gives  the 

Dialectician  for  once  a  real  victory  over  the  Natural  Historian 

We  must  also  express  our  surprise  that  Sir  John  Lubbock  should  not 
have  drawn  attention  to  the  difficulty  which  in  early  stages  of  our 
history  must  have  beset  the  collection  of  those  'experiences  of 
utility,'  of  which  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  speaks  as  the  foundation 
of  our  so-called  moral  intuitions;  and,  secondly,  to  the  exceeding 


*  The  italics  are  not  Professor  Rollestou's. 


!0  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  V. 

unfitncss  of  the  'nervous  organisation/  which  Mr.  Huxley  calls 
'  the  thoughtless  brains/  of  a  savage,  to  act  as  a  storehouse  for  such 
experiences  when  obtained.  For,  firstly,  the  wicked  often  remain  in 
a  state  of  great  prosperity  for  periods  commensurate  with  the  lifetime 
of  an  entire  population  of  civilised,  not  to  speak  of  the  notoriously 
shorter-lived  savage,  men ;  and  a  life-long  experience  would  neutralise 
the  results,  not  merely  of  tradition,  but  of  hereditary  transmission. 
And,  secondly,  as  Sir  John  Lubbock  himself  tells  us  (p.  70),  with 
reference  to  the  practice  of  infanticide,  the '  distinction  between  the 
sexes  implies  an  amount  of  forethought  and  prudence  which  the  lower 
races  of  men  do  not  possess.'  We  commend  this  estimate  of  the 
faculties  and  capacities  of  our  ancestors  to  the  careful  consideration 
of  those  philosophers  who  suppose  them  to  have  been  capable  of  pro- 
cesses of  stock-taking,  which  must,  ex  hypothesi,  have  enabled  them  to 
anticipate  the  epigram,  '  Honesty  is  the  best  policy.' " — The  Academy, 
Nov.  15, 1870. 

I  have  thus  Professor  Kolleston  on  my  side  when  I  assert 
that  it  is  impossible  to  account  for  the  natural  development 
of  a  moral  power  of  judgment,  without,  in  fact,  presupposing 
its  actual  existence — since  such  judgment  cannot  exist  with- 
out an  ethical  standard,  and  such  standard  cannot  exist 
without  an  ethical  judgment. 

The  third  question,  then,  now  alone  remains:  namely, 
DO  moral  whether  the  moral  perceptions  of  any  people  are 
iontSdirt  so  perverted  as  to  directly  contradict  our  own 
one  another?  abgtract  moral  judgments.  In  the  words  of  Mr. 
Lecky  :* — "  It  is  not  to  be  expected,  it  is  not  to  be  main- 
tained, that  men  in  all  ages  should  have  agreed  about  the 
application  of  their  moral  principles.  All  that  is  contended 
for  is  that  these  principles  are  themselves  the  same  .... 
in  fact,  that,  however  these  principles  might  be  applied, 
"  still  humanity  was  recognised  as  a  virtue,  and  cruelty  as 
a  vice."t  But  if  opponents  have  been  unable  to  bring 
instances  to  show  the  existence  of  a  non-moral  race,  still  less 
can  they  prove  that  of  one  the  moral  principles  of  which  are 


*  '  Morals/  vol.  i.  p.  104. 

t  Mr.  Lecky  (op.  cit.  p.  105)  gives  some  interesting  quotations  from  Hel- 
vctius,  '  De  1'Esprit,'  vol.  ii.  p.  13,  to  show  how  practices  which  are  at  first, 
glaringly  immoral  come,  when  fully  understood,  to  appear  relatively  moral, 
and  a  positive  improvement  upon  other  customs  they  have  displaced. 


CHAP.  V.]  DUTY  AND  PLEASUEE.  103 

inverted.  Let  thieving  be  here  and  there  encouraged  and 
taught,  yet  dishonesty  is  nowhere  erected  into  a  principle, 
but  is  reprobated  in  the  very  maxim  "honour  amongst 
thieves."  Frightful  cruelty  towards  prisoners  was  practised 
by  the  North  American  Indians,  but  it  was  towards  prisoners, 
and  cruelty  was  never  inculcated  as  an  ideal  to  be  always 
aimed  at  so  that  remorse  of  conscience  should  be  felt  by  any 
man  who  happened  to  have  let  slip  a  possible  opportunity 
of  cruelty  towards  any  one.  As  another  writer  has  well 
expressed  it :  * — "  Many  men  doubtless  in  various  times  and 
places  have  thought  it  right  to  do  many  an  act  which  we 
know  to  be  unjust ;  still  they  have  never  thought  it  right 
because  unjust;  they  have  never  thought  it  right  for  the 
sake  of  any  virtuousness  which  they  have  supposed  to  reside 
in  injustice ;  but  because  of  the  virtuousness  of  beneficence,  or 
gratitude,  or  the  like.  Similarly,  many  men  think  an  act 
wrong,  because  they  think  it  unjust ;  but  they  never  think 
it  wrong  because  they  think  it  just" 

We  may  then  safely  conclude  that  there  exists  no  evidence 
whatever  yet  discovered  for  the  existence  of  races  either 
non-moral  or  with  a  really  inverted  morality,  or  for  the 
evolution  of  a  "  moral  state  "  from  a  brutal,  non-moral  con- 
dition of  mankind. 

All  men  who  follow  the  school  of  thought  advocated  by 
John  Stuart  Mill,  Herbert  Spencer,  Winwood  Reade,  The  popular 
Huxley,  Vogt,  Tyndall,  and  Lewes,  assert,  and  school  impu- 

J>  o  >        J  >  >  citly  denies 

must  assert,  that  in  spite  of  the  present  difference  morality. 
between  the  ideas  of  "pleasure"  and  "duty"  they  are, 
nevertheless,  one  as  to  their  origin — an  origin  consisting 
ultimately  of  pleasurable  and  painful  sensations.  Moral 
conceptions,  they  say,  have  been  evolved  from  pleasurable 
sensations  by  the  preservation,  through  long  ages  (in  the 
struggle  for  life),  of  a  predominating  number  of  such  in- 
dividuals as  happened  to  have  a  natural  and  spontaneous 
liking  for  practices  and  habits  of  mind  useful  to  their  tribe 


'Dublin  Review,'  January  1872,  p.  G5. 


104  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  V. 

or  race,  and  that  the  same  action  has  destroyed  a  pre- 
dominating number  of  those  individuals  who  possessed  a 
marked  tendency  to  contrary  practices.  The  descendants  of 
individuals  so  preserved  have,  they  say,  come  to  inherit  such 
a  liking  and  such  useful  habits  of  mind,  and  at  last  (finding 
this  inherited  tendency  thus  existing  in  themselves,  distinct 
from  their  tendency  to  conscious  self-gratification)  have 
become  apt  to  regard  it  as  fundamentally  distinct,  innate, 
and  independent  of  all  experience.  In  fact,  according  to 
this  school,  the  idea  of  "right"  is  only  the  result  of  the 
gradual  accretion  of  useful  predilections  which,  from  time  to 
time,  arose  in  a  series  of  ancestors  naturally  selected.  In 
this  way  "morality"  is,  as  it  were,  the  congealed  past 
experience  of  the  race,  and  "  virtue  "  becomes,*  as  it  were,  a 
sort  of  "retrieving,"  which  the  thus  improved  human  animal 
practises  by  a  perfected  and  inherited  habit,  regardless  of 
self-gratification,  just  as  the  brute  animal  has  acquired  the 
habit  of  seeking  prey  and  bringing  it  to  his  master,  instead 
of  devouring  it  himself. 

Mr.  John  Stuart  Mill  has  very  amusingly  and  instructively 
Mr.  John       (though,  of  course,  quite  unintentionally)  shown  us 

Stuart  Mill's    V  J  } 

seif-contra-    how  radically  distinct  even  in  his  own  mind  are 

diction  in  J 

this  matter,  the  two  ideas,  which  he  nevertheless  endeavours  to 
identify.  In  his  examination  of  'Sir  William  Hamilton's 
Philosophy,'  he  eays :  "  If  I  am  informed  that  the  world  is 
ruled  by  a  being  whose  attributes  are  infinite,  but  what  they 
are  we  cannot  learn,  nor  what  the  principles  of  his  govern- 
ment, except  that  '  the  highest  human  morality  which  we 
are  capable  of  conceiving '  does  not  sanction  them ;  convince 
me  of  it,  and  I  will  bear  my  fate  as  I  may.  But  when  I  am 
told  that  I  must  believe  this,  and  at  the  same  time  call  this 
being  by  the  names  which  express  and  affirm  the  highest 
human  morality,  I  say  in  plain  terms  that  I  will  not.  "What- 
ever power  such  a  being  may  have  over  me,  there  is  one 


*  This  was  pointed   out  in  tlie  'Genesis  of  Species'  (Macmillan),  2nd 
edition,  p.  213. 


CHAP.  V]  DUTY  AND  PLEASURE.  105 

thing  which  he  shall  not  do ;  he  shall  not  compel  me  to 
worship  him.  I  will  call  no  being  good  who  is  not  what  I 
mean  when  I  apply  that  epithet  to  my  fellow-creatures ;  and 
if  such  a  being  can  sentence  me  to  hell,  to  hell  I  will  go." 

This  is  unquestionably  an  admirable  sentiment  on  the 
part  of  Mr.  Mill  (with  which  every  absolute  moralist  will 
agree),  but  it  contains  a  complete  refutation  of  his  own 
position,  and  is  a  capital  instance  of  the  vigorous  life  of 
moral  intuition  in  one  who  professes  to  have  eliminated  any 
fundamental  distinction  between  the  "  right "  and  the  "  ex- 
pedient." For  if  an  action  is  morally  good,  and  to  be  done 
merely  in  proportion  to  the  amount  of  pleasure  it  secures, 
and  morally  bad,  and  to  be  avoided  as  tending  to  misery,  and 
if  it  could  be  proved  that  by  calling  God  good — whether  He 
is  so  or  not  in  our  sense  of  the  term — we  could  secure  a 
maximum  of  pleasure,  and  by  refusing  to  do  so  we  should 
incur  endless  torment,  clearly,  on  utilitarian  principles,  the 
flattery  would  be  good.  Mr.  Mill,  of  course,  must  also  mean 
that  in  the  matter  in  question  all  men  would  do  well  to  act 
with  him.  Therefore  he  must  mean  that  it  would  be  well 
lor  all  to  accept  (on  the  hypothesis  above  given)  infinite  and 
final  misery  for  all  as  the  result  of  the  pursuit  of  happiness 
as  the  only  end. 

It  must  be  recollected  that  in  consenting  to  worship  this 
unholy  God,  Mr.  Mill  is  not  asked  to  do  harm  to  his  neigh- 
bour, so  that  his  refusal  reposes  simply  on  his  perception  of 
the  immorality  of  the  requisition. 

It  is  also  noteworthy  that  an  omnipotent  Deity  is  supposed 
incapable  of  altering  Mr.  Mill's  mind  and  moral  perceptions ! 

Mr.  Mill's  decision  is  right,  but  it  is  difficult  indeed  to  see 
how,  without  the  recognition  of  an  "absolute  morality,"  he 
can  justify  so  utter  and  final  an  abandonment  of  all  utility  in 
favour  of  a  clear  moral  perception. 

These  two  ideas,  the  "  right "  and  the  '•  useful,"  being 
so  distinct,  a  greater  difficulty  meets  us  with  The  origin  of 

...  tbe  concep- 

regard  to  their  origin  from  some  common  source  tion  "right." 
than    could   arise    from  "merely   considering  difficulties  as 
6 


106  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  V. 

to  the  incipient  stages  of  our  bodily  structures.  For  the 
distinction  between  the  "right"  and  the  "useful"  is  so 
fundamental  and  essential  that  not  only  does  the  idea  of 
benefit  not  enter  into  the  idea  of  duty,  but  we  see  that  the 
very  fact  of  an  act  not  being  beneficial  to  us  makes  it  the 
more  praiseworthy,  while  gain  tends  to  diminish  the  merit 
of  an  action.  Yet  this  idea,  "  right,"  thus  excluding,  as  it 
does,  all  reference  to  utility  or  pleasure,  has  nevertheless  to 
be  constructed  and  evolved  from  utility  and  pleasure,  and 
ultimately  from  pleasurable  sensations,  if  we  are  to  accept 
pure  Darwinianism :  if  we  are  to  accept,  that  is,  the  evolution 
of  man's  psychical  nature  and  highest  powers  by  the  ex- 
clusive action  of  "  Natural  Selection  "  from  such  faculties  as 
are  possessed  by  brutes ;  in  other  words,  if  we  are  to  believe 
that  the  conceptions  of  the  highest  human  morality  arose 
through  minute  and  fortuitous  variations  of  brutal  desires 
and  appetites,  in  all  conceivable  directions. 

It  is  here  contended,  on  the  other  hand,  that  no  con- 
servation of  any  such  variations  could  ever  have  given  rise 
to  the  faintest  beginning  of  any  such  moral  perceptions ; 
that  by  "Natural  Selection  "  alone  the  maxim  fiat  justitia, 
mat  cesium  could  not  have  been  excogitated,  still  less  have 
found  a  widespread  acceptance ;  that  it  is  impotent  to  sug- 
gest even  an  approach  towards  an  explanation  of  the  first  be- 
ginning of  the  idea  of  "  right."  It  need  hardly  be  remarked 
that  acts  may  be  distinguished  not  only  as  pleasurable,  useful, 
or  beautiful,  but  also  as  good,  in  two  different  senses ;  (1) 

Materially  materially  moral  acts,  and  (2)  acts  which  are  form- 
ed formally  y  '  .  J 

moral  acts,  atty  moral.  The  first  are  acts  good  in  themselves. 
as  acts,  apart  from  any  intention  of  the  agent  which  may  or 
may  not  have  been  directed  towards  the  right;  The  second 
are  acts  which  are  good  not  only  in  themselves  as  acts,  but 
also  in  the  deliberate  intention  of  the  agent  who  recognises 
his  actions  as  being  "  right."  Thus,  acts  may  be  materially 
moral  or  immoral  in  a  very  high  degree,  without  being  in 
the  least  formally  so.  For  example,  a  person  may  tend  and 
minister  to  a  sick  man  with  scrupulous  care  and  exactness, 


CHAP.  V.]  DUTY  AND  PLEASURE.  107 

having  in  view  all  the  time  nothing  but  the  future  reception 
of  a  good  legacy.  Another  may,  in  the  dark,  shoot  his  own 
father,  taking  him  to  be  an  assassin,  and  so  commit  what  is 
materially  an  act  of  parricide,  though  formally  it  is  only  an 
act  of  self-defence  of  more  or  less  culpable  rashness.  A 
woman  may  innocently,  because  ignorantly,.  marry  a  married 
man,  and  so  commit  a  material  act  of  adultery.  She  may 
discover  the  facts,  and  persist,  and  so  make  her  act  formal 
also. 

Actions  of  brutes,  such  as  those  of  the  bee,  the  ant,  or  the 
beaver,  however  materially  good  as  regards  their  relation  to 
the  community  to  which  such  animals  belong,  are  absolutely 
destitute  of  the  most  incipient  degree  of  real,  i.e.,  formal 
"goodness,"  because  unaccompanied  by  mental  acts  of 
conscious  will  directed  towards  the  fulfilment  of  duty. 

Mr.  Darwin  does  not  hesitate  to  declare  distinctly  that  the 
"  moral  sense"  is  but  a  mere  result  of  the  develop-  Mr.  Darwin-^ 
ment  of  brutal  instincts.     He  maintains,  "  the  first  vl 
foundation  or  origin  of  the  moral  sense  lies  in  the  social 
instincts,  including  sympathy ;  and  these  instincts  no  doubt 
were  primarily  gained,  as  in  the  case  of  the  lower  animals, 
through  natural    selection"    ('Descent    of    Man,'    vol.    ii. 
p.  394). 

Everything,  however,  depends  upon  what  we  mean  by  the 
"  moral  sense."  It  is  a  patent  fact  that  there  does  exist  a 
perception  of  the  qualities  "right"  and  "wrong"  attaching 
to  certain  actions.  However  arising,  men  have  a  conscious- 
ness of  an  absolute  and  immutable  rule  legitimately  claiming 
obedience  with  an  authority  necessarily  supreme  and  abso- 
lute—  in  other  words,  intellectual  judgments  are  formed 
which  imply  the  existence  of  an  ethical  idea  in  the  judging 
mind. 

It  is,  as  has  been  already  said,  the  existence  of  this  power 
which  has  to  be  accounted  for;  neither  its  application  nor 
even  its  validity  have  to  be  considered.  Yet  instances  of 
difference  of  opinion  respecting  the  moral  value  of  particular 
concrete  actions  are  often  brought  forward  as  if  they  could 


108  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  V. 

disprove  the  existence  of  moral  intuition.  Such  instances  are 
utterly  beside  the  question.  It  is  amply  sufficient  for  our 
purpose  if  it  be  conceded  that  developed  reason  dictates  to 
us  that  certain  modes  of  action,  abstractedly  considered,  are 
intrinsically  wrong  ;  and  this  we  believe  to  be  indisputable. 

It  can  hardly  be  too  often  insisted  on  that  it  is  equally 
beside  the  question  to  show  that  the  existence  of  mutually 
beneficial  acts  and  of  altruistic  habits  can  be  explained  by 
"  natural  selection."  No  amount  of  benevolent  habits  tend 
even  in  the  remotest  degree  to  account  for  the  intellectual 
perception  of"  right  "  and  "  duty."  Such  habits  may  make  the 
doing  of  beneficial  acts  pleasant,  and  their  omission  painful  ; 
but  such  feelings  have  essentially  nothing  whatever  to  do 
with  the  perception  of  "  right  "  and  "  wrong,"  nor  will  the 
faintest  incipient  stage  of  the  perception  be  accounted  for 
by  the  strongest  development  of  such  sympathetic  feelings. 
Liking  to  do  acts  which  happen  to  be  good  is  one  thing  ;  seeing 
that  actions  are  good,  whether  we  or  others  like  them  or  not, 
is  quite  another. 

Mr.  Darwin's  account  of  the  moral  sense  is  very  different 

That  moral     from  the  above.     It  may  be  expressed  most  briefly 

arT^ply3    by  saying  that  it  is  the  prevalence  of  more  enduring 

durtog'in-11"  instincts  over  less  persistent  ones  —  the  former  being 

social  instincts,  the  latter  personal  ones.     He  tells 


"  As  man  cannot  prevent  old  impressions  continually  repassing 
through  his  mind,  he  will  be  compelled  to  compare  the  weaker  im- 
pressions of,  for  instance,  past  hunger,  or  of  vengeance  satisfied  or 
danger  avoided  at  the  cost  of  other  men,  with  the  instinct  of  sympathy 
and  goodwill  to  his  fellows,  which  is  still  present  and  ever  in  some 
degree  active  in  his  mind.  He  will  then  feel  in  his  imagination  that 
a  stronger  instinct  has  yielded  to  one  which  now  seems  comparatively 
weak;  and  then  that  sense  of  dissatisfaction  will  inevitably  be  felt 
with  which  man  is  endowed,  like  every  other  animal,  in  order  that  his 
instincts  may  be  obeyed."  —  Vol.  i.  p.  90. 

Mr.  Darwin  then  means  by  "the  moral  sense"  an  instinct, 
and  adds,  truly  enough,  that  "the  very  essence  of  an  instinct 
is,  that  it  is  followed  independently  of  reason"  (vol.  i.  p.  100). 


CUAI-.  V.]  DUTY  AND  PLEASURE.  109 

But  the  very  essence  of  moral  action  is  that  it  is  not  followed 
independently  of  reason. 

When  Mr.  Darwin  eays,*  "  For  my  part  I  would  as  soon 
be  descended  from  that  heroic  little  monkey,  &c.,  as  from  a 
savage  who  delights  to  torture  his  enemies,  offers  up  bloody 
sacrifices,  &c.,  and  is  haunted  by  the  grossest  superstitions," 
it  only  shows  that  he  has  not  even  the  faintest  conception  of 
what  a  "  moral  nature  "  is. 

Having  stated  our  wide  divergence  from  Mr.  Darwin  with 
respect  to  what  the  term  "  moral  sense  "  denotes,  we  might 
be  dispensed  from  criticising  instances  which  must  from  our 
point  of  view  be  irrelevant,  as  Mr.  Darwin  would  probably 
admit.  Nevertheless,  let  us  examine  a  few  of  these  instances, 
and  see  if  we  can  discover  in  them  any  justification  of  the 
views  he  propounds. 

As  illustrations  of  the  development  of  self-reproach  for  the 
nc'glcct  of  some  good  action,  he  observes: —  Mr.Darwm-s 

instances. 

"A  young  pointer,  when  it  first  scents  game,  apparently  cannot 
help  pointing.  A  squirrel  in  a  cage  who  pats  the  nuts  which  it 
cannot  eat,  as  if  to  bury  them  in  the  ground,  can  hardly  be  thought  to 
act  thus  either  from  pleasure  or  pain.  Hence  the  common  assump- 
tion that  men  must  bo  impelled  to  every  action  by  experiencing  some 
]ikasure  or  pain  may  be  erroneous.  Although  a  habit  may  be  blindly 
and  implicitly  followed,  independently  of  any  pleasure  or  pain  felt  at 
the  moment,  yet  if  it  be  forcibly  and  abruptly  checked,  a  vague  sense 
of  dissatisfaction  is  generally  experienced ;  and  this  is  especially  true 
in  regard  to  persons  of  feeble  intellect." — Vol.  i.  p.  80. 

Now,  passing  over  the  question  whether  in  the  "pointing" 
and  "patting"  referred  to  there  may  not  be  some  agreeable 
sensations,  we  contend  that  such  instincts  have  nothing  to 
do  with  ¥  morality,"  from  their  blind  nature,  such  blindness 
simply  ipso  facto  eliminating  every  vestige  of  morality  from 
an  action. 

Mr.  Darwin  certainly  exaggerates  the  force  and  extent  of 
social  sympathetic  feelings.  Mr.  Mill  admits  that  they  are 


*  '  Descent  of  Man,'  vol.  ii.  p.  404. 


HO  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CiiAp.  V. 

"often  wanting;"  but  Mr.  Darwin  claims  the  conscious  pos- 
session of  such  feelings  for  all,  and  quotes  Hume  as  saying 
that  the  view  of  the  happiness  of  others  "  communicates  a 
secret  joy,"  while  the  appearance  of  their  misery  "  throws  a 
melancholy  damp  over  the  imagination."  *  One  might  wish 
that  this  remark  were  universally  true,  but  unfortunately 
some  men  take  pleasure  in  the  pain  of  others;  and  Laroche- 
foucauld  efe'n  ventured  on  the  now  well-known  saying,  "  that 
there  is  something  in  the  misfortunes  of  our  best  friends  not 
unpleasant  to  us."  But  our  feeling  that  the  sufferings  of 
others  are  pleasant  or  unpleasant  has  nothing  to  do  with  the 
question,  which  refers  to  the  judgment  whether  the  indulging 
of  such  feelings  is  "  right "  or  "  wrong." 

If  the  "social  instinct"  were  the  real  basis  of  the  moral 
sense,  the  fact  that  society  approved  of  anything  would  be 
recognised  as  the  supreme  sanction  of  it.  Not  only,  however, 
is  this  not  so,  not  only  do  we  judge  as  to  whether  society  in 
certain  cases  is  right  or  wrong,  but  we  demand  a  reason  why 
we  should  obey  society  at  all ;  we  demand  a  rational  basis 
and  justification  for  social  claims,  if  we  happen  to  have  a 
somewhat  inquiring  turn  of  mind.  We  shall  be  sure  avowedly 
or  secretly  to  despise  and  neglect  the  performance  of  acts 
which  we  do  not  happen  to  desire,  and  which  have  not  an 
intellectual  sanction. 

The  only  passage  in  which  our  author  seems  as  if  about  to 
meet  the  real  question  at  issue  is  very  disappointing,  as  the 
difficulty  is  merely  evaded.  He  remarks :  "  I  am  aware  that 
some  persons  maintain  that  actions  performed  impulsively  do 
not  come  under  the  dominion  of  the  moral  sense,  and  cannot 
be  called  moral"  (vol.  i.  p.  87).  This  is  not  a  correct  state- 
ment of  the  intuitive  view,  and  the  difficulty  is  evaded  thus  : 
"  But  it  appears  scarcely  possible  to  draw  any  clear  line  of 
distinction  of  this  kind,  though  the  distinction  may  be  real !" 
It  seems  to  us,  however,  that  there  is  no  difficulty  at  all  in 
drawing  a  line  between  a  judgment  as  to  an  action  being  right 


*  '  Inquiry  concerning  the  Priuciplcs  of  Morals,'  edit.  1751,  p.  132. 


CHAP.  V.]  DUTY  AND  PLEASURE.  11 1 

or  wrong  and  every  other  kind  of  mental  act.  Mr.  Darwin 
goes  on  to  say  : — 

"  Moreover,  an  action  repeatedly  performed  by  us,  will  at  last  be 
done  without  deliberation  or  hesitation,  and  can  then  hardly  be  dis- 
tinguished from  an  instinct ;  yet  surely  no  one  will  pretend  that  an 
action  thus  done  ceases  to  be  moral.  On  the  contrary,  we  all  feel  that 
an  act  cannot  be  considered  as  perfect,  or  as  performed  in  the  most 
noble  manner,  unless  it  is  done  impulsively,  without  deliberation  or 
effort,  in  the  same  manner  as  by  a  man  in  whom  the  requisite  qualities 
arc  innate." — Vol.  i.  p.  88. 

To  this  must  be  replied,  in  one  sense,  "  Yes ;"  in  another, 
"  No."  An  action  which  has  ceased  to  be  directly  or  indi- 
rectly deliberate  has  ceased  to  be  moral  as  a  distinct  act,  but 
it  is  moral  as  the  continuation  of  those  preceding  deliberate 
acts  through  which  the  good  habit  was  originally  formed, 
and  the  rapidity  with  which  the  will  is  directed  in  the  case 
supposed  may  indicate  the  number  and  constancy  of  antece- 
dent meritorious  volitions.  Mr.  Darwin  seems  to  see  this 
more  or  less,  as  he  adds :  "  He  who  is  forced  to  overcome  his 
fear  or  want  of  sympathy  before  he  acts,  deserves,  however, 
in  one  way  higher  credit  than  the  man  whose  innate  disposi-' 
tion  leads  him  to  a  good  act  without  effort." 

Mr.  Darwin  gives  as  an  illustration  of  the  genesis  of 
remorse, 

"of  a  temporary  though  for  the  time  strongly  persistent  instinct 
conquering  another  instinct  which  is  usually  dominant  over  all  others," 
the  case  of  Swallows,  which  "  at  the  proper  season  seem  all  day  long 
to  be  impressed  with  the  desire  to  migrate ;  their  habits  change ;  they 
become  restless,  are  noisy,  and  congregate  in  flocks.  Whilst  the 
mother-bird  is  feeding  or  brooding  over  her  nestlings,  the  maternal 
instinct  is  probably  stronger  than  the  migratory ;  but  the  instinct 
which  is  more  persistent  gains  the  victory,  and  at  last,  at  a  moment 
when  her  young  ones  are  not  in  sight,  she  takes  flight  and  deserts 
them.  When  arrived  at  the  end  of  her  long  journey,  and  the  migratory 
instinct  ceases  to  act,  what  an  agony  of  remorse  each  bird  would  feel, 
if,  from  being  endowed  with  great  mental  activity,  she  could  not 
prevent  the  image  continually  passing  before  her  mind  of  her  young 
ones  perishing  in  the  bleak  north  from  cold  and  hunger." — Vol.  i.  p.  90. 

Let  us  suppose  she  does  suffer  "  agony,"  that  feeling  would 
be  nothing  to  the  purpose.  What  is  requisite  is  that  she  shall 


112  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  V. 

judge  that  she  ought  not  to  have  left  them.  To  make  clear 
our  point,  let  us  imagine  a  man  formerly  entangled  in  ties 
of  affection  \\hieh  in  justice  to  another  his  conscience  has 
imhi'.vil  him  to  sever.  The  image  of  the  distress  his  act  of 
severance  has  caused  may  occasion  him.  keen  emotional  suf- 
fering for  years,  accompanied  by  a  clear  perception  that  his 
act  has  been  right.  Again,  let  us  suppose  another  case :  The 
struggling  father  of  a  family  becomes  aware  that  the  property 
on  which  he  lives  really  belongs  to  another,  and  he  reliu- 
» pushes  it  He  may  continue  to  judge  that  he  has  done  a 
proper  action,  whilst  tortured  by  the  trials  in  which  his  act 
of  justice  has  involved  him.  To  assert  that  these  acts  are 
merely  instinctive  would  be  absurdly  false.  In  the  t; 
supposed,  obedience  is  paid  to  a  clear  intellectual  perception 
and  against  the  very  strongest  instincts. 

Mr.  Darwin  objects  to  the  belief  that  the  word  "ought" 
means  more  than  "the  consciousness  of  the  existence  of  a 
persistent  instinct,"  the  fact  that  we  say  "  hounds  ought  to 
him: .  But  in  fact  when  we  so  judge  of  them,  we  mean 

lhat  they  do  not  fulfil  their  end  as  hounds  or  pointers  if 
they  fail.  The  rose  of  a  Chinese  convert,  who,  against  his 
lift -long  training  and  the  universal  opinion  of  his  fellows, 
elects  a  life  of  self-denial  ending  in  martyrdom,  is  one  of  a 
kind  not  included  in  Mr.  Darwin's  provisions. 

That  we  have  not  misrepresented  Mr.  Darwin's  exposition 
of  "conscience"  is  manifest.  He  says  that  if  a  man  has 
gratified  a  passing  instinct,  to  the  neglect  of  an  enduring 
instinct,  he  '*  will  then  feel  dissatisfied  with  himself,  and  will 
resolve  with  more  or  less  force  to  act  differently  for  the 
future.  This  is  conscience ;  for  conscience  looks  backwards 
and  judges  past  actions,  inducing  that  kind  of  dissatisfaction, 
which  if  weak  we  call  regret,  and  if  severe  remorse"  (voL  i. 
p.  91).  "Conscience"  certainly.  *  looks  back  anl  judges," 
but  not  all  that  "looks  back  and  judges"  is  "conscience," 
A  judgment  of  conscience  is  one  of  a  particular  kind,  namely, 
a  judgment  according  to  the  standard  of  moral  worth.  But 
for  this,  a  ^onriiuifit?,  suffering  after  dinner  from  dyspepsia 


CHAP.  V.]  DUTY  AND  PLEASURE.  113 

might  exercise  his  conscience  in  looking  back  and  judging 
with  dissatisfaction  that  he  had  eaten  the  wrong  sauce. 

Indeed,  elsewhere  (vol.  i.  p.  103)  Mr.  Darwin  speaks  of 
"  the  standard  of  morality  rising  higher  and  higher,"  though 
he  nowhere  explains  what  he  means  either  by  the  "  standard" 
or  by  the  "higher;"  and,  indeed,  it  is  very  difficult  to  under- 
stand what  can  possibly  be  meant  by  this  "rising  of  the 
standard,"  if  the  '"'standard"  is  from  first  to  last  pleasure  and 
profit. 

About  sympathy  for  suffering  he  says:  "Nor  could  we 
check  our  sympathy,  if  so  urged  by  hard  reason,  without 
deterioration  in  the  noblest  part  of  our  nature."  But  it  may 
well  be  asked,  why  and  how  noblest  ? 

We  find,  again,  the  singular  remark :  "  If  any  desire  or 
instinct  leading  to  an  action  opposed  to  the  good  of  others, 
still  appears  to  a  man,  when  recalled  to  mind,  as  strong  as  or 
stronger  than  his  social  instinct,  he  will  feel  no  keen,  regret 
at  having  followed  it"  (vol.  i.  p.  92). 

Of  Indians,  he  says  (vol.  i.  p.  99) :  "  It  would  be  difficult- 
to  distinguish  between  the  remorse  felt  by  a  Hindoo  who  has 
(at en  unclean  food,  from  that  felt  after  committing  a  theft." 
Very  likely  so,  for  it  would  be  difficult  to  say  which  act  would, 
in  him,  be  the  more  culpable. 

Mr.  Darwin  is  continually  mistaking  a  merely  beneficial 
action  for  a  moral  one ;  but,  as  before  said,  it  is  one  thing  to 
act  well,  and  quite  another  to  be  a  moral  agent.  A  dog  or 
even  a  fruit-tree  may  act  well,  but  neither  is  a  moral  agent, 
Of  course,  all  the  instances  he  brings  forward  with  regard  to 
animals  are  not  in  point,  on  account  of  this  misconception  of 
the  problem  to  be  solved.  He  gives,  how  ever,  some  examples 
which  tell  strongly  against  his  own  view.  Thus,  he  remarks 
of  the  Law  of  Honour:  "  The  breach  of  this  law,  even  when 
the  breach  is  known  to  be  strictly  accordant  with  true  mo- 
rality, has  caused  many  a  man  more  agony  than  a  real  crime. 
We  recognise  the  same  influence  in  the  sense  of  burning 
shame  which  most  of  us  have  felt,  even  after  the  interval  of 
when  calling  to  mind  some  accidental  breach  of  a 


114  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  V. 

trifling,  though  fixed,  rule  of  etiquette"  (vol.  i.  p.  92).  This 
is  most  true ;  some  trifling  breach  of  good  manners  may 
indeed  occasion  us  pain  ;  but  this  may  be  unaccompanied  by 
a  judgment  that  we  are  morally  blameworthy.  It  is  judgment, 
and  not  feeling,  which  has  to  do  with  right  and  wrong.  But 
a  yet  better  example  might  be  given.  What  quality  can 
have  been  more  universally  useful  to  social  communities  than 
courage  ?  It  has  always  been,  and  is  still,  greatly  admired 
and  highly  appreciated,  and  is  especially  adapted,  both 
directly  and  indirectly,  to  enable  its  possessors  to  become  the 
fathers  of  succeeding  generations.  If  the  social  instinct  were 
the  basis  of  the  moral  sense,  it  is  infallibly  certain  that 
courage  must  have  come  to  be  regarded  as  supremely  "  good," 
and  cowardice  to  be  deserving  of  the  deepest  moral  condem- 
nation. And  yet  what  is  the  fact  ?  A  coward  feels  probably 
self-contempt  and  that  he  has  incurred  the  contempt  of  his 
associates,  but  he  does  not  feel  "wicked."  He  is  painfully 
conscious  of  his  defective  organisation,  but  he  knows  that  an 
organisation,  however  defective,  cannot  in  itself  constitute 
moral  demerit.  Similarly,  we,  the  observers,  despise,  avoid, 
or  hate  a  coward ;  but  we  can  clearly  understand  that  a 
coward  may  be  a  more  virtuous  man  than  another  who 
abounds  in  animal  courage. 

The  better  still  to  show  how  completely  difctinct  are  the 
conceptions  "enduring  or  strong  instincts"  and  "virtuous 
desires"  on  the  one  hand,  and  "transient  or  weak  impulses" 
and  "  vicious  inclinations  "  on  the  other,  let  us  substitute  in 
the  following  passage  for  the  words  which  Mr.  Darwin,  on 
his  own  principles,  illegitimately  introduces,  others  which 
accord  with  those  principles,  and  we  shall  see  how  such 
substitution  eliminates  every  element  of  morality  from  the 
passage : — 

"  Looking  to  future  generations,  there  is  no  cause  to  fear 
that  the  social  instincts  will  grow  weaker,  and  we  may  expect 
that  enduring  [virtuous]  habits  will  grow  stronger,  becoming 
perhaps  fixed  by  inheritance.  In  this  case  the  struggle  be- 
tween our  stronger  [higher]  and  weaker  [lower]  impulses  will 


CHAP.  V.]  DUTY  AND  PLEASURE.  115 

be  less  severe,  and  the  strong  [virtue]  will  be  triumphant " 
(vol.  i.  p.  104). 

As  to  past  generations,  Mr.  Darwin  tells  us  (vol.  i.  p.  106) 
that  at  all  times  throughout  the  world  tribes  have  sup- 
planted other  tribes ;  and  as  social  acts  are  an  element  in 
their  success,  sociality  must  have  been  intensified,  and  Ihis 
because  "  an  increase  in  the  number  of  well-endowed  men 
will  certainly  give  an  immense  advantage  to  one  tribe  over 
another."  No  doubt !  but  this  only  explains  an  augmenta- 
tion of  mutually  beneficial  actions.  It  does  not  in  the  least 
even  tend  to  explain  how  the  moral  judgment  was  first 
formed. 

Our  author  again  and  again  uses  words,  which  are  only 
explicable  on  the  intuitive  view,  as  if  they  required  no  ex- 
planation whatever.  Thus  (vol.  i.  p.  101)  he  speaks  of  a 
certain  virtue  as  being  "  one  of  the  noblest  with  which  man  is 
endowed,"  and  says  that  "  the  highest  stage  in  moral  culture 
at  which  we  can  arrive  is  when  we  recognise  that  we  ought  to 
control  our  thoughts."*  But,  according  to  Mr.  Darwin,  the 
moral  sense  is  the  predominance  of  one  instinct  over  another 
in  intensity  or  duration.  Here  there  is  no  room  for  any 
element  of  quality,  and  for  him  to  introduce  such  is,  in  fact, 
to  abandon  his  position.  In  the  words  of  Mr.  Grote  (p.  83) 
-— ••  \\hat  is  it,  then,  that  thus,  distinct  from  duration  and 
intensity  of  enjoyment,  makes  one  sort  of  happiness  more 
desirable,  worthier,  worth  more  than  another  ?  ....  it  is  a 
third  dimension  of  happiness  besides  intensity  and  duration, 
and  far  the  most  important  of  the  three."  And  again  (p. 
125) — "  When  we  find  such  language  ....  in  the  mouths 
of  impugners  of  a  supposed  intuitivist  philosophy,  we  are  at 
first  probably  led  to  think  whether  such  a  philosophy  be  not 
what '  expellas  furca,  tamen  usque  recurret ' .  .  .  .  and  .... 
'  we  may  conclude  that  we  cannot  write  many  consecutive 
words  upon  a  moral  subject  without  involving '  a  higher 
philosophy." 

*  Mr.  Darwin  quotes  Marcus  Aurelius ;  he  might  have  quoted  an  older  and 
more  venerable  authority. 


L16  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  V. 

Iii  concluding  what  I  have  to  say  relative  to  Mr.  Darwin's 
conception  and  explanation  of  the  moral  sense  (namely,  that 
its  first  foundation  and  origin  lies  in  the  social  instincts, 
including  sympathy,  themselves  gained  primarily  through 
natural  selection),*  I  may  quote  some  observations  made  by 
Mr.'Hutton.f  He  says  that,  supposing  the  moral  nature  of  man 
to  have  been  simply  evolved  from  brutes,  "  the  moral  nature 
must,  then,  be  wholly  determined  by  the  physical  agencies  in 
which  it  is  reared.  And  to  suppose  that  they  could  give  a 
power  of  self-determination  of  which  they  are  not  themselves 
possessed,  or  issue  in  a  sense  of  obligation,  when  they  are  a 
mere  bundle  of  helpless  forces,  is  to  suppose  nature  at  once 
free  and  servile,  vigilant  and  asleep." 

The  notions  that  the  distinct,  deliberate,  reflective,  repre- 
sentative powers  of  the  mind  are  essentially  the  same  as  the 
mere  indeliberate,  presentative  faculties ;  and  that  the  gre- 
garious instincts  of  a  brute  are  fundamentally  one  with  our 
moral  intuitions,  is  open  to  another  of  Mr.  Hutton's  excel- 
lent remarks  (vol.  i.  p.  47) : — "  Nothing  is  less  scientific  than 
any  hypothesis  which  tries  to  run  one  set  of  facts  into  another 
without  justification,  in  order  to  evade  the  admission  of  a 
distinct  root.  Instead  of  increasing  our  means  of  representing 
the  universe,  such  a  procedure  confines  and  disturbs  them," 
and  "  the  problem  of  all  atheistic  philosophers  has  been,  not 
to  find  the  real  ultimate  link  between  the  different  classes  of 
natural  force  and  life,  but  to  soften  away  as  much  as  possible 
the  one  into  the  other,  so  as  to  make  the  transition  imper- 
ceptible, and  so  introduce  a  thoroughly  new  creative  force,  as 
if  it  were  but  an  expansion  of  that  beneath  it  "  (p.  51). 

It  would  not  be  impossible,  however,  to  modify  this  ex- 
pression of  Mr.  Darwin's  views,  so  as  to  make  them  harmonise 
with  our  ethical  perceptions.  If  he  were  to  say  that  a  moral 
First  Cause  had  so  ordered  events  that  the  right  and  the 
expedient  in  the  main  coincide,  and  thus  virtue  and  happi- 


*  '  Descent  of  Man,'  vol.  ii.  p.  394. 
t  'Essays,'  vol.  i.  p  43. 


CHAP.  V.]  DUTY  AND  PLEASURE.  117 

ness  are  so  far  (though  very  imperfectly)  conjoined  here  as 
to  reasonably  lead  us  to  look  forward  to  their  complete  union 
hereafter ;  and  if  he  were  further  to  add  that  such  a  Cause, 
having  implanted  in  man  the  unanalysable  power  of  per- 
ceiving moral  obligation,  had  made  use  of  the  lower  faculties, 
and  amongst  them  social  instincts,  as  occasions  to  call  out 
into  action  and  develop  this  power,  then  his  hypothesis 
would  not  be  manifestly  inadequate,  as  it  is.  But,  unfortu- 
nately, this  is  not  on  the  face  of  it  his  teaching.  We  are 
referred  for  the  "origin  of  morals"  to  the  same  source  to 
which  he  before  believed  that  he  had  traced  the  "  origin  of 
species."  He  says  :* — "  The  first  foundation  or  origin  of  the 
moral  sense  lies  in  the  social  instincts,  including  sympathy ; 
and  these  instincts,  no  doubt,  were  primarily  gained,  as  in 
the  case  of  the  lower  animals,  through  natural  selection." 

Criticisms  on  Mr.  Darwin  such  as  the  foregoing — criticisms 
of  mine  which  appeared  in  the  '  Genesis  of  Species'  Mr.Huxicy-8 
and  the  '  Quarterly  Review  '—elicited  from  Pro-  ffi?8Mr' 
fessor    Huxley  a    very   interesting    reply,  which  Cl 
appeared  in  the  'Contemporary  Review'  for  Nov.  1871. 

As  to  this  reply,  I  have  now,  and  shall  have  later  on, 
various  observations  to  offer  of  very  different  kinds. 

But  first,  as  to  the  question  concerning  morality  I  have,  I 
conceive,  some  reason  to  complain  of  Professor  Huxley's  treat- 
ment of  my  observations.  From  the  remarks  which  he  has 
a-ain  and  again  made,  it  is  evident  to  whom  he  attributes 
llio  artiele  in  the  'Quarterly  Review.'  Nevertheless  he,  in 
the  first  place,  misrepresents  my  statement  in  my  book,  and 
attributes  to  me  an  absurdity  which  is  not  in  it,  but  which 
is  distinctly  pointed  out  and  repudiated  in  the  '  Quarterly 
Review.'  In  the  second  place,  he  accuses  me  of  neglecting 
a-  remark  made  by  Mr.  Darwin,  which  remark  is  not  only 
jvf,  rred  to,  but  fully  quoted  in  the  same  review. 

First,  with  regard  to  Mr.  Darwin:  Professor  Huxley  ac- 
cuses me  of  charging  that  gentleman  "  with  being  ignorant 


Descent  of  Man,'  vol.  ii.  p  394. 


LESSONS  FKOH  NATUEE.  [CUAP.  V. 

of  the  distinction  between  material  and  formal  good- 
ness," though  Mr.  Darwin  himself  "discusses  the  very 
question  at  issue  in  a  passage,  well  worth  reading,  and 
also  comes  to  a  conclusion  opposed  to  Mr.  Mivart's  axiom." 
As  I  have  said,  this  passage  is  not  only  referred  to,  but 
quoted  in  the  '  Quarterly  Review.'  In  that  passage,  how- 
ever, Mr.  Darwin,  though  he  notices,  gives  no  evidence  of 
fully  understanding  my  distinction,  nor,  though  he  notices  an 
objection,  does  he  meet  the  difficulty  in  the  least.  Professor 
Huxley  seems  to  think  that  because  Mr.  Darwin  has  referred 
to  an  objection,  that  that  objection  has  thereby  lost  its  force. 
The  objection,  however,  has  not  been  refuted  either  by  Mr. 
Darwin  or  Professor  Huxley,  and  hence  it  becomes  probable 
that,  as  I  am  convinced  is  the  case,  it  cannot  be  refuted. 

We  will  turn  now  to  the  more  serious  misrepresentation  of 
which  I  have  to  complain.  My  critic  exhibits  me  as  com- 
mitting the  absurdity  of  maintaining  that  no  act  can  bo 
"  good"  unless  it  is  done  with  deliberate  and  actual  advert- 
ence in  every  instance— as  if  I  thought  that  a  man  must  stand 
still,  consider  and  reflect  in  each  case  in  order  to  perform  a 
meritorious  action.  He  also  implies  that  I  am  so  unreason- 
able as  to  deny  "  merit "  to  actions  done  unreflectingly  and 
spontaneously  from  the  love  of  God  or  one's  neighbour. 

What  I  assert,  however,  is,  that  for  an  act  to  be  "good" 
it  must  be  really  directed  by  the  doer  to  a  good  end,  either 
actually  or  virtually.  The  idea  of  good,  which  he  has  in  the 
past  apprehended,  must  be  influencing  the  man  at  the  time, 
whether  he  adverts  to  it  or  not,  otherwise  the  action  is  not 
moral.  The  merit  of  that  virtue  which  shows  itself  even  in 
the  spontaneous,  indeliberate  actions  of  a  good  man,  results 
from  the  fact  of  previous  acts  having  been  consciously  di- 
rected to  goodness,  by  which  a  habit  has  been  formed.  The 
more  thoroughly  a  man  is  possessed  by  the  idea  of  goodness, 
the  more  his  whole  being  is  saturated  with  that  idea,  the 
more  will  goodness  show  itself  in  all  his  even  spontaneous 
actions,  which  thus  will  have  additional  merit  through  their 
very  spontaneity.  Now  this  was  actually  expressed  in  the 


CHAP.  V.]  DUTY  AND  PLEASUEE.  Ill) 

'  Quarterly  Ixeview,'  where  of  such  an  act  it  is  stated  that 
"  it  is  moral  as  the  continuation  of  those  preceding  deli- 
berate acts  through  which  the  good  habit  was  originally 
formed;  and  the  rapidity  with  which  the  will  is  directed 
in  the  case  supposed  may  indicate  the  number  and  con- 
stancy of  antecedent  meritorious  actions."  Not  only,  how- 
ever, does  Professor  Huxley  avoid  notice  of  this  passage, 
but  he  quotes  my  words  as  to  the  unmeritorious  nature 
of  actions  "  unaccompanied  by  mental  acts  of  conscious 
will  directed  towards  the  fulfilment  of  duty,"  so  as  to 
lead  his  readers  to  believe  that  I  say  this  absolutely.  He 
takes  care  not  to  let  them  know  that  here  I  am  speaking  * 
only  of  the  '"'actions  of  brutes,  such  as  those  of  the  bee,  the 
ant,  or  the  beaver,"  which,  of  course,  never  at  any  period 
of  the  lives  of  any  one  of  these  creatures  were  consciously 
directed  to  "  goodness"  or  "  duty  "as  an  end,  so  that  no  later 
spontaneous  actions  could  in  their  case  result  from  an  ac- 
quired habit  of  virtue,  on  which  account  I  was  fully  justified 
in  speaking  of  their  actions  as  devoid  of  morality.  This  mis- 
representation is  noteworthy ;  but  what  is  surprising  in  one 
whose  eulogies  of  "  honesty  "  are  so  warm  and  so  repeated  is, 
that  the  whole  passage  has  been  reprinted  totidem  verbis  in 
his  '  Critiques  and  Addresses,'  after  having  had  his  attention 
directly  called  to  the  injustice  he  had  committed. 

Professor  Huxley  speaks  of  "  the  most  beautiful  character 
t  )  which  humanity  can  attain,  that  of  the  man  who  does  good 
w  ithout  thinking  about  it "  (p.  468).  Does  he  mean  that  the 
absence  of  thought  is  the  cause  of  the  beauty  ?  If  so,  then 
if  I  do  the  most  beneficial  acts  in  my  sleep,  I  attain  this 
apex  of  moral  beauty.  This,  of  course,  he  will  not  allow. 
Therefore,  it  is  not  by  reason  of  the  not  thinking  about  it 
that  the  action  is  beautiful,  but,  as  Professor  Huxley  goes  on 
to  say,  because  its  author  "  loves  justice  and  is  repelled  by 
evil."  In  this  last  point,  then — in  this  habit  of  mind,  the 
beauty  consists.  But  will  the  Professor  say  that  the  man  got 


*  Sec  '  Genesis  of  Specks,'  p.  221,  2nd  edition. 


120  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [Cn.vp.  V. 

himself  into  this  state  without  previous  acts  of  conscious  will  ? 
Can  a  man  love  justice  without  being  able  to  distinguish 
between  the  just  and  unjust  ?  If  he  loves  moral  beauty,  must 
he  not  know  it  ? 

I  would  fain  believe  that  Professor  Huxley  does  not 
mean  what  he  says  when  he  asserts  that  acts  may  be  moral 
which  are  not  directed  to  a  good  end.  Were  it  so,  such 
words  as  "  virtue  "  and  "  goodness "  would  have  no  rational 
and  logical  place  in  his  vocabulary.  Similarly,  I  would 
fain  disbelieve  him  when  he  says  he  "utterly  rejects"  the 
distinction  between  "  material "  and  "  formal "  morality.  I 
would  do  so  because  whatever  he  may  have  said  since,  he 
did  once  maintain  that  "  our  volition  counts  for  something  as 
a  condition  of  the  course  of  events."  If,  however,  he  rejects 
the  distinction  he  says  he  rejects,  he  thereby  positively 
denies  every  element  of  freedom  and  spontaneity  to  the 
human  will,  and  reduces  our  volition  to  a  rank  in  the 
"  course  of  events,"  which  counts  for  no  more  than  the 
freedom  of  a  match  as  to  ignition,  when  placed  within  the 
flame  of  a  candle.  With  the  enunciation  of  this  fatalism, 
"formal  morality"  most  certainly  falls,  and  together  with 
it  every  word  denoting  "virtue,"  which  thus  becomes  a 
superfluous  synonym  for  pleasure  and  expediency. 

And  here  it  may  be  well  to  make  a  few  further  remarks 
upon  our  power  of  will  as  connected  with  responsi- 
bility and  moral  reprobation.  We  have  seen  that 
the  distinction  between  duty  and  pleasure  is  a  fact  which 
introspection  shows  us.  Another  fact  which  introspection 
also  shows,  is  our  power  of  "  attention."  By  this  attention 
is  meant  the  deliberate,  self-conscious  act,  not  the  mere 
automatic  attention  which  a  sudden  strange  sensation  may 
call  from  us  indeliberately.  This  distinction  is  recognised 
and  well  stated  by  Dr.  Carpenter.  He  says : — 

"  Now  this  state  of  active  as  compared  with  passive  recipiency — of 
attention  as  compared  with  mere  insouciance,  may  be  either  volitional  or 
automatic ;  that  is,  it  may  be  either  intentionally  induced  by  an  act  of 
the  will,  or  it  may  be  produced  unint  ntionaUy  by  the  powerful  attrac- 


CHAP.  V.]  DUTY  AND  PLEASURE.  121 

lion  which  the  object  (whether  external  or  internal)  has  for  the  eye. 
Hence,  when  we  fix  our  attention  on  a  particular  object  by  a  deter- 
minate act  of  our  own,  the  strength  of  the  effort  required  to  do  so  is 
greater  in  proportion  to  the  attraction  of  some  other  object.  Thus,  the 
student  who  is  earnestly  endearouring  to  comprehend  a  passage  in 
'  Prometheus,'  or  to  solve  a  mathematical  problem,  may  have  his  atten- 
tion grievously  distracted  by  the  sound  of  a  neighbouring  piano,  which 
will  make  him  think  of  the  fair  one  who  is  playing  it,  or  of  the  beloved 
object  with  whom  he  last  waltzed  to  the  same  measure.  Here  the  will 
may  do  its  very  utmost  to  keep  the  attention  fixed,  and  may  yet  be 
overmastered  by  an  involuntary  attraction  too  potent  for  it ;  just  as  if 
a  powerful  electro-magnet  were  to  snatch  from  our  hands  a  piece  of 
iron  which  we  do  our  very  utmost  to  retain  within  our  grasp." — Mental 
Physiology,  p.  132. 

Closely  connected  with  tins  fact  of  active  <:  attention " 
is  the  faculty  of  choice  and  volition  of  which  we  are  all 
conscious.  Just  as  our  consciousness  tells  us  that  we  are 
continuously  existing  beings,  so  our  consciousness  tells  us 
that  we  have  a  power  of  choice  which  we  occasionally  exercise 
in  opposition  to  what  most  strongly  attracts  us.  We  are 
conscious  of  volitions  of  two  distinct  kinds — (1.)  An  act  of 
will  in  which  we  simply  follow,  without  deliberation,  in  the 
direction  induced  by  all  the  attractions  and  repulsions  act- 
ing upon  us — as  when  we  walk  down  to  dinner,  or  stretch  out 
our  hand  to  save  a  person  from  falling.  (2.)  An  act  of  will 
in  which,  after  full  deliberation,  we  elect  to  follow  a  course 
which  we  perceive  to  be  in  opposition  to  the  resultant  impulse 
of  all  the  involuntary  attractions  and  repulsions  acting  upon 
us,  and  make  an  "  anti-impulsive  effort,"  * — as  when,  from  a 
love  of  God,  we  deny  ourselves  an  immediate  gratification 
from  indulgence  in  which  we  do  not  perceive  any  remote 
evil  consequences  to  ourselves.  It  is  not  necessary  on  this 
occasion  to  go  further  into  the  question  of  free-will ;  it  is 
sufficient  for  our  present  purpose  to  note,  as  an  unquestion- 
able fact,  that  men  believe  they  have  this  double  kind  of 
volition,  and  that  they  have  a  firm  persuasion  of  their  power 


*  Upon  tliis  subject  see  the  article  on  Mr.  Mill's  denial  of  Free-will  in  the 
April  number  of  tlie  'Dublin  lieview,'  and  un  appendix  to  that  article  in  the 
inimbrr  for  July  1S74. 


122  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  V. 

of  true  voluntary  action — and  that  they  have  such  persuasion, 
the  terms  in  all  languages  of  moral  reprobation  or  praise 
is  sufficient  to  demonstrate.  When  a  man  has  notoriously 
lost  his  power  of  self-control,  and  become  an  automaton, 
dominated  by  external  or  internal  attractions  and  repulsions, 
we  say  he  is  not  "  an  accountable  being."  Nevertheless,  it 
may  here  be  remarked  by  the  way,  that  fatalists,  like  Herbert 
Spencer  and  the  late  John  Stuart  Mill,  when  they  assert  that 
all  men's  actions  are  determined,  assert  that  which  it  is  im- 
possible even  for  them  to  pretend  to  prove,  and  which  can 
only  be  maintained  on  speculative  and  a  priori  grounds,  yet 
inasmuch  as  they  contradict  the  common  voice  of  mankind, 
and  what  so  many  affirm  to  be  the  declaration  of  their  con- 
sciousness, they  are  clearly  bound  to  prove  their  position. 
Assertors  of  rt  free-will "  do  not,  of  course,  maintain  that  they 
are  conscious  of  what  is  external  to  their  consciousness,  as  if 
they  could  see,  as  a  spectator,  that  external  and  internal  in- 
fluences do  not  in  all  cases  determine  their  actions ;  but  what 
they  do  assert  is,  that  they  are  conscious  that  they  themselves, 
in  the  very  act  of  deciding,  exercise  occasionally  a  free  power 
of  choice,  for  which  choice  they  are  justly  responsible.  Just 
as  a  blind  man  pushing  his  way  through  a  thicket  in  one 
direction,  but  suddenly  taking  another,  because  on  recon- 
sidering his  past  footsteps  he  is  convinced  he  was  wrong, 
knows  that  his  change  of  path  was  due  to  his  own  thoughts, 
and  not  to  any  rocks,  pits,  or  other  external  impediments, 
though  he  cannot  affirm  that  such  were  not  close  to  him 
when  he  turned.  Fatalists  who  try  to  build  up  on  their 
principles  a  representation  of  what  we  do  when  we  exercise 
a  power  of  choice,  devise  a  representation  which  does  not 
answer  to,  and  fully  resemble  the  process  made  known  to  us 
by  our  consciousness,  but  is  an  incomplete  representation  *  of 
that  process. 

In  closest  relation  with  our  power  of  will  is  that  power 


*  See  an  article  iu  the  'North  British  Review,'  April— July,  vol.  lii.  1870, 
p.  93. 


CHAP.  V.]  DUTY  AND  PLEASUBE.  123 

which  our  self-consciousness  assures  us  we  have  of  apprehend- 
ing moral  worth,  which  \\e  have  already  considered,  but  as  to 
whicli  a  few  final  words  may  be  added.  On  introspection,  it 
is  at  once  apparent  that  in  pronouncing  any  man  or  action  to 
be  "  good "  our  reason  forms  a  judgment  different  in  kind 
'from  the  judgment  that  any  man  or  action  is  "pleasure- 
giviug."  If  our  neighbour,  intending  to  do  us  a  malicious  in- 
jury, through  some  miscalculation  on  his  part,  benefits  us,  we 
do  not  on  that  account  judge  him  in  so  acting  to  have  acted 
" lightly,"  or  pronounce  his  action  to  have  been  "virtuous." 
Indeed,  so  far  from  our  necessarily  associating  "  pleasure " 
with  virtue,  we  judge  a  benevolent  action  to  have  had  its 
merit  increased  by  the  very  self-denial  which  may  have  in- 
evitably resulted  from  its  performance.  We  are  able  clearly 
enough  to  distinguish  between  a  deliberate  judgment  that 
any  given  action  of  ours  is  right  or  wrong,  and  a  spontaneous 
indeliberate  tendency  to  do  what  is  generally  approved  of  by 
those  with  whom  we  dwell  or  a  feeling  of  distress  at  some 
violation  of  conventionality.  The  failure  to  repress,  when  in 
society,  some  harmless  natural  function  may  produce  the 
most  acute  feeling  of  distress  without  the  smallest  perception 
that  any  "wrong"  has  been  committed;  and  on  the  other 
hand  we  may  have  given  pleasure  to  and  received  the  most 
lively  proofs  of  gratitude  from  our  fellows  on  account  of 
some  act  which  has  been  really  done  against  our  conscience. 
Far  from  our  perception  of  morality  being  the  same  thing 
with  a  feeling  of  deference  to  the  opinions  and  feelings  of 
our  fellow-men,  we  ourselves  judge  whether  society  in  certain 
cases  is  right  or  wrong,  and  we  demand  a  rational  basis  and 
justification  for  social  claims  themselves. 

The  name  of  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  has  been  above  referred 
to  in  connection  with  this  matter,  and  the  position  Mr.  Herbert 

*  Spencer's 

he  takes  up  must  not  be  passed  over.     In  the  first  views- 
place  the  process  of  evolution,  as  understood  by  Mr.  Spencer, 
compels  him  to  be  at  one  with  Mr.  Darwin  in  his  denial  of 
the  existence  of  any  fundamental  and  essential  distinction 
between  duty  and  pleasure.   Virtuous  lives  are  represented  as 


124  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CuAP.  V. 

mere  results  of  the  continuation  of  that  same  process  which 
has  produced  the  association  of  wolves  in  packs  or  hornets 
in  a  nest.  Brutal  passions — the  desire  to  pursue  and  prey 
upon  a  victim  or  to  escape  such  pursuit,  or  the  gross 
appetite  of  sex,  are  given  to  us  as  the  ultimate  components 
at  once  of  our  loftiest  aspirations  and  of  our  tenderest  feelings 
— of  the  most  refined  human  affection  and  of  our  eense  of  awe 
at  the  Divine  Majesty  itself.  It  cannot  in  fact  be  denied 
that  "  virtue  "  and  "  goodness  "  are  words  which  can  have  no 
rational  or  logical  place  in  the  vocabulary  of  any  one  who 
accepts  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer's  views.  This  is  the  case  since 
Mr.  Spencer  explicitly  and  utterly  denies  eveiy  element  of 
freedom  to  the  human  will — a  fatal  but  necessary  conse- 
quence of  his  denial  of  the  persistent  and  substantial  ego. 
He  says :  —  * 

"Considered  as  an  internal  perception,  the  illusion"  [of  human 
freedom]  "  consists  in  supposing  that  at  each  moment  the  ego  is  some- 
thing more  than  the  aggregate  of  feelings  and  ideas  actual  and  nascent, 
which  then  exists."  ....  "This  composite  psychical  state  which 
excites  the  action,  is  at  the  same  time  the  ego  which  is  said  to  will  the 
action.  Naturally  enough,  then,  the  subject  of  such  psychical  changes 
says  that  he  wills  the  action ;  since,  psychically  considered,  he  is  at 
that  moment  nothing  more  than  the  composite  state  of  conscioiisness 
by  which  the  action  is  excited.  But  to  say  that  the  performance  of  the 
action  is,  therefore,  the  result  of  his  free  will,  is  to  say  that  he  deter- 
mines the  cohesions  of  the  psychical  states  which  arouse  the  action ; 
and  as  these  psychical  states  constitute  himself  at  that  moment,  this  is 
to  say  that  these  psychical  states  determine  their  own  cohesions,  which 
is  absurd.  Their  cohesions  have  been  determined  by  experiences — the 
greater  part  of  them,  constituting  what  we  call  his  natural  character, 
by  the  experiences  of  antecedent  organisms,  and  the  rest  by  his  own 
experience.  The  changes  which  at  each  moment  take  place  in  his 
consciousness,  and  among  others  those  which  he  is  said  to  will,  are 
produced  by  this  infinitude  of  previous  experiences  registered  in  his 
nervous  structure,  co-operating  with  the  immediate  impressions  on  his 
senses:  the  effects  of  these  combined  factors  being  in  every  case 
qualified  by  the  physical  state,  general  or  local,  of  his  organism." 

Our  doctrine  is  that  the  will  indeed  necessarily  follows  the 
stronger  motive,  but  that  the  soul  has,  on  certain  occasions, 

*  '  Psychology,'  vol.  i.  p.  500. 


CHAP.  V.]  DUTY  AND  PLEASUEE.  125 

the  power  of  intensifying  one  motive  at  will,  and  so  making 
that  motive,  for  the  time,  the  stronger.  As  Professor 
Carpenter  has  justly  observed,  much  of  the  mind's  work  is 
done  by  its  "automatic  faculties,"  but  "their  direction  is 
given  by  the  will,  in  virtue  of  its  power  of  intensifying  any 
idea  or  feeling  that  is  actually  present  to  consciousness,  by 
fixing  the  attention  upon  it."  Asserting,  as  we  do,  the  sub- 
stantial and  persistent  ego,  we  have  no  hesitation  in  affirm- 
ing that  the  ego  occasionally  does  "  determine  the  cohesions 
of  the  psychical  states  which  arouse  an  action,"  and  at  the 
same  time  in  denying  "  that  these  psychical  states  determine 
their  own  cohesions." 
Mr.  Spencer  adds  : — 

"  To  reduce  the  general  question  to  its  simplest  form : — Psychical 
changes  either  conform  to  law  or  they  do  not.  If  they  do  not  conform 
to  law,  this  work,  in  common  with  all  works  on  the  subject,  is  sheer 
nonsense  :  no  science  of  psychology  is  possible.  If  they  do  conform  to 
law,  there  cannot  be  any  such  thing  as  free  will." 

It  is  really  impossible  to  deny  that  this  passage  is  "  sheer 
nonsense,"  since  works  on  psychology  have  again  and  again 
been  written  by  authors  who  fully  accept  the  freedom  of  the 
will.  Mr.  Spencer's  error  lies  in  not  distinguishing  between 
perceptions  and  emotional  states  which  cannot  tut  produce 
an  effect  in  direct  proportion  to  their  strength  and  that 
faculty  of  will  which  our  consciousness  tells  us  is  no 
mere  impotence  arising  from  incomplete  adjustment ;  but  a 
conscious  exertion  of  power  adding  to  the  strength  of  such 
emotional  states  or  such  perceptions  as  may  be  selected  for 
intensification. 

But  the  want  in  Mr.  Spencer's  mind  of  any  perception  of 
morality  is  so  utter  that  he  looks  upon  the  absence  of  moral 
freedom  as  a  positive  gain.  He  says : — 

"  I  will  only  further  say  that  freedom  of  the  will,  did  it  exist,  would 
bo  at  variance  with  the  beneficent  necessity  displayed  in  the  evolution 
of  the  correspondence  between  the  organism  and  the  environment.' 
.  .  .  .  "  were  the  inner  relations  partly  determined  by  some  other 
agency,  the  harmony  at  any  moment  existing  would  be  disturbed,  and 


126  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  V. 

the  advance  to  a  higher  harmony  impeded.  There  would  be  a  retarda- 
tion of  that  grand  progress  which  is  bearing  humanity  onwards  to  a 
higher  intelligence  and  a  nobler  character." 

In  blaming  Mr.  Spencer  for  this  passage  I  strongly  protest 
against  being  charged,  as  I  have  been  by  Professor  Huxley 
with  the  absurdity  of  denying  merit  and  beauty  to  sponta- 
neous acts  of  voluntary  adhesion  to  good.  Such  acts  may  be 
highly  meritorious,  and  at  the  same  time  eminently  free. 
All  I  mean  is  that  for  an  act  to  be  "  moral,"  the  doer  of  it 
must  directly  or  indirectly  be  moved  by  the  idea  of  "  right  '* 
present  to  his  mind  then  or  antecedently,  so  as  to  have 
become  mentally  habitual.  Such  habitual  actions  may  be 
eminently  "  free,"  since  freedom  consists  in  the  unhindered 
power  of  following  the  dictates  of  intelligence  concerning 
what  is  best  and  most  desirable.  In  proportion  as  less  worthy 
motives  have  more  power  over  us,  just  so  far  are  we  less  free. 

It  would  be  a  superfluous  task  here  to  expatiate  upon  the 
immorality  of  a  philosophy  which  denies  to  man's  will  any 
more  power  of  choice  than  a  fragment  of  paper  thrown  into 
a  furnace  has  a  choice  concerning  its  ignition.  ' 

But  Mr.  Spencer's  system  is  even  yet  more  profoundly 
immoral,  as  it  denies  any  objective  distinction  between  right 
and  wrong,  in  any  being,  whether  men  are  or  are  not  re- 
•sponsible  for  their  actions.  According  to  our  author,  the 
laws  of  nature  are  ultimately  reducible  to  one  force  not  neces- 
sarily moral,  and  therefore  all  laws  and  all  actions  must  be, 
in  ultimate  analysis,  equally  moral  or  equally  immoral. 

Every  action  whatever  is  a  mode  of  the  Unknowable,  and 
the  stab  of  the  assassin  and  the  traffic  of  the  courtesan  are 
as  much  the  necessary  results  and  outcome  of  that  ultimate 
principle  as  are  the  charity  of  a  Howard  or  the  self-devotion 
of  Marseilles'  good  bishop. 

With  reason  then  we  may  affirm  of  Mr.  H.  Spencer's 
system,  "that  it  is  radically  and  necessarily  immoral." 
Although  (as  I  have  learned  with  no  small  surprise)*  it  is  a 

*  From  his  '  Ecplies  to  Criticisms :'  '  Fortnightly  Ecvicw,'  November 
1873,  p.  729. 


CHAP.  V.]  DUTY  AND  PLEASURE.  127 

fact  that  Mr.  Spencer  himself,  when  he  published  his  theory, 
was  himself  unaware  that  it  might  "  be  so  regarded." 

To  sum  up  then,  it   is  unquestionable,  if  what  has  been 
here  urged  is  valid,  that  nothing  put  forward  by 

Conclusion. 

Mr.  Mill,  Mr.  Darwin,  Mr.  Huxley,  or  Mr.  Spencer, 
lias  any  weight  in  contradicting  that  lesson  which  nature,  by 
introspection,  teaches  us — namely,  that  we  have  a  power  of 
discerning,  and  of  freely  obeying,  an  objective  moral  code 
which  our  faculties  are  organised  to  discern ;  a  power  of 
forming  more  or  less  developed  moral  judgments  being  uni- 
versally diffused  amongst  mankind,  while  there  is  no  evi- 
dence that  any  such  judgments  are  formed  by  even  the  very 
highest  members  of  the  mere  brute  creation.  Moreover,  it 
is  clear  that  to  assert  moral  judgments  to  be  but  feelings  of 
social  sympathy  or  love  of  tribe  inherited  and  generally 
misunderstood,  is  equivalent  to  a  denial  of  morality  root  and 
branch  ;  and,  as  we  may  hereafter  come  still  more  plainly  to 
see,  absolutely  stultifies  moral  precepts  as  being  necessarily 
mere  folly. 


CHAPTER  VI, 

MAN. 

"  The  study  of  religious  beliefs,  of  progress,  or  degradation,  and  of 
the  community  of  nature  found  in  the  most  diverse  races  of  men,  show 
(together  with  language  and  moral  perception)  that  man  differs  funda- 
mentally from  brutes,  while  the  anatomical  resemblances  to  animals 
which  his  frame  exhibits  in  no  way  invalidate  the  argument  drawn 
from  the  study  of  mind,  that  his  origin  (like  his  nature)  is  peculiar 
and  distinct." 

WE  have  seen,  in  the  last  two  chapters,  that  rational  lan- 
other  human  guage  and  m  oral  perception  are  universal  characters 
tfcs'u^be18"  °f  man  in  his  normal  condition,  i.e.,  when  he  is 
sidesfa^"  neither  locally  nor  generally  paralysed,  nor  insane, 
moral  pe£  But  to  learn  fully  the  lesson  which  science  has  to 
teach  us  with  respect  to  his  nature,  we  must  con- 
sider certain  other  characteristics  common  to  him,  both  as 
presented  to  us  in  his  simplest  and  most  barbarous  condition 
as  well  as  in  his  highest  state  of  civilisation.  Only  by 
so  doing  can  we  qualify  ourselves  to  form  any  scientific 
opinion  as  to  the  much-debated  question  of  his  origin.  In 
attaining  this  stage  of  our  inquiry,  we  have  reached  that 
which  is  proverbially  the  proper  study  of  mankind. 

And,  indeed,  that  the  proper  study  of  mankind  is  man 
sr^ai  can  seems  to  be  a  proposition  the  truth  of  which  is 

now  for  this  .  „  . 

study.  being  now  lorced  upon  us  with  peculiar  intensity. 

In  spite  of  the  expulsion  of  the  "microcosm"  by  astronomy 
from  the  centre  of  the  material  universe,  he  is  at  present 
acquiring  yet  fresh  claims  to  be  considered  the  one  key 
whereby  may  be  unlocked  the  mysteries  of  the  "  macrocosm." 
With  the  dispelling  of  that  dream  in  which  the  little  planet 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN.  129 

Tellus  appeared  the  great  solid  nucleus  of  encircling  crystal 
spheres  existing  only  for  its  sake,  began  the  vigorous  prose- 
cution of  the  physical  sciences — the  investigation  of  nature 
external  to  man.  This  investigation  having  reached  a  stage 
rendering  possible  the  exposition  of  all  non-human  pheno- 
mena as  the  multifold  co-ordinated  and  harmonised  manifesta- 
tions of  one  great  process — a  theory  of  evolution  ;  the  universal 
adequacy  of  that  theory  must  be  tested  by  its  application  to 
the  phenomena  presented  to  us  by  man  both  in  his  highest 
existing  condition,  and  also  as  the  wild  tenant  of  the  forest — 
the  Homo  sylvaticus.  If  all  the  phenomena  which  human  life 
presents  are  capable  of  being  brought  under  the  laws  which 
regulate  inferior  organisms,  it  is  hardly  possible  to  exaggerate 
the  amount  of  support  which  would  thereby  be  given  to  the 
universality  of  the  evolutionary  theory.  Moreover,  it  is  plain 
that  in  such  a  case  all  those  who  deem  the  theory  of  evolution 
sufficient  to  account  for  the  origin  of  all  other  animals,  must 
logically  admit  it  to  be  sufficient  to  account  for  the  origin  of 
man  also. 

At  present  there  are  two  very  distinct  views  as  to  the 
origin  of  the  animal  population  of  this  planet.  TWO  conflu-t- 

*  ing  hypo- 

I.  The  first  of  these  views — the  monistic  hypothe-  »he8e8- 

sis — asserts  that  one  uniform  law  has  presided  over  the  whole, 
since  all  such  creatures  are  distinguished  from  one  another  by 
differences  which  are  differences  of  degree  only,and  notof  kind. 

II.  The  other  of  these  views — the  dualistic  hypothesis — 
asserts  that  man  (whatever  may  have  been  the   case  with 
brute  animals)  must  have  originated  in  some  special  manner, 
since  the  difference  between  him  and  brutes  is  a  difference 
of  kind,  and  not  one  merely  of  degree — he  embodying  a 
distinct  principle  not  present  in  brute  animals. 

A  supporter  of  the  monistic  hypothesis  must  maintain  that 
man  at  his  first  appearance  was  literally  in  the  lowest  and 
most  brutal  stage  of  his  existence,  whence  he  has  gradually 
ascended  to  his  present  condition  by  a  process  of  progressive 
development  attended  with  only  exceptional  and  relatively 
insignificant  processes  of  retrogression  and  degradation.  Ho 

7 


130  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  VL 

\vill  consequently  not  only  maintain  that  races  have  existed 
without  articulate  speech,  or  any  equivalent  symbolic  system, 
without  perceptions  of  "  right "  and  "  wrong,"  and  without 
religious  conceptions,  but  .also  that  the  first  men  were 
actually  so  destitute.  He  may  or  may  not  expect  to  find 
specimens  of  this  lowest  condition  of  mankind  still  sur- 
viving at  the  present  day,  but  he  will  surely  anticipate  that 
archaeological,  historical,  and  ethnological  research  must  re- 
veal facts  pointing  plainly  towards  such  an  early  condition. 
He  will  also  anticipate  that  these  sciences  will  bring  to  our 
knowledge  tribes  in  an  intellectual  stage  which  is  less  remote 
from  that  presumed  early  condition  than  from  a  choice  assem- 
blage of  men  living  now — say,  the  members  of  our  own 
"  Eoyal  Society." 

A  supporter  of  the  dualistic  hypothesis  must,  on  the  other 
hand,  maintain  that  man  at  the  very  first  moment  of  his  ex- 
istence was  at  once  essentially  man,  and  separated,  at  his  very 
origin,  from  the  highest  brutes  by  as  impassable  a  gulf  as 
that  which  anywhere  exists  between  them  to-day.  He  will 
consequently  not  only  maintain  that  no  race  will  anywhere 
be  found  without  a  mode  of  rational  expression,  moral  per- 
ceptions, and  religious  conceptions  (however  rudimentary  or 
atrophied),  but  also  that  the  first  men  possessed  all  these. 
He  will  be  confident  that  no  scientific  researches  will  bring 
to  our  knowledge  any  human  races  devoid  of  reason,  or  (what 
we  have  in  a  former  chapter  seen  to  be  its  necessary  concomi- 
tant in  a  "  rational  animal ")  the  power  of  expressing  internal 
thoughts,  as  distinguished  from  mere  feelings,  by  external 
sensible  signs.  He  will  also  expect  to  find  in  all  races  of 
men  indications  of  religious  conceptions  and  of  an  apprehen- 
sion of  right  and  wrong,  however  curiously  or  perversely 
these  abstract  conceptions  may  be  concretely  embodied. 
Finally,  he  will  be  confident  that  no  race  will  be  found  less 
remote  intellectually  from  the  highest  existing  men  than 
i'rom  a  state  of  brutal  irrationality.  The  actual  first  origin 
of  man  must  for  ever  remain  a  problem  insoluble  by  unai'led 
reason — a  matter  incapable  of  direct  investigation,  and,  reve- 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN.  131 

lation  apart,  only  to  be  investigated  by  conjecture  and  analogy. 
This  being  so,  we  must  be  content  to  study  existing  races  of 
men,  and  thence  arrive  at  the  best  conclusions  we  may,  with 
the  aid  to  be  derived  from  history,  archaeology,  and  geology. 
The  questions,  then,  to  which  attention  should  be  directed 
with  a  view  to  determining  whether  the  balance  of  Testqnes- 

.      .  ,.      .       tionsfor 

evidence  favours  the  monistic  or  the  duahstic  t^ese. 
hypothesis,  are  the  following ;  and  to  answer  these,  the 
savage,  Homo  sylvaticus,  must  serve  as  our  test.  1.  Can  any 
direct  evidence  be  found  of  races  of  man,  past  or  present, 
existing  in  a  brutal  or  irrational  condition  ?  2.  Does  avail- 
able evidence  clearly  point  to  the  past  existence  of  such  a 
condition  ?  3.  Are  races  anywhere  to  be  found  in  a  con- 
dition which  is  less  remote  from  mere  animal  existence  than 
from  the  highest  human  development  of  which  we  have  as 
yet  experience  ? 

Should  unmistakable  evidence  of  the  sort  be  forthcoming, 
then  the  existence  of  an  essential  difference,  a  difference  of 
kind,  between  human  and  brutal  nature,  could  no  longer  be 
maintained.  It  would  also  follow  that  if  other  animals  have 
arisen  by  a  merely  natural  process  of  development,  reason 
could  oppose  no  barrier  to  the  belief  that  the  origin  of  man, 
in  the  totality  of  his  nature,  was  also  due  to  such  a  merely 
natural  process.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  no  such  direct 
evidence  is  forthcoming,  and  none  even  pointing  clearly  in 
the  indicated  direction ;  if,  also,  no  races  can  be  found  in  a 
condition  nearer  to  irrational  brutality  than  to  the  highest 
refinement — then  it  must  be  admitted  that,  we  have  no  scien- 
tific ground  for  asserting  that  man  is  of  one  nature  with  the 
brutes,  or  that  it  is  an  a  priori  probability  that  his  origin 
was  the  same  as  theirs. 

More  than  this,  in  the  absence  of  such  evidence  it  may 
fairly  be  inferred  that  there  is  an  d  priori  probability  against 
this  community  of  nature  and  origin.  It  may  be  so  inferred, 
because  it  seems  likely  that  if  all  men  were  once  irrational 
animals,  some  tribe  of  the  kind  would  have  survived  in  some 
remote  part  of  the  world  to  this  day,  especially  tts,  on  the 


132  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  VI. 

theory  of  evolution,  they  must  have  been  well  fitted  to  main- 
tain themselves  under  the  conditions  existing  in  their  own 
region. 

Man  is  generally  admitted  to  be,  as  to  antiquity,  at  the 
most,  but  a  tertiary  mammal ;  but  Australia  presents  us  with 
a  fauna  in  some  respects  triassic.  Some  eminent  authorities, 
however,  assert  that  miocene  man  still  exists,  and  that  we 
behold  him  in  the  Esquimaux.  It  may  naturally  be  a  matter 
of  some  regret  that  this  cannot  be  proved,  since,  if  the 
Esquimaux  are  indeed  miocene  men  surviving  to  this  day, 
an  investigation  of  their  mental  condition  would  almost 
suffice  to  solve  the  problem  decisively  one  way  or  the  other. 
It  would  suffice  to  solve  it,  since  we  might  fairly  argue  from 
the  progress  made  between  the  miocene  period  and  to-day, 
to  that  which  might  be  supposed  to  have  taken  place  between 
the  beginning  of  the  tertiary  period  and  the  miocene. 

If,  however,  ethnology  and  archaeology  fail  to  furnish  the 
requisite  evidence,  and  thus  show  themselves  manifestly  in- 
competent to  solve  the  question,  then  the  cause  must  be  trans- 
ferred to  the  tribunal  of  Philosophy  for  decisive  judgment. 
In  that  case,  if  philosophy  (including  psychology)  shows  us,  as 
it  is  here  contended  that  it  does,  that  there  is  a  difference  of 
kind  between  the  lowest  races  of  men  and  the  highest  species 
of  brutes,  pointing  to  a  difference  of  essential  principle,  and, 
therefore,  of  origin,  then  ethnology  and  archeology  (in  the  case 
of  their  supposed  failure  as  to  the  evidence  referred  to)  become 
important  auxiliaries,  and  will  powerfully  aid  to  reinforce  such 
conclusion.  They  will,  by  their  eloquent  silence,  supply  us 
with  additional  grounds  for  maintaining  that  the  progress  of 
physical  science  will  but  more  and  more  clearly  bring  out 
the  difference  existing  between  all  merely  animal  natures 
and  that  of  the  rational  animal  man. 

There  are  five  main  subjects  of  inquiry  which  bear  upon 
Three  new  this  question.  These  are :  1.  Language ;  2.  Morals ; 
inquiry.  3.  Religion ;  4.  Progress ;  5.  Community  of  Nature 
— as  made  known  (or  contradicted)  by  yet  other  lines  of 
inquiry. 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN.  133 

Language  and  morals  have  been  already  considered  in  the 
two  preceding  chapters,  but  before  passing  to  the  third 
subject-matter  above  enumerated,  it  may  be  well  to  refer 
to  some  further  unprejudiced  testimonies  to  the  unity  of 
human  reason  generally,  as  exhibited  in  widely  different 
races.  And  here  Mr.  Tylor  may  again  be  cited  with  advan- 
tage. He  expresses  himself  *  thus  :  "  We  come  preliminary 
back  to  the  fact,  so  full  of  suggestion,  that  the  note' 
languages  of  the  world  represent  substantially  the  same 
intellectual  art,  the  higher  nations  indeed  gaining  more  ex- 
pressive power  than  the  lowest  tribes,  yet  doing  this  not  by 
introducing  new  and  more  effective  central  principles,  but 
by  mere  addition  and  improvement  in  detail."  Speaking  of 
the  native  proverbs  of  Fernando  Po,  he  tells  us,t  "There 
are  hundreds  at  about  as  high  an  intellectual  level  as  those 
of  Europe,"  and  he  cites  examples.  We  have  said  that  we 
mean  by  language,  not  emotional  expressions,  but  the  enun- 
ciations of  judgments  concerning  "  the  what"  "  the  how" 
and  "  the  ivliy."  Mr.  Tylor's  verdict  as  to  the  result  of  the 
application  of  this  test  to  the  expressions  of  savages  is 
sufficiently  distinct.  He  says  :  —  t 

"  Man's  craving  to  know  tho  causes  at  work  in  each  event  he  witnesses, 
11  10  reasons  why  each  state  of  tilings  he  surveys  is  such  as  it  is  and  no 
other,  is  no  product  of  high  civilisation,  but  a  characteristic  of  his  race 
down  to  its  lowest  stage.  Among  rudo  savages  it  is  already  an  intel- 
lectual appetite  whose  satisfaction  claims  many  of  tho  moments  not 
engrossed  by  war  or  sport,  food  or  sleep." 

This  decisive  judgment  may  yet  be  reinforced  by  some 
very  distinct  admissions,  for  which  we  have  to  thank  Mr. 
Darwin  himself:  —  § 

"  Tho  Fuegians  rank  amongst  the  lowest  barbarians  ;  but  I  was  con- 
tinually struck  with  surprise  how  closely  tho  three  natives  on  board 
1  1.  M.S.  '  Beagle,'  who  had  lived  some  years  in  England  and  could  talk 
a  little  English,  resembled  us  in  disposition,  and  in  most  of  our  mental 
qualities." 


*  '  Primitive  Culture,'  vol.  i.  p.  216.  t  IMd.  vol.  i.  p.  80. 

I  Ibid.  vol.  i.  p.  332.    The  itnlics  are  ours. 
§  '  Voyage  of  the  u  Beagle,"  '  vol.  i.  p.  84. 


LESSONS  FBOM  NATURE.  [Ciur.  VI. 

Again : — * 

"  The  American  aborigines,  negroes,  and  Europeans,  differ  as  much 
from  each  other  in  mind  as  any  three  races  that  can  be  named ;  yet  I 
was  incessantly  struck,  whilst  living  with  the  Fuegians  on  board  the 
'  Beagle,'  with  the  many  little  traits  of  character,  showing  how  similar 
their  minds  were  to  ours ;  and  so  it  was  with  a  full-blooded  negro  with 
whom  I  happened  once  to  be  intimate." 

Again  :|  "  Differences  of  this  kind  (mental)  between 
the  highest  .men  of  the  highest  races  and  the  lowest  savages, 
are  connected  by  the  finest  gradations."  He  also  bears 
testimony  to  the  substantial  unity  (he  says,  "  close  simi- 
larity ")  between  men  of  all  races  in  the  following  passage  :J 
"This  is  shown  by  the  pleasure  which  they  all  take  in 
dancing,  rude  music,  acting,  painting,  tattooing,  and  other- 
wise decorating  themselves — in  their  mutual  comprehension 
of  gesture-language — and,  as  I  shall  be  able  to  show  in 
a  future  essay,  by  the  same  expression  in  their  features, 
and  by  the  same  inarticulate  cries,  when  they  are  excited 
by  various  emotions.  This  similarity,  or  rather  identity, 
is  striking,  when  contrasted  with  the  different  expressions 
which  may  be  observed  in  distinct  species  of  monkeys. 
There  is  good  evidence  that  the  art  of  shooting  with  bows 
and  arrows  has  not  been  handed  down  from  any  common 
progenitor  of  mankind,  yet  the  stone  arrow-heads,  brought 
from  the  most  distant  parts  of  the  world  and  manu- 
factured at  the  most  remote  periods,  are,  as  Nilsson  has 
shown,  almost  identical ;  and  this  fact  can  only  be  accounted 
for  by  the  various  races  having  similar  inventive  or  mental 
powers.  The  same  observation  has  been  made  by  archae- 
ologists with  respect  to  certain  widely-prevalent  ornaments, 
such  as  zigzags,  &c. ;  and  with  respect  to  various  simple 
beliefs  and  customs,  such  as  the  burying  of  the  dead  under 
megalithic  structures.  I  remember  observing  in  South 
America,  that  there,  as  in  so  many  other  parts  of  the  world, 


*  '  Voyage  of  the  "Beagle," '  vol.  i.  p.  232. 
f  Op.  cit.  p.  35.  J  Op.  at.  p.  232. 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN.  135 

man  has  generally  chosen  the  summits  of  lofty  hills,  on 
which  to  throw  up  piles  of  stones,  either  for  the  sake  of 
recorclirg  some  remarkable  event,  or  for  burying  his  dead." 

Mr.  Darwin  then  plainly  tells  us  that  all  the  essential 
mental  characters  of  civilised  man  are  found,  in  however 
less  completely  developed  a  state,  in  the  very  lowest  races  of 
men. 

These  testimonies  by  themselves  are  sufficient  to  show 
that,  in  the  opinion  of  those  most  capable  of  acquiring  and 
most  certain  to  acquire  information  tending  to  confirm  the 
monistic  hypothesis,  not  only  are  there  no  evidences  of 
men  in  a  nascent  state  as  to  the  power  of  speech,  but  all 
available  evidence  shows  that  in  the  essential  of  language1 
the  various  existing  races  of  men  are  mentally  one.  This, 
indeed,  is  manifest  and  undeniable.  No  tribe  exists  which 
cannot  count  two,  cannot  say  "  I,"  "  woman,"  "  death," 
"  food,"  &c.  In  other  words,  there  is  no  tribe  which  does 
not  express  general  conceptions  and  abstract  ideas  by  ar- 
ticulate sounds.  But,  as  we  have  seen,  the  differences  be- 
tween vocal  sounds  capable  of  such  expression  are  but 
differences  of  degree,  while  the  differences  between  all  such 
utterances  and  vocal  utterances  which  but  express  sen- 
sations and  emotions  is  a  difference  of  kind.  Therefore,  we 
were  compelled  to  conclude,  in  our  last  chapter  but  one, 
that  the  most  imperfect  languages  offer  us  no  indication  of  a 
transition  from  irrational  cries,  being  separated  from  the 
latter  by  an  indefinitely  wide  barrier,  while  they  differ  from 
the  highest  speech,  but  by  a  greater  simplicity,  which 
indeed  is  sometimes  far  more  apparent  than  real.  We 
have  also  seen  reason  to  conclude,  in  our  last  chapter,  that 
there  is  no  evidence  whatever  for  the  existence  of  man  in  a 
non-moral  condition,  or  with  fundamental  moral  principles 
which  directly  contradict  our  own. 

Turning  now  to  the   first   subject-matter  of  our  present 
inquiry,  that  concerning  religion — concerning  the  First  new 
universality,  or  non-universality,  of  religious  con-  religion, 
ceptions — it  is  once  more  necessary  here,  as  in  th,e  subjects 


1 36  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VI. 

"  language "  and  "  morals,"  to  commence  with  definitions 
and  distinctions.  Obviously  it  cannot  here  be  meant  to 
assert  that  men  have,  almost  universally,  a  positive  religious 
belief,  since  so  many  of  those  we,  most  of  us,  know  familiarly, 
have  none.  It  is  evident  that  we  have  no  cause  to  be  sur- 
prised at  finding  generally  diffused  in  some  other  nations 
irreligious  or  non-religious  phenomena  analogous  to  those 
we  may  meet  with  in  our  own.  Neither  can  it  be  meant 
that  a  distinct  religious  system  is  to  be  found  in  every 
nation  or  tribe,  since  it  would  be  very  probable  that  the 
descendants  of  some  isolated  irreligious  parents  should  have 
grown  up  devoid  of  religion  altogether.  What  is  meant  by 
the  universality  of  religious  conceptions  is  the  general  dif- 
fusion amongst  all  considerable  races  of  men:  first,  of  a 
power  to  apprehend  the  existence  of  a  good  supernatural 
Being  possessed  of  knowledge  and  will,  and  rewarding  men 
in  another  world  in  accordance  with  their  conduct  in  tliis ; 
secondly,  of  a  tendency  to  believe  in  the  actual  existence  of 
superhuman  powers  and  beings,  and  also  in  an  existence 
beyond  the  grave — however  shadowy,  distorted,  or  aborted 
such  conceptions  may  seem  to  us  to  be. 

We  have  then  to  consider  our  authors'  teachings  as  to  the 
following  questions : — First,  whether  any  people  are  now  in 
a  state  equally  unconscious  of  the  preternatural,  and  equally 
unconcerned  with  regard  to  a  future  life,  as  are  the  brutes  ? 
Secondly,  whether  any  races  exist  which  may  be  deemed 
to  be  in  a  transitional  condition  from  brutish  non -religiosity, 
or  with  religious  conceptions  so  essentially  divergent  from 
our  own  as  to  be  different  in  kind,  and,  therefore,  iacapable 
of  transition  either  from  or  to  the  highest  religious  con- 
dition ? 

But  if  in  the  former  inquiries  it  was  necessary  for  us  to 

be  upon  our  guard  against  the  misapprehensions 

and  misinterpretations  of  travellers,  it  is  still  more 

necessary  for  us  to  be  so  here.     The  necessity  is  so  great 

because  both  theological  and  anti-theological  prejudices  are 

more  likely  than  are  any  others  to  warp  the  judgment  and 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN.  137 

influence  the  appreciations  of  even  well-meaning  observers. 
As  to  the  theological  prejudice,  however,  we  can  effectually 
guard  against  that  by  building  upon  the  facts  and  inferences 
offered  to  us  by  the  authors  here  referred  to.  Whatever 
may  be  their  most  conspicuous  merits,  or  their  shortcomings, 
theological  prejudice  will  not  be  a  vice  we  shall  have  to 
guard  against  in  them.  Admissions  made  by  them,  favour- 
able to  theology,  may  be  accepted  without  apprehension  upon 
that  score. 

As  regards  the  influence  of  bias  in  this  matter,  I  will  cite 
some  remarks  of  Mr.  Tylor  himself  which  are  well  worthy 
of  consideration  : — 

"  While  observers  who  have  had  fair  opportunities  of  studying  the 
religions  of  savages  have  thus  sometimes  done  scant  justice  to  the  facts 
before  their  eyes,  the  hasty  denials  of  others  who  have  judged  without 
even  facts  can  carry  no  great  weight.  A  sixteenth-century  traveller 
gave  an  account  of  the  natives  of  Florida  which  is  typical  of  such : 
'  Touching  the  religion  of  this  people  which  we  have  found,  for  want  of 
their  language  we  could  not  understand  neither  by  signs  nor  gesture 

that  they  had  any  religion  at  all We  suppose  that  they  have  no 

religion  at  all,  and  that  they  live  at  their  own  libertie.'  Better  know- 
ledge of  these  Floridans  nevertheless  showed  that  they  had  a  religioni 
and  better  knowledge  has  reversed  many  another  hasty  assertion  to  the 
same  effect ;  as  when  writers  used  to  declare  that  the  natives  of  Mada- 
gascar had  no  idea  of  a  future  state,  and  no  word  for  soul  or  spirit,  or 
when  Dampier  inquired  after  the  religion  of  the  natives  of  Timor,  and 
was  told  that  they  had  none;  or  when  Sir  Thomas  Eoe  landed  in 
SulJunlui  Bay,  on  his  way  to  the  court  of  the  Great  Mogul,  and 
remarked  of  the  Hottentots  that  '  they'  have  left  off  their  custom  of 
stealing,  but  know  no  God  or  religion.'  Among  the  numerous  accounts 
collected  by  Sir  John  Lubbock  as  evidence  bearing  on  the  absence  or 
low  development  of  religion  among  low  races,  some  may  be  selected  as 
lyiug  open  to  criticism  from  this  point  of  view.  Thus,  the  statement 
that  the  Samoan  Islanders  had  no  religion  cannot  stand  in  the  face  of 
the  elaborate  description  by  the  Rev.  G.  Turner  of  the  Samoan  religion 
itself;  and  the  assertion  that  the  Tapinombas  of  Brazil  had  no  religion, 
is  one  not  to  be  received  without  some  more  positive  proof,  for  the 
religious  doctrines  and  practices  of  the  Tapi  race  have  been  recorded 
by  Lery,  De  Laet,  and  other  writers.  Even  with  much  time  and  care 
and  knowledge  of  language,  it  is  not  always  easy  to  elicit  from  savages 
the  details  of  their  theology.  They  rather  try  to  hide  from  the  prying 
and  contemptuous  foreigner  their  worship  of  gods  who  seem  to  shrink, 


138  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUBE.  [CiiAi-.  VI. 

like  their  worshippers,  before  the  white  man  and  his  mightier  Deity. 
And  thus,  even  where  no  positive  proof  of  religious  development  among 
any  particular  tribe  has  reached  us,  we  should  distrust  its  denial  by 
observers  whose  acquaintance  with  the  tribe  in  question  has  not  been 
intimate  as  well  as  kindly.  Assertions  of  this  sort  are  made  very  care- 
lessly. Thus,  it  is  said  of  the  Andaman  Islanders  that  they  have  not 
the  rudest  elements  of  a  religious  faith;  Dr.  Monat  states  this  ex- 
plicitly ;  yet  it  appears  that  the  natives  did  not  even  display  to  the 
foreigners  the  rude  music  which  they  actually  possessed,  so  that  they 
could  scarcely  have  been  expected  to  be  communicative  as  to  their 
theology,  if  they  had  any.  In  our  time,  the  most  striking  negation  of 
the  religion  of  savage  tribes  is  that  published  by  Sir  Samuel  Baker,  in 
a  paper  read  in  1866  before  the  Ethnological  Society  of  London,  as 
follows :  '  The  most  northern  tribes  of  the  White  Nile  are  the  Dinkas, 
Shillooks,  Nuchr,  Eytch,  Bohr,  Aliab,  and  Shir.  A  general  description 
will  suffice  for  the  whole,  excepting  the  Kytch.  "Without  any  excep- 
tion, they  are  without  a  belief  in  a  supreme  being,  neither  have  they 
any  form  of  worship  or  idolatry ;  nor  is  the  darkness  of  their  minds 
enlightened  by  even  a  ray  of  superstition.'  Had  this  distingiiished 
explorer  spoken  only  of  the  Latukas,  or  of  other  tribes  hardly  known, 
to  ethnographers  except  through  his  own  intercourse  with  them,  his 
denial  of  any  religious  consciousness  to  them  would  have  been  at  least 
entitled  to  stand  as  the  best  procurable  account,  until  more  intimate 
communication  should  prove  or  disprove  it.  But  in  speaking  thus  ot 
comparatively  well-known  tribes,  such  as  the  Dinkas,  Shillooks,  and 
Nuehr,  Sir  S.  Baker  ignores  the  existence  of  published  evidence,  such 
as  describes  the  sacrifices  of  the  Dinkas,  their  belief  in  good  and  evil 
spirits  (adjok  and  djyok),  their  good  deity  and  heaven-dwelling  creator, 
Dendid,  as  likewise  Near,  the  deity  of  the  Nuehr,  and  the  Shillooks' 
creator,  who  is  described  as  visiting,  like  other  spirits,  a  sacred  wood 
or  tree.  Kaufmann,  Boun,  Bollet,  Lejean,  and  other  observers,  had  thus 
placed  on  record  details  of  the  religion  of  these  White  Nile  tribes,  years 
before  Sir  Samuel  Baker's  rash  denial  that  they  had  any  religion  at 
all." — Primitive  Culture,  vol.  i.  p.  381. 

Again,  Mr.  Tylor  quotes,  as  surprisingly  inconsistent,— 

"  Mr.  Moffat's  declaration  as  to  the  Bechuanas,  that  '  man's  immor- 
tality was  never  heard  of  among  that  people,'  he  having  remarked  in 
the  sentence  next  before,  that  the  word  for  the  shades  or  manes  of  the 
dead  is  '  liriti.'  In  South  America,  again,  Don  Felix  de  Azara  com- 
ments on  the  positive  falsity  of  the  ecclesiastics'  assertion  that  the 
native  tribes  have  a  religion.  He  simply  declares  that  they  have  none ; 
nevertheless,  in  the  course  of  his  work  he  mentions  such  facts  as  that 
the  Payaguas  bury  arms  and  clothing  with  their  dead,  and  have  some 
notions  of  a  future  life,  and  that  the  Guanas  believe  in  a  being  who 


CHAP.  VI.J  MAN.  130 

rewards  good  and  punishes  evil.  In  fact,  this  author's  reckless  denial 
of  religion  and  law  to  the  lower  races  of  this  region  justifies  D'Orbigny's 
.sharp  criticism  *  that '  this  is  indeed  what  he  says  of  all  the  nations  he 
describes,  while  actually  proving  the  contrary  of  his  thesis  by  the  very 
facts  he  alleges  in  its  support.' " — Ibid.  vol.  i.  p.  379. 

Once  more,  by  way  of  showing  how  the  real  meaning  of 
words  may  escape  the  reporters  of  such  expressions,  Mistakes. 
Mr.  Ty  lor  judiciously  observes: — 

"  Prudent  ethnographers  must  often  doubt  accounts  of 
such,  for  this  reason,  that  the  savage  who  declares  that  the 
dead  live  no  more,  may  merely  mean  to  say  that  they  are 
dead.  When  the  East  African  is  asked  what  becomes  of  his 
buried  ancestors,  the  '  old  people,'  he  can  reply  that '  they 
are  ended,'  yet  at  the  same  time  ho  fully  admits  that  their 
ghosts  survive." — Ibid.  vol.  ii.  p.  18. 

Mr.  Tylor's  own  belief  (expressed,  of  course,  in  terms 
conformable  to  his  own  view  of  evolution)  as  to  the  religion 
of  the  lower  races,  is  thus  declared : — t 

"  Genuine  savage  faiths  do,  in  fact,  bring  to  our  view  what 
seem  to  be  rudimentary  forms  of  ideas  which  un-  g^ge 
derlie  dualistic  theological  schemes  among  higher  fli 
nations.  It  is  certain  that  even  amongst  rude  savage  hordes 
native  thought  has  already  turned  toward  the  deep  problem 
of  good  and  evil."  He  thus  admits  an  essentially  and  dis- 
tinctly ethical  element  into  the  theology  of  even  "  genuine  " 
savages.  But  our  author  has  yet  more  decided  views  as  to 
the  universality  of  religious  conceptions.  Concerning  the 
existence  of  savages  without  religion,  he  saysj  (speaking 
from  his  point  of  view  as  a  supporter  of  the  monistic  hypo- 
thesis) :  "  Though  the  theoretical  niche  is  ready  and  conve- 
nient, the  actual  statue  to  fill  it  is  not  forthcoming.  The 
case  is,  in  some  degree,  similar  to  that  of  the  tribes  asserted 
to  exist  without  language  or  without  the  use  of  fire :  nothing 
in  the  nature  of  things  [?]  seems  to  forbid  the  possibility  of 


*  'L'Homme  Amdricain,'  vol.  ii.  p.  318. 
t  '  Primitive  Culture,'  vol.  ii.  p.  288. 
J  Ibid.  vol.  i.  p.  378. 


140  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [Ciur.  VI. 

such  existence,  but,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  the  tribes  are  not 
found." 

As  we  have  said,  the  native  Australians  have  much  pre- 
tension to  the  post  of  lowest  of  existing  races,  and 

Vustralians.  '  . 

we  often  hear  a  great  deal  as  to  their  non-religious 
condition;  nevertheless  Mr.  Tylor  quotes*  the  Rev.  AY. 
Eidley  to  the  effect  that  "  whenever  he  has  conversed  with 
the  Aborigines,  he  found  them  to  have  quite  definite  tradi- 
tions concerning  supernatural  beings,  as  Baime,  whose  voice 
they  hear  in  thunder,  and  who  made  all  things."  Moreover  this 
testimony  is  reinforced  by  that  of  Stanbridge  ("  T.  Eth.  Soc." 
vol.  i.  p.  301),  who  is  quoted  as  asserting  that  so  far  from  the 
Australians  having  no  religion,  "  they  declare  that  Jupiter, 
whom  they  call  *  foot  of  day '  (Ginabong-Beary),  was  a  chief 
among  the  old  Spirits,  that  ancient  race  who  were  translated 
to  heaven  before  man  came  on  earth."  But  not  only  do  we 
thus  meet  with  distinct  conceptions  of  the  supernatural  where 
their  existence  has  been  denied,  but  some  of  the  external 
manifestations  of  these  conceptions  are  by  no  means  to  be 
despised.  Thus  in  a  prayer  used  by  the  Khonds  of  Oris.sa 
we  find  f  the  following  words :  "  We  are  ignorant  of  what  it  is 
good  to  ask  for.  You  know  what  is  good  for  us.  Give  it 
us ! "  Mr.  Tylor  adds :  "  Such  are  types  of  prayer  in  the 
lower  levels  of  culture !" 

But  the  universal  tendency  of  even  the  most  degraded 
tribes  to  practices  which  clearly  show  their  belief  in  preter- 
natural agencies  is  too  notorious  to  admit  of  serious  discussion, 
while  the  wide-spread,  and  probably  all  but  universal,  prac- 
tice of  some  kind  of  funereal  rites  speaks  plainly  of  as  wide 
a  notion  that  the  dead  in  some  sense  yet  live.  As  to  the 
power  possessed  by  even  the  lowest  races  of  apprehending 
strictly  religious  conceptions,  the  annals  of  the  "  propagation 
of  the  faith "  prove  it  abundantly.  The  Australians,  how- 
ever, are  generally  believed  to  be  the  most  hopeless  subjects 


*  '  Primitive  Culture,'  vol.  i.  p.  378. 
t  Ibid.  vol.  ii.  p.  335. 


CHAP.  VI]  MAN.  141 

of  missionary  effort,  and  yet  Western  Australia*  demonstrates 
the  utter  groundlessness  of  tliis  persuasion.  It  does  so  by 
means  of  the  flourishing  community  of  reclaimed  savages 
who  live  under  the  care  and  supervision  of  the  fathers  of  the 
Benedictine  Abbey  situate  in  that  region.  There  can  be  no 
question  but  that  Australians  can,  by  such  agency,  be  civi- 
lised, or  that  they  can,  as  a  community,  be  perpetuated  in  a 
reclaimed  condition,  though  the  influx  of  hostile  influences 
may  ultimately  prevent  the  accomplishment  of  the  benevo- 
lent object  so  pursued. 

We  may  conclude,  then,  that  no  existing  race  is  generally 
devoid  of  conceptions  regarding  the  preternatural,  or  entirely 
unconcerned  about  future  existence,  whether  their  own  or 
that  of  their  friends  or  enemies. 

It  remains  to  inquire  whether  any  savage  races  may  be 
fairly  considered  as  in  a  transitional  state  from  a  Arcthe 
non-religious   condition,   like   that   of  beasts;    or  [^lousw'cos 
whether  the  religious  conceptions  of  any  race  are  toiiyTkT" 
so  different  in  kind  from  our  own  as  to  render  it  im-  hlgher 
possible  for  them  to  be  the  degraded  remnants  of  former 
religious  beliefs  of  a  higher  character.      As  to  the  first  of 
these  questions,  it  may  be  observed  that  the  difference  be- 
tween a  nature  capable  of  religious  conceptions    and   one 
not  so  capable  is  a  difference  of  kind,  and  therefore  "  tran- 
sitions"  are  just  as    possible  or  as   impossible  here   as  in 
the  previously  considered  matters  of  morality  and  speech. 
It  appears  to  me  manifest  that  no  combinations  of  merely 
sensible  perceptions   could  give  rise  to   the   conception  of 
beings  of  a   preternatural  nature   and   with   preternatural 
powers.     It  is  a  question  not  of  a  vague  fear,  but  of  con- 
ceptions of  beings  with  superhuman  attributes.     As  to  the 
second  question — that  concerning  the   nature  of  religious 
conceptions   in   the  most  distinct  races — it  may  be  safely 
adirmed,  on  Mr.  Tylor's  authority,  that  the  differences  are 


*  Sco  '  Mcinoircs  Historiqiies  sur  1'Aubtralio,'  par  Mgr.  Rudfsino  Salvado, 
1834. 


LESSONS  FKOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VI. 

often  much  more  superficial  and  the  agreements  much  more 
profound  than  is  very  often,  if  not  generally,  supposed.  The 
extreme  want  of  flexibility  of  so  many  minds  is  the  cause 
of  this  difficulty  of  perceiving  how  often  the  same  essential 
idea  underlies  external  modes  of  representation  which  are  very 
different.  The  personifications  of  stars,  rivers,  clouds,  &c., 
when  viewed  under  a  certain  aspect,  are  to  some  tribes  not  only 
the  natural  expression  of  their  religious  conceptions,  but  pro- 
bably even  the  nearest  approach  to  truth  now  possible  to  them 
apart  from  revelation.  As  to  their  conceptions  Mr.  Tylor 
remarks  :  *  "  They  rest  upon  a  broad  philosophy  of  nature, 
early  and  crude  indeed,  but  thoughtful,  consistent,  and 
quite  really  and  seriously  meant."  As  to  the  crudity  of 
these  modes  of  expressing  a  belief  in  the  general  action  of 
superhuman  causation,  it  may  be  remarked  that  after  all  the 
error  was  trifling  compared  with  that  of  modern  Materialists 
— i.e.,  the  modern  crude  conception  that  because  the  pheno- 
mena of  nature  are  not  produced  by  a  human  personality, 
they  are  produced  by  none! .  Mr.  Tylor  himself  says,f  as  to 
the  real  resemblance  between  apparently  very  different  reli- 
gious developments,  "Baime,  the  creator,  whose  voice  the 
rude  Australians  hear  in  the  rolling  thunder,  will  sit  enthroned 
by  the  side  of  Olympian  Zeus  himself." 

We  have  heard  much  as  to  the  notion  entertained  by  some 
barbarians  i  that  a  distinction  of  ranks  extends  into  the  next 
world,  and  that  the  future  state  depends  upon  the  social  con- 
dition of  the  departed.  But  similar  notions  may  exist 
amongst  civilised  people,  as  was  evidenced  by  the  often- 
quoted  French  lady  of  the  ancien  regime,  who  exclaimed,  on 
learning  the  death  of  a  profligate  noble,  "  God  will  think 
twice  before  he  damns  a  man  of  the  marquis's  quality."  In- 
deed it  may  be  said  that  a  belief  in  the  continuance  after 
death  of  the  conditions  of  this  life  is  at  the  present  time 
spreading  widely  amongst  many  thousands  who  accept  the 


*  'Primitive  Culture,'  vol.  i.  p.  258.  f  Ibid.  Vol.  i.  p.  248. 

J  Ibid.  vol.  ii.  p.  78. 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN.  113 

teachings  of  Spiritism  as  a  new  gospel.  But  how  often 
may  not  the  highest  signification  lie  hidden  and  latent  under 
a  term  which  is  apparently  but  sensuous  in  its  meaning  ? 
The  loftiest  terms  in  use  amongst  us  even  now,  whether  in 
Science,  .Religion,  or  Philosophy,  are,  when  ultimately  ana- 
lysed, but  sensuous  symbols,  such  being  the  necessary  mate- 
rials of  our  whole  language ;  but  this  by  no  means  prevents 
our  attaching  to  such  subjects  very  different  ideas.  Who, 
when  speaking  of  the  spirit  of  Shakespeare,  thinks  of  the 
pulmonary  exhalation  which  that  term  primitively  denoted  ? 
Mr.  Tylor  objects  *  to  the  expression,  "  an  offering  made  by 
fire  of  a  sweet  savour  before  the  Lord,"  as  being  barbarous ; 
but  what  words  could  have  been  used  to  express  spiritual 
acceptability  which  would  not  have  had  a  primarily  sensuous 
meaning?  Yet  granted  that  many  races  have  no  higher 
conceptions  as  to  the  preternatural  than  belief  in  demons, 
dread  of  witchcraft,  and  belief  in  ghosts,  is  that  any  reason 
why  such  races  should  not  be  descended  from  remote  ances- 
tors with  a  much  higher  creed  ?  Such,  indeed,  does  appear 
to  be  the  opinion  of  Sir  John  Lubbock,  who  says  :  f  "Religion 
appeals  so  strongly  to  the  hopes  and  fears  of  men,  it  takes  so 
deep  a  hold  on  most  minds,  in  its  higher  forms  it  is  so  great 
a  consolation  in  times  of  sorrow  and  sickness,  that  I  can 
hardly  think  any  nation  would  ever  abandon  it  altogether." 
Ai:;un,  in  reply  to  the  Duke  of  Argyll,  who  had  objected 
existing  phenomena,  Sir  John  observes :  \  "If  the  Duke 
means  to  say  that  men  who  are  highly  civilised,  habitually 
or  frequently  lose  and  scornfully  disavow  religion,  I  can  only 
say  that  I  should  adopt  such  an  opinion  with  difficulty  and 
regret."  The  latter  of  these  passages  takes  away  any  weight 
which  might  attach  to  the  former,  for  it  is  difficult  to  believe 
that  the  passage  last  quoted  can  have  been  seriously  meant 
by  its  author  when  we  reflect  that  he  must  be  acquainted 
with  the  views  of  Buchner,  Vogt,  and  Strauss.  It  is  in  one 


*  '  Primitive  Culture,'  vol.  ii.  p.  350. 
f  The  '  Origin  of  Civilisation,'  p.  331. 
I  Ibid.  p.  318. 


141  LESSONS  FROM  NAT  UEE.  [CHAP.  VI. 

respect  a  calamity  of  our  time  and  country  that  unbelievers, 
instead  of,  as  in  France,  honestly  avowing  their  sentiments, 
disguise  them  by  studious  reticence — as  Mr.  Darwin  at  first 
studiously  disguised  *  his  views  as  to  the  bestiality  of  man, 
and  as  the  late  Mr.  Mill  silently  allowed  himself  to  be 
represented  to  the  public  as  a  thorough  believer  in  God. 
When  we  consider  how  energetically  atheism  manifested 
itself  recently  in  Paris,  its  passionate  development  in  Spain 
with  the  vigorous  atheistic  declarations  of  a  late  Spanish 
Colonial  Minister,  when  any  one  at  all  acquainted  with  the 
Continent  must  know  that  it  counts  its  enthusiastic  disciples 
by  tens  of  thousands,  it  is  surely  nothing  less  than  solemn 
triflingf  to  speak  of  "  difficulty"  in  recognising  facts  so  patent. 

We  have,  then,  but  to  look  about  us  to  see  how  very  easily 
such  a  corruption  as  that  supposed  might  have  taken  place, 
even  in  nations  as  highly  developed  as  our  own.  We  have 
but  to  imagine  the  emigration  of  a  few  such  families,  and  the 
extinction  of  religion  in  their  progeny  would  be  inevitable ; 
and  in  order  that  a  belief  in  ghosts  and  in  evil  spirits  might 
coexist  with  such  religious  ignorance,  we  need  but  suppose 
some  spiritists  to  be  amongst  the  emigrants  in  question. 

But  a  difficulty  is  put  forward  as  to  the  rite  of  sacrifice. 


*  In  a  review  of  Haeckel  in  the  'Academy'  of  January  2,  1875,  p.  1C, 
Professor  Huxley,  with  a  zeal  for  Mr.  Darwin  more  zealous  than  fortunate, 
objected  to  a  less  strong  statement  of  this  fact  than  that  here  given,  as  false 
and  calumnious,  denying  that  Mr.  Darwin  had  been  "  reticent  about  his  views 
respecting  the  origin  of  man."  The  statement  objected  to,  however,  simply 
reposed  upon  Mr.  Darwin's  own  express  declaration  (in  the  introduction  to  his 
'  Descent  of  Man')  as  to  his  own  conduct  and  motives,  and,  after  all,  ho  must 
have  known  them  better  than  even  the  most  eager  of  his  disciples.  His  own 
words  are  as  follows :  "  During  many  years  I  collected  notes  on  the  origin  and 
descent  of  man,  without  any  intention  of  publishing  on  the  subject,  but 
rather  with  the  determination  not  to  publish,  as  I  thought  that  I  should  thus 
only  add  to  the  prejudices  against  my  views."  If  this  does  not  denote 
deliberate  and  intentional  "  reticence,"  the  words  have  no  meaning. 

t  At  p.  256  Sir  John  also  says : — "  If  we  consider  the  various  aspects  of 
Christianity  as  understood  by  different  nations,  we  can  hardly  fail  to  perceive 
that  the  dignity,  and  therefore  the  truth,  of  their  religious  beliefs,  is  in  direct 
relation  to  the  knowledge  of  science  and  of  the  great  physical  laws  by  which 
our  universe  is  governed."  Were  this  true,  Vogt,  Buchner,  Darwin,  and 
Strauss  would  exemplify  the  highest  religious  belief.  But,  in  truth,  what  can 
be  more  preposterous  than  to  assert  or  imply  that  physical  science  has  to  do 
with  the  government  of  the  univeise? 


CHAT.  VI.]  MAN.  145 

This  practice  is  represented  as  having  originated  in  the  gross 
notion  of  actually  feeding  the  gods  with  flesh,  or  at  o 

J  Sacrifice. 

least  in  the  idea  of  the  spirit  of  such  flesh  serving 
as  food  to  the  spiritual  beings  to  whom  it  was  offered,  and  not 
in  the  modern  notion  of  sacrifice.  Mr.  Tylor  says  :*  "  The 
mere  fact  of  sacrifice  to  deities,  from  the  lowest  to  the  highest 
levels  of  culture  consisting  of  the  extent  of  nine-tenths  or 
more  of  gifts  of  food  for  sacred  banquets,  tells  forcibly  against 
the  originality  of  the  abnegation  theory."  But,  I  ask,  Why 
so  ?  If  food  in  the  earliest  period  was  the  thing  to  sacrifice 
which  constituted  the  greatest  self-denial  easily  practised, 
then,  on  natural  grounds  only,  we  might  conclude  that  such 
a  practice  would  arise  and  that  the  habit,  being  once  formed, 
continued  and  became  widely  diffused.  But  elsewhere,  in- 
deed, he  concedes  a  great  deal,  and  admits t  that  "we  do 
not  find  it  easy  to  analyse  the  impression  which  a  gift  makes 
on  our  own  feelings,  and  to  separate  the  actual  value  of  the 
object  from  the  sense  of  gratification  in  the  giver's  good  will 
or  request,  and  thus  we  may  well  scruple  to  define  closely 
how  uncultured  men  work  out  this  very  same  distinction  in 
their  dealings  with  their  deities."  This  remark  is  excellent ; 
and  how  distinctly  a  real  and  unmistakably  expressed  ethical 
conception  really  accompanies  such  practices  in  some  tribes 
fle  himself  shows  us  in  another  passage.  In  a  Zulu  prayer 
quoted  by  him,J  we  find :  "  If  you  ask  food  of  me  which  you 
have  given  me,  is  it  not  proper  that  I  should  give  it  to  you  ?" 
As  he  truly  says: §  "The  Phoenicians  sacrificed  the  dearest 
children  to  propitiate  the  angry  gods,  &c."  But,  in  fact, 
early  sacrifice  contained  at  the  least  implicitly,  potentially, 
vaguely  and  in  germ,  all  that  which  later  became  actually 
developed  and  distinctly  expressed.  It  is  not  possible  for 
Mr.  Tylor,  ||  or  for  any  one  else,  to  prove  that  it  did  not  do 


*  '  Primitive  Culture,'  vol.  ii.  p.  3GO.     *  t  Ibid.  p.  357. 

+  Ibid.  p.  333.  §  Ibid.  p.  361. 

||  Mr.  Tylor's  judgments  as  to  ancient  religion  must  be  received  with 
caution,  whc-n  w«;  observe  the  curious  and  hasty  remarks  into  which  he  L< 
occasionally  l>etray<d  as  to  the  religion  of  to-day.  lie  tells  us  that  '•  St. 
I.u/urus,  patron  saint  of  lepirs  !:ud  their  hospitals,  and  fiorn  whom  the 


146  LESSONS  FBGM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VI. 

so,  and  that  it  must  have  done  so  we  may  judge  from  the 
outcome  which  has  since  resulted. 

We  may,  then,  conclude  that  there  is  no  evidence  of  the  ex- 
istence of  any  race  altogether  devoid  of  religious  conceptions, 
or  possessing  religious  conceptions  so  fundamentally  different 
from  those  existing  to-day,  that  it  is  impossible  to  regard  them 
as  instances  of  degradation.  The  actual  non-existence  of 
such  races  may  be  taken  as  established  from  the  failure  of  all 
efforts  to  prove  their  existence,  and  from  the  admissions  herein 
quoted.  Before  leaving  the  subject,  an  amusing  parody  of 
certain  recent  attempts  to  explain  almost  all  early  history 
and  legend  by  myths  of  dawn  and  sunrise  may  be  cited. 
Mr.  Tylor  says,*  with  respect  to  the  '  Song  of  Sixpence :' — 
"  Obviously,  the  four-and-twenty  blackbirds  are  the  four- 
and'twenty  hours,  and  the  pie  that  holds  them  is  the  under- 
lying earth  covered  with  the  overarching  sky:  how  true  a 
touch  of  nature  it  is,  that  when  the  pie  is  opened,  that  is, 
when  day  breaks,  the  birds  begin  to  sing.  The  king  is  the 
sun,  and  his  counting  out  his  money  is  pouring  out  the  sun- 
shine, the  golden  shower  of  Danae.  The  queen  is  the  moon, 
and  her  transparent  honey  the  moonlight.  The  maid  is  the 
rosy-fingered  dawn,  who  rises  before  the  sun  her  master,  and 
hangs  out  the  clouds,  his  clothes,  across  the  sky.  The 
particular  blackbird  who  so  tragically  ends  the  tale  by 
snipping  off  her  nose  is  the  hour  of  sunrise."  Mr.  Tylor 
similarly  explains  the  life  and  death  of  Julius  Caesar. 

We  may  now  proceed  to  our  fourth  inquiry,  that  concerning 
second  new  "  Progress,"  or  the  question  whether,  on  the  whole, 

subject,  Pro-  . 

gress.  progress   has  prevailed   among    savage    races,   or 

whether  they  have  not,  in  the  main,  degenerated  ?  As  to 
this  matter,  both  our  authors  are  strongly  of  opinion  that  no 
extensive  or  predominant  retrogression  has  taken  place. 
Nevertheless,  certain  facts  stated  by  them,  and  certain 


lazzarone  and  the  lazzaretto  take  their  name,  obviously  derives  these  qualities 
from  the  Lazarus  of  the  parable.''  Does  Mr.  Tylor  forget  the  Laznrtis  raised 
from  the  dead  ? 

*  '  Primitive  Culture,'  vol.  i.  p.  287. 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN.  1-17 

opinions  expressed,  seem  to  indicate  at  least  the  possibility 
of  a  more  extensive  process  of  degeneration  than  they  are 
inclined  to  allow.  Social  progress  is  an  exceedingly  complex 
phenomenon,  the  result  of  many  factors ;  and  even  existing 
instances  of  retrogression,  as  in  Spain,  are  palpable  enough, 
while  no  one  probably  -will  contest  the  inferiority,  in  many 
respects,  of  the  Greece  of  our  day  to  that  which  listened 
to  the  voice  of  Aristotle  or  Plato. 

Mr.  Tylor  contrasts  very  favourably  with  the  late  Mr. 
Buckle  in  his  appreciation  of  this  complexity,  and  in  his 
perception  of  the  importance  of  moral  as  well  as  of  intel- 
lectual advance,  and  of  the  absurdity  of  those  who  make 
sure  that  every  revolutionary  change  must  be  an  improve- 
ment. He  says: — 

"  Even  granting  that  intellectual,  moral,  and  political  life  may,  on 
a  broad  view,  be  seen  to  progress  together,  it  is  obvious  that  they  are 
far  from  advancing  with  equal  steps.  It  may  be  taken  as  a  man's  rule 
of  duty  in  the  world,  that  he  shall  strive  to  know  as  well  as  he  can  find 
out,  and  do  as  well  as  he  knows  how.  But  the  parting  asunder  of 
these  two  great  principles,  that  separation  of  intelligence  from  virtue 
which  accounts  for  so  much  of  the  wrongdoing  of  mankind,  is  continu- 
ally seen  to  happen  in  the  great  movements  of  civilisation.  As  one 
conspicuous  instance  of  what  all  history  stands  to  prove,  if  we  study 
the  early  ages  of  Christianity,  we  may  see  men  with  minds  pervaded 
by  the  new  religion  of  duty,  holiness,  and  love,  yet  at  the  same  time 
actually  falling  away  in  intellectual  life,  thus  at  once  vigorously  grasp- 
ing one-half  of  civilisation,  and  contemptuously  casting  off  the  other." 
— Primitive  Culture,  vol.  i.  p.  25. 

This  aspect  of  the  question  has  an  important  bearing  upon 
the  view  we  should  take  respecting  the  earliest  families  of  man. 
It  is  plain  that  a  high  moral  standard  might  have  existed 
with  a  most  rudimentary  state  of  art  and  the  scantiest  appli- 
ances of  material  civilisation.  After  speaking  of  Mr.  Alfred 
Wallace  and  of  Lieut.  Bruiju  Korjs,  Mr.  Tylor  says :  "  Ethno- 
graphers who  seek  in  modern  savages  types  of  the  remotely 
ancient  human  race  at  large,  are  bound  by  such  examples  to 
consider  the  rude  life  of  primaeval  man  under  favourable  con- 
ditions to  have  been,  in  its  measure,  a  good  and  happy  life." 

It  is   difficult  for  us,  surrounded  by  the  abundant  aids 


148  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VI. 

afforded  by  international  communication,  to  realise  the  dif- 
ferent effects  which  would  probably  result  from  an  absence  of 
such  assistance  and  stimulus.  This  difficulty  is  perceived  by 
Mr.  Tylor,  who  remarks  :*  "  In  striking  a  balance  between 
the  effects  of  forward  and  backward  movements  in  civilisa- 
tion, it  must  be  borne  in  mind  how  powerfully  the  diffusion 
of  culture  acts  in  preserving  the  results  of  progress  from  the 
attacks  of  degeneration."  Therefore,  at  an  early  period, 
when  there  was  little  diffusion  and  no  intercommunication 
between  groups  which  had  become  isolated,  degeneration 
might  very  easily  have  taken  place,  and  these  isolated  groups 
may  have  become  the  parents  of  tribes  now  widely  spread. 
Indeed,  our  author  adds, — 

"  Degeneration  probably  operates  even  more  actively  in  the  lower 
than  in  the  higher  culture.  Barbarous  nations  and  savage  hordes, 
with  their  less  knowledge  and  scantier  appliances,  would  seem  pecu- 
liarly exposed  to  degrading  influences." 

After  giving  an  instance  from  West  Africa,  he  continues  :— 

"  In  South-East  Africa,  also,  a  comparatively  high  barbaric  culture, 
which  we  especially  associate  with  the  old  descriptions  of  the  kingdom 
of  Monomotapa,  seems  to  have  fallen  away,  and  the  remarkable  ruins 
of  buildings  of  hewn  stone  fitted  without  mortar  indicate  a  former 
civilisation  above  that  of  the  native  population." 

But  actual  degradation  is  a  fact  which  is  directly  attested, 
and  which,  the  ruins  of  Central  America  demonstrate.  Our 
author  quotes  Father  Charlevoix  to  the  effect  that  the 
Iroquois,  having  had  their  villages  burnt, 

"  have  not  taken  the  trouble  to  restore  them  to  their  old  condition. 
....  The  degradation  of  the  Cheyenne  Indians  is  matter  of  history, 
and  '  Lord  Milton  and  Dr.  Cheadle  came  upon  an  outlying  fragment 
of  the  Shushway  race,  without  horses  or  dogs,  sheltering  themselves 
under  rude  temporary  slants  of  bark  or  matting,  falling  year  by  year 
into  lower  misery.' " — Primitive  Culture,  vol.  i.  pp.  41,  42. 

With  respect  to  the  question  of  the  degradation  of  savage 
races,  Mr.  Albert  J.  Mott,  in  a  remarkable  address  (delivered 
before  the  Literary  and  Philosophical  Society  of  Liverpool 

'  rriinitivc  Culture,'  vol.  i.  p.  39. 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN.  149 

on  October  6th,  1873)  "  On  the  Origin  of  Savage  Life,"  makes 
the   following    highly   interesting   and    important  MI.MOU-S 
remarks.      Almost  at  the  opening  of  his  address  n 
he  pertinently  observes :  "  Questions  concerning  the  origin 
of  mankind  have  become  either  the  radiating  or  the  .culmi- 
nating points  in  most  branches  of  science."     And   this  is 
indeed  most  true. 

One  of  the  facts  the  significance  of  which  he  insists  most 
strongly  on,  is  the  existence  of  remarkable  works  of  art  in 
Easter  Island.  He  says : — 

"  Easter  Island  stands  alono  in  the  Pacific  Ocean,  two  thousand 
miles  from  South  America,  and  about  one  thousand  from  the  nearest 
islands  that  are  habitable.  It  is  about  twelve  miles  long  by  four  in 
width ;  not  so  large  as  Jersey.  The  inhabitants,  about  a  thousand  iu 
number,  are  savages.  They  are,  of  course,  entirely  isolated,  and  the 
island  is  seldom  visited  by  ships.  It  is  volcanic,  and  the  soil  fertile, 
but  it  could  not  maintain  a  population  of  ten  thousand  souls  without 
the  aid  of  civib'sation  or  foreign  intercourse.  Probably  the  natives 
have  never  reached  half  that  number  in  their  present  condition  of  life. 

"  This  island  is  strewed  with  hundreds  of  carved  stone  images,  many 
of  them  of  extraordinary  size.  Some  are  nearly  forty  feet  long.  Many 
are  over  fifteen  feet.  Two  of  the  smaller  ones  are  in  the  British 
Museum.  One  of  these  is  eight  feet  high,  and  weighs  four  tons. 
Many  of  these  images  have  had  separate  stone  crowns  placed  upon  their 
heads,  the  crowns  being  from  two  to  ten  feet  across.  Thirty  of  these 
crowns  were  found  on  the  hill  from  the  rock  of  which  they  were  sculp- 
tured, waiting  to  be  removed.  The  images  were  generally  set  on 
pedestals,  upon  raised  terraces,  of  which  there  are  many.  The  terraces 
are  about  a  hundred  yards  long,  ten  yards  wide,  and  on  one  side — they 
stand  on  slopes — seven  or  eight  yards  high.  They  are  built  of  largo 
stones,  some  of  them  six  feet  long.  There  are  also  remains  of  numerous 
low  stone  houses  and  other  structures  in  the  island.  The  present 
inhabitants  know  nothing  about  the  origin  of  these  things."  * 

"  Similar  terraces  and  images  have  been  seen  in  other  islands  now 
uninhabited.  The  ruins  of  ancient  stone  buildings  of  great  extent  are 
found  in  the  Philippine  Islands,  the  Ladrones,  the  Marshall  and  Gilbert 
groups  ;  the  Society  Islands,  the  Navigators,  and  the  Marquesas.  They 
thus  extend  over  ten  thousand  miles  of  ocean." 

These   facts  he  cites  as  unmistakable   evidences  of  the 


*  Palmer:  Journal  Royal  Geographical  Society,  January  1870.  'Proceedings 
of  tlie  linyul  GitogiaTibical  Sociity,'  vol.  xrv.  p.  108 


150  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VI. 

existence  of  a  very  ancient  and  far-spread  higher  culture,  of 
which  they  now  constitute  the  only  traces  in  the  spots  where 
they  are  found. 

Again  he  observes : — 

"  The  whole  of  North  America,  from  the  Gulf  of  Mexico  to  Canada, 
is  full  of  ancient  works  of  earth  and  stone,  chiefly  found  in  the  form 
of  mourids  and  embankments.  They  exist  in  countless  thousands,  and 
I  believe  in  every  State ;  but  the  most  remarkable  are  in  the  great 
plain  or  valley  between  the  Alleghanies  and  the  Rocky  Mountains,  a 
district  at  least  a  thousand  miles  square.  Some  lines  of  embankment 
are  thirty  feet  high.  Many  areas  inclosed  by  them  are  from  one  to  two 
hundred  acres ;  some  are  double  this  size.  One  group  of  works  con- 
tains twenty  miles  of  embankment.  One  of  the  mounds  is  one  thousand 
feet  in  circumference,  and  seventy  feet  high.  Another  is  two  thousand 
feet  round  the  base,  and  ninety  feet  high ;  a  truncated  pyramid,  with  a 
flat  top  of  several  acres.  Many  of  the  inclosures  are  in  the  form  of 
circles  and  squares,  and  in  many  cases  these  figures  are  mathematically 
exact,  notwithstanding  their  great  size.  In  one  of  these  exact  squares 
each  side  is  a  thousand  and  eighty  feet  long,  and  the  area  inclosed 
twenty-seven  acres.  In  one  of  the  exact  circles  the  diameter  is  seven- 
teen hundred  feet,  the  area  forty  acres.  The  precision  of  these  figures 
has  been  ascertained  by  mathematical  survey.  The  ellipse,  also  exact, 
is  found  in  other  cases." 

Now,  as  he  truly  says : — 

"  Neither  a  true  circle,  with  a  radius  of  eight  hundred  and  fifty  feet, 
nor  a  true  square,  with  a  side  of  one  thousand  and  eighty  feet,  can  be 
drawn  upon  open  ground  by  any  one  without  the  help  of  exact 
measures  and  mathematical  knowledge." 

He  proceeds : — 

"  A  numerous  people  spread  over  a  wide  empire  must  have  had  easy 
means  of  internal  communication.  We  see,  accordingly,  from  the 
objects  found  in  the  mounds,  that  they  possessed  copper  in  abundance, 
which  came,  doubtless,  from  the  shores  of  Lake  Superior,  where  the 
ancient  mines  have  been  rediscovered;  obsidian,  which  is  not  found 
nearer  than  Mexico ;  mica,  probably  from  South  Carolina ;  pearls,  and 
marine  shells.  And  among  the  sculptured  objects  from  Ohio  are  exact 
representations  of  the  Toucan,  which  belongs  to  tropical  South  America, 
and  the  Manatee,  found  on  the  coast  of  Florida. 

"  The  objects  of  the  greatest  interest  are  the  sculptured  stone  tobacco 
pipes;  the  oldest  known  tobacco  pipes  in  the  world,  most  of  which 
were  found  in  the  same  mound  in  Ohio. 

"  These  pipes  are  unique  in  form,  and  arc  carved  out  of  hard 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN.  151 

ornamental  stone,  in  which  their  bowls  are  hollowed  and  their  tubes 
drilled  with  perfect  skill,  and  the  bowls  themselves  are  sculptured  into 
the  forms  of  birds,  animals,  and  human  heads,  in  a  manner  quite 
unapproachable  by  any  but  civilised  races.  It  is  necessary  to  see  these 
pipes  to  appreciate  the  force  of  their  silent  testimony,  and  in  the 
Salisbury  Museum,  where  they  are  seen  in  contrast  with  the  works  of 
the  present  Indians  and  other  savage  tribes,  the  ^evidence  is  at  once 
conclusive.  They  are  works  of  art  of  a  high  order ;  true  to  nature  and 
exquisite  in  finish.  They  are  the  products  of  taste,  leisure,  and  refine- 
ment in  a.  cultivated  and  prosperous  nation." 

And  yet,  as  he  justly  remarks : — 

"The  North  American  Indians,  when  the  continent  first  became 
known  to  us,  were  typical  savages  in  every  way.  They  were  neither 
the  lowest  nor  the  highest,  nor  were  they  all  alike ;  but  if  'the  modern 
theory  is  true,  they  were  in  one  of  those  stages  of  development  through 
which  all  civilised  nations  must  have  passed  on  their  way  to  something 
h idicr.  Yet  these  Indians,  instead  of  springing  from  some  lower  state 
like  that  of  the  Australians,  are  proved  to  be  the  successors  of  a  people 
in  every  respect  much  higher  than  themselves.  They  are  proved  also  to 
be  their  descendants  as  well  as  their  successors,  because  one  at  least  of 
the  most  striking  customs  of  the  ancient  race  has  been  inherited,  and 
because  it  is  impossible  to  suppose  that  so  numerous  and  cultivated  a 
people  could  themselves  become  extinct,  or  that  they  could  be  extermi- 
nated by  any  immigrant  tribes  in  the  condition  of  the  Indians.  These 
savages,  therefore,  have  reached  their  present  state  by  degradation, 
and  not  by  progress.  Their  rude  arts  are  not  their  own  invention,  but 
are  derived  from  higher  art,  become  barbarous  in  their  hands.  No 
single  custom  found  amongst  them  can  be  identified  as  of  savage  origin, 
for  their  former  customs  were  of  course  those  of  their  more  civilised 
ancestors,  and  it  is  these  as  altered  by  barbarism  that  we  find  among 
them  now. 

"  But  if  tlu's  is  the  case  over  an  entire  continent,  what  becomes  of  the 
idea  that  savage  life  in  general  is  an  example  of  arrested  progress,  and 
not  an  example  of  retrogression  ?  " 

In  deprecation  of  hasty  conclusions  to  the  effect  that  the 
use  of  hieroglyphic  signs  is  an  indication  of  relative  barbarism, 
he  observes : — 

"  But  if  the  letters  MAN  stand  thus  for  the  word  expressing  the 
idea  of  man,  independently  of  their  separate  phonetic  force,  they  have 
no  advantage  over  any  other  symbol  conveying  the  same  meaning. 
Nay,  they  arc  at  a  certain  disadvantage,  because  the  idea  of  man  is  the 
same  thing  to  every  one,  while  the  uttered  sound  expressing  the  idea  is 


152  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VI. 

not  so.  An  Englishman  who  calls  a  roan  a  "  mon  "  might  be  puzzled 
by  the  -written  word  composed  of  letters.  He  could  not  be  puzzled  by 
a  symbol  which  was  independent  of  determinate  sound. 

"An  alphabet  is  a  grand  instrument,  and  its  powers  have  been 
wonderfully  exercised,  but  it  may  well  be  doubted  whether  the  language 
of  thought  cannot  be  even  better  expressed  by  symbols  of  some  other 
kind  ;  and  it  must,  I  think,  be  certain  that  this  will  depend  largely  on 
the  structure  of  the  spoken  language,  and  the  forms  of  thought  which 
have  become  habitual.  Those  astronomical  and  other  symbols  which 
Mr.  Tylor  regards  as  survivals  of  the  rudest  form  of  writing  are 
nevertheless  retained  and  multiplied  by  the  deliberate  choice  of  modern 
science,  for  the  double  reason  that  they  abbreviate  the  record,  and  that 
they  can  be  universally  understood,  whatever  the  spoken  language  of 
the  reader  may  be." 

Another  remark  is  important,  as  it  puts  forcibly  before  us 
the  hasty  conclusions  in  favour  of  barbarism  so  often  found. 
He  says : — 

"  Nor  does  subsequent  ignorance  prove  that  knowledge  has  not  been 
possessed  before.  Of  this  the  discoveries  concerning  ancient  art  con- 
tinually bring  fresh  evidence.  The  glass  from  Assyria  and  the  bronzes 
cast  upon  cores  of  iron  are  striking  examples.  The  latter  is  especially 
important.  It  shows  that  the  use  of  iron  was  well  understood  by  the 
Assyrians,  and  that  the  use  of  bronze  in  ancient  times  was  the  result 
of  choice,  and  not  of  ignoranca  We  might,  I  think,  have  safely 
assumed  this  on  general  grounds,  and  might  thus  have  avoided  much 
misleading  speculation  concerning  a  bronze  age.  Archaeologists  take 
for  granted  far  too  readily  that  if  anything  valued  by  ourselves  was  not 
used  in  former  times,  it  cannot  have  been  known,  without  considering 
what  reasons  besides  mere  want  of  knowledge  may  have  led  to  its 

neglect." 

*  *  *  *  *  .* 

"  We  pick  up  a  sunburnt  brick,  and  treat  it  as  a  proof  of  ignorance 
in  the  makers.  It  may,  on  the  contrary,  be  the  evidence  of  a  most  wise 
economy,  which  utilised  the  sun's  heat  where  it  was  sufficient  for  the 
purpose,  and  where  artificial  heat  could  only  be  applied  at  too  great  a 
cost.  The  makers  of  sunburnt  bricks  in  Assyria  and  Egypt  certainly 
understood  the  use  of  fire  as  well  as  we  do,  and  it  may  be  well  for  us 
if  we  can  turn  the  solar  rays  to  equally  good  account." 

He  adds : — 

"  And  finally,  our  knowledge  of  the  extent  to  which  iron  has  been  used 
in  the  past,  and  of  the  circumstances  under  which  the  art  of  working 
it  may  have  been  lost  in  various  localities,  is  so  limited  by  the  perish- 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN.  153 

able  nature  of  the  metal  that  it  is  never  safe  to  form  positive  opinions 
about  it  from  merely  negative  evidence.  This  has  been  forcibly  illus- 
trated by  the  discoveries  of  ancient  iron-work  in  Assyria,  and  again  by 
the  great  iron  column  found  in  Delhi,  apparently  the  work  of  the 
fourth  century,  a  cast  of  which  has  just  been  placed  in  the  South 
Kensington  Museum.  This  column  is  a  solid  shaft  of  wrought  iron, 
more  than  fifty  feet  long,  and  about  eighteen  inches  in  diameter.  No 
other  piece  of  iron- work  at  all  like  it  has  been  found  in  the  east ;  and 
two  things  are  made  clear  by  its  discovery.  It  shows  that  the  manu- 
facture of  iron  in  large  masses  was  practised  in  India  at  least  two 
thousand  years  ago ;  for  the  art  could  not  be  in  its  infancy  when  this 
column  was  made ;  and  it  also  shows  that  the  old  iron-work  has  dis- 
appeared, leaving  no  tradition  of  its  former  state.  Nothing  of  any 

considerable  size  in  ir^>n  has  been  made  in  India  in  recent  times." 
****** 

"  Observe,  too,  the  special  feature  in  America.  Its  civilisation  once 
lost  was  never  recovered  till  help  came  from  without,  in  the  shape  of 
European  intercourse  and  colonisation.  To  be  isolated  is  plainly  to 
lose  the  power  of  recovery,  and  we  may  well  believe,  from  the  example 
of  Australia  and  equatorial  Africa,  that  the  longer  the  isolation  the 
more  profound  will  bo  the  decay." 

Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  himself  makes  the  following  note- 
worthy admissions.  He  says  of  savages : — *  Mr.  Herbert 

Sheer's. 

"  Probably  most  of  them,  if  not  all  of  them,  had  ancestors  in  higher 
states ;  and  among  their  beliefs  remain  some  which  were  evolved  during 
those  higher  states.  "While  the  degradation  theory,  as  currently  held, 
is  untenable,  the  theory  of  progression,  taken  in  its  unqualified  form, 
seems  to  me  untenable  also.  If,  on  the  one  hand,  the  notion  that 
savagery  is  caused  by  lapse  from  civilisation,  is  irreconcilable  with  the 
evidence ;  there  is,  on  the  other  hand,  inadequate  warrant  for  the  notion 
that  the  lowest  savagery  has  always  been  as  low  as  it  is  now.  It  is 
quite  possible,  and,  I  believe,  highly  probable,  that  retrogression  has 
l>een  as  frequent  as  progression." 

He  also  adds : — f 

"  That  supplanting  of  race  by  race",  and  thrusting  into  corners  such 
inferior  races  as  are  not  exterminated,  which  is  now  going  on  so 
uctively,  and  which  has  been  going  on  from  the  earliest  recorded  times, 
must  have  been  ever  going  on.  And  the  implication  is  that  remnants 
of  inferior  races,  taking  refuge  in  inclement,  barren,  or  otherwise  unfit 
regions,  have  retrograded." 


1  Principles  of  Sociology,'  vol.  i.  p.  10(J.  f  Op.  tit.  p.  109. 

8 


154  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VI 

It  may  well  be  asked,  why  then  does  Mr.  Spencer,  in  the 
teeth  of  evidence,  believe  in  the  primitive  and  original 
bestiality  of  man?  He  does  so  simply  in  consequence  of 
the  exigences  of  the  theory  he  adopts,  but  we,  who  are  bound 
in  the  fetters  of  no  such  theory,  are  at  liberty  to  appreciate 
facts  at  whatever  may  be  their  just  value.  Mr.  Spencer's 
admissions  are,  however,  extremely  important. 

Mr.  Darwin  also  admits  :*  "  The  problem  of  the  first 
Mr.  Dar-  advance  of  savages  towards  civilisation  is  at  pre- 
sent much  too  difficult  to  be  solved."  He  also 
adds  :f  "  Many  nations,  no  doubt,  have  fallen  away  in  civili- 
sation," though  he  doubts  their  falling  into  utter  bar- 
barism. Finally  he  says  4  "  The  inhabitants  of  Tierra  del 
Fuego,  the  Cape  of  Good  Hope,  and  Tasmania,  in  the  one 
hemisphere,  and  of  the  Arctic  regions  in  the  other,  must 
have  passed  through  many  climates  and  changed  their  habits 
many  times."  One  may  well  ask,  why  then  may  they  net 
have  degenerated  ? 

Thus  we  may  be  certain  that  some  savages  have  been 
Degradation  degraded  from  a  higher  level,  and  this  certainty 
establishes  an  a  priori  probability  that  all  have 
been  so.  Such  degradation  would  not,  however,  be  incon- 
sistent with  the  existence  of  a  considerable  amount  of  pro- 
gress in  some  places  side  by  side  with  a  wider  degradation. 
The  New  Zealanders  show  evidence  of  a  possible  degrada- 
tion through  changed  conditions,  as  they  doubtless  at  one 
time  inhabited  a  warmer  clime.  They  show§  this  by  their 
use  of  the  well-known  Polynesian  word  "niu"  (cocoa-nut)  for 
different  kinds  of  divination,  thus  keeping  "up  a  trace  of 
the  time  when  their  ancestors  in  the  tropical  islands  had 
them,  and  divined  by  them." 

How  soon  the  use  even  of  stone  implements  may  be  for- 
gotten is  proved  by  Erman  in  KamskatkaJ  who  got  there 
a  fluted  prism  of  obsidian ;  "  but  though  one  would  have 


*  'Descent  of  Man,'  vol.  i.  p.  167.  t  Op.  cit.  p.  181. 

I  Op.  cit.  p.  136.  §  'Primitive  Culture,'  vol.  i.  p.  73. 

||  '  Researches  into  the  Early  History  of  Mankind,'  p.  207. 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN.  155 

thought  that  the  comparatively  recent  use  of  stone  instru- 
ments in  the  country  would  have  been  still  fresh  in  the 
memory  of  the  people,  the  natives  who  dug  it  up  had  no  idea 
what  it  was."  Again :  "  The  Fuegians*  have  for  centuries  used 
a  higher  method  "  of  making  fire  than  have  the  Patagonians. 
This  habit  looks  very  much  like  the  survival  of  a  higher 
culture  as  to  such  practice  in  the  midst  of  a  wide-spread 
degeneracy.  Such  an  explanation  is  strengthened  by  the 
following  remark  f  about  the  Fuegians :  "  This  art  of  striking 
fire  instead  of  laboriously  producing  it  with  the  drill,  is  not, 
indeed,  the  only  thing  in  which  the  culture  of  this  race 
stands  above  that  of  their  northern  neighbours,"  their  canoes 
also  being  of  superior  quality.  Mr.  Tylor  thinks  that  the 
South  Australians  may  have  learnt  their  art  of  making 
polished  instruments  of  green  jade  from  "some  Malay  or 
Polynesian  source,"  instead  of  its  having  survived  the  wreck 
of  a  higher  culture,  as  the  fire-making  art  of  the  Fuegians 
has  probably  done.  But  such  acquisition  is  a  mere  possi- 
bility, and  experience  shows  us  how  often  such  arts  are  not 
learnt  even  when  we  know  for  certain  that  the  opportunity  of 
learning  them  has  been  offered.  Thus  our  author  remarks^ 
that  the  North  Americans  never  learnt  the  art  of  metal 
work,  &c.,  from  the  Europeans  of  the  tenth  century.  That 
the  belief  in  a  persistence  of  social  conditions  after  death, 
before  referred  to,  may  be  a  degradation,  is  shown  by  the 
spread  of  modern  "  spiritism,"  which  has  widely  propagated 
that  belief  amongst  people  whose  ancestral  creed  taught  a 
very  different  doctrine. 

A  curious  proof  of  degradation  of  one  kind  or  another  is 
exemplified  by  the  ceremonial  purifications  practised  by  the 
Kafirs.  Respecting  such  Mr.  Tylor  remarks  :§  "  It  is  to  be 
noticed  that  these  ceremonial  practices  have  come  to  mean 
something  distinct  from  mere  cleanliness.  Kafirs  who  will 
purify  themselves  from  ceremonial  uncleanness  by  washing, 


*  '  Researches  into  the  Early  History  of  Mankind,'  pp.  245,  24G. 
t  Jlml.  p.  259.  J  Hid.  p.  205. 

§  'Primitive  Culture,'  vol.  ii.  p.  393. 


156  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VI. 

are  not  in  the  habit  of  washing  themselves  or  their  vessels 
for  ordinary  purposes,  and  the  dogs  and  the  cockroaches 
divide  between  them  the  duty  of  cleaning  out  the  milk- 
baskets."  Therefore  here  one  of  two  things  must  be  con- 
ceded. "We  have  either  a  case  of  degradation  and  degenera- 
tion from  earlier  cleanliness,  or  else  there  must  have  been 
an  original  spiritual  meaning  in  certain  primitive  washings 
pointing  to  a  higher  religious  condition  than  that  at  pre- 
sent existing  amongst  those  who  practise  the  ceremonies  in 
question.  Again,  the  legend  of  the  World  Tortoise*  may  be 
but  a  degradation,  and  have  meant,  as  Mr.  Tylor  suggests, 
to  express  the  hemispherical  heavens  overarching  the  flat 
expanded  plain  of  earth. 

Sir  John  Lubbock  presents  to  us  data  which,  in  fact,  alto 
speak  of  degradation  in  a  more  northern  part  of  Africa, 
namely,  amongst  the  Christians  of  Abyssinia.  He  quotes  | 
Bruce  as  saying  that  there  is  "  no  such  thing  as  marriage  in 
Abyssinia,  unless  that  which  is  contracted  by  mutual  consent, 
without  other  form,  subsisting  only  till  dissolved  by  dissent 
of  one  or  other,  and  to  be  renewed  or  repeated  as  often  as  it 
is  agreeable  to  both  parties,  who,  when  they  please,  live  toge- 
ther again  as  man  and  wife,  after  having  been  divorced,  had 
children  by  others,  or  whether  they  have  been  married,  or  had 
children  with  others  or  not.  I  remember  to  have  once  been 
at  Koscam  in  presence  of  the  Iteghe  (the  queen),  when,  in 
the  circle,  there  was  a  woman  of  great  quality,  and  seven  men 
who  had  all  been  her  husbands,  none  of  whom  was  the  happy 
spouse  at  that  time."  }  Sir  John  significantly  couples  with 
this  quotation  another  to  the  effect  that,  for  all  this,  "  there 
is  no  country  in  the  world  where  there  are  so  many  churches."§ 
Now  when  Christianity  was  first  accepted  by  these  Christians 
their  practice  must  have  been  very  different ;  and,  therefore* 
we  have  here  an  unquestionable  case  of  Christian  degeneracy 
parallel  with  but  carried  further  than  the  analogous  religious 


*  '  Rf  searches  into  the  Early  History  of  Mankind,'  p.  333. 

f  '  The  Origin  of  Civilisation,'  p.  57. 

j  '  Brucc's  Travels,'  vol.  iv.  p.  487.  §  Ibid.  vol.  v.  p.  1. 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN.  157 

degeneracy  of  Portugal  and  its  transatlantic  offspring  Brazil 
— a  degeneracy  manifestly  due  to  the  jealousy  felt  by  those 
States  of  the  controlling  action  of  the  Head  of  the  church 
and  consequent  tendency  to  schism.  In  all  these  cases,  then, 
more  or  less  religious  isolation  has  been  the  prelude  to 
degeneracy. 

There  is,  then,  much  reason  to  think  that  degeneracy  may 
have  been  both  great  in  degree  and  widespread  in  its  effects, 
so  as  to  account  by  degradation  for  the  existing  states  of  all 
the  various  tribes  of  savages  which  discovery  has  made  known 
to  us.  But  the  maintenance  of  this  position,  it  may  be  re- 
marked by-the-way,  is  by  no  means  necessary  to  justify  the 
religious  belief  of  even  the  most  orthodox  Christians.  Ortho- 
doxy does  not  by  any  means  necessarily  conflict  with  such  views 
as  those  put  forward  by  Messrs.  Tylor  and  Lubbock.  All  traces 
now,  or  to  be  hereafter,  discovered  of  ancient  man,  may  indi- 
cate ascent  and  progress,  and  all  existing  savages  may  be 
ascending  from  still  lower  levels,  and  yet  the  first  man  may,  not- 
withstanding, have  been  all  that  theology  asserts  that  he  was. 
Nay  more,  his  progeny  may  none  the  less  have  preserved  for 
a  considerable  period  a  high  degree  of  direct,  simple,  moral 
elevation  in  an  age  of  stone,  and  yet  have  been  the  ancestors 
of  races  who  fell  below  the  level  of  any  savages  now  ex- 
isting on  the  earth..  In  theology  Adam  stands  in  a 

&-7  Ailam. 

category  of  his  own,  and  was  actually  all  that  it 
became  him  as  man  to  be,  having  the  full  and  perfect  use 
of  reason  in  the  first  moment  of  his  existence.  But  it  is 
impossible  to  argue  from  Adam  even  to  his  immediate 
descendants,  as  the  difference  between  their  states  is  a  differ- 
ence not  of  degree  but  of  kind.  According  to  the  strictest 
theology,  part  even  of  Adam's  knowledge  was  acquired,  not 
infused,  and,  therefore,  took  time  and  depended  upon  the 
occurrence  of  opportunities.  His  descendants  were  ]ris  dcscc^. 
naturally  in  a  state  of  mere  ignorance,  to  be  re-  ant8' 
moved  only  by  education  either  by  way  of  what  is  technically 
called  disciplina  or  else  by  inventio.  Now  as  regards  their 
degenerate  descendants,  the  Homines  sylvatici,  these  were, 


158  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VI. 

by  the  hypothesis,  in  a  position  which  deprived  them  of  the 
first  of  these  influences,  and  circumstances  might  well  have 
rendered  their  power  of  inventio  inoperative  and  practically 
futile.  Thus  some  might  have  remained  stationary,  or  have 
continued  to  retrograde  till  discovered  by  civilised  man,  while 
others  more  favourably  circumstanced  might  have  again  spon- 
taneously advanced  by  their  own  inventio  and  been  found  by 
discoverers  in  a  positively  ascending  and  improving  condition. 
Nothing,  therefore,  which  ethnology  or  archaeology  can  de- 
monstrate can  conflict  with  Christian  doctrine,  since  the  ques- 
tion concerning  the  mental  condition  of  Adam  is  one  utterly 
beyond  the  reach  of  any  physical  science,  while  any  facts 
which  science  can  prove  concerning  Homo  sylvaticus  will  be 
welcomed  by  theologians  as  tending  to  throw  light  upou 
the  condition  of  his  descendants,  respecting  which  question 
there  is  complete  freedom  of  opinion. 

It  is  physical  science,  not  theology,  which  inclines  me  to 
assign  a  greater  scope  to  degeneration  than  that  assigned  to 
it  by  the  authors  herein  referred  to.  As  has  been  said,  in- 
stances of  degeneration  are  before  our  eyes  to-day  in  Europe, 
and  even  the  periodical  literature  of  our  own  country  is  con- 
tinually giving  vent  to  opinions  (such,  above  all,  as  those  of 
the  Agnostics),  which  have  but  to  spread  predominantly  to 
render  our  degradation  certain. 

France  of  the  Kegency  and  Pagan  Rome  long  ago  demon- 
strated how  easily  the  most  profound  moral  corruption  can 
co-exist  with  the  most  varied  appliances  of  a  complex  civili- 
sation. The  peasants  of  the  Tyrol,  on  the  other  hand,  serve 
equally  well  to  demonstrate  how  pure  and  lofty  a  morality, 
and  how  really  refined  a  mental  civilisation  may  co-exist 
with  very  great  simplicity  in  the  adjuncts  and  instruments  of 
social  life.  We  have  but  to  develop  this  idea  somewhat 
further  to  see  a  family  of  the  stone  age,  clothed  in  a  few 
skins,  ignorant  of  the  sciences,  and  innocent  of  all  but  the 
rudest  art,  yet  possessed  of  a  moral  integrity  but  very  ex- 
ceptionally present  amidst  the  population  of  the  greatest' 
cities  of  modern  days. 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN. 

But  instances  are  easily  to  be  found  of  the  co-existence  of 
moral  excellence  accompanied  by  the  rudest  con-  Rude  people 

*  may  be 

dition  of  life  with  respect  to  the  mere  appliances  ww^ 
of  physical  well-being.  Mr.  Tylor  tells*  us  that  the  wild 
Veddahs  of  Ceylon,  though  extremely  barbarous  as  to  their 
dwellings,  clothing,  and  use  of  the  fire-drill,  "  are  most 
truthful  and  honest,"  and  "  their  monogamy  and  conjugal 
fidelity  contrast  strongly  with  the  opposite  habits  of  the 
more  civilised  Singhalese."  Sir  John  Lubbock  has  collected 
the  following  particulars  respecting  the  social  state  of  the 
Esquimaux,  a  people  so  peculiarly  interesting  to  us  in  this 
inquiry  because  by  some  deemed  to  be  the  last  survivors  of 
an  ancient  miocene  race : — 

"  Captain  Parry  gives  us  the  following  pictures  of  an  Esquimaux 
hut.  '  In  the  few  opportunities  we  had  of  putting  their  hospitality  to 
the  test  we  had  every  reason  to  be  pleased  with  them.  Both  as  to  food 
and  accommodation,  the  best  they  had  were  always  at  our  service ;  and 
their  attention,  both  in  kind  and  degree,  was  everything  that  hospitality 
and  even  good  breeding  could  dictate.  The  kindly  offices  of  drying 
and  mending  our  clothes,  cooking  our  provisions,  and  thawing  snow 
for  cur  drink,  were  performed  by  the  women  with  an  obliging  cheer- 
fulness which  we  shall  not  easily  forget,  and  which  demanded  its  due 
share  of  our  admiration  and  esteem.  While  thus  their  guest  I  have 
passed  an  evening  not  only  with  comfort,  but  with  extreme  gratifica- 
tion ;  for  with  the  women  working  and  singing,  their  husbands  quietly 
mending  their  lines,  the  children  playing  before  the  door  and  the  pot 
boiling  over  the  blaze  of  a  cheerful  lamp,  one  might  well  forget  for  the 
time  that  an  Esquimaux  hut  was  the  scene  of  this  domestic  comfort 
and  tranquillity ;  and  I  can  safely  affirm,  with  Cartwright,  that,  while 
thus  lodged  beneath  their  roof,  I  know  no  people  whom  I  would  more 
confidently  trust,  as  respects  either  my  person  or  my  property,  than 
the  Esquimaux.'  Dr.  Eae,f  who  had  ample  means  of  judging,  tells  us 
that '  the  Eastern  Esquimaux  are  sober,  steady,  and  faithful,  .  .  .  pro- 
vident of  their  own  property  and  careful  of  that  of  others  when  under 
their  charge.  .  .  .  Socially  they  are  lively,  cheerful,  and  chatty  people, 
fond  of  associating  with  each  other  and  with  strangers,  with  whom 
they  soon  become  on  friendly  terms,  if  kindly  treated.  ...  In  their 
domer,tic  relations  they  are  exemplary.  The  man  is  an  obedient  son, 
a  good  husband,  and  a  kind  father.  .  .  .  The  children  when  young  are 


*  '  Primitive  Culture,'  vol.  i.  p.  45. 
f  'Trans.  Eth.  Sue.  18GG,'  p.  138. 


100  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  VI. 

docile.  .  .  .  The  girls  have  their  dolls,  in  making  dresses  and  shoes 
for  which  they  amuse  and  employ  themselves.  The  boys  have  minia- 
ture bows,  arrows,  and  spears When  grown  up  they  are  dutiful 

to  their  parents.  .  .  .  Orphan  children  are  readily  adopted  and  well 
cared  for  until  they  are  able  to  provide  for  themselves/  He  concludes 
by  saying :  '  The  more  I  saw  of  the  Esquimaux  the  higher  was  the 
opinion  I  formed  of  them.5 " — The  Origin  of  Civilisation,  p.  343. 

The  quotations  just  given  bring  us  directly  to  the  explicit 
Third  new  consideration  of  our  fifth  inquiry,  the  answer  to 
munity  of™"  which  has  been  already  so  much  anticipated — that, 
namely,  respecting  the  existence  of  a.  community 
of  nature  amongst  all  the  most  diverse  races  of  mankind. 
Here  again  we  must  carefully  bear  in  mind  the  inaccuracy 
and  the  tendency  to  exaggeration  so  common  with  travellers, 
as  well  as  their  liability  to  be  intentionally  deceived.  Thus 
Mr.  Oldfield  showed  to  some  New  Hollanders  a  drawing  of 
one  of  their  own  people,  which  they  asserted  to  be  intended 
to  represent  not  a  man  but  a  ship  or  a  kangaroo,  or  other 
very  different  object.  Of  this  story  Sir  John  Lubbock 
shrewdly  remarks :  *  "  It  is  not,  however,  quite  clear  to  me 
that  they  were  not  poking  fun  at  Mr.  Oldfield."  A  similar 
explanation  is  probably  available  in  some  other  cases  also. 
The  absence  of  certain  arts  or  customs  in  a  given  area  at  a 
given  early  period,  by  no  means  necessarily  implies  that  they 
had  not  previously  existed.  The  necessity  of  caution  is 
shown  by  the  following  remark  f  of  Sir  John  Lubbock  con- 
cerning the  pictorial  art :  "  It  is  somewhat  remarkable  that 
while  even  in  the  Stone  period  we  find  very  fair  drawings 
of  animals,  yet  in  the  latest  part  of  the  Stone  age, 
and  throughout  that  of  Bronze,  they  are  almost  entirely 
wanting,  and  the  ornamentation  is  confined  to  various  com- 
binations of  straight  and  curved  lines  and  geometrical  pat- 
terns." In  the  two  preceding  pages  the  same  author  relates 
to  us  different  curious  modes  of  salutation ;  but  all  such 
curious  customs  prove  the  essential  similarity  and  rationality 


*  '  Prehistoric  Times,'  p.  428. 

f  '  The  Origin  of  Civilisation,'  p.  25. 


CHAP.VL]  MAN.  161 

of  man,  and  form  no  approximation  to  a  brutal  condition,  in 
which  "  salutation  "  is  unknown.  Sir  John  Lubbock  gives  * 
the  following  as  an  instance  of  remarkable  superstition: 
"  The  natives  near  Sydney  made  it  an  invariable  rule  never 
to  whistle  when  beneath  a  particular  cliff,  because  on  one 
occasion  a  rock  fell  from  it  and  crushed  some  natives  who 
were  whistling  underneath  it."  It  is  not  clear,  however, 
that  this  was  not  rather  a  case  of  prudence,  which  many 
Europeans  would  be  inclined  to  imitate.  Sir  John  Lubbock 
also  quotes  with  approval  from  Mr.  Sproat  the  opinion  that 
the  difference  between  the  savage  and  the  cultivated  mind 
is  merely  between  the  more  or  less  aroused  condition  of  the 
one  and  the  same  mind.  The  quotation  is  made  t  in  reference 
to  the  Ahts  of  North-Western  America :  "  The  native  mind, 
to  an  educated  man,  seems  generally  to  be  asleep ;  and,  if 
you  suddenly  ask  a  novel  question,  you  have  to  repeat  it 
while  the  mind  of  the  savage  is  awakening,  and  to  speak 
with  emphasis  until  he  has  quite  got  your  meaning." 

The  low  arithmetical  power  possessed  by  many  tribes  has 
been  much  spoken  of;  but,  in  fact,  what  is  really  remark- 
able is,  that  this  power,  however  low,  really  exists  in  all.  If 
any  tribe  could  be  found  without  the  conception  "number" 
at  all,  and  therefore  unable  to  count  two,  that  would  indeed 
show  the  existence  of  an  essential  diversity  ;  but  no  one  has 
ventured  to  assert  that  such  a  tribe  has  been  discovered. 
Those  who  have  examined  the  remains  of  our  own  ancestors 
of  the  Bronze  period — their  elaborate  ornaments,  their  cere- 
monial weapons — can  hardly  have  avoided  arriving  at  the 
conclusion  that  the  difference,  between  them  and  the  Eng- 
lishmen of  to-day  can  have  been  but  trifling  in  the  extreme. 
An  absurdly  exaggerated  idea  of  the  special  importance  of 
our  own  social  condition  and  of  the  value  of  the  merely 
material  appliances  of  civilisation  can  alone  induce  an  oppo- 
site conclusion.  It  is  an  analogous  superficiality  which  also 
tends  to  break  down  the  barrier  between  man  and  brute  by 


1  The  Origin  of  Civilisation,'  p.  188.  t  Ibid.  p.  5. 


162  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VI. 

what  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  calls  "  inverted  anthropomor- 
phism ;"  and  with  respect  to  which  some  good  remarks*  are 
made  by  Mr.  Tylor,  who  tells  us : — 

"  Uncivilised  man  deliberately  assigns  to  apes  an  amount  of  human 
quality  which  to  modern  naturalists  is  simply  ridiculous.  Every  ono 
has  heard  the  story  of  the  negroes  declaring  that  apes  can  speak,  but 
judiciously  hold  their  tongues  lest  they  should  be  made  to  work ;  but 
it  is  not  generally  known  that  that  is  found  as  serious  matter  of  belief  in 
several  distant  regions — West  Africa,  Madagascar,  South  America,  &c. 
— where  monkeys  or  apes  are  found.  ...  On  the  other  hand,  popular 
opinion  has  under-estimated  the  man  as  much  as  it  has  over-estimated 
the  monkey.  We  know  how  sailors  and  emigrants  can  look  on  savages 
as  senseless,  ape-like  brutes,  and  how  some  writers  on  anthropology 
have  contrived  to  make  out  of  the  moderate  intellectual  difference 
between  an  Englishman  and  a  negro  something  equivalent  to  the 
immense  interval  between  a  negro  and  a  gorilla.  Thus  we  can  have  no 
difficulty  in  understanding  how  savages  may  seem  mere  apes  to  the 
eyes  of  men  who  hunt  them  like  wild  blasts  in  the  forests,  who  can 
only  hear  in  their  language  a  sort  of  irrational  gurgling  and  barking, 
and  who  fail  totally  to  appreciate  the  real  culture  which  better 
acquaintance  always  shows  among  the  rudest  tribes  of  man." 

Again,  he  adds: — ( 

"  The  sense  of  an  absolute  psychical  distinction  between  man  and 
beast,  so  prevalent  in  the  civilised  world,  is  hardly  to  be  found  among 
the  lower  races." 

Thus  the  view,  so  popular  to-day,  as  to  the  community  of 
nature  between  man  and  brutes  is  really  a  reversion  towards 
savage  thought.  As  to  man,  considered  without  reference  to 
lower  animals,  Mr.  Tylor  declares  himself  very  decidedly  in 
favour  of  the  substantial  community  of  nature  existing  in  the 
most  divergent  human  races.  He  pronounces  $  as  follows : 
"  The  state  of  things  amongst  the  lower  tribes  which  presents 
itself  to  the  student,  is  a  substantial  similarity  in  knowledge, 
arts  and  customs,  running  through  the  whole  world.  Not 
that  the  whole  culture  of  all  tribes  is  alike — far  from  it ;  but 
if  any  art  or  custom  belonging  to  a  low  tribe  is  selected  at 
random,  it  is  twenty  to  one  that  something  substantially  like 

*  '  Primitive  Culture,'  pp.  342,  343.  f  Op.  cit.  vol.  i.  p.  423. 

J  '  Researches  into  the  Early  History  of  Mankind,'  p.  1G9. 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN.  163 

it  may  be  found  in  at  least  one  place  thousands  of  miles  off, 
though  it  very  frequently  happens  that  there  are  large  por- 
tions of  the  earth's  surface  lying  between,  where  it  has  not 
been  observed.  Indeed  there  are  few  things  in  cookery, 
clothing,  arms,  vessels,  boots,  ornaments,  found  in  one  place, 
that  cannot  be  matched  more  or  less  nearly  somewhere  else." 
Kespecting  the  alleged  ignorance  of  fire  in  some  races,  he 
observes : *  "It  is  likely  that  the  American  explorers  may 
have  misinterpreted  the  surprise  of  the  natives  at  seeing 
cigars  smoked,  and  fire  produced  from  flint  and  steel,  as  well 
as  the  eating  of  raw  fish,  and  the  absence  of  signs  of  cooking 
in  the  dwellings."  "Wilkes,  in  the  'Narrative  of  the  United 
States'  Exploring  Expedition'  (1838-42),  has  given  "igno- 
rance of  fire"  as  an  interpretation  of  such  observed  pheno- 
mena ;  and  yet,  as  Mr.  Tylor  remarks,  "  curiously  enough, 
within  the  very  work  particulars  are  given  which  show  that 
fire  was  in  reality  a  familiar  thing  in  the  island !"  It  is 
probable  that  the  same  error  has  occurred  in  other  instances. 

The  last-named  author  even  thinks  f  that  the  Fijians  have 
themselves  invented  an  eating  fork,  and  he  reminds  usj  how 
our  practices  of  stopping  teeth  with  gold  and  dressing  fish  en 
papillotte  have  been  anticipated  by  the  ancient  Egyptians  on 
one  hand,  and  by  the  Australians  (with  bark  for  paper)  on 
the  other. 

But  it  would  be  difficult  to  cite  stronger  testimony  than 
that  given  by  Mr.  Tylor  to  the  community  of  nature  in  dif- 
ferent races  under  the  most  diverse  physical  conditions, 
judging  from  unity  of  products,  gesture,  language,  customs, 
&c.,  although  §  "  We  might  reasonably  expect  that  men  of 
like  minds,  when  placed  under  widely  different  circumstances 
of  country,  climate,  vegetable  and  animal  life,  and  so  forth, 
should  develop  very  various  phenomena  of  civilisation." 

Although  Mr.  Tylor  ventures  "  to  judge  in  a  rough  way 
of  an  early  condition  of  man,  which  from  our"  [hid]  "  point  of 


*   Op.  cit.  p.  231.  t  Op.  cit.  p.  175. 

:  Up.  cit.  p.  173.  §  Op.  cit.  p.  3G2. 


LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAT.  VI: 

view  is  to  be  regarded  as  a  primitive  condition,  whatever  yet 
earlier  state  may  in  reality  have  lain  behind  it,"  he  fully 
admits  that,  as  far  as  research  carries  us,  the  same  human 
characteristics  come  again  and  again  before  us  on  every  hand. 
He  concludes  with  the  following  emphatic  tribute  to  the 
essential  unity  of  man  in  all  ages,  all  climes,  and  all  con- 
ditions : — 

"  The  historian  and  the  ethnographer  must  be  called  upon  to  show 
the  hereditary  standing  of  each  opinion  and  practice,  and  their  inquiry 
must  go  back  as  far  as  antiquity  or  savagery  can  show  a  vestige,  for 
there  seems  no  human  thought  so  primitive  as  to  have  lost  its  bearing 
on  our  own  thought,  nor  so  ancient  as  to  have  broken  its  connection 
with  our  own  life." 

With  these  declarations  we  may  well  rest  contented,  and 
conclude — from  the  absence  of  opposing  evidence,  as  well 
as  from  such  admissions  on  the  part  of  a  witness  whose  bias 
is  in  an  opposite  direction — that  one  common  fundamental 
human  nature  is  present  in  all  the  tribes  and  races  of  men 
(however  contrasted  in  external  appearance)  which  are 
scattered  over  the  whole  surface  of  the  habitable  globe. 

We  are  now  in  a  position  to  draw  our  conclusions  from 
the  foregoing  data,  and  state  the  results  which  the 

Conclusions.  />    TIT       mi  i    n-    •  T    i         Tii        i 

teaching  ot  Mr.  lylor  and  feir  John  Lubbock  seem 
to  force  upon  us.  The  works  referred  to  and  quoted  have 
been,  as  we  said,  selected  for  citation  because  their  authors 
are  not  only  most  justly  esteemed  for  their  information  and 
capability,  not  only  because  they  are  representative  men  in 
ethnology  and  archaeology,  but  also  because  their  bias  is 
favourable  to  the  monistic  view  of  evolution,  and  their  evi- 
dences, and  admissions  made  by  them  which  tell  against 
that  view,  can  be  more  safely  relied  on.  We  have  considered 
facts  brought  forward  by  one  or  other  of  them,  and  judg- 
ments expressed  on  those  facts  with  regard  to  speech,  mo- 
rality, religion,  progress,  and  community  of  nature  in  the 
most  diverse  tribes  of  mankind,  with  a  view  of  discovering 
(1)  whether  any  evidence  can  be  adduced  of  man's  existence 
in  a  brutal  or  irrational  condition  ;  (2)  whether  the  evidence 


CHAP.  VI]  MAN.  165 

points  in  the  direction  of  such  a  condition  in  the  past ;  and 
(3)  whether  any  men  now  exist  less  remote  from  beasts  than 
from  the  highest  individuals  of  mankind.  We  have  found, 
as  regards  language,  not  only  an  essential  agreement  amongst 
all  men,  but  that  even  the  dumb  prove  by  their  gestures 
that  they  are  possessed  of  the  really  important  part  of  the 
faculty  (the  verbum  menfale),  though  accidentally  deprived 
of  the  power  of  giving  it  verbal  expression  (the  verbum 
oris).  As  to  Morals,  we  have  found  that  not  only  are  all 
races  possessed  of  moral  perception,  but  even  that  their 
fundamental  moral  principles  are  not  in  contradiction  with 
our  own. 

Concerning  Religion,  we  have  seen  that  religious  concep- 
tions appear  to  exist  universally  amongst  all  races  of  man- 
kind, though  often  curiously  aborted  or  distorted,  and  often 
tending  to  extreme  degradation  after  periods  during  which 
a  higher  level  had  been  maintained.  ^Respecting  Community 
of  Nature,  we  have  been  able  to  quote  from  Mr.  Tylor  asser- 
tions of  the  most  unequivocal  character.  Finally,  as  to  Pro- 
gress, we  have  found  cause  to  believe  that " Eetrogression  "  may 
have  been  much  greater  and  more  extensive  than  our  authors 
are  disposed  to  admit ;  but  that  however  that  may  be,  and 
even  if  their  views  on  this  subject  are  correct,  as  to  existing 
rarrs,  such  views,  if  established,  would  not  constitute  one  iota 
of  proof  that  the  Christian  doctrines  as  to  man,  his  origin 
and  nature,  are  erroneous. 

From  the  absence  of  any  positive  proof  as  to  a  brutal  con- 
ilition  of  mankind,  and  from  the  absence  of  even  any  tran- 
sitional stage,  a  presumption,  atvthe  least,  arises  that  no  such 
transition  ever  took  place.  This  absence,  also  (there  being 
at  the  same  time  so  much  positive  evidence  of  essential 
community  of  nature  amongst  all  men),  clearly  throws  the 
onus  probandi  on  those  who  assert  the  fact  of  such  transition 
in  the  past.  At  the  least  they  must  show  that  the  asserted 
transition  is  not  only  possible  but  also  probable  ;  and  both 
demonstrations,  I  am  confident,  are  beyond  their  power. 

It  seems,  then,  that  in  the  sciences  we  are  considering, 


166  LESSONS  FBOM  NATURE.  [CiiAr.  VI. 

namely,  ethnology  and  archaeology,  the  most  recent  re- 
searches of  the  most  trustworthy  investigators  show  that  the 
expectations  of  the  supporters  of  the  dualistic  hypothesis  are 
fulfilled,  while  those  of  the  favourers  of  the  monistic  view 
are  disappointed. 

The  final  result  therefore  is  that  ethnology  and  archee- 
ology,  though  incapable  of  deciding  as  to  the  possibility  of 
applying  the  monistic  view  of  evolution  to  man,  yet,  as  far 
as  they  go,  oppose  that  application.  Thus  the  study  of  man 
past  and  present,  by  the  last-mentioned  sciences,  when  used 
as  a  test  of  the  adequacy  of  the  THEOKY  OF  EVOLUTION, 
tends  to  show  (though  the  ultimate  decision,  of  course,  rests 
with  philosophy)  that  it  is  inadequate,  and  that  another 
factor  must  be  introduced  of  which  it  declines  to  take  any 
account — the  action,  namely,  of  a  DIVINE  MIND  as  the  direct 
and  immediate  originator  and  cause  of  the  existence  of  its 
created  image,  the  mind  of  man. 

Such  being  the  result  of  the  inquiry  we  have  undertaken, 
the  assertors  of  man's  dignity  are  clearly  under  no  slight 
obligations  to  Sir  John  Lubbcck  and  Mr.  Tylor  for  their 
patient,  candid,  and  laborious  toil.  But  if  such  is  the  case 
with  regard  to  these  writers,  how  much  greater  must  be  the 
obligation  due  to  that  author  who  has  so  profoundly  in- 
fluenced them,  and  whose  suggestive  writings  have  produced 
so  great  an  effect  on  nineteenth-century  Biology. 

A  deep  debt  of  gratitude  will  indeed  be  one  day  due  to 
Mr.  Darwin — one  difficult  to  over-estimate.  This  sentiment, 
however,  will  be  mainly  due  to  him  for  the  indirect  result 
of  his  labours.  It  will  be  due  to  him  for  his  having,  in  fact, 
become  the  occasion  of  the  reductio  ad  dbsurdum  of  that 
system  which  he  set  out  to  maintain — namely,  the  origin  of 
man  by  natural  selection,  and  the  sufficiency  of  mechanical 
causes  to  account  for  the  harmony,  variety,  beauty,  and 
sweetness  of  that  teeming  world  of  life,  of  which  man  is  the 
observer,  historian,  and  master. 

But  the  study  of  savage  life  has  taught  us  much. 

Our  poor  obscurely  thinking,  roughly  speaking,  childishly 


CIIAP.  VI.]  MAN.  167 

acting,  impulsive  cousin  of  the  wilds,  the  Homo  sylvaticus,  is 
not  a  useless  tenant  of  his  woods  and  plains,  his  rocks  and 
rivers.  His  humble  testimony  is  of  the  highest  value  in 
supporting  the  claims  of  his  most  civilised  brothers  to  a 
higher  than  a  merely  brutal  origin. 

The  religion  of  Abraham  and  Chrysostom,  the  intellect 
of  Aristotle  and  Newton,  the  art  of  Raphael,  of  Shakespeare, 
of  Mozart,  have  their  claims  to  be  no  mere  bestial  develop- 
ments, supported  by  that  testimony.  Through  it  these 
faculties  are  plainly  seen  to  be  different  in  kind  from  com- 
plex entanglements  of  merely  animal  instincts  and  sensible 
impressions.  The  claims  of  man,  as  we  know  him  at  his 
noblest,  to  be  of  a  fundamentally  different  nature  from  the 
beasts  which  perish,  become  reinforced  and  reinvigorated  in 
our  eyes,  when  we  find  the  very  same  moral,  intellectual, 
and  artistic  nature  (though  disguised,  obscured,  and  often 
profoundly  misunderstood)  present  even  in  the  rude,  uncul- 
tured soul  of  the  lowest  of  our  race,  the  poor  savage — Homo 
sylvaticus. 

Having  considered  that  which  is  the  really  essential  ques- 
tion— man's  intellectual  nature — we  may  now  pass 

,  .  .  Man's  body. 

on  to  the  subordinate  question  concerning  pecu- 
liarities of  man's  bodily  frame,  and  the  value  and  significa- 
tion of  the   resemblances  presented   by  it  to  the  various 
.structures  which  are  found  to  exist  in  lower  members  of  the 
animal  kingdom. 

Mr.  Darwin  treats  us  to  a  very  interesting  account,  not 
only  of  man's  anatomy,  but  also  of  the  habits,  diseases,  and 
parasites  (internal  and  external)  of  man,  together  with  the 
process  of  his  development.  He  points  out  (vol.  i.  p.  11) 
not  only  the  close  similarity  even  of  cerebral  structure 
between  man  and  apes,  but  also  how  the  same  animals 
are  "  liable  to  many  of  the  same  diseases  as  we  are ;  thus 
Kengger,  who  carefully  observed  for  a  long  time  the  Cebus 
Azarse  in  its  native  land,  found  it  liable  to  catarrh,  with 
the  usual  symptoms,  and  which,  when  often  recurrent, 
led  to  consumption.  These  monkeys  suffered  also  from 


108  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VI. 

apoplexy,  inflammation  of  the  bowels,  and  cataract  in  the 
eye.  The  younger  ones,  when  shedding  their  milk-teeth, 
often  died  from  fever.  Medicines  produced  the  same  effect 
on  them  as  on  us.  Many  kinds  of  monkeys  have  a  strong 
taste  for  tea,  coffee,  and  spirituous  liquors  ;  they  will  also,  as 
I  have  myself  seen,  smoke  tobacco  with  pleasure."  He  also 
tells  us  of  baboons  which,  after  taking  too  much  beer,  "  on 
the  following  morning  were  very  cross  and  dismal,  held  their 
aching  heads  with  both  hands,  and  wore  a  most  pitiable 
expression:  when  beer  or  wine  was  offered. them  they  turned 
away  with  disgust,  but  relished  the  juice  of  lemons."  He 
also  notices  the  process  of  development  in  man,  with  the 
transitory  resemblances  it  exhibits  to  the  immature  con- 
ditions of  other  animals,  and  he  mentions  certain  muscular 
abnormalities. 

As  to  the  process  of  development : — • 

"  Man  is  developed  from  an  ovule,  about  the  125th  of  an  inch  in 
ins  embry-  diameter,  which  differs  in  no  respect  from  the  ovules  of  other 
•onic  develop-  animals.  The  embryo  itself,  at  a  very  early  period,  can 
hardly  be  distinguished  from  that  of  other  members  of  the 
vertebrate  kingdom.  At  this  period  the  arteries  run  in  arch-like 
branches,  as  if  to  carry  the  blood  to  branchiae,  which  are  not  present 
in  the  higher  vertebrata,  though  the  slits  on  the  sides  of  the  neck 
still  remain  marking  their  former  position.  At  a  somewhat  later 
period,  when  the  extremities  are  developed,  the  feet  of  lizards  and 
mammals,  wings  and  feet  of  birds,  no  less  than  the  hands  and  feet  of 
man,  all  arise  from  the  same  fundamental  form." 

Amongst  other  points  he  adds : — 

"  The  heart  first  exists  as  a  simple  pulsating  vessel ;  the  excreta  are 
voided  through  a  cloacal  passage ;  and  the  os  coccyx  projects  like  a 
true  tail,  extending  considerably  beyond  the  rudimentary  legs." — Vol.  i. 
p.  16. 

Again,  as  to  more  or  less  useless  parts  which  represent 
important  structures  in  lower  animals,  he  says : — 

"  Rudiments  of  various  muscles  have  been  observed  in  many  parts 
of  the  human  body;  and  not  a  few  muscles,  which  are  regularly 
present  in  some  of  the  lower  animals,  can  occasionally  be  detected  in 
man  in  a  greatly  reduced  condition.  Every  one  must  have  noticed  the 


CIIAP.  VI.]  MAN.  169 

power  which  many  animals,  especially  horses,  possess  of  moving  or 
twitching  the  skin;  and  this  is  effected  by  the  panniculus  carnosus. 
Remnants  of  this  muscle  in  an  efficient  state  are  found  in  various  parts 
of  our  bodies ;  for  instance,  on  the  forehead,  by  •which,  the  eyebrows 
are  raised.  The  platysma  myoides,  which  is  well  developed  on  the  neck, 
belongs  to  this  system,  but  cannot  voluntarily  be  brought  into  action. 
Professor  Turner,  of  Edinburgh,  has  occasionally  detected,  as  he 
informs  me,  muscular  fasciculi  in  five  different  situations,  namely,  in 
the  axilte,  near  the  scapulae,  &c.,  all  of  which  must  be  referred  to  the 
system  of  the  panniculus.  He  has  also  shown  that  the  musculus 
sternalis  or  sternalis  Iruforum,  which  is  not  an  extension  of  the  rectus 
abdominalis,  but  is  closely  allied  to  the  panniculus,  occurred  in  the 
proportion  of  about  3  per  cent,  in  upwards  of  600  bodies." — Vol.  i. 
p.  19. 

Mr.  Darwin  brings  forward,  amongst  other  things,  an 
observation  of  Mr.  Woolner,  the  sculptor,  as  to  a  small  pro- 
jection of  the  helix  or  outermost  fold  of  the  human  ear, 
which  projection,  Mr.  Darwin  says,  "  we  may  safely  con- 
clude" to  be  "a  vestige  of  formerly  pointed  ears — which 
occasionally  reappears  in  man"  (vol.  i.  p.  23).  Very  many 
other  interesting  points  are  noted  which  it  would  be  super- 
fluous here  to  recapitulate. 

It  would  be  superfluous  because,  however  anatomically 
interesting,  they  are  really  beside  the  question.  Super.. 
They  may,  indeed,  and  they  probably  will  produce  M^iSwfn's 
a  considerable  effect  on  readers  who  are  not  anato-  ["we^uV11 
mists,  but  in  fact  the  whole  and  sole  result  is  to  Jecls' 
show  that  man  is  an  animal.  That  he  is  such  is  denied  by 
DO  one,  but  has  been  taught  and  accepted  since  the  time 
of  Aristotle.  I  remember  on  one  occasion  meeting  at  a 
dinner-table  a  clever  medical  onan  of  materialistic  views. 
He  strongly  impressed  the  minds  of  some  laymen  present 
by  an  elaborate  statement  of  the  mental  phenomena  follow- 
ing upon  different  injuries,  or  abnormal  or  diseased  conditions 
of  different  parts  of  the  brain,  until  one  of  the  number  re- 
marked as  a  climax,  "Yes;  and  when  the  brain  is  entirely 
removed,  the  mental  phenomena  cease  altogether" — the 
previous  observations  having  only  brought  out  vividly  what 
no  one  denied,  viz.,  that  during  this  life  a  certain  integrity 


170  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VI. 

* 

of  bodily  structure  is  requisite  for  the  due  exercise  of  the 
mental  powers.  Thus  Mr.  Darwin's  remarks  are  merely  an 
elaborate  statement  of  what  all  admit — namely,  that  man  is 
an  animal,  coupled  with  a  sort  of  implied  assertion  that 
he  is  no  more,  and  that  the  mode  of  origin  of  his  visible 
being  must  be  the  mode  of  his  origin  as  a  whole — a  conclusion 
of  which  I  should  not  question  the  legitimacy  if  I  could 
accept  Mr.  Darwin's  views  of  man's  mental  powers. 

But,  once  more,  it  is  conceded  on  all  hands  that  man  is 
Necessary  an  animal,  though  a  rational  one.  Let  us  then 
dMoSirofCon"  assume,  for  argument's  sake,  that  he  was  suddenly 
ttoMHtyaas  and  miraculously  created.  How  far  do  any  of  the 
ure<  facts  as  to  his  structure  or  development  from  the 
embryonic  condition  conflict  with  such  a  view  ?  What,  from 
such  an  origin,  ought  we  to  expect  ? 

If  man,  that  is,  if  a  rational  animal,  was  to  be  created  at 
all,  he  must  have  been  made  more  or  less  like  some  other 
animal;  and  for  the  exercise  of  rationality  in  a  corporeal 
frame  he  must  have  had  a  body  capable  of  expressing  the 
unspoken  word  of  thought  (the  verbum  mentale)  by  con- 
venient external  signs  of  the  requisite  multitudinous  variety. 
Moreover,  since  in  a  rational  animal  the  exercise  of  the 
intellect  must  depend  on  sensations  prodigious  in  number 
and  most  complexly  associated,  such  an  animal  must  pos- 
sess a  voluminous  nervous  system,  with  the  most  complex 
inter-relations  between  its  different  parts. 

Man,  then,  could  hardly  have  been  made  a  member  of  any 
of  the  invertebrate  classes.  For  similar  reasons,  we  may  fairly 
conclude  that  he*  could  not  have  been  made  a  member  of  the 
cold-blooded  division  of  the  vertebrata — reptiles  and  fishes; 
nor,  considering  the  restricted  utility  of  birds'  pectoral  limbs 
(their  wings),  could  his  intellectual  activity  have  been  fittingly 
housed  within  the  body  of  any  kind  of  bird.  "VVe  are  reduced, 
then,  to  the  class  mammalia  as  the  only  one  affording  a  type 
of  animal  structure  available  to  minister  to  a  reflective,  self- 
conscious  nature.  Amongst  mammals,  the  whole  group  of 
marine  forms  (whales,  porpoises,  seals)  and  that  of  hoofed  beasts 


CHAP.  VI]  MAN.  171 

may  be  similarly  excluded,  as  also  those  in  which  the  cerebral 
structure  is  of  manifest  inferiority.  There  remains,  then, 
only  the  carnivorous,  or  flesh-eating  brutes  (lions,  bears, 
wolves,  &c.)  to  compete  with  the  order  of  apes  and  lemurs 
for  the  dignity  of  furnishing  the  type  of  the  animal  rationale. 
The  manifest  superiority  for  such  a  purpose  of  the  latter 
group  over  the  carnivora  must  be  manifest  to  any  one  who 
considers  the  subject.  Then  we  are  landed  at  once  in  the 
order  Primates. 

But  which  forms  of  that  order  might  we  expect  the  rational 
animal  to  resemble  ?  Surely  not  those  which  by  their  small 
cerebral  development  as  well  as  by  a  variety  of  other  charac- 
ters manifest  their  close  affinity  to  groups  which  we  have 
found  reason  to  reject.  One  almost  necessary  character  for 
the  animal  in  question,  namely,  an  upright  posture,  to  set  one 
pair  of  limbs  free  to  minister  to  the  teeming  brain,  at  once 
determines  that  he  shall  resemble  those  apes  which  approxi- 
mate towards  a  vertical  attitude  ;  in  other  words,  that  he  shall 


resemble  what  we   call  an   anthropoid  ape.     But  Man' 

-,  -.  ,  i  i  •  i  blance  to 

though  man  does  resemble  such  anthropoid  apes  apes. 
more  closely  than  such  apes  resemble  the  lowest  forms  of  the 
order,  and  though  his  zoological  rank  is  merely  that  of  a 
family,  nevertheless  he  does  not  predominantly  resemble  any 
one  of  them.  Thus  some  of  the  lower  apes  resemble  man 
more  than  they  do  the  anthropoid  ones  in  the  length  of  the 
arm  and  hand  compared  with  that  of  the  spine  ;  while  in  the 
length  of  the  leg  without  the  foot,  compared  with  that  of  the 
arm  without  the  hand,  he  is  equalled  only  by  certain  lemurs. 
The  baboons  (the  lowest  of  the  group  of  apes  of  that  family 
which  stands  next  to  man)  exceed  all  the  higher  apes  in 
resemblance  to  man,  in  the  sigmoid  curvature  of  the  spine  ; 
in  the  angle  formed  by  the  sacrum  with  the  spine  ;  in  the  con- 
cuvity  of  the  visceral  surface  of  the  sacrum  ;  in  the  convexity 
of  the  bones  of  the  nose  ;  in  the  development  of  the  styloid 
process  ;  in  the  transverse  breadth  of  the  pelvis  compared 
with  its  depth  ;  in  the  greater  descent  of  the  inner  condyle 
of  the  thigh-bone  ;  in  the  length  of  the  foot  compared  with 


172  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  VI. 

that  of  the  backbone,  and  in  the  angle  formed  by  the  axis  of 
the  cranium  with  the  axis  of  the  face. 

Some  or  other  even  of  the  monkeys  of  the  New  World 
resemble  man  more  than  the  monkeys  of  the  Old  World 
(which  in  general  are  more  like  him)  in  the  following  cha- 
racters : — (1)  No  ischial  callosities  ;  (2)  no  cheek-pouches  ; 
(3)  copious  beard  and  whiskers  (SaJcis)  ;  (4)  hair  of  arms  di- 
rected as  in  man ;  (5)  cranium  more  rounded ;  (6)  cranium 
higher;  (7)  face  relatively  smaller;  (8)  foramen  magnum 
situate  more  forwardly ;  (9)  the  length  of  the  thumb  com- 
pared with  that  of  the  hand  (Marmosets}  ;  (10)  the  length  of 
the  thigh-bone  compared  with  that  of  the  backbone  (spider- 
monkeys)  ;  (11)  the  greater  descent  of  the  inner  condyle  of 
the  femur  (spider-monkeys)  ;  (12)  the  length  of  the  shin- 
bone  compared  with  that  of  the  femur  (spider-monkeys) ; 
(13)  the  length  of  the  hallux  compared  with  that  of  the 
spine  (SaJcis) ;  (14)  the  presence  of  the  bridging  convolu- 
tions (spider-monkeys);  (15)  the  very  overlapping  cerebrum 
(squirrel-monkeys)  ;  (16)  the  oblique  ridge  on  the  upper 
grinders  (howling  monkeys). 

The  half-apes  (Lemuroidea)  differ,  as  before  said,  from  both 
man  and  true  apes  in  points  so  numerous  and  so  significant 
that  there"  can  be  no  question  as  to  their  great  inferiority 
and  the  vast  chasm  which  exists  between  the  two  sub-orders. 

Nevertheless,  we  find  amongst  the  half-apes  certain  cha- 
racters which,  resemble  those  of  man  more  than  do  most, 
sometimes  even  more  than  do  any,  of  the  characters  exhibited 
by  the  true  apes. 

Thus  the  typical  lemurs  and  the  indris  have  a  more  com- 
pletely opposable  and  better-developed  thumb  than  any  ape. 
In  the  slender  loris  we  find  an  absence  of  the  extra-inter- 
locking processes  (metapophyses  and  anapophyses)  of  the 
backbone,  the  spinous  processes  of  which  do  not  converge 
(fore  and  aft)  towards  a  central  point ;  the  pisiform  bone  of 
the  wrist  is  smaller  than  in  any  ape ;  the  proportion  borne 
by  the  thumb  to  the  hand  in  length  is  more  human,  as  is  the 
form  assumed  by  the  ischium,  and  the  relative  size  of  the 


CHAP.  VI.  j  MAN.  173 

foot  compared  with  the  leg.  In  the  Indrisinse  and  in  Lepi- 
lemur  we  find  but  eight  carpal  bones  (a  character  found  in 
no  other  Primates  save  man,  the  chimpanzee  and  the  go- 
rilla), and  the  most  human  proportional  length  of  both  the 
thumb  and  the  index  finger  compared  with  the  length  of  the 
spine.  We  also  find  in  the  short-tailed  indris  the  length  of 
the  femur  compared  with  that  of  the  haunch-bone  most 
human,  as  also  the  length  of  the  foot  compared  with  that  of 
the  hand,  and  the  near  approach  made  by  the  length  of  the 
"  great  toe  "  to  the  actually  longest  toe  of  the  foot.  In  the 
typical  genus  Lemur  we  find  the  proportion  (in  length)  of 
thigh-bone  to  the  upper  arm-bone  most  human,  as  well  as 
that  of  the  longest  toe  to  the  backbone. 

In  the  slow  lemur  (Nycticebus),  the  length  of  the  shin-bone 
bears  a  relation  to  that  of  the  thigh-bone  more  human  than 
in  any  other  species  below  man ;  while  in  other  kinds  of 
half-apes  we  meet  with  a  development  of  the  anterior  inferior 
spinous  process  of  the  ilium  more  like  that  of  man  than  we 
find  in  any  ape ;  also  upper  grinding  teeth  furnished  with 
an  "  oblique  ridge "  as  in  man,  and  sometimes  an  almost 
equality  of  vertical  development  in  the  teeth,  and  even  an 
absence  of  any  interspace  between  them  or  diastema. 

Having  noted  some  of  the  structural  resemblances  and 
differences  presented  by  the  different  forms  of  Primates,  we 
may  now  consider  and  appraise  their  value,  as  bearing  upon 
the  question  of  the  "  origin  of  species,"  and  especially  upon 
the  asserted  "  descent  of  man  "  from  some  "  non-human"  ape 
ancestor.  The  question,  that  is,  as  to  man's  body ;  for  as  to 
the  totality  of  his  nature  no  mere  anatomical  examinations 
will  enable  us  to  decide — that  is  the  task  of  psychology  and 
philosophy  generally. 

In  the  first  place,  it  is  manifest  that  man,  the  apes,  and  the 
half-apes  cannot  be  arranged  in  a  single  ascending  series,  of 
which  man  is  the  term  and  culmination. 

We  may,  indeed,  by  selecting  one  organ  or  one  set  of  parts, 
and  confining  our  attention  to  it,  arrange  the  different  forms 
in  a  more  or  less  simple  manner.  But  if  all  the  organs  bo 


174  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CiiAP.  VI. 

taken  into  account,  the  cross  relations  and  interdependences 
become  in  the  highest  degree  complex  and  difficult  to 
unravel. 

This  has  been  more  or  less  generally  recognised ;  but  it 
has  been  distinctly  put  forward  by  Mr.  Darwin,  and  widely 
accepted,  that  the  resemblances  between  man  and  apes  are 
such  that  man  may  be  conceived  to  have  descended  from 
some  ancient-  members  of  the  broad-breastboned  group  of 
apes,  and  the  gorilla  is  still  popularly  credited  with  the 
closest  relationship  to  him  which  is  to  be  found  in  all  existing 
apes. 

As  to  the  latter  opinion,  evidence  has  elsewhere  been 
adduced*  to  show  that  it  is  quite  untenable. 

As  to  Mr.  Darwin's  proposition,  much  remains  to  be  said. 
But  it  is  certainly  true  that,  on  the  whole,  the  anatomical 
characters  of  man's  body  have  much  more  resemblance  to 
those  common  to  the  latisternal  group  than  to  those  presented 
by  any  other  section  of  the  order  Primates. 

But,  in  the  first  place,  we  should  consider  what  evidence  of 
common  origin  does  community  of  structure  afford  ? 

The  human  structural  characters  are  shared  by  so  many 
and  such  diverse  forms,  that  it  is  impossible  to  arrange  even 
groups  of  genera  in  a  single  ascending  series  from  the 
aye-aye  to  man  (to  say  nothing  of  so  arranging  the  several 
single  genera),  if  all  the  structural  resemblances  are  taken 
into  account. 

On  any  conceivable  hypothesis  there  are  many  similar 
structures,  each  of  which  must  be  deemed  to  have  been  inde- 
pendently evolved  in  more  than  one  instance. 

If  the  number  of  wrist-bones  be  deemed  a  special  mark  of 
affinity  between  the  gorilla,  chimpanzee,  and  man,  why  are 
we  not  to  consider  it  also  a  special  mark  of  affinity  between 
the  indris  and  man  ?  That  it  should  be  so  considered,  how- 
ever, would  bo  deemed  an  absurdity  by  every  evolutionist. 

If  the  proportions  of  the  arms  speak  in  favour  of  tire  chiin- 


*  See  'Man  and  Apes:'  Hardwickc,  1873, 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN.  175 

panzee,  why  do  not  the  proportions  of  the  legs  serve  to 
promote  the  rank  of  the  gibbons  ? 

If  the  "  bridging  convolutions  "  of  the  orang  go  to  sustain 
its  claim  to  supremacy,  they  also  go  far  to  sustain  a  similar 
claim  on  the  part  of  the  long-tailed,  thumbless  spider- 
monkeys. 

If  the  obliquely-ridged  teeth  of  Simia  and  Troglodytes  point 
to  community  of  origin,  how  can  we  deny  a  similar  commu- 
nity of  origin,  as  thus  estimated,  to  the  howling  monkeys  and 
galagos  ? 

The  liver  of  the  gibbons  proclaims  them  almost  human ; 
that  of  the  gorilla  declares  him  comparatively  brutal. 

The  ear-lobule  of  the  gorilla  makes  him  our  cousin  ;  but 
his  tongue  is  eloquent  in  his  own  dispraise. 

The  slender  loris,  from  amidst  the  half-apes,  can  put  in 
many  a  claim  to  be  our  shadow  refracted,  as  it  were,  through 
a  lemurine  prism.  • 

The  lower  American  apes  meet  us  with  what  seems  "  the 
front  of  Jove  himself,"  compared  with  the  gigantic,  but  low- 
browed denizens  of  tropical  Western  Africa. 

In  fact,  in  the  words  of  the  illustrious  Dutch  naturalists, 
Messrs.  Schroeder,  Van  dcr  Kolk,  and  Vrolik,  the  lines  of 
ufh'nity  existing  between  different  Primates  construct  rather 
a  network  than  a  ladder. 

It  is  indeed  a  tangled  web,  the  meshes  of  which  no  natu- 
ralist has  as  yet  unravelled  by  the  aid  of  natural  selection. 
Nay,  more,  these  complex  affinities  form  such  a  net  for  the 
use  of  the  teleological  retiarius  as  it  will  be  difficult  for  his 
Lucretian  antagonist  to  evade,  even  with  the  countless  turns 
and  doublings  of  Darwinian  evolutions. 

But  it  may  be  replied,  the  spontaneous  and  independent 
;;ppearance  of  these  similar  structures  is  due  to  "  atavism  " 
and  "reversion" — to  the  reappearance,  that  is,  in  modern 
descendants,  of  ancient  and  sometimes  long-lost  structural 
characters,  which  formerly  existed  in  more  or  less  remote 
hypothetical  ancestors. 

Lot  us  see  to  what  this  reply  brings  us.     If  it  is  true,  and 


176  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [Ciui>.  YI. 

if  man  and  the  orang  are  diverging- descendants  of  a  creature 
with  certain  cerebral  characters,  then  that  remote  ancestor 
must  also  have  had  the  wrist  of  the  chimpanzee,  the  voice  of 
a  long-urmed  ape,  the  blade-bone  of  the  gorilla,  the  chin  of 
the  siamang,  the  skull-dome  of  an  American  ape,  the  ischium 
of  a  slender  loris,  the  whiskers  and  beard  of  a  saki,  the  liver 
and  stomach  of  the  gibbous,  and  the  number  of  othei  cha- 
racters in  which  the  various  several  forms  of  higher  or  lower 
Primates  respectively  approximate  to  man. 

But  to  assert  this  is  as  much  as  to  say  that  low  down  in  the 
scale  of  Primates  was  an  ancestral  form  so  like  man  that  it 
might  well  be  called  an  liomuneulus  ;  and  we  have  the  virtual 
pre-existence  of  man's  body  supposed,  in  order  to  account 
for  the  actual  first  appearance  of  that  body  as  we  know  it 
— a  supposition  manifestly  absurd  if  put  forward  as  an 
explanation. 

The  question,  however,  regarding  development  may  be 
Astode-  thought  by  some  to  be  more  important  and  sig- 
•ciopment.  nj£can^  than  adult  structure.  But  here  again  we 
have  but  to  look  facts  boldly  in  the  face  and  fearlessly  to 
consider  the  possibilities  of  the  case.  The  body  of  each  man 
born,  must,  to  resemble  an  animal  at  all,  originate  by  a  germ 
and  embryo  of  some  kind.  For  this  is  the  law  not  only 
of  all  animals  but  even  of  all  plants  also.* 

Now  let  us  suppose  that  the  embryo  of  man,  instead  of 
taking  that  course  of  development  which  is  the  law  of  the 
class  to  which  he  belongs,  assumed  at  once  the  miniature 
form  and  proportions  of  the  adult  body.  Would  this  be  any 
proof  of  miraculous  origin,  or  that  man's  original  appearance 
was  due  to  another  operation  than  in  the  case  of  other 
animals?  Certainly  not,  for  it  would  be  easy  for  the 
naturalist  to  point  to  many  of  the  lower  animals  in  which 
such  a  direct  building  up  of  the  adult  form  takes  place. 

But  it  is  surely  natural  and  congruous  that  if  an  animal 
of  the  class  mammalia  was  to  be  formed  and  endowed  with 


We  are  not  hero  considering  the  question  of  spontaneous  generation. 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN.  177 

reason,  such  a  being  should  be  made  to  conform  to  the 
universal  laws  of  its  class,  and  that  not  only  in  the  adult 
condition  of  the  body  but  also  in  its  mode  of  attaining  to 
that  adult  condition. 

Similarly  as  regards  disease,  effects  of  stimulants,  nar- 
cotics, &c.,  the  facts  given  by  Mr.  Darwin  are  simply  the 
consequences  of  the  minute  structure  and  conditions  of  the 
tissues  and  a  similarity  in  animal  nature  and  constitution. 
If  man  could  freely  imbibe  prussic  acid  without  harm  result- 
ing to  his  frame,  or  could  receive  with  impunity  the  venom 
of  the  rattlesnake,  he  would  have  rather  the  mere  appear- 
ance only  of  an  animal  instead  of  having  the  nature  of  one 
in  all  its  fulness  and  reality.  All  the  more  or  less  curious 
facts  cited  by  Mr.  Darwin  follow  necessarily  from  this  prin- 
ciple, calculated  as  they  may  be  to  strike  at  first  the  imagi- 
nation of  the  unreflecting. 

All  that  can  be  said  to  be  established  by  our  author  is, 
that  if  the  various  kinds  of  lower  animals  have  been  evolved 
one  from  the  other  by  a  process  of  natural  generation  or 
evolution,  that  then  it  becomes  highly  probable  a  priori 
that  man's  body  has  been  similarly  evolved ;  but  this,  in 
such  a  case,  becomes  equally  probable  from  the  admitted 
fact  that  he  is  an  animal  at  all. 

It,  however,  only  amounts  to  an  a  priori  probability,  and 
might  be  reconciled  with  another  mode  of  origin  if 
there  were  sufficient  evidence  (of  another  kind)  in 
support  of  such  other  mode  of  origin.  Mr.  Darwin  ongult 
says: — "It  is  only  our  natural  prejudice/  and  that  arro- 
gance which  made  our  forefathers  declare  that  they  were 
descended  from  demigods,  which  leads  us  to  demur  to  this 
conclusion"  (vol.  i.  p.  32).  But  this  is  not  the  case;  for 
many  demur  to  his  conclusion  because  they  believe  that  to 
accept  his  view  would  be  to  contradict  other  truths  which 
to  them  are  far  more  evident. 

He  also  makes  the  startling  assertion  that  to  take  any 
other  view  than  his  as  to  man's  origin,  "is  to  admit  that  our 
own  structure  a^id  that  of  all  the  animals  around  us,  is  a 
9 


178  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  VI. 

mere  snare  laid  to  entrap  our  judgment"  (vol.  i.  p.  32). 
Mr.  Darwin  is,  I  am  quite  sure,  far  enough  from  pretend- 
ing that  he  has  exhausted  the  possibilities  of  the  case,  and 
yet  could  anything  but  a  conviction  that  the  whole  field  had 
been  explored  exhaustively,  justify  such  an  assertion?  If, 
without  such  a  conviction,  it  was  permissible  so  to  dogma- 
tise, every  theoriser  who  had  attained  to  a  plausible  expla- 
nation of  a  set  of  phenomena  might  equally  make  use  of 
the  assertion,  and  say,  until  a  better  explanation  was  found, 
that  to  doubt  him  would  be  to  attribute  duplicity  to  the 
Almighty. 

Some  of  the  instances  that  Mr.  Dar\\in  gives  of  reversion 
Mistakes  as  to  brutal  ancestry  are  quite  gratuitous.  Of  the 
to  reversion.  occasionai  double  uterus  of  the  human  female  he 


"  In  other  and  rarer  cases,  two  distinct  uterine  cavities  are  formed, 
each  having  its  proper  orifice  and  passage.  No  such  stage  is  passed 
through  during  the  ordinary  development  of  the  embryo,  and  it  is 
difficult  to  believe,  though  perhaps  not  impossible,  that  the  two  simple, 
minute,  primitive  tubes  could  know  how  (if  such  an  expression  may  be 
used)  to  grow  into  two  distinct  uteri,  each  with  a  well-constructed 
orifice  and  passage,  and  each  furnished  with  numerous  muscles, 
nerves,  glands  and  vessels,  if  they  had  not  formerly  passed  through  a 
similar  course  of  development,  as  in  the  case  of  existing  marsupials. 
No  one  will  pretend  that  so  perfect  a  structure  as  the  abnormal  double 
uterus  in  woman  could  be  the  result  of  mere  chance.  But  the  principle 
of  reversion,  by  which  long -lost  dormant  structures  are  called  back 
into  existence,  might  serve  as  the  guide  for  the  full  development  of  the 
organ,  even  after  the  lapse  of  an  enormous  interval  of  time." — Vol.  i. 
page  123. 

But  if  this  were  really  a  reversion  to  marsupial  structure, 
we  ought  surely  more  often  to  meet  with  reversion  to  the 
characters  of  animals  much  less  removed  in  time  (on  Mr. 
Darwin's  theory)  than  are  the  Marsupialia.  We  ought,  that 
is,  to  meet  with,  for  example,  a  long  tail,  or  a  prehensile 
hallux,  or  tusk-like  canine  teeth,  or  a  completely  hairy  back, 
far  more  often  than  we  do  a  completely  double  uterus.  Yet 
such  is  by  no  means  the  case.  As  to  the  fancy  concerning 
the  inability  of  an  organ  to  form  itself  de  novo,  Mr.  Darwin 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN.  179 

may  be  refuted  from  his  own  notes  on  the  very  next  page, 
where  \ve  read  that  he  was  at  first  similarly  disposed  to 
attribute  the  development  of  abnormal,  erratic  mammary 
glands  (breasts  placed  in  unusual  parts  of  the  body)  to 
reversion,  but  from  observations  of  Professor  Preyer  as  to 
the  appearance  of  such  structures  on  the  lack  leads  our 
author  to  candidly  admit  that  his  "argument  is  greatly 
weakened  or  perhaps  quite  destroyed." 

The  same  power  which  could  produce  so  complex  a  struc- 
ture as  a  mammary  gland,  in  a  situation  which  showed  that 
it  was  not  due  to  reversion,  could  also  produce  the  con- 
ditions of  a  completely  divided  and  double  uterus. 

In  attempting  to  trace  man's  origin  Mr.  Darwin  has  even 
been  betrayed  into  slight  inaccuracies.     Thus,  in  other  mis- 
combating  the  position,  advanced  in   the   *  Quar-  takes- 
terly  Eeview,'*  that  the  hands  of  apes  had  been  preformed 
(with  a  view  to  man)  in  a  condition  of  perfection  beyond 
their  needs,  he  says : — 

"  On  the  contrary,  I  see  no  reason  to  doubt  that  a  more  perfectly 
constructed  hand  would  have  been  an  advantage  to  them,  provided, 
and  it  is  important  to  note  this,  that  their  hands  had  not  thus  been 
rendered  less  well  adapted  for  climbing  trees.  We  may  suspect  that  a 
perfect  hand  would  have  been  disadvantageous  for  climbing;  as  the 
most  arboreal  monkeys  in  the  world,  namely,  Ateles  in  America  and 
Hylobates  in  Asia,  either  have  their  thumbs  much  reduced  in  size  and 
even  rudimentary,  or  their  fingers  partially  coherent,  so  that  their 
hands  are  converted  into  grasping-hooks." — Vol.  i.  p.  140. 

In  a  note,  Mr.  Darwin  refers  to  the  Sindactyle  Gibbon  as 
having  two  of  the  digits  coherent.  But  these  digits  are  not, 
as  he  supposes,  digits  of  the<  hand  but  toes.  Moreover, 
though  doubtless  the  Gibbon  and  spider-monkeys  are  ad- 
mirably organised  for  their  needs,  yet  it  is  plain  that  a 
well-developed  thumb  is  no  impediment  to  climbing,  for 
the  strictly  arboreal  Lemurs  are  exceedingly  well  furnished 
in  this  respect. 

We  shall  see  later  t  that  Mr.  Darwin  tries  to  account  for 


*  See  '  Quarterly  Review,'  April  18G9,  p.  392. 
f  See  infra  the  chapter  on  sexual  selection. 


180  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VI. 

man's  hairlessness  by  the  help  of  "sexual  selection."  He 
also,  however,  speculates  as  to  the  possibility  of  his  having 
lost  it  through  heat  of  climate,  saying : — "  Elephants  and 
rhinoceroses  are  almost  hairless;  and  as  certain  extinct 
species  which  formerly  lived  under  an  arctic  climate  were 
covered  with  long  wool  or  hair,  it  would  almost  appear  as 
if  the  existing  species  of  both  genera  had  lost  their  hairy 
covering  from  exposure  to  heat"  (vol.  i.  p.  148). 

This  affords  us  a  good  example  of  hasty  and  inconclusive 
speculation.  Surely  it  would  be  quite  as  rational  to  suppose 
that  the  arctic  species  had  gained  their  coats  as  that  the 
tropical  species  had  lost  theirs.  But  hasty  conclusions  are 
but  too  frequent  in  Mr.  Darwin's  speculations  as  to  man's 
genealogy — which  he  calls  his  "  descent,"  though  "  ascent  " 
would  be  a  far  more  appropriate  term. 

In  fact,  Mr.  Darwin's  power  of  reasoning  seems  to  be 
in  an  inverse  ratio  to  his  power  of  observation.  On  the 
whole,  we  are  convinced  that,  by  his  '  Descent  of  Man,'  the 
cause  of  "  Natural  Selection  "  has  been  rather  injured  than 
promoted ;  and  I  must  confess  to  a  feeling  of  surprise  that 
the  case  put  before  us  is  not  stronger,  since  we  had  anticipated 
some  telling  and  significant  facts  from  Mr.  Darwin's  biolo- 
gical treasure-house. 

A  great  part  of  the  work  may  be  dismissed  as  beside  the 
point — as  a  mere  elaborate  and  profuse  statement  of  the 
obvious  fact,  which  no  one  denies,  that  man  is  an  animal, 
and  has  all  the  essential  properties  of  a  highly  organised 
one.  Along  with  this  truth,  however,  we  find  the  assump- 
tion that  he  is  no  more  than  an  animal — an  assumption 
which  is  necessarily  implied  in  Mr.  Darwin's  distinct  asser- 
tion that  there  is  no  difference  of  Jcind,  but  merely  one  of 
degree,  between  man's  mental  faculties  and  those  of  brutes. 

I  have  endeavoured  to  show  that  this  is  distinctly  untrue ; 
that  not  only  we  are  not  compelled,  but  that  it  is  our 
duty,  not  to  abandon  the  received  position  that  man  is  an 
animal  indeed,  but  the  only  rational  one  known  to  us,  and 
that  this  is  a  distinction  in  kind,  and  fundamental.  The 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN.  181 

estimate  I  have  formed  of  man's  position  differs  therefore 
most  widely  from  that  of  Mr.  Darwin. 

Mr.  Darwin  says  :*  "  We  must  admit  that  there  is  a  much 
\\  ider  interval  in  mental  power  between  one  of  the  lowest 
fishes,  as  a  lamprey  or  a  lancelet,  and  one  of  the  higher  apes, 
than  between  an  ape  and  man ;  yet  this  immense  interval  is 
filled  up  by  numberless  gradations."  This  I  cannot  admit, 
since  I  believe  the  assertion  to  be  absolutely  false.  In 
my  view  the  "  immense  interval "  is  between  the  ape  and 
the  man. 

Mr.  Darwin  supports  his  view  by  the  analogy  of  certain 
insects  which,  though  zoologically  allied,  differ  Mr.  Darwin's 

.        .'         ,        .j         .  „,...  remarksasto 

enormously  in  the  development  of  their  instincts,  insects. 
He  says : — 

"  Some  naturalists,  from  being  deeply  impressed  with  the  mental 
and  spiritual  power  of  man,  have  divided  the  whole  organic  world 
into  three  kingdoms,  the  Human,  the  Animal,  and  the  Vegetable,  thus 
giving  to  man  a  separate  kingdom.  Spiritual  powers  cannot  be  com- 
pared or  classed  by  the  naturalist ;  but  he  may  endeavour  to  show,  as 
I  have  done,  that  the  mental  faculties  of  man  and  the  lower  animals 
do  not  differ  in  kind,  although  immensely  in  degree.  A  difference  in 
degree,  however  great,  does  not  justify  us  in  placing  man  in  a  distinct 
kingdom,  as  will  perhaps  be  best  illustrated  by  comparing  the  mental 
powers  of  two  insects,  namely,  a  coccus  or  scale  insect  and  an  ant, 
wlu'ch  undoubtedly  belong  to  the  same  class.  The  difference  is  here 
greater,  though  of  a  somewhat  different  kind,  than  that  between  man 
;iiid  the  highest  mammal.  The  female  coccus,  whilst  young,  attaches 
itself  by  its  proboscis  to  a  plant ;  sucks  the  sap  but  never  moves 
again ;  is  fertilised  and  lays  eggs ;  and  this  is  its  whole  history.  On 
the  other  hand,  ants  communicate  information  to  each  other,  and 
several  unite  for  the  same  work,  or  games  of  play.  They  recognize 
their  fellow-ants  after  months  of  absence.  They  build  great  edifices, 
keep  them  clean,  close  the  doors  in  the  evening,  and  post  sentries. 
They  make  roads  and  even  tunnels  under  rivers.  They  collect  food 
for  the  community,  and  when  an  object,  too  large  for  entrance,  is 
brought  to  the  nest,  they  enlarge  the  door,  and  afterwards  build  it  up 
again.  They  go  out  to  battle  in  regular  bands,  and  freely  sacrifice 
their  lives  for  the  common  weal.  They  emigrate  in  accordance  with 
a  preconcerted  plan.  They  capture  slaves.  They  keep  aphides  as 


Descent  of  Man,'  vol.  L  p.  35. 


182  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [CiiAp.  VI. 

milch  cows.  They  move  the  eggs  of  their  aphides,  as  well  as  their 
own  eggs  and  cocoons,  into  warm  parts  of  the  nest,  in  order  that  they 
may  be  quickly  hatched ;  and  endless  similar  facts  could  bo  given. 
On  tho  whole,  the  difference  in  mental  power  between  an  ant  and  a 
coccus  is  immense ;  yet  no  one  has  ever  dreamed  of  placing  them  in 
distinct  classes,  much  less  in  distinct  kingdoms.  No  doubt  this 
interval  is  bridged  over  by  the  intermediate  mental  powers  of  many 
other  insects ;  and  this  is  not  the  case  with  man  and  the  higher  apes. 
But  we  have  every  reason  to  believe  that  breaks  in  the  series  arc 
simply  the  result  of  many  forms  having  become  extinct." 

I  have  extracted  the  whole  of  this  passage  because  it  states 
in  the  strongest  manner  what  Mr.  Darwin  considers  the  most 
telling  points  in  his  favour,  while  it  exhibits  as  clearly  his 
misapprehensions  as  to  the  true  significance  of  man's  mental 
powers. 

In  the  first  place  the  zoological  classification  universally 
adopted  is  a  morphological  classification.  That  is  to  say  it 
is  a  classification  based  upon  form  and  structure — upon  the 
number  and  shape  of  the  several  parts  of  animals,  and  not 
at  all  upon  what  those  parts  do,  the  consideration  of  which 
belongs  to  physiology.  This  being  the  case  we  not  only 
may,  but  should,  in  the  field  of  zoology,  neglect  all  questions 
of  diversities  of  instinct  or  mental  power,  equally  with  every 
other  power,  as  is  evidenced  by  the  location  of  the  bat  and 
the  porpoise  in  the  same  class,  mammalia  and  the  parrot  and 
the  tortoise  in  the  same  larger  group,  Sauropsida. 

Looking,  therefore,  at  man  with  regard  to  his  bodily  struc- 
ture, we  not  only  may,  but  should,  reckon  him  as  a  member 
of  the  class  mammalia,  and  even  (we  believe)  consider  him 
as  the  representative  of  a  mere  family  of  the  first  order  of 
that  class.  But  all  men  are  not  zoologists;  and  even 
zoologists  must,  outside  their  science,  consider  man  in  his 
totality  and  not  merely  from  the  point  of  view  of  anatomy. 

If  then  I  am  right  in  my  assertion  that  man's  mental 
faculties  are  different  in  kind  from  those  of  brutes ;  and  if  he 
is,  as  we  maintain,  the  only  rational  animal,  then  is  man,  as 
a  whole,  to  be  spoken  of  by  preference  from  the  point  of  view 
of  his  animality,  or  from  the  point  of  view  of  his  rationality  ? 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN.  183 

Surely  from  the  latter,  and,  if  so,  we  must  consider  not 
structure,  but  action. 

Now  in  the  last  quoted  passage  Mr.  Darwin  seems  to  con- 
cede that  a  difference  in  kind  would  justify  the  placing  of 
man  in  a  distinct  kingdom,  inasmuch  as  he  says  a  difference 
in  degree  does  not  so  justify  ;  and  \ve  have  no  hesitation  in 
affirming  (with  Mr.  Darwin)  that  between  the  instinctive 
powers  of  the  coccus  and  the  ant  there  is  but  a  difference 
of  degree,  and  that,  therefore,  they  do  belong  to  the  same 
kingdom,  but  we  contend  it  is  quite  otherwise  with  man. 

Mr.  Darwin,  doubtless,  admits  that  all  the  wonderful  ac- 
tions of  ants  are  mere  modifications  of  instinct.  But  if  it 
were  not  so — if  the  piercing  of  tunnels  beneath  rivers,  &c.. 
were  evidence  of  their  possession  of  reason,  then  far  from 
agreeing  with  Mr.  Darwin,  we  should  say  that  ants  also  are 
rational  animals,  and  that,  while  considered  from  the  ana- 
tomical stand-point  they  would  be  insects,  from  that  of  their 
rationality  they  would  rank  together  with  men  in  a  kingdom 
apart  of  "rational  animals."  Keally,  however,  there  is  no 
tittle  of  evidence  that  ants  possess  the  reflective,  self-con- 
scious, deliberate  faculty ;  while  the  perfection  of  their  in- 
stincts is  a  most  powerful  argument  against  the  need  of 
attributing  a  rudiment  of  rationality  to  any  brute  whatever. 

Thus,  then,  we  seem  to  have  Mr.  Darwin  on  our  side  when 
we  affirm  that  animals  possessed  of  mental  faculties  Man  forms  a 

kingdom  by 

distinct  in  kind  should  be  placed  in   a  kingdom  wmseir. 
apart.     And  man  possesses  such  a  distinction. 

Is  this,  however,  all  that  can  be  said  for  the  dignity  of 
his  position  ?  Is  he  merely  .  one  division  of  the  visible 
universe  co-ordinate  with  the  animal,  vegetable,  and  mineral 
kingdoms  ? 

It  would  bo  so  if  he  was  intelligent  and  no  more.  If  ho 
could  observe  the  facts  of  his  own  existence,  investigate  the 
co-existences  and  successions  of  phenomena,  but  all  the  time 
remain  like  the  other  parts  of  the  visible  universe  a  mere 
floating  unit  in  the  stream  of  time,  incapable  of  one  act  of 
free  self-determination  or  one  voluntary  moral  aspiration  after 


181  LESSONS  PROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VI. 

an  ideal  of  absolute  goodness.  But  this  is  not  so.  Man  is  not 
merely  an  intellectual  animal,  but  he  is  a  free  moral  agent, 
and,  as  such — and  with  the  infinite  future  such  freedom  opens 
out  before  him — differs  from  all  the  rest  of  the  visible  universe? 
by  a  distinction  so  profound  that  no  one  of  those  which  separate 
other  visible  beings  is  comparable  with  it.  The  gulf  which 
lies  between  his  being  as  a  whole,  and  that  of  the  highest 
brute,  marks  off  vastly  more  than  a  mere  kingdom  of  material 
beings,  and  man,  so  considered,  differs  far  more  from  an 
elephant  or  a  gorilla  than  do  these  from  the  dust  of  the  earth 
on  which  they  tread. 

Thus,  then,  in  our  judgment  the  author  of  the  '  Descent  of 
Man '  has  utterly  failed  in  the  only  part  of  his  work  which 
is  really  important.  Mr.  Darwin's  errors  are  mainly  due  to 
a  radically  false  metaphysical  system  in  which  he  seems  (like 
so  many  other  physicists)  to  have  become  entangled.  .  With- 
out a  sound  philosophical  basis,  however,  no  satisfactory 
scientific  superstructure  can  ever  be  reared;  and  if  Mr. 
Darwin's  failure  should  lead  to  an  increase  of  philosophic 
culture  on  the  part  of  physicists,  we  may  therein  find  some 
consolation  for  the  injurious  effects  which  his  work  is  likely 
to  produce  on  too  many  of  our  half-educated  classes. 

There  is  another  question  concerning  the  various  races  of 
Unity  of  man  about  which  only  a  few  words  can  now  be  said, 
human  races,  Fortunately  but  few  words  need  be  said,  since  there 
is  much  unanimity  on  the  subject  between  thinkers  of  very 
diverse  views  as  to  man's  origin. 

This  question  is  whether  the  races  of  man  form  but  one 
species.  Upon  this  subject  the  verdicts  of  evolutionists  of 
the  school  of  Darwin  and  Huxley  are  not  doubtful.  Mr. 
Darwin  says  *  as  to  the  instability  of  racial  characters : 
•'*  it  may  be  doubted  whether  any  character  can  be  named 
which  is  distinctive  of  a  race  and  is  constant."  Again,  as  to 
the  origin  of  the  existing  races  from  a  single  pair,  he  admits  | 
that  "  with  our  domestic  animals  a  new  race  can  readily  be 


Descent  of  Man.'  vol.  i.  p.  225.  f  Op.  clt.  p.  235. 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN.  185 

formed  from  a  single  pair."  Those  men  of  science  who 
believe  that  all  animals  whatever  sprang  but  from  a  few 
separate  stocks  can  hardly  dispute  the  singleness  of  man's 
origin.  Those,  on  the  other  hand,  who  share  my  views  as  to 
the  frequently  independent  origin  of  different  structures  may 
dispute  it.  The  arguments  however  here  advanced  in  favour 
of  man's  unity  of  nature  lend  support  to  the  unity  of  his  origin. 
That  original  man  should  have  been  of  a  lighter  colour  than 
the  existing  darkest  races,  and  without  woolly  hair,  is  indi- 
cated (at  least  on  evolutionary  principles)  by  the  facts  of  de- 
velopment in  such  races.  Mr.  Darwin  fells  us  *  "  the  new- 
born negro  child  is  reddish  nut-brown,  which  soon  become  3 
slaty-gray."  ..."  The  eyes  of  the  negro  are  at  first  blue, 
and  the  hair  chestnut-brown  rather  than  black,  being  curled 
only  at  the  ends." 

As  to  the  origin  of  variations  in  colour,  we  may,  as  Mr. 
Darwin  says,f  "  well  reflect "  .  .  .  "  on  the  remarkable 
changes  of  colour  in  the  plumage  of  parrots,"  fed  on  special 
food  or  inoculated  with  toad  poison,  "for  we  can  thus  see 
that  the  fluids  of  the  system,  if  altered  for  some  special 
purpose,  might  induce  other  strange  changes." 

In  the  present  state  of  science,  and  especially  in  that  of 
the  controversy  as  to  specific  origin,  it  would  be  a  work  of 
supererogation  to  insist  upon  the  probability,  almost  amount- 
ing to  certainty,  of  the  common  origin  of  the  whole  human 
race.  The  question  may  at  least  be  left  until  such  time  as 
good  evidence  may  be  forthcoming  of  the  sterility  inter  se 
of  the  descendants  of  cross-breeds  between  two  widely 
distinct  families  of  mankind.  « 

But  what  should  be  our  final  verdict  as  to  the  main  ques- 
tion here  considered — that  of  the  origin  of  man?  whatshaii 
We  have  seen  that  no  arguments  adduced  by  any  SictwuT 
of  the  writers  quoted  suffice  to  make  probable  his  m 
origin  from  speechless,  irrational,  non-moral   brutes.      But 
there  is  evidence  to  be  adduced  from  high  authority  directly 

*  •  Descent  of  Man,'  vol.  il  p.  318.  t  Op.  tit.  p.  152. 


186  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VI. 

on  the  other  side.  No  less  a  writer  than  Mr.  Wallace,  the 
independent  originator  and  by  far  the  best  expounder  of  the 
theory  of  natural  selection,  differs  widely  from  Mr.  Darwin  as 
to  the  question  of  man's  origin.  He  contends*  that  some 
Mr.wai-  special  agency  was  needed  to  produce  the  human 
3W8>  frame.  He  specially  adverts  to  the  peculiar  disposi- 
tion of  the  hair  on  man,  especially  that  nakedness  of  the  back 
which  is  common  to  all  races  of  men,  and  to  the  peculiar  con- 
struction of  the  foot  and  hand.  He  tell^  us,  "  the  hand  of 
man  contains  latent  capacities  and  powers  which  are  unused 
by  savages,  and  must  have  been  even  less  used  by  palaeolithic 
man  and  his  still  ruder  predecessors.  It  has  all  the  appear- 
ance of  an  organ  prepared  for  the  use  of  civilised  man,  and 
one  which  was  required  to  render  civilisation  possible." 
Again,  speaking  of  the  "  wonderful  power,  range,  flexibility, 
and  sweetness  of  the  musical  sounds  producible  by  the 
human  larynx,"  he  adds,  "  The  habits  of  savages  give  no  in- 
dication of  how  this  faculty  could  have  been  developed"  .  .  . 
"  the  singing  of  savages  is  a  more  or  less  monotonous  howl- 
ing, and  the  females  seldom  sing  at  all."  ..."  It  seems  as  if 
the  organ  had  been  prepared  in  anticipation  of  the  future 
progress  of  man,  since  it  contains  latent  ^capacities  which  are 
useless  to  him  in  his  earlier  condition." 

But,  indeed,  as  to  this  subject,  even  Mr.  Darwin  himself 
admits :f  That  "neither  the  enjoyment  nor  the  capacity  of 
producing  musical  notes  are  faculties  of  the  least  direct  use 
to  man  in  reference  to  his  ordinary  habits  of  life,  they  must 
be  ranked  amongst  the  most  mysterious  with  which  he  is 
endowed." 

Mr.  Wallace  also  agrees  with  us  concerning  the  value  he 
attaches  to  man's  "  capacity  to  form  ideal  conceptions  of  space 
and  time,  of  eternity  and  infinity — the  capacity  for  intense 
artistic  feelings  of  pleasure,  in  form,  colour,  and  composition 
— and  those  abstract  notions  of  form  and  number  which 


*  'Natural  Selection,'  pp.  332-360. 
t  '  Descent  of  Man,'  vol.  ii.  p.  333. 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN.  187 

render  'geometry  and  arithmetic  possible,"  as  also  respecting 
the  non-bestial  origin  of  moral  perception.* 

Yet  more,  he  considers  man  as  not  only  placed  "  apart, 
as  the  head  and  culminating  point  of  the  grand  series  of 
organic  nature,  but  as  in  some  degree  a  new  and  distinct 
order  of  being."  .  .  .  "When  the  first  rude  spear  was  formed 
to  assist  in  the  chase  ;  when  fire  was  first  used  to  cook  his 
food  ;  when  the  first  seed  was  sown  or  shoot  planted,  a  grand 
revolution  was  effected  in  nature,  a  revolution  which  in  all 
the  previous  ages  of  the  earth's  history  has  had  no  parallel, 
for  a  being  had  arisen  who  was  no  longer  necessarily  subject 
to  change  with  the  changing  universe,  a  being  who  was  in 
some  degree  superior  to  nature,  inasmuch  as  he  knew  how  to 
control  and  regulate  her  action,  and  could  keep  himself  in, 
harmony  with  her,  not  by  a  change  in  body,  but  by  an  advance 
in  mind." 

It  remains  to  say  a  few  words  respecting  the  results  of  our 
perception   of    our   own   moral    freedom    on    the  Free-win, 
question  of  our  origin. 

Mr.  Darwin  naturally  makes  no  attempt  to  account  for  the 
origin  of  man's  free-will  (perhaps  the  most  wonderful  quality 
he  possesses) ;  and  I  am  confident  that  it  is  fundamentally 
impossible  to  explain  this  power  of  ours  without  granting 
what  is  fatal  to  his  hypothesis  of  man's  essential  bestiality. 
On  this  subject  I  may,  with  advantage,  quote  some  remarks 
by  Mr.  Eichard  Holt  Hutton  :— f 

"  Here  seems  the  right  point  to  note,  that  neither  the  scientific  prin- 
ciple of  what  is  called  the  '  correlation  of  forces/  nor  the  Darwinian 
law  of  selection,  seems  to  throw  the  smallest  glimpse  of  light  on  the 
origin  of  human  free-will,  and  that  sense  of  responsibility  of  which 
free-will  is  the  absolute  condition.  As  for  the  Darwinian  law,  it  is 
simply  inconceivable,  supposing  you  deny  free-will  to  the  lower  types 
of  organic  beings,  out  of  which,  on  his  conception,  the  higher  species 
are  gradually  elaborated  by  natural  selection,  that  an  accidental  varia- 
tion should  introduce  free-will It  is  inconceivable  that  any 

law  of  transmission  should  introduce  an  element  of  freedom  which  was 


*  '  Natural  Selection,'  pp.  351,  352. 
t  '  Essays,'  vol.  i.  pp.  til- 67. 


188  LESSONS  FliOM  NATURE.  [Ciur.  VI. 

entirely  absent  from  the  universe  before.  All  that  is  supposed  to  vary 
in  the  qualities  derived  from  ancestors  is  the  proportion  in  which  they 
are  mingled,  and,  so  to  say,  the  mode  of  application  to  the  universe 
outside.  But  that  a  necessary  being  should  give  birth  to  a  being  with 
any  amount,  however  limited,  of  moral  freedom  is  infinitely  less  con- 
ceivable than  that  parents  of  the  insect  or  fish  type  should  give  birth 
to  a  perfect  mammal.  An  accidental  variation  only  means  a  variation 
of  which  you  cannot  determine  the  direction ;  but  you  can  determine 
that  the  direction  of  variation  will  not  outrage  all  the  laws  of  pa- 
rentage  If  all  the  lower  laws  of  force  and  life  are  absolutely 

fixed  and  inviolable,  then  they  cannot  revoke  their  own  constitution 
when  they  issue  out  of  the  region  of  physiology  into -that  of  moral  life. 
If  it  be  the  essence  of  all  things  to  follow  fixed  laws,  if  there  is  nothing 
but  unchangeable  force  moulding  the  universe  by  its  gradually  con- 
centrating strength,  then  the  conscience  of  man  is  a  delusion,  and  his 

sense  of  responsibility  and  freedom  must  be  explained  away 

The  logic  of  science  is  consistent,  but  it  does  not  explain  freedom. 
We  know  that  we  are  morally  free ;  and  we  know  that  a  free  person 
cannot  be  the  issue  of  helplessly  unfolded  laws.  It  is  impossible  for 
necessity  to  emancipate  itself.  Only  if  the  observed  necessity  has  been 
the  '  must '  of  a  Divine  free-will,  can  that  '  must '  be  withdrawn,  and 
freedom  restored  wherever  the  materials  for  self-determination  have 
been  granted.  The  identity  of  all  the  sciences  is  assumed  only  at  the 
expense  of  the  falsification  of  some,  and  the  total  abrogation  of  one. 
The  main  facts  of  man's  moral  nature — all  those  on  which  the  great 
interests  of  mankind  centre,  all  which  are  the  life  of  reverence  and 
love — are  swept  away  into  meaningless  unreality  by  the  absolute 
identification  of  moral  science  with  the  natural  sciences  on  the  summit 
of  which  it  stands.  It  is  dangerous  enough  to  scientific  reality  to 
confuse  intelligence  with  instinct  and  to  describe  memory  as  '  a  weak 
form'  of  perception ;  but  it  is  the  suicide  of  a  science  to  manufacture  a 
theory  of  moral  obligation  out  of  the  materials  of  physical  necessity — 
a  theory  of  vision  for  the  blind." 

Indeed,  man  being,  as  the  mind  oF  each  man  may  tell  him, 
a  being  not  only  conscious,  but  conscious  of  his  own  con- 
sciousness ;  one  not  only  acting  on  inference,  but  capable  of 
analysing  the  process  of  inference ;  a  creature  not  only  capable 
of  acting  well  or  ill,  but  of  understanding  the  ideas  "  virtue"  and 
"  moral  obligation,"  with  their  correlatives  freedom  of  choice 
and  responsibility — man  being  all  this,  it  is  at  once  obvious 
that  the  principal  part  of  his  being  is  his  mental  power. 

"  In  nature  there  is  nothing  great  but  man, 
In  man  there  is  nothing  great  but  mind." 


CHAP.  VL]  MAN.  189 

Nevertheless,  man's  body  must  be  fairly  compared  with  the 
bodies  of  other  species  of  animals  more  or  less  like  him,  and 
his  corporeal  affinities  thus  estimated. 

Let  us  suppose  ourselves,  then,  to  be  without  bodies  our- 
selves, to  be  purely  immaterial  intelligences,  acquainted  only 
with  a  world  peopled  like  our  own  except  that  the  species 
man  had  never  lived  upon  it,  yet  that  somehow  the  dead 
body  of  a  man  was  presented  for  our  examination. 

We  should  then,  I  think,  consider  such  body  to  be  that  of 
some  large  ape,  and  of  one  differing  less  widely  from  the  apes 
most  like  it  in  form  than  do  such  apes  differ  from  others, 
e.g.,  from  marmosets.  Yet  we  should  note  some  striking 
specialities  of  structure.  We  should  be  especially  struck 
with  its  vast  brain,  and  we  should  be  the  more  impressed  by 
it  when  we  noted  how  bulky  was  the  body  to  which  that 
brain  belonged.  We  should  be  so  impressed  because  we 
should  have  previously  noted  that,  as  a  general  rule,  in  back- 
boned animals,  the  larger  the  bulk  of  the  body  the  less  the 
relative  size  of  the  brain.  From  our  knowledge  of  the  habits 
and  faculties  of  various  animals  in  relation  to  their  brain- 
structure,  we  should  be  led  to  infer  that  the  animal  man  was 
one  possessing  great  power  of  co-ordinating  movements,  and 
that  his  emotional  sensibility  would  have  been  considerable. 
'But,  above  all,  his  powers  of  imagination  would  have  been 
deemed  by  us  to  have  been  prodigious,  with  a  corresponding 
faculty  of  collecting,  grouping,  and  preserving  sensible  images 
of  objects  in  complex  and  coherent  aggregations  to  a  de- 
gree much  greater  than  in  any  other  animal  with  which  we 
were  before  acquainted.  Did  we  know  that  all  the  various 
other  kinds  of  existing  animals  had  been  developed  one  from 
another  by  evolution ;  did  we  know  that  the  numerous  species 
had  been  evolved  from  potential  to  actual  existence  by  im- 
planted powers  in  matter,  aided  by  the  influence  of  incident 
forces ;  then  we  might  reasonably  argue  by  analogy  that  a 
similar  mode  of  origin  had  given  rise  to  the  exceptional 
being,  the  body  of  which  we  were  examining. 

If,  however,  it  were  made  clear  to  us — immaterial  intelli- 


190  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VI. 

gences — that  the  dead  body  before  us  had  been  in  life  endowed 
with  an  activity  not  merely  animal  but  intellectual,  so  that 
man's  mind  was  an  active  intelligence  like  our  own — if,  in 
other  words,  we  understood  that  the  difference  between  him 
and  all  other  animals  was  not  a  difference  of  degree  but  of  kind 
— if  we  could  be  made  to  understand  that  its  vast  power  of  col- 
lecting and  grouping  sensible  images  served  but  to  supply  its 
intellectual  activity  with  materials  whereby  it  might  perceive 
not  merely  sensible  phenomena,  but  also  abstract  qualities  of 
objects — if  we  became  aware  that  the -sounds  uttered  by  it  in 
life  were  not  exclusively  emotional  expressions,  but  were  the 
external  signs  of  general  conceptions,  then  the  aspect  of  the 
question  would  be  entirely  altered  for  us.  If  we  further 
came  to  know  that  the  being  we  were  considering  had  been 
endowed  with  the  marvellous  gift  of  free-will,  by  which  his 
intelligence  could  interrupt  and  dominate  the  vast  chain 
of  merely  physical  causation,  wo  should  then  surely  con- 
clude that  as  that  activity  and  the  acting  body  together 
formed  but  one  unity,  and  as  that  intellectual  activity  was 
not  only  different  in  kind  from  that  displayed  by  any  other 
animal  but  indefinitely  more  different  from  the  activity  of 
the  highest  brute  than  the  activity  of  the  highest  brute  is 
different  from  that  of  the  lowest — for  these  reasons  we  should 
conclude  that  man's  origin  was  different  in  kind  from  theirs. 

The  lesson  then  concerning  man,  which  we  seem  to  gather 
from  nature  as  revealed  to  us  in  our  own  conscious- 
ness and  as  externally  observed,  is  that  man  differs 
fundamentally  from  every  other  creature  which  presents 
itself  to  our  senses.  That  he  differs  absolutely,  and  therefore 
differs  in  origin  also.  Although  a  strict  unity,  one  material 
whole  with  one  form,  or  force  (not  made  of  two  parts  mutually 
acting  according  to  the  vulgar  notion  of  soul  and  body),  yet 
he  is  seen  to  be  a  compound  unity  in  which  two  distinct 
orders  of  being  unite. 

He  is  manifestly  "  animal,"  with  the  reflex  functions,  feel- 
ings, desires,  and  emotions  of  an  animal.  Yet  equally  mani- 
fest is  it  that  he  has  a  special  nature  "  looking  before  and 


CHAP.  VI.]  MAN.  191 

after"  which  constitutes  him  "rational."  Ruling,  com- 
prehending, interpreting,  and  completing  much  in  nature, 
we  also  see  in  him  that  which  manifestly  points  above 
nature.  We  see  this,  since  we  know  that  he  can  conceive 
mind  indefinitely  augmented  in  power  and  devoid  of  those 
limitations  and  imperfections  it  exhibits  in  him.  Mani- 
festly a  contemplation  of  nature  must  be  futile  indeed  which 
neglects  to  ponder  over  those  ideas  of  power,  wisdom,  pur- 
pose, goodness  and  will,  which  are  revealed  to  him  in  and  by 
his  own  nature  as  he  knows  it  to  exist,  and  therefore  as  con- 
ceivably existing  in  a  far  higher  form  in  that  vast  universe 
of  being  of  which  he  is  a  self-conscious  fragment. 


CHAPTER  VII. 

THE   BRDTE. 

"  The  highest  psychical  powers  of  animals  resemble  the  lower  psy- 
chical faculties  of  man.  The  brute  is  devoid  of  reason,  and  instinct 
is  a  peculiar  function  of  the  material  organism,  automatic  and  blind." 

IN  the  preceding  chapter  the  nature  of  man,  the  rational 
Necessity  of  animal,  could  not  be  investigated  without  by  im- 
uiation.  plication,  and  indeed  more  or  less  directly,  treating 
of  the  irrational  creation  considered  in  contrast  with  him. 
Here,  where  our  purpose  is  to  endeavour  to  gather  what 
lesson  we  may  from  a  consideration  of  the  highest  activities 
which  brutes  manifest,  it  will  be  necessary  to  reconsider 
some  of  the  matters  already  treated  of  in  our  examination  of 
the  nature  of  man.  Thus  some  recapitulation  is  unavoidable 
save  at  the  sacrifice  of  clearness  and  cogency. 

The  highest  activities  of  irrational  animals  are  those 
sensitive  and  emotional  ones  which  constitute  the  functional 
exercise  of  their  nervous  system,  and  especially  characteristic 
of  animal  nature  is  that  form  of  nervous  activity  called 
"  Instinct." 

The  question  as  to  the  true  nature  of  "  Instinct "  is  one 
instinct,  which  has  been  much  discussed  of  late,  and  is 
studying  it.  considered  by  many  persons  to  be  peculiarly 
difficult.  It  is,  in  fact,  attended  with  some  peculiar 
difficulty,  because  not  only  are  we  unable  to  make  brute 
psychosis  a  part  of  our  own  consciousness,  but  we  are 
also  debarred  from  learning  it  by  any  process  similar 
to  that  which  enables  us  to  enter  into  the  minds  of  our 
fellow-men — namely,  rational  speech.  The  instincts  of 


CHAP.  VII.]  TEE  BEUTE.  193 

animals  have  been,  however,  and  are  very  carefully 
studied  and  observed,  and  it  is  generally  assumed  that  to 
understand  "Instinct"  the  continued  and  reiterated  study 
of  animal  activity  is  the  one  thing  necessary.  It  is  obvious, 
indeed,  that  without  such  study  Instinct  cannot  be  clearly 
comprehended ;  and  yet  it  may  be  questioned  whether 
mental  activity,  in  its  endeavour  to  understand  Instinct,  has 
not  been  almost  exclusively  exercised  in  what,  under  existing 
circumstances,  is  the  least  useful  mode.  Every  object  of 
study  is  made  clear  to  us  by  that  which  limits  and  contrasts 
with  it,  just  as  the  size  of  any  particular  building  is  brought 
home  to  us  by  considering  the  size  of  surrounding  objects, 
or  its  relation  to  the  human  stature.  To  comprehend 
Instinct  is  to  appreciate  justly  its  relations  with  the  other 
faculties  of  animals  and  with  our  own,  and  it  is  especially  its 
relation  to  Eeason  which  is  an  object  of  interest.  It  is, 
then,  plainly  necessary  that  we  should,  more  or  less,  perfectly 
understand  "  Eeason,"  in  order  to  thoroughly  understand 
"  Instinct."  Now,  unfortunately,  it  appears  that  most  of 
those  who  have  made  it  their  business  to  study  the  The  mode  in 
so-called  "  minds "  of  animals  have  taken  very  defective. 
little  pains  to  understand  their  own  mind.  If  this  appear- 
ance is  not  deceptive,  it  follows  that  what  most  requires  to 
be  done,  in  order  to  justly  appreciate  "  Instinct,"  is  to 
patiently  study,  not  Instinct,  but  Keason.  Perhaps  the  most 
remarkable  circumstance  connected  with  living  English 
writers,  on  questions  such  as  those  we  here  refer  to,  is  the 
conspicuous  absence  in  them  of  any  manifest  comprehension 
of  those  very  powers  they  so  continually  exercise,  and  their 
apparent  want  of  appreciation  of  that  Reason  to  which  they 
verbiilly  appeal.  Thus,  while  what  Instinct  is,  and  can  do, 
is  now  fairly  appreciated  ;  what  it  is  not,  and  what  it  cannot 
do,  though  Eeason  can  and  does,  is  generally  lost  sight  of 
and  ignored. 

That  this  defect  should  exist  will  not  appear  so  surprising 
when  we  consider  how  trying  and  difficult,  for  those  unac- 
customed to  it,  is  the  habit  of  turning  the  mind  in  upon 


19-i  LESSONS  FKOM  NATURE.  [CHAP,  m 

itself,  and  the  investigation  by  the  mind  of  the  mind's  own  pro- 
Reason  for  cesses.  It  is  not  to  be  wondered  at  if  many  persons 
shirk  unwonted  labour  of  this  kind.  Unfortunately, 
the  study  of  Reason,  and  therefore  the  study  of  Instinct  also, 
cannot  be  pursued  with  any  reasonable  hope  of  profit  without 
frequent  use  of  this  process  of  introspection,  nor  without 
referring  to,  and  at  least  briefly  considering,  some  of  the 
most  fundamental  questions  of  Philosophy.  This  is,  indeed, 
obvious,  since  to  compare  "Instinct"  with  "Reason,"  we 
must  know  what  "  Reason  "  is  ;  and  this  can  only  be  ascer- 
tained by  an  inquiry  into  the  activity  of  our  own  mind,  into 
its  ultimate  and  supreme  declarations,  into  the  tests  as  to 
such  supremacy,  and  into  the  grounds  on  which  we  are,  if  at 
all,  to  accept  such  supreme  declarations  as  true.  Yet,  after 
all,  however  arduous  may  be  the  process,  it  nevertheless  does 
come  within  the  field  of  experimental  science  in  its  widest 
sense.  It  does  come  within  that  field,  because  the  elementary 
truths  concerning  the  mind  and  its  modes  of  activity  repose 
upon  observation  and  experiment,  and  the  hypothesis  which 
the  inductions  so  induced  suggest  can  be  verified  by  testing 
experimentally  such  deductions  as  may  necessarily  flow 
from  such  hypothesis.  But  the  most  important  of  these 
observations  are  observations  made  by  each  observer  on  his 
own  mental  processes,  while  many  of  the  experiments  are  of 
a  similar  nature. 

The  slightest  consideration  of  our  own  mental  activity 
Results  of  in-  soon  shows  us  that,  in  addition  to  our  various 
infection.  feeiingS}  we  aiso  « think"  and  "will."  Thus,  when 

a  kindness  has  been  done  us,  besides  pleasurable  feelings 
and  emotions,  we  can  think  of  and  recognise  the  kindness  of 
the  kind  act — possibly,  also,  the  self-denying  goodness 
apparent  in  the  performer  of  it — and  we  can  will  to  return 
such  kindness  by  some  corresponding  act  on  our  own  part. 
On  the  other  hand,  we  may  feel  great  annoyance  at  some 
hostile  action;  and  as  we  think  of  the  unpleasant  conse- 
quences, one  after  another,  which  will  probably  result  to  us 
from  it,  and  of  the  peculiar  ingratitude  and  treachery  of  the 


CHAP.  VII.]  THE  BRUTE.  l'J3 

doer,  we  may  begin  to  determine  upon  some  act  of  hostility 
in  return.  The  idea  may  then  occur  to  us  that  revenge  is 
wrong,  and  we  may  wish  to  avoid  our  contemplated  act  of 
hostility,  but  the  "  malice  "  of  the  action  may  have  been 
such,  and  our  temperament  may  be  so  irascible,  that  the 
temptation  to  revenge  is  almost  overpowering.  We  may 
then,  with  the  deliberate  intention  of  aiding  the  weakness  of 
our  goodwill,  deliberately  consider  all  the  claims  on  our 
forbearance  we  can  think  of — such,  e.g.,  as  that  the  father  of 
our  enemy,  while  alive,  did  us  many  kindnesses ;  that  the 
circumstances  of  his  mother  are  such  that  any  trouble  or 
anxiety  would  do  her  serious  injury  ;  that  the  son  has  almost 
ceased  to  be  a  rational  man  from  his  habitual  intemperance  ; 
and  we  may  reinforce  these  considerations  by  others  drawn 
from  religion.  Finally,  we  may  force  ourselves  to  relinquish 
all  hostile  intention,  and  perhaps  even  to  perform  some 
beneGcial  action  instead.  Here  we  have  feelings  and  emo- 
tions; but,  in  addition,  we  have  "thought"  reflecting  on 
such  feelings  and  emotions,  and  "will"  dictating  our  re- 
sponsive action.  These  phenomena  of  our  mind  are  facts  of 
observation  and  experience,  as  immediately  perceptible  as 
any  concerning  our  body. 

On  turning  our  mind  inwards  upon  itself,  we  recognise 
our  own  enduring  existence  as  a  fact  supremely  certain. 
We  know  with  absolute  '  certainty  that  we  are  the  same 
person  we  were  an  hour  ago,  a  week  ago,  perhaps  many 
years  ago.  If  we  are  asked  how  we  recognise  our  own 
existence,  we  reply  we  recognise  it  by  our  activity,  by  the 
actual  exercise  of  our  various  powers — in  this  instance  by  the 
act  of  thinking,  and  thinking  of  ourselves.  If  we  are  further 
asked  whether  we  can  prove  our  own  existence  to  ourselves,  we 
reply  that  primary  truths  cannot  be  proved.  Every  process  of 
truth,  as  we  have  already  seen,  must  ultimately  rest  on  truths 
directly  known  without  proof,  otherwise  the  process  of  reason- 
ing must  run  back  for  ever,  and  nothing  could  ever  be  proved. 
Our  own  existence,  as  a  primary  truth  directly  known  to 
each  of  us,  cannot  be  proved.  Nevertheless,  though  we 


198  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VII. 

cannot  prove  our  own  existence,  we  can  bring  forward  a  truth 
to  justify  and  reinforce  our  consciousness — namely,  "  What- 
ever thinks,  exists ;"  and  since  we  know  that  we  can  and  do 
think,  it  necessarily  follows  that  we  exist,  and  so  reason 
reinforces  the  declaration  of  consciousness.  Should  any  one 
object — "How  do  you  know  that  such  primary  dicta  are 
true  ?  May  not  what  you  think  is  your  existence  be  really 
the  existence  of  somebody  else,  or  your  life  the  dream  of 
some  other  being  ?"  We  reply,  that  in  self-consciousness, 
and  in  the  perception  of  such  primary  truths  as  that  "  What 
thinks,  exists,"  we  reach  the  limit  which  nature  has  placed, 
and  that  should  any  man  be  so  mad  as  to  doubt  the  truth  of 
such  primary  dicta,  he  must  logically  doubt  of  every  other 
affirmation  whatever,  even  that  of  his  own  doubt,  which  thus 
destroys  itself.  Absolute  scepticism,  and  consequently  utter 
intellectual  paralysis,  are  the  inevitable  logical  results  of  any 
real  doubt  in  this  matter  of  our  own  existence. 

There  is  another  point  of  which  we  should  make  sure  in 
examining  the  activity  of  our  own  minds.  To  have  a  know- 
ledge of  anything  is  one  thing; "to  know  that  we  have  that 
knowledge  is  another,  and  a  very  different  thing.  We  cognize 
an  object — e.g.,  a  crow  flying — by  one  act ;  we  cognize  that 
cognition  by  a  very  different  act.  To  judge  that  one  moun- 
tain is  higher  than  another  is  one  mental  act;  to  recognise 
that  mental  act  as  a  judgment  is  an  act  of  a  very  different 
kind.  Yet  both  these  are  judgments.  To  feel — to  have  a 
sensation,  then,  is  indeed  a  different  thing  from  recognising 
such  sensation  as  ours,  or  as  being  one  of  a  particular  class 
of  sensations. 

Our  knowledge  of  ourselves  as  being  the  same  person 
now  as  in  the  past,  implies  the  trustworthiness  of  memory 
— one  of  the  most  wonderful'  of  our  many  wonderful  facul- 
ties. Now  by  a  little  further  introspection  we  may  easily 
organic  and  see  that  memory  is  of  two  kinds — (1)  Involuntary, 

intellectual 

memory.  passive,  unconscious,  sensitive  memory — to  our 
present  possession  of  which  we  do  not  advert ;  and  (2)  Volun- 
tary, active,  conscious,  intellectual  memory,  which  we  re- 


CHAP.  VII.]  THE  BRUTE.  197 

cognise  ourselves  as  actually  possessing,  or  as  having  pos- 
sessed in  the  past,  or  as  likely  to  possess  in  the  future. 
Either  of  these  may  exist  without  the  other.  That  the 
passive  memory  may  so  exist  is  obvious,  but  that  the 
second  may  be  alone  present  is  proved  by  that  most  remark- 
able fact  that  we  may  search  our  minds  for  something  which 
we  know  we  have  fully  remembered,  and  which  we  think  we 
shall  probably  fully  remember  again  ;  which  at  present  we 
cannot  imagine,  but  which  we  intellectually  remember,  and 
immediately  recognise  as  the  object  of  our  intellectual  pur- 
suit as  soon  as  its  image  presents  itself  in  our  imagination. 

Bearing  in  mind  the  lessons  as  to  self-consciousness,  reason, 
memorv,  will,  and  language,  gathered  from  intro-  List  of  the 

.   *  ,  '  :  P      ?     ,,  v  ,  .      mind's  higher 

spection  and  observation  in  the  earlier  chapters,  it  powers. 
seems  undeniable  that  we  severally  possess  the  following 
powers  :  — 

1.  A  power  of  directly  perceiving  and  reflecting  upon  our 

continued  personal  activity  and  existence  —  sensations 
and  perceptions  being  reflected  on  by  thought  and 
recognised  as  our  own,  and  we  ourselves  being  recog- 
nised as  affected  and  perceiving  —  self-consciousness. 

2.  A  power  of  actively  recalling  passed  thoughts  or  expe- 

riences —  intellectual  memory. 

3.  A  power  of  reflecting  upon  our  sensations  and  per- 

ceptions, and  asking  what  they  are  and  why  they  are  ; 
of  apprehending  abstract  ideas;  of  perceiving  truth 
directly  or  by  ratiocination  and  also  goodness  —  reason. 

4.  A  power  of,  on  certain  occasions,  deliberately  electing 

to  act  either  with,  or  in  opposition  to,  the  apparent 
resultant  of  involuntary  attractions  and  repulsions  — 


5.  A  power  of  giving  expression  by  signs  to  general  con- 
ceptions and  abstract  ideas  ;  a  power  of  enunciating 
deliberate  judgments  by  articulate  sounds  —  language. 
These  powers  result  in  actions  which  are  deliberate  opera- 
tions implying  the  use  of  a  self-conscious,  reflective,  repre- 
sentative faculty. 


198  LESSONS  FHOM  XATUKE.  [CHAP.  VII. 

Are  such  powers,  however,  possessed  by  all  mankind  ? 
which  are  Putting  aside  idiots  as  beings  whose  latent  facul- 

onnmon  to          .  '  ° 

aii  mankind,  ties  are  inaccessible,  aiid  who  are  manifestly  in 
an  abnormal  pathological  condition,  we  have  no  hesitation, 
after  considering  what  has  been  brought  forward  in  preceding 
chapters,  in  affirming  that  they  have.  The  mental  nature  of 
all  men  is  essentially  one  ;  and  if  there  are  those  who  do  not 
understand  all  that  is  above  implied,  they  can  at  least  be 
made  to  understand  it.  The  essential  oneness  of  human  nature 
is,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  last  chapter,  sufficiently  attested 
by  witnesses  the  least  likely  to  be  biassed  in  favour  of  such 
unity,  and  the  most  fitted  by  their  abilities,  and  the  patient 
labour  they  have  bestowed  upon  the  subject,  to  express  an 
authoritative  judgment.  "  Ileason  "  I  take  to  be  a  reflective 
power  which  asks  the  questions  "  What  ?  "  and  "  Why  ? " 
But  Mr.  Tylor  tells  us,  in  a  passage  before  cited : — 

"  Man's  craving  to  know  the  causes  at  work  in  each  event  lie  wit- 
nesses, the  reasons  why  each  state  of  things  he  surveys  is  such  as  it  is 
and  no  other,  is  no  product  of  high  civilisation,  but  a  characteristic  of 
his  race  down  to  its  lowest  stage.  Among  rude  savages  it  is  already  an 
intellectual  appetite,  whose  satisfaction  claims  many  of  the  moments 
not  engrossed  by  war,  or  sport,  or  sleep." — Primitive  Culture,  vol.  i. 
p.  332. 

He  also  remarks : — 

"  The  state  of  things  amongst  the  lower  tribes  which  presents  itself 
to  the  student,  is  a  substantial  similarity  in  knowledge,  arts,  and 
customs,  running  through  the  whole  world.'1 — Researches  into  the  Early 
History  of  Mankind,  p.  231. 

Indeed,  this  author  not  only  witnesses  to  the  essential  unity 
of  man  in  all  places  but  also  in  all  times.  He  says : — 

"  The  historian  and  the  ethnographer  must  be  called  upon  to  show 
the  hereditary  standing  of  each  opinion  and  practice,  and  their  inquiry 
must  go  back  as  far  as  antiquity  or  savagery  can  show  a  vestige,  for 
there  seems  no  human  thought  so  primitive  as  to  have  lost  its  bearing 
on  our  own  thought,  nor  so  ancient  as  to  have  broken  its  connection 
with  our  life." — Primitive  Culture,  vol.  i.  p.  409. 

All  men,  then,  agree  in  possessing  the  faculties  above  enu- 
merated—  namely,  self-consciousness,  reason,  and  will,  with 


CHAP.  VII.]  THE  BEUTE. 

rational  speech.  It  will  not,  probably,  be  contended  by  any 
naturalist  that  Instinct  ever  rises  to  such  a  height  as  this,  but 
many  assert  that  it  contains  such  faculties,  potentially  and  in 
germ,  and  that  there  is,  as  Mr.  Darwin  says,  no  difference  of 
kind,  but  only  one  of  degree,  between  it  and  reason. 

•  Since  we  are  unable  to  converse  with  brutes,*  we  can  but 
divine  and  infer  from  their  gestures,  motions,  and  Danger  of  a 
the  sounds  they  emit,  what  may  be  the  nature  of  lacy. 
their  highest  physical  powers.     Now,  in  this  process  of  infer- 
ence, we  necessarily  risk  being  guilty  of  a  fallacy  similar  to 
that  of  which  a  certain  school  of  Theology  has  shown  us  a 
conspicuous  instance. 

The  whole  process  of  reasoning  being  a  progression  to  the 
unknown  by  means  of  the  known,  we  can  of  course  only  define 
the  former  in  terms  of  the  latter.  All  our  knowledge  having 
human  sensible  experience  as  its  necessary  condition,  scientific 
language  can  only  make  use  of  terms  which  primarily  denote 
such  human  experiences.  Thus,  when  men  speak  of  God  and 
of  his  attributes,  they  are,  of  course,  necessarily  limited  to 
terms  primarily  denoting  human  sensible  experiences,  and 
hence  arises  the  danger  of  theological  anthropomorphism.  In 
the  temporary  philosophical  decline  which  has  accompanied 
the  rise  of  physical  science,  very  many  modern  theologians, 
neglecting  the  old  rational  conception  of  a  Deus  analogus, 
liiive  been  asserting  a  Deus  univocus  with  the  natural  result 
of  producing  the  modern  opposite  error  of  asserting  a  Deus 
xquivocus.  In  other  words,  the  absurdity  of  asserting  that 
the  terms  which  denote  powers  and  qualities  in  man  have  the 
very  same  meaning  when  also  applied  to  God,  has  naturally 
led  to  the  opposite  absurdity  of  denying  that  there  is  any 
relation  whatever  between  certain  terms  as  applied  to  God, 


*  Professor  Huxley  ('Contemporary  Review'  for  November  1871,  p.  464) 
1ms  aski-cl  the  singular  question  :  "  What  is  the  value  of  the  evidence  which 
loads  one  to  believe  that  one's  fellow-man  feels?  The  only  evidence  in  this 
argument  of  analogy,  is  the  similarity  of  his  structure  and  of  his  actions  to 
one's  own."  Surely  it  is  not  by  similarity  of  structure  or  actions,  but  by  lan- 
<l'/">jf,  that  men  are  placed  in  communication  with  one  another,  and  that 
the  rational  intellect  of  each  perceives  the  rationality  and  sensibility  of  hid 
fuilbw-man. 


200  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VII. 

and  tlio  same  terms  as  applied  to  man.  It  lias  become  ne- 
cessary to  return  to  the  old,  safe  via  media  of  an  older  school, 
and  maintain  with  them  that  though  no  term  can  be  used  in 
precisely  the  same  sense  of  man  and  of  God,  yet  that  none 
the  less  there  is  a  certain  relation  of  analogy  between  these 
two  uses  of  the  same  term. 

An  exactly  parallel  but  opposite  error  has  taken  place  in 
biological  science.  Descartes,  that  fruitful  author  of  philo- 
sophic error,  deserted  the  old  moderate  view  which  affirmed 
that  between  the  highest  psychical  powers  of  man  and  brutes 
there  is  a  certain  natural  likeness  and  analogy,  and  gave  rise 
to*  the  notion  that  animals  are  nothing  but  wonderfully 
complex  machines — an  error  naturally  resulting  in  the  oppo- 
site one  now  so  prevalent — the  error,  namely,  that  there  is  a 
substantial  identity  between  the  brute  soul  and  the  soul  of 
man — Biological  Anthropomorphism. 

Statements  and  misrepresentations  of  the  kind  follow  natu- 
rally from  that  tendency  which  exists  on  the  part  of  so  many 
to  be  interested  in  and  attracted  by  anecdotes  in  praise  of 
the  mental  powers  of  brutes.  Wo  see  this  tendency  in  the 
many  fables  about  animals — fables  of  all  ages  and  of  all 
climes — such  as  now  serve  to  amuse  our  childhood  or  to  call 
out  the  skill  of  artists  such  as  Kaulbach. 

It  is  this  biological,  or  inverted,  anthropomorphism,  which 
has  led  to  that  exaggerated  interpretation  of  animal  activities, 
of  which  Mr.  Darwin,  in  his  '  Descent  of  Man,'  has  given  us, 
as  we  shall  shortly  see,  such  an  ever-memorable  example. 
As  an  example  of  the  hasty  attribution  of  human  qualities  to 
brutes,  on  account  of  certain  superficial  resemblances,  we  may 
take  a  sitting  bird.  It  is,  no  doubt,  true  that  the  parent 
birds  have  keen  parental  emotions,  yet  a  particular  conspi- 
cuous act  has  had  very  undue  weight  assigned  to  it  as  a  proof 
of  such  tenderness.  What  praises  of  the  patient  fidelity  of 


*  We  say  "  gave  rise  to,"  because  Descartes  did  not  really  himself  maintain 
that  animals  were  pure  machines.  He  allowed  feeling  to  the  animal,  and  said : 
"  Je  ne  lui  repose  pas  meme  le  sentiment,  en  tant  qu'il  depend  des  organes 
du  corps ;  aiiisi  mon  opinion  n'est  pas  si  cruelle  aux  auiniaux." 


CHAP.  VII.]  THE  BRUTE.  201 

the  bird  sitting  on  her  unhatched  progeny  do  we  not  meet 
with,  and  yet  this  constancy  is  said  to  be  promoted  by  some- 
thing very  different  from  maternal  tenderness !  In  truth,  a 
multitude  of  branching  arteries  and  veins  furnish  such  an 
abundance  of  blood  to  the  bird's  breast  as  to  cause  it  to  seek 
in  the  contact  of  the  eggs  a  refreshing  sensation.  Cabanis 
and  Duges  tell  us*  that  if  a  capon  be  plucked  in  that  region 
which  is  naturally  bare  in  a  sitting  hen,  and  if  an  irritating 
substance  be  applied  to  the  part  so  stripped,  then  not  only 
will  the  local  inflammation  cause  the  capon  to  seek  the  con- 
tact of  eggs  and  to  sit,  but  even  to  act  maternally  to  the 
young  when  they  come  to  be  hatched. 

But  the  distinction  in  kind  between  Instinct  and  lieason  is 
shown  both  by  the  fact  that  the  former  is  not  able  instinct  can- 

.  .  not  perform 

to  do  things  specially  characteristic  of  the  latter,  rational  acts, 
and  by  the  fact  that  it  can  do  other  things  for  which  reason, 
under  sucli  circumstances,  would  be  impotent.  Thus,  no 
animals  employ  rational  language,  nor  do  they  deliberately 
act  in  mutual  concert,  nor  make  use  of  antecedent  expe- 
riences to  intentionally  improve  upon  the  past.  Apes  are 
said,  like  dogs  and  cats,  to  warm  themselves  with  pleasure  at 
deserted  fires,  yet,  though  they  see  wood  burning,  they  are 
unable  to  add  fresh  fuel  for  their  comfort.  Swallows  will 
continue  to  build  on  a  house  which  they  can  see  has  begun 
to  be  demolished.  Flies  will  deposit  their  eggs  on  a  carrion 
plant  instead  of  on  animal  matter.  The  hymenopterous 
insects  show  us,  perhaps,  the  most  wonderful  and  complex  of 
all  insects,  and  yet  Sir  John  Lubbock  has  f  demonstrated,  by 
careful  and  interesting  experiments,  that  there  is  such  an 
habitual  absence  of  any  intercommunication  between  them 
as  to  facts,  as  to  fairly  lead  to  the  inference  that  their  com- 
munications concern  their  feelings  only. 

But  Instinct  can  do  things  impossible  to  Keason.     Thus, 
chickens  newly  hatched  will  so  correctly  adjust  their  rnovc- 


*  '  Rapports  du  Physique  ct  <lti  Moral,'  Ed.  i.  p.  127. 

t  Sec  two  truly  admirable  Papers  rend  before  tho   Linnean  Society  on  the 
19th  of  March  and  17th  of  December,  187 1. 

10 


202  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VII. 

ments  as  at  once  to  pick  up  various  objects.  Some  young 
puppies,  M.  Gratiolet  tells  us,  that  had  never  seen  a  wolf, 
cut  can  do  have  been  thrown  into  convulsions  by  the  srnell  of  a 
cannot  do.  small  pof  tion  of  wolf-skin.  Birds  of  the  first  year 
migrate  readily  to  avoid  a  cold,  of  which  they  can  have  no 
knowledge.  The  young  female  wasp  (Sphex],  without  ma- 
ternal experience,  will  seize  caterpillars  or  spiders,  and, 
stinging  them  in  a  certain  definite  spot,  paralyse  and  deprive 
them  of  all  power  of  motion  (and  probably  also  of  sensation), 
without  depriving  them  of  life.  She  places  them  thus  para- 
lysed in  her  nest  with  her  eggs,  so  that  the  grubs,  when 
hatched,  may  be  able  to  subsist  on  a  living  prey,  unable 
to  escape  from  or  resist  their  defenceless  and  all  but  power- 
less destroyers.  Now,  it  is  absolutely  impossible  that  the 
consequences  of  its  actions  can  have  been  intellectually 
apprehended  by  the  parent  wasp.  Had  she  Eeason  without 
her  natural  Instinct,  she  could  only  learn  to  perform  such 
actions  through  experience  and  the  teaching  (by  precept  or 
example)  of  older  wasps.  Now,  if  such  complex  actions  can 
be  performed  in  this  unconscious  manner  by  insects,  why 
may  not  the  most  seemingly  rational  actions  of  higher  animals 
be  performed  in  a  similar  manner  ?  Some  such  actions,  in- 
deed, singularly  resemble  those  of  Spliex.  Thus,  even  as  to 
mammals,  one  writer  tells  us : — 

"  I  dug  out  five  young  pole-cats,  comfortably  imbedded  in  dry, 
withered  grass ;  and  in  a  side  hole,  of  proper  dimensions  for  such  a 
larder,  I  poked  out  forty  large  frogs  and  two  toads,  all  alive,  but 
merely  capable  of  sprawling  a  little.  On  examination  I  found  that  the 
whole  number,  toads  and  all,  had  been  purposely  and  dexterously  bitten 
through  the  brain." — (See  Magazine  of  Natural  History,  vol.  vi.  p.  206.) 

Again,  let  us  consider  the  carpenter  bee,  which  lays  its 
eggs  in  wooden  excavations,  placed  one  above  another  and 
separated  by  thin  partitions,  the  lower  cell  having  a  commu- 
nication with  the  exterior.  The  egg  of  this  lowest  cell  is 
hatched  first,  and  the  young  readily  escapes  through  the  way 
of  exit  provided  for  it.  The  next  grub  has  to  eat  its  way 
through  the  partition  beneath  to  reach  the  outlet,  and  so  with 


CHAP.  VII.]  THE  BRUTE.  203 

those  successively  placed  higher  up.  How  could  the  mother 
learn  by  Eeason  to  construct  such  a  nest,  or  the  young  so 
learn  to  escape  from  it  ? 

Thus,  then,  both  by  what  it  can  do,  and  by  what  it  cannot, 
Instinct  exhibits  its  fundamental  distinctness  from  Reason. 
But,  indeed,  there  is  no  difficulty  in  quoting  from  our  best- 
known  evolutionists  the  most  striking  declarations  as  to  the 
wide  difference  between  the  highest  psychical  faculties  of 
men  and  brutes.     Thus,  even  Mr.  Darwin  is  con-  Mr.  Herbert 
strained  to  admit,*  that  there  is  "no  doubt,"  but  nSSs?a 
that  the  difference  is  "  enormous."     Mr.  Herbert  Spencer 
also  makes  some  noteworthy  admissions.    He  remarks,  e.g., 
as  to 

"  birds  that  fly  from  inland  to  the  seaside  to  feed  when  the  tide  is 

out,  and  cattle  that  return  to  the  farmyard  at  milking-time 

Even  here  there  is  not  a  purely  intelligent  adjustment  of  inner  to 
outer  sequences,  for  creatures  accustomed  to  eat  or  to  be  milked  at 
regular  intervals  come  to  have  recurrences  of  constitutional  states,  and 
the  sensations  accompanying  these  states  form  the  proximate  stimuli 
to  their  acts."— Psychology,  vol.  i.  pp.  323,  324. 

And,  again,  he  says : — 

"  It  is  anatomically  demonstrable  tliat  the  pairing  and  nidification  of 
birds  in  the  spring  is  preceded  by  constitutional  changes  which  are 
probably  produced  by  more  food  and  higher  temperature.  And  it  is  a 
rational  inference  that  the  whole  series  of  processes  in  the  rearing  of  a 
brood  are  severally  gone  through,  not  with  'any  recognition  of  remote 
ends,  but  solely  made  under  the  stimulus  of  conditions  continuously 
present." 

Also  he  admits  that  we  find  this 

"  higher  order  of  correspondence  in  time,  scarcely  more-  than  fore- 
shadowed among  the  higher  animals,  and  definitely  exhibited  only 
when  we  arrive  at  the  human  race." 

And,  again : — 

"  Only  when  we  come  to  the  human  race  are  correspondences  of  this 
degree  of  speciality  exhibited  with  distinctness  and  frequency." — Op. 
cit.  p.  338. 

*  '  Descent  of  Man,'  vol.  ii.  p.  84. 


204  LESSONS  FJXOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  VII. 

He  also  makes  a  very  important  admission  when  he  says : — 

"  It  might  fairly  be  said  that  the  Indian  fish,  which  catches  insects 
flying  over  the  surface  by  hitting  them  with  jets  of  water,  exhibits  an 
adjustment  of  inner  relations  to  outer  relations  as  special  as  that  shown 
by  the  archer  (who  shoots  high  according  to  the  distance  of  the  object 
aimed  at);  but  considering  that  in  the  fish  nothing  more  is  implied 
than  an.  automatic  connection  between  certain  visual  impressions  and 
certain  muscular  contractions,  it  cannot  be  held  that  there  is  anything 
like  the  complexity  of  correspondence." — Op.  cit.  p.  353. 

Surely  the  very  same  principle  may  be  applied  to  explain 
the  actions  of  the  parrot,  the  pointer,  the  sapajou  cracking  his 
nut  with  a  stone,  or  the  chimpanzee  drinking  out  of  his  tea- 
cup. There  is  nothing  in  any  of  these  actions  indicating  a 
power  different  in  kind  from  that  evidently  possessed  by  the 
fish,  so  aiming  his  watery  jet  as  to  hit  in  the  air  an  object  seen 
from  beneath  the  water  in  spite  of  the  effects  of  refraction. 
Finally,  may  be  cited  the  following  passage : — 

"  The  animal's  nervous  system  is  played  upon  by  external  objects, 
the  clustered  properties  of  which  draw  out  answering  chords  of  feelings, 
followed  by  faintly-reverberating  chords  of  further  feelings ;  but  it  is 
otherwise  passive — it  cannot  evolve  a  consciousness  that  is  independent 
of  the  immediate  environment" — Op.  cit.  pp.  564,  565. 

Here  we  have  the  necessary  results  of  an  absence  of  self- 
consciousuess.  Beings  devoid  of  self-consciousness 

"  differentiate  nothing  consciously ;  they  move,  but  they  know  not 
where,  or  why,  or  when ;  they  see,  but  they  know  not  colour  as  dis- 
tinguished from  sound,  which  they  bear  equally  unconsciously.  They 
know  not  their  eye  as  such ;  they  have  senses  and  perceive,  but  they 
know  not  anything  as  such.  Memory  they  may  have,  but  they  dis- 
tinguish not  the  remembrance  from  the  perception." — The  Psychology 
of  Scepticism  and  Phenomenalism.  By  James  Andrews.  Glasgow : 
J.  Maclefuse,  1874. 

It  may  be  well  here  to  consider  the  anecdotes  narrated 
Mr.  Darwm's  by  Mr.   Darwin  in  support   of  the  rationality  of 
>tea.      kmtes.    Before  doing  so,  however,  we  must  remark 
that  his  statements  given  on  the  authority  (sometimes  second- 
hand authority)  of  others  afford   little  evidence  of  careful 


CIIAP.  VII.]  THE  BRUTE.  205 

criticism.  This  is  the  more  noteworthy  when  we  consider 
the  care  and  pains  which  he  bestows  on  all  the  phenomena 
which  he  himself  examines. 

Thus,  for  example,  we  are  told  on  the  authority  of  Brelim 
that 

"An  eaglo  seized  a  young  cercopithecus,  which,  by  clinging  to  a 
branch,  was  not  at  once  carried  off;  it  cried  loudly  for  assistance, 
upon  which  other  members  of  the  troop,  with  much  uproar,  rushed  to 
the  rescue,  surrounded  the  eagle,  and  pulled  out  so  many  feathers  that 
he  no  longer  thought  of  his  prey,  but  only  how  to  escape." — vol.  i. 
p.  76. 

I  confess  I  wish  that  Mr.  Darwin  had  witnessed  this 
episode.  Perhaps,  however,  he  has  seen  other  facts  suffi- 
ciently similar  to  render  this  one  credible.  In  the  absence, 
of  really  good  evidence,  I  should,  however,  be  inclined  to 
doubt  the  fact  of  a  young  cercopithecus,  unexpectedly 
seized,  being  able,  by  clinging,  to  resist  the  action  of  an 
eagle's  wings. 

Again  he  tells  us  (vol.  i.  p.  41)  that  "  one  female  baboon 
had  so  capacious  a  heart  that  she  not  only  adopted  young 
monkeys  of  other  species,  but  stole  young  dogs  and  cats, 
which  she  continually  carried  about.  Her  kindness,  how- 
ever, did  not  go  so  far  as  to  share  her  food  with  her  adopted 
oil  spring,  at  which  Brehm  was  surprised,  as  his  monkeys 
always  divided  everything  quite  fairly  with  their  own  young 
ones.  An  adopted  kitten  scratched  the  above-mentioned 
affectionate  baboon,  who  certainly  had  a  fine  intellect,  for  she 
was  much  astonished  at  being  scratched,  and  immediately 
examined  the  kitten's  feet,  and  •without  more  ado  bit  off 
the  claws !" 

Another  sensational  statement  is  given  on  the  same  au- 
thority :*  "  A  great  troop  of  baboons  were  crossing  a  valley ; 
some  had  already  ascended  the  opposite  mountain,  and 
some  were  still  in  the  valley ;  the  latter  were  attacked  by 
dogs,  but  the  old  males  immediately  hurried  down  from  the 

*  Op.  tit.  p  75. 


20G  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VII. 

rocks,  and  with  mouths  widely  opened  roared  so  fearfully 
that  the  dogs  precipitately  retreated.  They  were  again 
encouraged  to  the  attack  ;  but  by  this  time  all  the  baboons 
had  re-ascended  the  heights,  excepting  a  young  one,  about 
six  months  old,  who,  loudly  calling  for  aid,  climbed  on  a 
block  of  rock  and  was  surrounded.  Now  one  of  the  largest 
males,  a  true  hero,  came  down  again  from  the  mountain, 
slowly  went  to  the  young  one,  coaxed  him,  and  triumphantly 
led  him  away — the  dogs  l^eing  too  much  astonished  to  make  an 
attach"*  The  last  words  are  truly  puerile;  the  whole  we 
have  no  hesitation  in  characterizing  as  an  audacious  ro- 
mance, though  possibly  "  founded  on  fact."  The  statement 
that  "  the  dogs,"  which  had  not  hesitated  to  attack  "  the 
great  troop  of  baboons,"  were  too  much  overcome  to  assault 
one,  even  while  "slowly"  returning,  or  when  again  retreat- 
ing and  "  leading  away  "  with  him  the  infant  of  six  months, 
will  form  a  good  "  pendant "  to  the  weak-winged  eagle  of  the 
preceding  tale. 

Again  we  readt  of  a  "troop  of  the  Cercopithecus  griseo- 
viridis "  having  rushed  through  a  thorny  brake,  after  which 
"each  monkey  stretches  itself  on  a  branch,  and  another 
monkey  sitting  by  'conscientiously'  examines  its  fur  and 
extracts  every  thorn  or  burr."  In  those  who  know  monkeys, 
even  at  the  Zoological  Gardens,  the  process  of  extraction 
will  create  no  surprise,  but  the  epithet  "conscientiously" 
and  the  word  "  every  "  reveal  the  animus  of  this  too  willing 
witness. 

Again  we  have  a  romance  on  only  second-hand  authority 
(namely  a  quotation  by  Brehm  of  Schimper)  to  the  follow- 
ing effect : — 

"In  Abyssinia,  when  the  baboons  belonging  to  one  species  (C.  gelada) 
descend  in  troops  from  the  mountains  to  plunder  the  fields,  they  some- 
times encounter  troops  of  another  species  (C.  hamadryas),  and  then  a 
fight  ensues.  The  Geladas  roll  down  great  stones,  which  the  Hama- 
dryas  try  to  avoid,  and  then  both  species,  making  a  great  uproar,  rush 
furiously  against  each  other.  Brehm,  when  accompanying  the  Duke 

*  Italics  ours.  t  Op.  cit,  p.  75. 


CHAP.  VII.]  THE  BRUTE.  207 

of  Coburg-Gotha,  aided  in  an  attack  with  fire-arms  on  a  troop  of 
baboons  in  the  pass  of  Meusa  in  Abyssinia.  The  baboons  in  return 
rolled  so  many  stones  down  the  mountain,  some  as  large  as  a  man's 
head,  that  the  attackers  had  to  beat  a  retreat;  and  the  pass  was 
actually  for  a  time  closed  against  the  caravan.  It  deserves  notice  that 
these  baboons  thus  acted  in  concert." — Yol.  i.  p.  51. 

Now,  if  every  statement  of  fact  here  given  be  absolutely 
correct,  it  in  no  way  even  tends  to  invalidate  the  distinction 
we  have  drawn  between  "  instinct "  and  "  reason  ;"  but  the 
positive  assertion  that  the  brutes  "  acted  in  concert,"  when 
the  evidence  proves  nothing  more  than. that  their  actions 
were  simultaneous,  shows  a  strong  bias  on  the  part  of  the 
narrator.  A  flock  of  sheep  will  simultaneously  turn  round 
and  stare  and  stamp  at  an  intruder ;  but  this  is  not  "  con- 
certed action,"  which  means  that  actions  are  not  only  simul- 
taneous, but  are  so  in  consequence  of  a  reciprocal  under- 
standing and  convention  between  the  various  agents.  It 
may  be  added  that  if  any  brutes  were  capable  of  such  really 
concerted  action,  the  effects  would  soon  make  themselves 
known  to  us  so  forcibly  as  to  prevent  the  possibility  of 
mistake. 

Mr.  Darwin  even  permits  himself  to  indulge  in  such 
remarks  as  the  following.  He  says  :*  "  But  can  we  feel  sure 
that  an  old  dog  with  an  excellent  memory  and  some  power 
of  imagination,  as  shown  by  his  dreams,  never  reflects  on 
his  past  pleasures  in  the  chase  ?  and  this  would  be  a  form 
of  self-consciousness.  On  the  other  hand,  Buchner  has  re- 
marked, how  little  can  the  hard-worked  wife  of  a  degraded 
Australian  savage,  who  uses  haidly  any  abstract  words  [ !] 
and  cannot  count  above  four,  exert  her  self-consciousness,  or 
reflect  on  the  nature  of  her  own  existence." 

The  consequences  of  accepting  facts  which  have  no  evi- 
dence in  their  favour  and  many  against  them,  merely  be- 
cause we  cannot  feel  sure  that  they  are  not  true,  would  be 
alarming  indeed.  Here,  however,  for  the  reasons  before 


'  Descent  of  Man,'  vol.  ii.  p.  109. 


208  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  VII. 

given  in  this  chapter,  we  may  feel  quite  sure.  Mr.  Darwin's 
speculation  as  to  the  dog  is  utterly  gratuitous,  since  we  need 
never  introduce  an  unlikely  cause  for  any  phenomenon  when 
one  known  to  exist,  the  dog's  sentient  nature,  is  sufficient 
to  explain  the  phenomenon  in  question.  As  to  the  Aus- 
tralian, experience  shows  us  how  very  slight  powers  of  arith- 
metic may  coexist  with  very  distinct  reflections  on  the 
problems  of  human  existence. 

Again,  Mr.  Darwin  says  :*  "  Who  can  say  what  cows  feel, 
when  they  surround  and  stare  intently  on  a  dying  or  dead 
companion  ?  That  animals  sometimes  are  far  from  feeling 
any  sympathy  is  too  certain ;  for  they  will  expel  a  wounded 
animal  from  the  herd,  or  gore  or  worry  it  to  death."  It  is 
such  passages  as  these  which  make  the  task  of  criticism  so 
painful ;  yet  the  gravity  of  the  issue  leaves  no  alternative, 
though  I  am  anxious  to  keep  the  expression  of  disapproval 
within  the  narrowest  possible  limits  consonant  with  justice. 

To  exaggerate  the  emotions  of  brutes  and  give  them  an 
intellectual  appearance  is,  however,  a  necessity  of  Mr.  Darwin's 
position,  since  (as  we  saw  in  our  fifth  chapter)  he  makes  first 
gregariousness  and  then  social  sympathy  the  origin  of  our 
power  of  moral  perception. 

And  here  a  caution  may  well  be  given  against  the  am- 
biguity which  may  lie  hid  in  the  terms  "  gregarious  "  and 
"  social." 

It  must  never  be  lost  sight  of  that  in  a  "  gregarious 
habit "  there  is  no  moral  element.  First,  because  the  mental 
powers  of  brutes  are  not  equal  to  form  reflective,  deliberate 
judgments;  and,  secondly,  because  all  the  facts,  however 
mutually  beneficial  may  be  their  action,  may  be  explained 
without  the  intervention,  on  their  part,  of  reason.  The 
word  "  social "  is  ambiguous,  since  gregarious  animals  may, 
metaphorically,  be  called  social,  and  man's  social  relations 
may  be  regarded  both  as  to  the  material  benefits  they 
occasion  and  also  morally.  Having  then  first  used  the 

*  Op.  cit.  p.  76. 


CHAT.  Vn.]  THE  BRUTE.  209 

term  "  social "  in  one  sense,  it  may  easily  be  afterwards 
employed  in  the  other  meaning,  and  thus  the  conception 
of  "  moral  action  "  may  be  silently  and  illegitimately  intro- 
duced when  describing  the  habits  of  animals. 

Speaking  of  the  actions  of  gregarious  animals,  Mr.  Darwin 
remarks  that  their  feelings  and  services  are  by  no  means 
extended  to  all  the  individuals  of  the  same  species,  only  to 
those  of  the  same  association.  But  Mr.  Galton  has  shown* 
by  evidence  that  direct  services  are  not  extended  even  to 
members  of  the  same  troop  or  herd. 

We  come  now  to  Mr.  Darwin's  instances  of  brute  ration- 
ality. In  the  first  place  he  tells  us : —  AS  to  brute 

rationality. 

"  I  had  a  dog  who  was  savage  and  averse  to  all  strangers,  and  I  pur- 
posely tried  his  memory  after  an  absence  of  five  years  and  two  days. 
I  went  near  the  stable  where  he  lived,  and  shouted  to  him  in  my  old 
manner ;  he  showed  no  joy,  but  instantly  followed  me  out  walking  and 
obeyed  me,  exactly  as  if  I  had  parted  with  him  only  half  an  hour  before. 
A  train  of  old  associations,  dormant  during  five  years,  had  thus  been 
instantaneously  awakened  in  his  mind." — vol.  i.  p.  45. 

No  doubt !  but  this  is  not  "  reason."  Indeed,  we  could 
hardly  have  a  better  instance  of  the  mere  action  of  associated 
sensible  impressions.  What  have  we  here  which  implies 
more  than  memory,  impressions  of  sensible  objects  and  their 
;iv<  ociation?  Had  there  been  reason  there  would  have  been 
signs  of  joy  and  wonder,  though  such  signs  would  not  alone 
prove  reason  to  exist.  It  is  evident  that  Mr.  Darwin's  own 
explanation  is  the  sufficient  one — namely,  a  train  of  asso- 
ciated sensible  impressions.  Mr.  Darwin  surely  cannot  think 
that  there  is  in  this  case  any  evidence  of  the  dog's  having 
put  to  himself  those  questions  which,  under  the  circum- 
stances, a  rational  being  would  put.  Mr.  Darwin  also  tells 
us  how  a  monkey-trainer  gave  up  in  despair  monkeys  the 
attention  of  which  was  easily  distracted  from  his  teaching, 
while  "a  monkey  which  carefully  attended  to  him  could 
always  be  trained."  But  "attention"  does  not  imply 


See  '  Macmillan's  Magazine '  for  March  1871. 


210  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [Ciup.  VII. 

"  reason."  The  anecdote  only  shows  that  some  monkeys  are 
more  easily  impressed  and  more  retentive  of  impressions 
than  others. 

Again,  we  are  told,  as  an  instance  of  reason,  that  "  Rengger 
sometimes  put  a  live  wasp  in  paper  so  that  the  monkeys  in 
hastily  unfolding  it  got  stung  ;  after  this  had  once  happened, 
they  always  first  held  the  packet  to  their  ears  to  detect  any 
movement  within."  But  here  again  we  have  no  need  to  call 
in  the  aid  of  "  reason."  The  monkeys  had  had  the  group 
of  sensations  "folded  paper"  associated  with  the  other 
groups — "  noise  and  movement "  and  "  stung  fingers."  The 
second  time  they  experience  the  group  of  sensations  "  folded 
paper "  the  succeeding  sensations  (in  this  instance  only  too 
keenly  associated)  are  forcibly  recalled,  and  with  the  recol- 
lection of  the  auditory  sensation  the  hand  goes  to  the  ear. 
Yet  Mr.  Darwin  considers  this  unimportant  instance  of  such 
significance  that  he  goes  on  to  say : — 

"  Any  one  who  is  not  convinced  by  such  facts  as  these,  and  by  what 
he  may  observe  with  his  own  dogs,  that  animals  can  reason,  would  not 
be  convinced  by  anything  I  could  add.  Nevertheless,  I  will  give  one 
case  with  respect  to  dogs,  as  it  rests  on  two  distinct  observers,  and  can 
hardly  depend  on  the  modification  of  any  instinct.  [The  italics  are  mine.] 
Mr.  Colquhoun  winged  two  wild  ducks,  which  fell  on  the  opposite  side 
of  a  stream ;  his  retriever  tried  to  bring  over  both  at  once,  but  could 
not  succeed ;  she  then,  though  never  before  known  to  ruffle  a  feather, 
deliberately  killed  one,  brought  over  the  other,  and  returned  for  the 
dead  bird.  Colonel  Hutchinson  relates  that  two  partridges  were  shot 
at  once,  one  being  killed  and  the  other  wounded ;  the  latter  ran  away, 
and  was  caught  by  the  retriever,  who  on  her  return  came  across  the 
dead  bird;  she  stopped,  evidently  greatly  puzzled,  and  after  one  or 
two  trials,  finding  she  could  not  take  it  up  without  permitting  the 
escape  of  the  winged  bird,  she  considered  a  moment,  then  deliberately 
murdered  it  by  giving  it  a  severe  crunch,  and  afterwards  brought  away 
both  together.  This  was  the  only  known  instance  of  her  having 
wilfully  injured  any  game." 

Mr.  Darwin  adds : — 

"  Here  we  have  reason,  though  not  quite  perfect,  for  the  retriever 
might  have  brought  the  wounded  bird  first  and  then  returned  for  the 
dead  one,  as  in  the  case  of  the  two  wild  ducks." — Vol.  i.  pp.  47,  48. 

Here  I  reply  we  have  nothing  of  the  kind,  and  to  bring 


CHAP.  VIL]  THE  BRUTE.  211 

"  reason "  into  play  is  gratuitous.  The  circumstances  can 
be  perfectly  explained  (and  on  Mr.  Darwin's  own  principles) 
as  evidences  of  the  revival  of  an  old  instinct.  The  ancestors 
of  sporting  dogs  of  course  killed  their  prey,  and  that  trained 
dogs  do  not  do  so  is  simply  due  to  man's  action,  which  has 
suppressed  the  instinct  by  education  and  which  so  continu- 
ally keeps  it  under  control.  It  is  indubitable  that  the  old 
tendency  must  be  latent,  and  that  a  small  interruption  in  the 
normal  retrieving  process,  such  as  occurred  in  the  cases  cited, 
would  probably  be  sufficient  to  revive  it  and  call  the  obso- 
lete habit  into  exercise. 

But  perhaps  the  most  surprising  instance  of  groundless 
inference  is  presented  in  the  following  passage : — 

"  My  dog,  a  full-grown  and  very  sensible  animal,  was  lying  on  the 
lawn  during  a  hot  and  stillday ;  but  at  a  little  distance  a  slight  breeze 
occasionally  moved  an  open  parasol,  which  would  have  been  wholly  das- 
regarded  by  the  dog,  had  any  one  stood  near  it.  As  it  was,  every  time 
that  the  parasol  slightly  moved,  the  dog  growled  fiercely  and  barked. 
He  must,  I  think,  have  reasoned  to  himself  in  a  rapid  and  unconscious 
manner,  that  movement  without  any  apparent  cause  indicated  the  pre- 
sence of  some  strange  living  agent,  and  no  stranger  had  a  right  to  bo 
on  his  territory." — vol.  i.  p.  67. 

The  consequences  deduced  from  this  trivial  incident  are 
amazing.  Probably,  however,  Mr.  Darwin  does  not  mean 
what  he  says  ;  but,  on  the  face  of  it,  we  have  a  brute  credited 
\\iththe  abstract  ideas  "movement,"  "causation,"  and  the 
notions  logically  arranged  and  classified  in  subordinate 
genera — "  agent,"  "  living  agent,"  "  strange  living  agent." 
lie  also  attributes  to  it  the  notion  of  "  a  right "  of  "  terri- 
torial limitation,"  and  the  relation  of  such  "limited  terri- 
tory" and  "personal  ownership."  It  may  safely  be  affirmed 
that  if  a  dug  could  so  reason  in  one  instance  he  would  in 
others,  and  would  give  much  more  unequivocal  proofs  for 
Mr.  Darwin's  use. 

Mr.  Darwin,  however,  speaks  of  reasoning  iu  an  "un- 
conscious manner,"  so  that  he  cannot  really  mean  any  pro- 
cess of  reasoning  at  all;  but,  if  so,  his  case  is  in  no  way 
apposite.  Even  an  insect  can  be  startled,  arid  will  exhibit 


212  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [CnAP.  VII 

as  much  evidence  of  rationality  as  is  afforded  by  the  growl 
of  a  dog ;  and  all  that  is  really  necessary  to  explain  such  a 
phenomenon  exists  in  an  oyster,  or  even  in  the  much-talked- 
of  Ascidian. 

Thus,  then,  it  appears  that,  even  in  Mr.  Darwin's  specially- 
selected  instances,  there  is  not  a  tittle  of  evidence  tending, 
however  slightly,  to  show  that  any  brute  possesses  the  re- 
presentative reflective  faculties.  But  if,  as  we  assert,  brute 
animals  tire  destitute  of  such  higher  faculties,  it  may  well  be 
that  those  lower  faculties  which  they  have  (and  whicli  we  more 
or  less  share  with  them)  are  highly  developed,  and  their 
senses  possess  a  degree  of  keenness  and  quickness  incon- 
ceivable to  us.  Their  minds*  being  entirely  occupied  with 
such  lower  faculties,  and  having,  so  to  speak,  nothing  else  to 
attend  to,  their  sensible  impressions  become  interwoven  and 
connected  to  a  greater  extent  than  in  us.  Indeed,  in  the 
absence  of 'free-will,  the  laws  of  the  association  of  ideas 
obtain  supreme  command  over  the  minds  of  brutes:  the 
brute  being  entirely  immersed,  as  it  were,  in  his  presentative 
faculties. 

There  yet  remains  a  matter  for  consideration,  which  tends 
to  prove  the  fundamental  difference  which  exists  between 
the  mental  powers  of  man  and  brutes :  I  mean  the  mental 
equality  between  animals  of  very  different  grades  of  struc- 
ture, and  their  non-progressiveness.  Considering  the  vast 
antiquity  of  the  great  animal  groups,!  it  is,  indeed,  remark- 
able how  little  advance  in  mental  capacity  has  been  made 
even  by  the  highest  brutes.  This  is  made  especially  evident 
by  Mr.  Darwin's  own  assertions  as  to  the  capacities  of  lowly 
animals.  Thus  he  tells  us  that — 

"  Mr.  Gardner,  whilst  watching  a  shore-crab  (Gelasimus)  making  its 
burrow,  threw  some  shells  towards  the  hole.    One  rolled  in,  and  three 


*  The  words  "  mind,"  "  mental,"  "  intelligence,"  &o.,  are  here  made  use  of  in 
reference  to  the  highest  psychical  faculties  of  brutes,  in  conformity  to  popular 
usage,  and  not  as  strictly  appropriate. 

•f  Mr.  Darwin  (vol.  i.  p.  :-it>0)  refers  to  Dr.  Scutlder's  discovery  of  "  a  fossil 
insect  in  the  Devonian  formation  of  New  Brunswick,  furnished  with  the 
well-known  tympanum  or  stridulating  apparatus  of  the  male  Locustidie." 


CHAP.  VII.]  THE  BEUTE.  213 

other  shells  remained  within  a  few  inches  of  the  mouth.  In  about  five 
minutes  the  crab  brought  out  the  shell  which  had  fallen  in,  and  carried 
it  away  to  the  distance  of  a  foot ;  it  then  saw  the  three  other  shells 
lying  near,  and  evidently  thinking  (the  italics  arc  mine)  that  they  might 
likewise  roll  in,  carried  them  to  the  spot  where  it  had  laid  the  first." — 
vol.  i.  p.  331. 

Mr.  Darwin  adds  or  quotes  the  astonishing  remark,  "  It 
would,  I  think,  be  difficult  to  distinguish  this  act  from  one 
performed  by  man  by  the  aid  of  reason."  Again,  he  tells 
us: — 

"  Mr.  Lonsdale  informs  me  that  ho  placed  a  pair  of  land-snails 
(lldix  pomatia),  one  of  which  was  weakly,  into  a  small  and  ill-provided 
garden.  After  a  short  time  the  strong  and  healthy  individual  dis- 
appeared, and  was  traced  by  its  track  of  slime  over  a  wall  into  an 
adjoining  well-stocked  garden.  Mr.  Lonsdale  concluded  that  it  had 
deserted  its  sickly  mate ;  but  after  an  absence  of  twenty-four  hours 
it  returned,  and  apparently  communicated  the  result  of  its  successful 
exploration,  for  both  then  started  along  the  same  track  and  disappeared 
over  the  wall." — vol.  i.  p.  325. 

Whatever  may  be  the  real  value  of  the  statements  quoted, 
they  harmonize  with  a  matter  which  is  incontest-  Parjty  of 
able.     I  refer  to  the  fact  that  the  intelligence  of  ^"^. 
brutes,  be  they  high  or  be  they  low,  is  essentially  ^£,^1- 
one  in  kind,  there  being  a  singular  parity  between  mal8- 
animals  belonging  to  groups  widely  different  in  type  of 
structure  and  in  degree  of  development.    It  is  difficult  to  see 
in  \vhat  respect  the  " intelligence "  of  these  land-snails  fell 
short  of  that  of  a  gorilla. 

Apart  from  the  small  modifications  which  experience  occa- 
sionally introduces  into  the  habits  of  animals — as  sometimes 
occurs  after  man  has  begun  to  frequent  a  newly-discovered 
island — it  cannot  be  denied  that,  looking  broadly  over  the 
whole  animal  kingdom,  there  is  no  evidence  of  advance  in 
mental  power  on  the  part  of  brutes.  This  absence  of  pro- 
gression in  animal  intelligence  is  a  very  important  con- 
sideration, and  it  is  one  which  does  not  seem  to  be  adverted 
to  by  Mr.  Darwin,  though  the  facts  detailed  by  him  are 
exceedingly  suggestive  of  it. 

When  I  speak  of  this  absence  of  progression,  I  do  not,  of 


214  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CnAr.  VII. 

course,  mean  to  deny  that  the  dog  is  superior  in  mental 
activity  to  the  fish,  or  the  jackdaw  to  the  toad.  What  is 
meant  is  that,  considering  the  vast  period  of  time  that  must 
have  elapsed  (on  Mr.  Darwin's  theory)  for  the  evolution  of 
an  Orang  from  an  Ascidian,  and  considering  how  beneficial 
increased  intelligence  must  be  to  all  in  the  struggle  for  life, 
it  is  inconceivable,  on  Mr.  Darwin's  principles  only,  that  a 
mental  advance  should  not  have  taken  place  greater  in  degree, 
more  generally  diffused,  and  more  in  proportion  to  the  grade 
of  the  various  animals  than  we  find  to  be  actually  the  case. 
For  in  what  respect  is  the  intelligence  of  the  ape  superior  to 
that  of  the  dog  or  of  the  elephant  ?  An  absurd  over-esti- 
mate of  the  psychical  qualities  of  apes  is  common  enough. 
But  with  respect  to  them  the  mistake  is  natural,  seeing  that 
their  resemblance  to  us  in  bodily  form  gives  a  deceptive 
appearance  to  actions  and  tricks  which,  but  for  this  resem- 
blance, would  excite  no  very  special  notice.  Yet  in  fact, 
as  to  apes,  it  cannot  be  said  that  there  is  one  point  in  which 
their  psychical  nature  approximates  to  man  more  than  that 
of  those  of  four-footed  beasts.  But,  again,  where  is  the  great 
superiority  of  a  dog  or  an  ape  over  a  bird  ?  The  falcon 
trained  to  hawking  is  at  least  as  remarkable  an  instance 
of  the  power  of  education  as  the  trained  dog.  The  tricks 
which  birds  can  be  taught  to  perform  are  as  complex  and 
wonderful  as  those  acted  by  the  mammal.  The  phenomena 
of  nidification,  and  some  of  those  now  brought  forward  by 
Mr.  Darwin  as  to  courtship,  are  fully  comparable  with 
analogous  phenomena  of  quasi-intelligence  in  any  beast. 

This,  however,  is  but  a  small  part  of  the  argument.  For 
let  us  descend  to  the  Invertebrata,  and  what  do  we  find  ? — 
a  restriction  of  their  quasi-mental  faculties  proportioned  to 
their  constantly  inferior  type  of  structure  ?  By  no  means. 
We  find,  e.g.,  in  ants,  phenomena  which  simulate  those  of 
an  intelligence  such  as  ours  far  more  than  do  any  pheno- 
mena exhibited  by  the  highest  beasts.  Ants  display  a 
complete  and  complex  political  organization,  classes  of  beings 
socially  distinct,  war  resulting  in  the  capture  of  slaves,  and 


CHAP.  VII.]  THE  BRUTE.  215 

the    appropriation    and    maintenance  of    domestic   animals 
(Aphides)  analogous  to  our  milk-giving  cattle. 

Mr.  Darwin  truthfully  remarks  on  the  great  difference  in 
these  respects  between  such  creatures  as  ants  and  bees,  and 
singularly  inert  members  of  the  same  class,  such  as  the 
scale  insect  or  coccus.  But  can  it  be  pretended  that  natural 
and  sexual  selection  have  alone  produced  these  phenomena  in 
certain  insects,  and  failed  to  produce  them  in  any  other 
mere  animals  even  of  the  very  highest  class?  If  these 
phenomena  are  due  to  a  power  and  faculty  similar  in  kind 
to  human  intelligence,  and  which  power  is  latent  and  capable 
of  evolution  in  all  animals,  then  it  is  certain  that  this  power 
must  have  been  evolved  in  other  instances  also,  and  that  we 
should  see  varying  degrees  of  it  in  many,  and  notably  in  the 
highest  brutes  as  well  as  in  man.  If,  on  the  other  hand,  the 
faculties  of  brutes  are  different  in  kind  from  human  intelli- 
gence, there  can  be  no  reason  whatever  why  animals  most 
closely  approaching  man  in  physical  structure  should  re- 
semble him  in  psychical  nature  also. 

To   criticisms   of  this  nature   addressed  to   Mr.  Darwin, 
Professor  Huxley,  as  already  said,  has  replied  in  the  '  Con- 
temporary Review.'     Adverting  to  the  question  of  "  reason," 
Professor  Huxley  there  asserts  *  that  "  ratiocination  ^0^^,. 
is  resolvable  into  predication,  and  predication  con-  S^ff,.™ 
sists  in  marking,  in  some  way,  the  succession,  the  tionaluJr- 
likeness  and  unlikeness,  of  things  or  their  ideas.     Whatever 
does  this,  reasons ;  and  if  a  machine  produces  these  effects  of 
reason,  I  see  no  more  ground  for  denying  to  it  the  reasoning 
power  because  it  is  unconscious, 'than  I  see  for  refusing  to 
Mr.  Babbage's  engine  the  title  of  a  calculating  machine  on 
the  same  grounds." 

"  Thus  it  seems  to  me  that  a  gamekeeper  reasons,  whether  he 
is  conscious  or  unconscious,  whether  his  reasoning  is  carried  on 
by  neurosis  alone,  or  whether  it  involves  more  or  less  psychosis." 

I,  on  the  other  hand,  consider  that  predication  essentially 


'Contemporary  Review '  for  November  1871,  p.  463. 


210  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [Ciur.  YiL 

consists  not  in  marking  "  succession,  likeness,  and  unlike- 
ness,"  but  in  recognising  tliese  relations  as  true. 

To  this  extent  I  may  shelter  myself  under  the  authority  of 
Mr.  John  Stuart  Mill.  Mr.  Mill,  in  criticising  Sir  William 
Hamilton's  definition  of  judgment,  makes  the  following  re- 
marks ('Examination  of  Sir  William  Hamilton's  Philosophy,' 
p.  346):— 

"  The  first  objection  which,  I  think,  must  occur  to  any  one,  on  the 
contemplation  of  this  definition,  is  that  it  omits  the  main  and  charac- 
teristic element  of  a  judgment  and  of  a  proposition.  .  .  .  When  we  judge 
or  assert,  there  is  introduced  a  new  element,  that  of  objective  reality, 
and  a  new  mental  fact,  belief.  Our  judgments,  and  the  assertions 
which  express  them,  do  not  enunciate  our  mere  mode  of  mentally  con- 
ceiving things,  but  our  conviction  or  persuasion  that  the  facts  as  con- 
ceived actually  exist;  and  a  theory  of  judgments  and  propositions 
which  does  not  take  account  of  this,  cannot  be  a  true  theory.  In  the 
words  of  Eeid,  'I  give  the  name  of  judgment  to  every  determination  of 
the  mind  concerning  what  is  true  or  what  is  false.  This,  I  think,  is 
what  logicians,  from  the  days  of  Aristotle,  have  called  judgment.'  And 
this  is  the  very  element  which  Sir  Wm.  Hamilton's  definition "  [and  I 
may  now  add  Professor  Huxley's  also]  "  omits  from  it." 

Farther  on  Mr.  Mill  says : — 

"  Belief  is  an  essential  element  in  a  judgment.  .  .  .  The  recognition 
of  it  as  true  is  not  only  an  essential  part,  but  the  essential  element  of  it 
as  a  judgment;  leave  that  out,  and  there  remains  a  mere  play  of  thought, 
in  which  no  judgment  is  passed.  It  is  impossible  to  separate  the  idea 
of  judgment  from  the  idea  of  the  truth  of  a  judgment;  for  every  judg- 
ment consists  in  judging  something  to  be  true.  The  element  belief, 
instead  of  being  an  accident  which  can  be  passed  in  silence,  and 
admitted  only  by  implication,  constitutes  the  very  difference  between 
a  judgment  and  any  other  intellectual  fact,  and  it  is  contrary  to  all  the 
laws  of  definition  to  define  judgment  by  anything  else.  The  very 
meaning  of  a  judgment  or  a  proposition  is  something  which  is  capable 
of  being  believed  or  disbelieved ;  which  can  be  true  or  false ;  to  which 
it  is  possible  to  say  yes  or  no." 

In  addition  to  this,  Mr.  Mill,  in  his  notes  on  his  father's 
Mr.  James  Mill's,  'Analysis  of  the  Human  Mind,'  ably  shows, 
against  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  that  rational  belief  cannot  be 
explained  as  being  identical  with  indissoluble  association 
(vol.  i.  p.  402). 

In  denying,  then,  reason  to  brutes — in  denying  that  their 


CHAP.  VII]  THE  BEUTE.  217 

acts  are  rational,  I  do  not,  of  course,  deny  for  a  moment  that 
they  are  rational  in  the  sense  in  which  Mr.  Babbage's  ma- 
chine is  calculating ;  but  what  I  do  maintain  is,  that  brutes 
have  not  the  power  of  forming  judgments  in  the  sense  above 
explained.  And  I  still  more  emphatically  deny  that  brutes 
have  any,  even  the  very  dimmest,  consciousness  of  such  ideas 
as  "  ought "  and  "  moral  excellence."  And  because  I  further 
believe  that  no  amount  of  sensible  experiences  can  generate 
these  conceptions,  I  deny  that  any  brute  is  even  potentially 
a  moral  agent.  Those  who  credit  brutes  with  "  morality," 
do  so  by  first  eliminating  from  that  idea  all  its  essential 
characteristics. 

One  word  now  of  explanation.  Professor  Huxley  seems 
much  disturbed  at  my  speaking  of  virtue  as,  in  his  view,  a 
kind  of  retrieving,  and  accuses  me  of  imposing  an  "  injurious 
nickname,"  and  making  a  "joke."  Nothing  could  have  been 
further  from  my  intention  than  either  the  one  or  the  other. 
As  it  happens  the  expression  was  not  my  own,  but  was  picked 
up  in  conversation  with  as  thorough  a  Darwinian  even  as 
Professor  Huxley  himself,  who  used  it,  as  I  understood,  not 
as  a  nickname,  but  as  a  handy  mode  of  bringing  home  his 
conceptions  to  my  mind.  I  made  use  of  it  in  all  innocence, 
and  I  still  think  it  singularly  apt  and  appropriate,  not  cer- 
tainly to  express  the  conception  "  virtue,"  but  to  bring  home 
the  utilitarian  notion  of  it.  Professor  Huxley  says,  "  What 
if  it  is?  Does  that  make  it  less  virtue?"  I  answer,  unhesi- 
tatingly, that  it  not  only  makes  it  "  less  virtue,"  but  pre- 
vtnts  it  being  virtue  at  all,  unless  it  springs  as  a  habit 
acquired  from  self-conscious  acts'  directed  towards  an  end 
recognised  as  good. 

It  is  perhaps  no  less  decided  a  sensationalist  than  Mr. 
LI-WOS  who  has  of  late  made  the  most  unequivocal  de- 
claration as  to  the  great  difference — a  difference  even  in 
kind  between  the  highest  psychical  faculties  of  brutes,  and 
our  own  mental  powers.  He  tells  us : —  Mr.  Lewes-s 

admissions. 


"  The  animal  feels  the  cosmos,  and  adapts  himself  to  it.    Man  feels 


218  LESSONS  FKOM  NATUKE.  [CHAP.  VII 

the  cosmos,  but  lie  also  thinks  it." — Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,  vol.  i. 
pp.  123, 124. 

Again  lie  says : — 

"  Circles  differ  from  circles  in  degree ;  they  differ  from  ellipses  in 
kiiid.  Whether  large  or  small  the  circle  has  the  same  properties,  and 
these  are  different  from  the  properties  of  the  ellipse.  It  is  true  that  by 
insensible  gradations  the  circle  may  flatten  into  an  ellipse,  or  the  two 
foci  of  the  ellipse  may  blend  into  one,  and  form  a  circle.  But  so  long 
as  there  are  two  foci,  the  ellipse  has  its  characteristic  properties.  In 
like  manner  the  boundaries  of  the  animal  and  human  may  be  found 
insensibly  blending  at  certain  points ;  but  whenever  the  '  animal  circle  ' 
has  become  transformed  into  the  '  human  ellipse,'  by  the  introduction 
of  a  second  centre,  the  difference  ceases  to  be  one  of  degree,  and  becomes 
one  of  kind,  the  germ  of  infinite  variations." — Op.  cit.  pp.  153, 154. 

This  remarkable  passage  contains  even  a  stronger  argu- 
ment in  favour  of  the  distinctness  in  kind  between  the 
faculties  of  men  and  brutes,  even  than  Mr.  Lewes  himself 
intends.  It  does  so  because  Mr.  Lewes  is  wrong  in  saying 
that  "by  insensible  grades  the  circle  may  flatten  into  an 
ellipse."  With  the  least  degree  of  flattening,  the  figure 
ceases  absolutely  to  be  a  circle,  although  our  senses  may 
fail  to  detect  the  aberration.  Mr.  Lewes  also  admits*  that 
brutes  have  "no  conceptions,  no  general  ideas,  no  symbols 
of  logical  operations,"  and  affirms  that  the  absurdity  of 
thinking  brutes  could  be  rational 

"is  so  glaring,  that  we  need  not  wonder  at  profoundly  meditative 
minds  having  been  led  to  reject  with  scorn  the  hypothesis  which  seeks 
for  an  explanation  of  human  intelligence  in  the  functions  of  the  bodily 
organism  common  to  man  and  animals,  and  having  had  recourse  to  the 
hypothesis  of  a  spiritual  agent  superadded  to  the  organism." — Op.  cit. 
p.  157. 

He  also  saysf  that  "animal  imagination  is  reproduc- 
tive, but  not  plastic:  it  never  constructs;"  and  describes J 
the  ' "  knowledge "  of  the  brute  as  "  such  registrations  of 
experience  as  suffice  to  guide  his  actions  in  the  satisfac- 
tion of  immediate  impulses."  In  addition  to  all  this,  he 


*  Op.  cit.  pp.  154,  155.  f  Op.  cit.  p.  1G9. 

J  Op.  cit.  p.  250. 


CHAP.  VII.]  THE  BRUTE.  2]  9 

makes*  the  highly  important  and  suggestive  addition 
that  "between  animal  and  human  intelligence  there  is  a 
gap,  which  can  only  be  bridged  over  by  an  addition  from 
without" 

He  alsof  remarks:  "The  animal  thinks,  but  only  in 
sensations  and  images,  not  in  abstractions  and  symbols.  The 
animal  perceives  no  'object,'  no  'causal  nexus,'  not  being 
able  to  form  such  abstractions  from  his  feelings." 

It  may  be  remarked,  by  the  way,  that  it  is  a  strange  .and 
misleading  abuse  of  language  to  speak  of  "thinking  in 
sensations;"  one  might  as  well  use  the  phrase  "talking  in 
respirations." 

Finally  he  tells  us  :J  "  The  animal  world  is  a  continuum 
of  smells,  sights,  touches,  tastes,  pains,  and  pleasures ;  it  has 
no  objects,  no  laws,  no  distinguishable  abstractions  such  as 
Self  and  Not-self.  This  world  we  can  never  understand, 
except  in  such  dim  guesses  as  we  can  form  respecting  the 
experiences  of  those  born  blind,  guesses  that  are  always 
vitiated  by  the  fact  that  we  cannot  help  seeing  what  we  try 
to  imagine  them  as  only  touching.  ....  If  we  see  a  bud, 
after  we  have  learned  that  it  is  a  bud,  there  is  always  a 
glance  forward  at  the  flower,  and  backward  glances  at  the 
seed,  dimly  associated  with  the  perception.  But  what  animal 
sees  such  things  ?  What  animal  sees  a  bud  at  all,  except  as 
a  visual  sign  of  some  other  sensation  ?  " 

Surely  Hegel  was  far  more  right  than  his  critic,  Mr.  Lewes, 
in  distinguishing  human  feeling  from  animal  feeling,  on  the 
ground  that  thought  is  immanent  in  the  former  and  not  in 
the  latter. 

But  long  ago  the  world-renowned  physiologist,  John 
Muller,  clearly  laid  down  such  distinctions,  saying  §  that 
brutes  may  easily  enough  form  associations  between  sensible 
perceptions,  but  that  to  form  abstract  conceptions 

*  ,.  ,,  ,,  .  JohnMullcr. 

oi    such  operations   as   ot  something  common   to 


*  Op.  eit,  p.  156.  t  '  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,'  vol.  i.  p.  127. 

J  Op.  cit.  p.  140. 

§  Soc  Miiller's  '  Physiology,'  translated  by  Dr.  Baly,  1812,  vol.  ii.  p.  1317. 


220  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  VII. 

many  under  the  notion  of  cause  and   effect,   is  a  perfect 
impossibility  to  them.     He  distinctly  says  that : — 

"  The  cause  of  this  difference  between  man  and  beasts  does  not  lie  in 
the  comparative  lucidity  or  obscurity  of  the  impressions  made  on  their 
minds  respectively ;  for  in  this  respect  there  is  assuredly  no  superiority 
in  the  human  mind.  I  am,  therefore,  of  opinion  that  the  human  mind 
also  would  never  derive  from  the  mere  experience  aiforded  by  the 
senses,  and  from  habit,  the  general  abstract  idea  of  causality,  unless  it 
had  a  certain  power  of  abstraction — a  power,  namely,  of  forming  a 
mental  something  out  of  the  returning  combinations  of  two  things  of 
which  one  requires  the  succession  of  the  other." — (See  Miiller's  Phy- 
siology. Translated  by  Dr.  Baly,  1842,  vol.  ii.  p.  1347.) 

He  adds  that  although  dogs  will  become  accustomed  to 
perceive  that  hats  and  caps  of  various  forms  are  put  on  the 
head,  to  recognise  their  master  whether  naked  or  clothed, 
and  sticks  of  different  shapes,  yet  the  notions  of  identity 
and  constancy,  as  opposed  to  difference  and  variability,  are 
beyond  the  limits  of  their  psychical  powers. 

It  is  undeniable,  then,  that  Instinct,  as  made  known  to  us 
Man'siower  in  and  by  animals,  is  something  very  different 
lacuities.  from  Keason  in  its  developed  condition.  Such  being 
the  broad  distinction  between  the  highest  psychical  faculties 
of  men  and  brutes,  we  may  proceed  to  consider  whether  any 
of  the  lower  faculties  of  the  former  can  throw  any  light  upon 
such  highest  faculties  of  the  latter.  In  considering  our 
highest  mental  powers,  we  have  already  seen  that  besides 
deliberate  thought,  inference,  voluntary  attention,  active 
memoiy,  will,  moral  judgment,  and  speech,  we  have  direct  per- 
ception, association,  automatic  attention,  involuntary  memory, 
indeliberate  volition,  sympathetic  emotion,  and  emotional 
expression.  It  may  be  well  here  to  look  a  little  further  at 
these  and  some  cognate  matters,  though  space  will  only 
permit  us  to  do  so  in  a  very  cursory  manner. 

In  a  healthy  condition,  digestion,  assimilation,  and  growth 
are  all  performed  by  us  in  utter  unconsciousness,  as  are  the 
essential  and  intimate  processes  of  respiration  and  reproduc- 
tion ;  and  all  these  are  faculties  shared  by  us,  not  only  with 
every  animal,  but  with  every  plant.  Another  faculty  is 


CHAP.  VII.]  THE  BEUTE.  221 

shared  by  us  with  animals,  and  is  ministered  to  by  our 
nervous  system,  though  still  without  the  intervention  of 
consciousness.  This  is  the  now  familiar  power  of  "reflex 
action,"  a  power  which  gives  rise  to  movements  in  response 
to  uufelt  stimuli,  such  movements  becoming  positively  more 
energetic  with  the  advent  of  insensibility.* 

Thus  when  the  back  has  been  broken  by  an  injury  so  that 
the  patient  has  no  longer  the  slightest  power  of  feeling  with 
his  lower  limbs,  yet  none  the  less  the  foot  will  withdraw 
itself  from  tickling  as  if  a  sensation  were  consciously  felt. 

A  medical  friend  mentioned  to  me  a  short  time  ago  a 
curious  instance  of  the  external  manifestation  of  apparent 
self-consciousness  which  none  the  less  was  really  absent.  He 
was  removing  a  lady's  finger  who  was  under  the  influence  of 
nitrous  oxide.  All  the  time  she  was  weeping  and  exclaiming, 
"  Oh,  my  poor  finger !"  &c.  Yet,  on  recovery,  she  had  not  at 
first  the  slightest  knowledge  that  the  operation  had  been 
performed. 

As  to  the  lower  animals,  multitudes  of  experiments  demon- 
strate that  the  performance  of  varied  and  complex  consenta- 
neous movements  may  be  unaccompanied  by  even  sensation — 
as  in  the  case  of  the  lady,  or  of  the  patient  with  the  fractured 
spine.  Thus  a  frog  which  has  been  decapitated  will  none  the 
less  join  its  hind  legs  together  and  push  away  a  probe  intro- 
duced into  the  cloaca.  Even  more  remarkable  is  the  fact 
that  a  frog  which  has/  not  only  lost  its  head  but  even  the 
greater  part  of  its  body  also,  will  similarly  act  with  apparent 
volition.  The  case  alluded  to  is  when  the  head  is  removed 
and  also  the  posterior  part  of  the  trunk  and  the  lower 
extremities,  the  part  left  being  only  the  anterior  portion  of 
the  body  together  with  the  arms.  If  this  operation  be  per- 
formed on  a  male  frog  at  the  breeding  season,  and  if,  after 
its  performance,  the  little  wart-like  prominence  on  its  fore 
paw  (which  at  that  season  is  in  the  place  of  a  thumb)  be 
touched,  the  two  arms  immediately  fly  together  in  an 


*  For  good  examples  sec  Dr.  Carpenter's  '  Mental  Physiology,'  1874,  p.  70. 


222  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  VII. 

embrace,  just  as  they  would  do  in  a  living  and  perfect  frog 
in  the  act  of  clasping  the  female. 

There  is,  however,  another  class  of  actions  which  in  us 
result,  indeed,  from  sensations,  but  which  take  place  auto- 
matically, and  without  the  intervention  of  our  will,  or  even 
of  our  attention. 

Thus,  when  an  object  suddenly  approaches  our  eye,  the 
eyelids  may  close  almost  simultaneously  with  the  experience 
of  the  sensation.  A  sudden  or  unwonted  sound  will  cause 
the  whole  frame  to  start — a  direct  and  immediate  sense- 
perception,  producing  a  result  before  we  have  time  to  inquire 
into  the  cause  of  that  affection  of  our  sense.  The  act  of 
swallowing  an  object  placed  far  back  in  the  mouth  is  probably 
simply  reflex,  but,  as  Dr.  Alison  has  remarked,*  the  initial 
act  of  deglutition,  that  of  passing  the  food  backwards  from 
the  tongue  to  the  isthmus  faucium,  is  due  to  a  sometimes 
almost  irresistible  propensity  to  swallow  whatever  grateful 
food  or  drink  is  in  the  mouth.  Again,  as  to  the  act  of 
sucking,  Bichat  says : — 

"  It  is  instinct,  which  I  do  not  understand,  and  of  which  I  cannot 
give  the  smallest  account,  which  makes  the  infant,  at  the  time  of  birth, 
draw  together  its  lips  to  commence  the  action  of  sucking." 

Indeed,  actions  of  this  kind  are  commonly  spoken  of  as 
instinctive  ;  and  such  are  those  we  perform-  in  walking 
through  crowded  streets  absorbed  in  a  reverie,  or  in  running 
up  or  down  stairs — when,  indeed,  any  direction  of  the  atten- 
tion upon  our  successive  actions  tends  but  to  mar  them. 
Allied  to  these  actions,  also,  are  the  wonderful  wanderings 
of  somnambulists.  Dr.  Carpenter  givesf  an  amusing  account 
of  the  spontaneous  production  of  movements  in  response  to 
felt  stimuli  on  the  part  of  certain  somnambulists.  He  says 
of  such  that,  if  their  arm  be 

"  advanced  forward  in  the  position  of  striking  a  blow,  ....  the  som- 
nambulist is  very  apt  to  put  it  into  immediate  execution."  On  one  occa- 
sion, when  Dr.  Carpenter  was  present, "  a  violent  blow  was  struck,  which 


*  See  Todd's  '  Cyclopaedia,'  vol.  iii.  p.  4. 
f  'Mental  Physiology,'  1874,  p.  605. 


CHAP.  VII.]  THE  BRUTE. 

chanced  to  alight  upon  a  second  somnambulist  within  reach ;  his  com- 
bativeness  being  thereby  excited,  the  two  closed  and  began  to  belabour 
one  another  with  such  energy  that  they  were  with  difficulty  separated. 
Although  their  passions  were  at  the  moment  so  strongly  excited  that, 
even  when  separated,  they  continued  to  utter  furious  denunciations 
against  each  other,  yet  a  little  discreet  manipulation  of  their  muscles 
soon  calmed  them,  and  put  them  into  perfect  good  humour." 

A  very  singular  and  complete  case  of  automatism  has 
occurred  in  France,*  where  a  man  who  was  severely  wounded 
in  the  head  in  the  late  war  passes  a  day  or  two  of  each 
month  in  a  condition  in  which  his  consciousness  seems 
entirely  to  disappear,  and  every  sense  but  touch  is  dormant, 
while  his  acts  are  entirely  directed  through  the  suggestions 
offered  to  him  by  objects  he  feels. 

But  apart  from  all  abnormality,  such  actions  as  walking 
and  talking,  or  playing  the  piano,  show  that  wonderful 
effects  may  be  produced  by  the  sensibility,  apart  from  self- 
consciousness,  and  show  how  wonderfully  different  is  sense- 
perception  from  thought. 

Miss  Cobbe's  remarks  on  this  matter  may  be  here  referred 
to.  She  says  of  music-playing : — 

"  Here  we  seem  not  to  have  one  alone,  bTit  a  dozen.  Two  different 
sets  of  hieroglyphics  have  to  be  read  at  once,  and  the  right  hand  has 
to  be  guided  to  attend  to  one  of  them,  the  left  to  another.  All  the  ten 
fingers  have  their  work  assigned  as  quickly  as  they  can  move.  The 
mind — or  something  which  does  duty  as  mind— interprets  scores  of 
A  sharps,  and  B  flats  and  C  naturals  into  black  ivory  keys  and  white 
ones ;  crotchets  and  quavers  and  demisemiquavers,  rests,  and  all  tho 
mysteries  of  music.  The  feet  are  not  idle,  but  have  something  to  do 
with  the  pedals;  and  if  the  instrument  be  a  double-action  harp  (or  an 
organ),  a  task  of  pushings  and  pullings  more  difficult  than  that  of  tho 
hands.  And  all  this  time  the  performer — the  conscious  performer — is 
in  the  seventh  heaven  of  artistic  rapture  at  the  results  of  all  this  tre- 
mendous business,  or  perchance  lost  in  a  flirtation  with  the  individual 
who  turns  the  leaves  of  the  music-book,  and  is  justly  persuaded  she  is 
giving  him  the  whole  of  her  soul." — (See  Macmillan's  Magazine,  No- 
rm ibcr  1870,  p.  26.) 

Wo  could  hardly  wish  for  a  stronger  instance  of  how 
sensations  may  coalesce  and  become  agglutinated  together  in 

*  See  « Medical  Times '  for  July  28th,  1874.  This  cnso  was  cited  by  Pro- 
fessor Huxloy,  at  Bolfast.  Seo  '  Nature,'  of  September  3rd,  1874,  p.  304. 


224:  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VII. 

complex  aggregations  so  as  to  act  independently  of  intel- 
ligence. Moreover,  even  where  actions  are  distinctly  at- 
tended to  and  deliberately  willed,  all  the  several  nervous 
and  muscular  acts  which  condition  such  actions  are  performed 
unconsciously  and  involuntarily. 

A  striking  and  very  complete  demonstration  of  the 
difference  between  sense-perception  and  thought  has  been 
presented  by  a  distinguished  writer  in  the  '  Dublin  Review  '* 
as  follows: — 

"Let  it  be  supposed  that  I  am  the  spectator  of  a  great  battle. 
Posted  upon  the  vantage  ground  of  a  lofty  tower,  I  see  it  begin,  con- 
tinue, and  come  to  an  end.  Early  in  the  morning,  whilst  the  rays  of 
the  summer  sun  are  yet  slanting  nearly  level  across  the  plain  below, 
one  host  is  coming  on  and  massing  its  battalions  where  the  slight  rise 
of  the  ground  meets  the  sky.  Opposite  to  it  is  the  vast  irregular  semi- 
circle of  the  enemy,  half  hidden  in  dips  and  hollows,  one  flank  resting 
upon  a  wood,  and  a  broad  high  road  running  through  the  centre  of 
his  position.  The  battle  begins  with  the  advance  of  a  strong  division 
on  one  side,  and  a  heavy  fire  of  shells  from  batteries  of  both  the  armies. 
The  advancing  forces  are  met  by  others;  the  sharp  cracking  and 
rattling  of  the  rifles  mingles  with  the  roar  of  the  cannon ;  more  forces 
engage ;  the  battle  is  general  all  along  the  line.  The  noise  and  the 
smoke  confuse  the  spectator.  There  is  a  retreat,  advance,  flight,  first 
on  one  part  of  the  field,  then  on  another.  Bodies  of  troops  are  broken, 
the  dead  begin  to  strew  the  field,  and  the  bearers  of  the  wounded  pass 
swiftly  between  the  battle  and  the  rear.  Brilliant  masses  of  cavalry 
thunder  down  upon  bright  lines  of  bayonets,  that  wither  them  with  far- 
reaching  death.  Officers  gallop  hither  and  thither ;  the  reserves  como 
up ;  shouts  as  of  victory  are  heard,  and  with  a  general  advance  of  one 
army,  the  other  is  driven  back,  broken,  put  to  flight,  slain,  or  taken, 
until  the  wave  of  war  seems  to  pass  away  over  the  sky-line  from 
whence  in  the  morning  the  attack  had  been  made.  The  sun  sets  and 
the  moon  rises  upon  reek,  blood,  dead  and  dying  men,  plunderers, 
slowly  vanishing  smoke,  and  what  seems  like  silence.  All  this  scene 
I  have  taken  in  with  my  senses.  Complicated  as  it  has  been,  I  have 
followed  it  with  accuracy,  estimated  distances  and  velocities  correctly, 
and  formed  a  fair  impression 'of  what  has  actually  been  transacted. 
What  is  more  than  this,  I  have  that  scene  with  me  still,  although  it  is 
past  never  to  return.  I  can  recall  it  on  the  following  day,  a  year  after, 
now.  And  when  I  recall  it,  it  seems  to  be  the  same  in  its  details  as 
when  I  saw  it.  The  battle-field  comes  back  to  me  with  its  apparent 


*  See'  the  Number  for  July  1871,  vol.  xvli.  pp.  26-3i. 


CHAP.  VII.]  THE  BRUTE.  225 

space  and  breadth — tho  horizon,  the  wood,  the  hollows,  and  the  road. 
I  realize  the  colour — the  green  of  the  grass  and  of  the  springing  corn, 
with  their  different  shades,  the  darker  wood,  the  red  and  the  blue  of 
the  massed  troops,  the  glitter  of  helmet,  bayonet,  and  scabbard,  tho 
flash  of  sabres,  the  lightning  and  black  storm  of  the  guns,  great  and 
small.  I  seem  to  hear  the  sounds.  The  din  of  roaring  culverin  and 
bursting  missile,  the  noise  of  men  and  of  horses,  the  far-off  rushing, 
audible  and  desperate,  so  far  away — how  clear  they  come  back ! 
And  I  distinguish  in  my  fancy  all  the  movements  and  mano3uvres  of 
that  hard-fought  day :  the  charges,  the  melees,  the  retreats,  the  pur- 
suits. Many  a  slight  and  momentary  scene  or  sound  revives — the 
gallant  rider  throwing  up  his  arms  as  the  fatal  bullet  found  him  out, 
the  plumed  hat  with  which  the  field  officer  waved  on  his  men,  the  mad 
riderless  horse  that  galloped  my  way,  the  wild  shriek  that  once  and 
again  had  come  up  out  of  the  uproar  and  appalled  me.  It  all  remains ; 
not  perhaps  as  fresh  to-day  as  it  was  yesterday,  but  quite  unmistake- 
able ;  and  it  is  probable  that  I  shall  carry  it  with  me  to  my  last 
moments.  If  I  lose  any  of  the  details  I  can  often  recall  them  by  first 
of  all  recalling  what  preceded  or  followed — one  fragment  of  the  picture 
suggests  another.  And  even  if  I  meet  with  similar  details  in  quite 
other  scenes,  my  battle  is  brought  back  to  my  imagination.  The 
harmless  firing  of  volunteer  artillery  recalls  the  fearful  volleys  of  that 
day.  I  cannot  see  the  smoke  of  a  weed  fire  hanging  in  the  air  of  a 
March  afternoon,  or  watch  the  mists  curling  along  tho  sides  of  a 
wooded  hill  after  rain,  without  having  the  lurid  canopy  of  that  field  in 
my  thought  again.  When  I  mount  a  church  tower,  and  look  out  over 
Yorkshire  wold  or  Cornish  moor,  I  range  my  armies  as  they  once 
stood  on  another  plain  far  away.  The  smell  of  the  blue-bells  never 
fails  to  make  me  think  of  that  day,  for  there  was  a  patch  of  blue-bells 
under  the  trees  by  my  post  of  observation.  Whenever  I  see  again  that 
peculiar  arrangement  of  the  clouds  that  marked  one  moment  of  tho 
day,  I  recollect  the  tremendous  rush  of  cavalry  there  was  just  then. 
Nay,  if  I  had  reason  during  the  fight  to  fear  for  my  own  life  or  safety, 
there  are  moments  when  a  tremor  of  my  nerves,  proceeding  from  fear 
or  ill-health,  or  from  surprise,  will  carry  me  back  from  the  midst  of  a 
crowd  .and  from  the  engrossment  of  interesting  conversation  to  the 
moment  when  I  stood  solitary  and  anxious  so  long  before  upon  tho 
tower." 

He  goes  on : — 

"  Let  us  suppose  that  the  man  who  witnessed  the  battle  already 
mentioned  had  lived  for  several  years  after  it,  and  neither  during  its 
occurrence  nor  since  had  travelled  out  of  the  region  of  impressions 
and  reproduction  described  above.  And  let  it  bo  supposed  that,  one 
day  under  circumstances  of  peculiar  quietness  and  solitude,  there 
suddenly  arose  within  his  mind  a  reflection— the  reflection,  for  iu- 

11 


226  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [CnAr.  VII. 

stance,  that  the  battle  after  all  was  utterly  useless.  Surely  this  is  a 
step  into  a  higher  atmosphere.  He  did  not  see  that  in  the  battle  itself. 
'  Utility'  did  not  come  in  through  his  eyes  and  cars.  It  certainly  did 
not  exist  in  the  battle.  For  the  same  reason  it  could  not  have  existed, 
and  so  been  impressed  on  his  sense,  in  any  other  battle  or  in  any  other 
incident  whatever.  Besides,  even  if  it  were  possible  that  it  had  existed 
elsewhere,  and  been  caught  by  the  sense,  the  difficulty  would  still 
remain  of  accounting  for  its  connection  with  that  particular  battle  — 
connected,  be  it  observed,  not  as  when  one  sight  or  sound  suggests 
another  without  suggesting  a  relation,  but  by  a  definite  process  of 
affirming  the  battle  to  be  what  it  did  not  at  all  declare  itself  to  be. 
Can  a  relation  or  an  affirmation  be  given  in  sensible  impression — in  re- 
iterated shocks  of  the  sense  ?  This  is  the  deeper 'question  which  is  forced 
upon  us.  We  may  leave  out  of  consideration  the  abstract '  utility '  and 
the  difficulties  attending  its  origin  and  application.  The  question  is, 
Can  the  sense  say  anything — make  a  judgment  at  all  ?  Can  it  furnish 
the  blank  formula  of  judgment — the  '  is/  in  '  A  is  B '  ?  The  grass  of 
the  battle-field  was  green,  and  the  sense  gave  both  the  grass  and  the 
greenness ;  but  did  it  affirm  that  '  the  grass  is  green '  ?  It  may  be 
answered  that '  grass '  and  '  green '  together  form  one  complex  sensible 
object,  which  is  an  object  under  space  and  time,  and  therefore  of 
sense.  But  against  this  the  rejoinder  at  once  is,  that  the  sense 
may  indeed  take  in  and  report  (so  to  speak)  a  complex  object,  but  that 
in  this  case  the  question  is,  not  about  the  complex  object,  but  about 
the  complexity  of  the  object.  It  is  one  thing  to  see  green  '  grass,'  and 
evidently  quite  another  to  affirm  the  greenness  of  the  grass.  The  differ- 
ence is  all  the  difference  between  seeing  two  things  united  and  seeing 
them  as  united.  It  may  be  further  contended  that '  grass '  is  an  object 
of  sense,  and  '  greenness '  also  is  an  object  of  sense,  being  the  remem- 
brance or  revival  of  a  certain  frequently-repeated  sensation,  which,  in 
order  to  label  it,  has  been  denominated  greenness ;  and  since  both  the 
terms  of  the  judgment  are  objects  of  sense,  the  juxtaposition  or  com- 
position of  the  terms  may  also  be  effected  by  the  sense.  But  the  reply 
again  is  evident.  '  Green,'  in  the  sense  of '  greenness,'  cannot  have  come 
from  the  sense — that  is,  from  any  faculty  which  is  impressed  only  by  a 
repetition  of  shocks  in  space  and  time :  for  first,  it  is  not  the  greenness 
of  any  particular  object,  but  greenness  in  general ;  secondly,  it  is  not 
the  greenness  of  all  the  green  objects  experienced  in  the  past,  but,  as  is 
admitted,  a  general  idea  acquired  from  these,  and  labelled  or  named ; 
and,  thirdly,  even  if  it  were  the  greenness  of  a  particular  sensible 
object,  the  sense,  as  we  have  already  contended,  could  not  have  given 
it,  because  the  sense  only  gives  '  green.'  A  further  important  con- 
sequence follows.  If  in  the  judgment  '  the  grass  is  green/  '  green ' 
cannot  have  come  altogether  from  sense,  then  neither  can  '  grass '  have 
come  altogether  from  sense.  In  other  words,  '  grass '  seen  or  known 
by  sense  is  a  different  mental  object  to  'grass'  as  the  term  of  an 


CHAP.  VIL]  THE  BEUTE.  227 

affirmation  or  judgment.  For,  in  this  particular  judgment,  of  what  is 
'  green '  affirmed  ?  Of  this  plant  called  '  grass.'  But '  green '  is  a  part 
of  the  object  'grass'  as  it  comes  to  the  sense.  The  sense  knows  no 
such  thing  as  green  and  no  such  thing  as  grass  existing  separately, 
over  against  each  other,  comparably ;  it  only  knows  a  particular  plant 
which  would  not  (by  hypothesis)  be  this  particular  plant  at  all  unless 
it  were  green.  And  therefore,  just  as  the  term  '  green '  in  the  affirma- 
tion contains  in  it  an  element  not  furnished  by  sense,  so  does  the  other 
term  'grass.'  It  is  evident  then,  that  not  only  must  we  say  of  a 
judgment  that  the  relation  it  expresses  by  the  word  '  is '  cannot  have 
been  furnished  by  sense-impressions,  but  we  must  also  say  that  the 
very  terms  of  that  relation  or  judgment  must  also  have  been  derived 
from  another  source. 

"  It  need  hardly  be  insisted  that  the  terms  of  this  judgment,  let 
alone  the  '  is '  of  the  judgment,  are  independent  of  space  and  time. 
Not  only  so,  but  they  so  absolutely  exclude  and  transcend  space  and 
time  that  to  think  them  under  space  and  time  would  be  to  destroy 
them.  'Green,'  as  we  have  so  often  said,  is  not  this  greenness,  but 
greenness  in  general ;  but  no  such  thing  as  greenness  in  general  exists 
in  rerum  natura,  or  can  be  conceived  to  exist.  But  if  greenness  be 
thought  under  space  (so  much)  and  time  (so  long)  then  it  is  no  longer 
greenness,  but  some  green  thing.  And  '  grass '  also,  in  the  judgment, 
is  independent  of  space  and  time.  For  to  judge  that  grass  is  green 
implies,  as  we  have  said,  a  mental  separation  of  this  grass  from  its 
greenness;  for  you  cannot  compare  two  things  between  which  no 
separation  exists. 

"  But  this  grass  does  not  exist  in  space  or  time  separated  from  its 
greenness ;  and  so  far  as  it  is  thought  under  space  and  time,  it  actually 
is  (the  same  as)  green.  Therefore  as  it  occurs  in  the  given  judgment, 
it  excludes  space  and  time.  And  the  same  reasoning  might  be  made 
as  strongly  in  regard  to  the  copula, '  is.'  If  a  brute  could  think  '  is ' 
brute  and  man  would  be  brothers.  '  Is,'  as  the  copula  of  a  judgment, 
implies  the  mental  separation  and  recombination  of  two  terms  that 
only  exist  united  in  nature,  and  can  therefore  never  have,  impressed 
the  sense  except  as  one  thing.  And  '  is '  considered  as  a  substantive 
verb,  as  in  the  example  '  This  man  is,'  contains  in  itself  the  application 
of  the  copula  of  judgment  to  the  most  elementary  of  all  abstractions — 
'  tiling,'  or  '  something.'  Yet  if  a  being  has  the  power  of  thinking — 
'  thing,'  it  has  the  power  of  transcending  space  and  time  by  dividing 
or  decomposing  the  phenomenally  one.  Here  is  the  point  where 
instinct  ends  and  reason  begins." 

This  author  also  well  remarks*  that  excess  of  sensation 
paralyses  the  sense,  disintegrating  the  tissues;  but  with 

*  Op.  tit.  p.  33. 


LESSONS  FROM  NATDEE.  [CHAP.  VII. 

regard  to  the  "abstract"  no  amount  of  clearness  or  definite- 
ness  injures.  "The  sensible  eye  may  be  blinded  by  light, 
but  the  eye  of  the  mind  was  never  blinded  by  truth." 

The  existence  of  emotion  apart  from  intellectual  apprehen- 
sion need  not  again  be  more  than  adverted  to,  and  little  need 
be  said  as  to  that  spontaneous  tendency  to  imitation  which  at 
least  most  of  us  possess  in  some  degree.  As  to  this  latter 
matter,  Mr.  Darwin  remarks : — 

"  This  is  exhibited  in  the  most  extraordinary  manner  in  certain  brain 
diseases,  especially  at  the  commencement  of  inflammatory  softening  of 
the  brain,  and  has  been  called  the  '  echo  sign.'  Patients  thus  affected 
imitate,  without  understanding,  every  absurd  gesture  which  is  made, 
and  every  word  which  is  uttered  near  them,  even  in  a  foreign  lan- 
guage."— See  his  Expression  of  the  Emotions,  p.  356,  where  he  refers  to 
Dr.  Bateman  on  "  Cephalea,"  1870,  p.  110. 

To  sum  up,  then,  what  our  rapid  survey  has  seemed  to 
teach  us  about  ourselves,  it  seems  we  may  establish 

Listofthem.      ,          „  ,,        .  .   .  .    .. 

the  following  propositions :  Man  is  a  persisting 
being,  consisting  of  a  complex  organism,  possessing,  besides 
the  highest  psychical  powers  already  enumerated,  the  follow- 
ing powers  and  activities  also  : — 

1.  Vegetative  powers  of  nutrition,  growth,  and  reproduction. 

2.  A  power  responding  to  unfelt  stimuli  by  means  of 

nervous  interconnections — reflex  action. 

3.  A  power  of  inadvertently  performing  appropriate  actions 

in  response  to  felt  stimuli,  such  actions,  termed  in- 
stinctive, being  provided  for  beforehand  by  the  special 
organisation  of  the  body. 

4.  A  power  of  experiencing  sensible  pleasure  and  pain. 

5.  A  power  of  indeliberately  perceiving  sensible  objects, 

of  which  some  start  or  exclamation  may  be  the  sign 
— sensible  perception. 

6.  A  power  of  effecting  the  coalescence,  agglutination,  and 

combination  of  sensations  in  more  or  less  complex 
aggregations,  and  so  simulating  inference. 

7.  A  power  of  automatic  or  organic  memory,  which  may 

exhibit  itself  in  unintellectual  imitation. 


CHAP.  VII.]  THE  BEUTE.  229 

8.  A  power  of  responding  by  appropriate  actions  to  plea- 

surable and  painful  sensations  and  emotions — organic 
volition.  • 

9.  A  power  of  experiencing  vague  pleasurable  and  painful 

feelings — emotional  sensibility. 

10.  A  power  of  expressing  such  feelings  by  sounds  or  by 
gestures  understood  by  our  fellows,  and  replied  to 
by  corresponding  sounds  and  gestures  —  emotional 
language. 

The  above  ten  groups  are  composed  of  powers  and  resulting 
actions  which  may  be  performed  without  deliberation  and 
self-consciousness.  For  these  groups  it  is  necessary  that  the 
soul  should  sensibly  perceive  existing  things,  but  it  is  not 
necessary  that  it  should  intellectually  perceive  their  exist- 
ence ;  that  it  should  feel  itself  existing,  but  not  that  it  should 
intellectually  recognise  its  own  existence ;  that  it  should  feel 
relations  existing  between  objects,  but  not  that  it  should 
recognise  them  as  relations ;  that  it  should  remember,  but 
not  intentionally  seek  to  recollect;  that  it  should  feel 
and  express  emotion,  but  not  that  it  should  intellectually 
advert  to  it ;  that  it  should  seek  the  pleasurable,  but  not 
that  it  should  consciously  make  such  pleasure  its  deliberate 
aim. 

We  have  already  seen  that  the  Instinct  of  animals  is 
something  very  different  from  our  developed  Reason  ;  Their  rcia- 

,.,..  .   .       .  ..  tion  to  the 

but  their  highest  psychical  faculties  appear  to  answer  psychical  fa- 
pretty  closely  to  the  above  indeliberate  human  brutes. 
faculties,  and  thus  we  come  to  see  not  only  what  Instinct 
differs  from,  but  also  what  it  resembles. 

The  remark  will  here  naturally  occur  to  many  that  reason 
is  only  gradually  made  manifest  in  ourselves,  and  The  develop 

:        .  .  J  .,..,,  mentofthe 

that  the  history  of  the  human  individual  seems  to  individual, 
show  that  the  indeliberate  faculties  may  grow  into  the  deli- 
berate ones,  and  thus  the  latter  can  only  be  considered  as 
differing  from  the  former  in  degree,  and  not  in  kind. 

To  this  it  may  be  replied,  that  one  and  the  same  being 


230  LESSONS  FKOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  VII. 

may  most  undoubtedly  possess  faculties  of  different  kinds  (as 
we  possess  the  power  of  thought,  and  also  the  power  of 
pressing  down  by  our  weight  any  object  on  which  we  stand), 
and  these  different  faculties  may  manifest  themselves  at  dif- 
ferent times,  some  remaining  for  a  season  in  a  latent  condi- 
tion. The  fact  of  our  not  perceiving  at  first  in  the  infant  the 
latent  higher  powers,  may  be  merely  due  to  the  imperfection 
of  our  powers  of  observation,  like  our  inability  to  distinguish, 
at  a  certain  stage,  the  embryos  of  two  widely  different  animals, 
which  inability  no  one  thinks  of  advancing  as  an  argument 
in  favour  of  their  identity 'in  the  face  of  the  divergence 
which  subsequent  development  makes  manifest. 

This  hypothesis  of  latency  accounts  for  the  facts,  since  it 
allows  the  recognition  of  a  difference  in  kind  between  the 
deliberate  and  the  indeliberate  faculties.  Two  faculties  are 
distinct  in  kind,  if  w:e  may  possess  the  one  in  perfection  with- 
out thereby  implying  that  we  possess  the  other;  and  still 
more  so  if  the  two  faculties  tend  to  increase  in  an  inverse 
ratio,  the  perfection  of  the  one  being  accompanied  by  a 
degradation  of  the  other.  Yet  this  is  just  the  distinction 
between  the  instinctive  and  the  intellectual  parts  of  man's 
nature.  His  instinctive  actions  are,  as  all  admit,  not  rational 
ones ;  his  rational  actions  are  not  instinctive.  Even  more 
than  this,  we  may  say  the  more  instinctive  are  a  man's  actions 
the  less  are  they  rational,  and  vice  versa ;  and  this  amounts 
to  a  demonstration  that  reason  has  not,  and  by  no  possibility 
could  have  been,  developed  from  instinct.  In  man  we  have 
this  inverse  ratio  between  sensation  and  perception,  and  in 
brutes  it  is  just  there  where  the  absence  of  reason  is  most 
generally  admitted  (e.g.,  in  insects)  that  we  have  the  very 
summit  and  perfection  of  instinct  made  known  to  us  by  the 
ant  and  the  bee.  That  instinct  and  reason  then  are  so  distinct, 
is  made  manifest  by  the  inverse  relation  existing  between  the 
two.  The  intensification  of  sensation  diminishes  the  power 
of  intellectual  action,  while  intense  intellectual  pre-occupation 
deadens  the  sensitive  faculties.  Sir  William  Hamilton  long 
ago  called  attention  to  this  inverse  relation  ;  but  when  two 


CHAP.  VII.]  THE  BEUTE.  231 

faculties  tend  to  increase  in  an  inverse  ratio,  it  becomes 
unquestionable  that  the  difference  between  them  is  one  of 
kind. 

On  the  other  hand,  no  power  may  be  assumed  as  latent 
unless  its  existence  is  subsequently  made  known  in  the  same 
individual,  or  in  others  of  the  same  species.  We  may  fairly 
assume  rational  powers  to  have  been  latent  in  an  infant  that 
died  a  week  old,  because  such  powers  exist  plainly  in  all  men 
normally  constituted ;  but  we  have  no  right  to  assume  that 
rationality  is  latent  in  brutes,  because  no  brute  has  been 
known  ever  to  perform  one  single  action  for  which  the  pre- 
sence in  it  of  faculties  like  our  own  indeliberate  faculties  will 
not  amply  account. 

Professor  Huxley  has  lately  *  made  public  a  thesis  which, 
as  to  part  of  it,  sorely  needs  amplification  and  ex-  Human  au_ 
planation.     By  reference  to  a  series  of  interesting  tomati8m- 
experiments  on  mutilated  frogs,  he  supported  a  view  as  to 
the  psychical  faculties  of  brutes  which  is  identical  with  that 
here  maintained — the  view, namely,  that  animals  are  sentient 
automata.     But  he  added  the  expression : — 

"  Undoubtedly,  I  do  hold  that  the  view  I  have  taken  of  the  relations 
between  the  physical  and  mental  faculties  of  brutes  applies  in  its 
fulness  and  entirety  to  man." — Op.  cit.  p.  366. 

Now,  by  this  expression,  Professor  Huxley  may  mean, 
either  (1),  simply  that  men  have  all  the  faculties  of  brutes, 
or  (2),  that  they  have  no  more  than  the  faculties  of  brutes. 
But  he  can  hardly  mean  the  first,  for  it  is  the  merest  truism 
which  no  one  thinks  of  denying.  Of  course,  we  are  conscious 
automata,  as,  equally  of  course,  we  have  the  same  vital 
powers  as  cabbages  have;  nay  more,  we  agree  even  with 
pieces  of  rock  and  lumps  of  clay,  in  that  we  are  coherent 
masses  of  matter,  and  not  mere  loose  aggregations,  like  heaps 
of  sand.  But  because  we  possess  the  properties  of  clay  or 
cabbages,  it  by  no  means  follows  we  have  not  other  proper- 


*  At  the  meeting  of  Iho  British  Association  at  Belfast.     See  '  Nature'  for 
September  3rd,  1874,  pp.  302-oOG. 


232  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VII. 

ties  also ;  and  similarly,  because  we  are,  as  we  all  know, 
sentient,  conscious  automata,  it  by  no  means  follows  that  we 
are  no  more  than  such  automata.  The  first  meaning  sug- 
gested cannot  then  be  his  true  meaning.  Yet  the  second 
meaning  seems  at  least  equally  open  to  objection.  It  is  so 
open  for  two  reasons :  first,  because  it  contradicts  the  Pro- 
fessor's express  declaration  on  a  former  occasion  that  the 
human  will  does  count  for  something ;  secondly,  because  it 
contradicts,  as  we  have  seen,  the  primary  and  ultimate  decla- 
rations of  consciousness.  It  is  all  very  well  to  profess  not  to 
care  for  consequences ;  but,  after  all,  the  consequence  that 
otherwise  two  right  lines  would  have  to  inclose  a  space,  is  a 
sufficient  reason  for  asserting  the  equality  of  the  bases  of  two 
triangles  having  two  equal  sides  inclosing  equal  angles,* 
There  is  yet  another  reason  why  the  Professor  cannot  have 
meant  to  deny  every  element  of  spontaneity  to  the  human  will : 
namely,  because  he  cites  as  on  his  side  Calvin,  Malebranche, 
St.  Augustin,  and  Kant !  But  even  Calvin  never  denied  free- 
will in  the  sense  in  which  it  is  denied  by  Mill  and  Spencer. 
He  did  not  deny  such  power  to  the  natural  man,  but  only  to 
man  in  that  tmnutural,  degraded  condition  in  which,  accord- 
ing to  the  Calviuistic  doctrine  respecting  "  the  fall,"  he  now 
is.  A  very  able  writer  in  the  '  North  British  Keview '  t  re- 
marks that  very  erroneous  opinions  are  current  about  the 
bearing  of  Calvinism  on  that  doctrine  of  Mill,  Spencer,  and 
Huxley  called  "  Determinism :" — 

"Determinism  and  predestination  spring  from  premisses 
which  lie  quite  in  separate  regions  of  thought."  "  The  pre- 
destinarian  is  obliged  by  his  theology  to  admit  the  existence 


*  Professor  Tyndall  introduced  Professor  Huxley  to  his  audience  as  a  man 
"  perfectly  fearless  iu  his  utterances."  But  it  may  well  be  asked  trJmf  //«.-,• 
any  one  to  fear  in  giving  expression  to  such  views  as  Professor  Tyndall 
appears  to  favour?  Surely  it  is  quite  opposite  views  which  involve  social 
persecution,  which  entail  political  ostracism  and  the  denial  of  State  aid.  No 
fear  of  man  need  deter  any  one.  If,  then,  Professor  Tyndall  refers  to  "  the 
fear  of  the  Lord  "  as  that  the  absence  of  which  is  praiseworthy,  he  selects  for 
eulogy  that  which  is  not  proverbially  considered  as  the  indication  of  a  great 
advance  in  wisdom. 

t  For  April  1870  :  "  The  Will  and  Free-will." 


CHAP.  VII.]  THE  BRUTE.  233 

of  a  free  will  in  God,  and,  as  a  matter  of  fact,  he  does  admit 
it  in  the  devil."  "  But  the  final  consideration,  which  puts  a 
great  gulf  between  the  determinist  and  the  predestinarian,  is 
this,  that  the  latter  asserts  the  reality  of  the  vulgar  notion  of 
moral  desert.  Even  if  he  were  not  obliged  by  his  interpreta- 
tion of  Scripture  to  assert  this,  he  would  be  obliged  to  assert 
it  in  order  to  help  out  his  doctrine  of  eternal  reprobation." 

Keverting  to  our  subject,  it  seems,  at  least,  that  I  have 
Professor  Huxley  with  me  when  I  assert  that  there  are  no 
grounds  for  considering  brutes  as  anything  more  than  sen- 
tient automata,  and  thus  Instinct  becomes,  in  a  certain 
degree,  intelligible  to  us  through  our  own  lower  psychical 
faculties.  As  animals  have  reflex  action,  so  also  have  we ;  as 
animals  have  direct  and  indeliberate  sentient  (i.e.,  instinctive) 
action,  so  have  we ;  but  that  we  have  also  vastly  more, 
enough,  it  is  hoped,  has  been  said  even  in  this  chapter  to 
make  manifest. 

But  can  any  further  light  be  thrown  upon  the  nature  of 
Instinct  than  that  derivable  from  its  comparison  with  our 
lower  mental  powers  ? 

Mr.  Lewes  and  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  agree  in  entertaining 
a  very  singular  view  as  to  Instinct — namely,  that  it  ^^^ 
is  superior  to  intelligence,  in  that  either  by  its  the^toe°of 
failure  it  becomes  intelligence,  or  that  it  is  itself  Instinct- 
"  lapsed  intelligence."  Mr.  Spencer,  indeed,  shortly  de- 
scribes *  Instinct  as  "  compound  reflex  action " — a  complex 
reflex  action,  in  which  sensation  intervenes,  established  by 
the  "  survival  of  the  fittest ;"  and,  as  it  becomes  more  and 
more  compound,  failing  to  be  so  ready  and  decided  in  its 
action,  and  so  becoming  "  intelligence."  Thus,  according  to 
this  author,  "  Reason  "  is  a  negative  entity — a  failure  of  In- 
stinct! It  may  be  mentioned,  by  the  way,  that,  in  his 
chapter  on  Instinct,  Mr.  Spencer  shirks  considering  the  most 
difficult  phenomena,  saying  not  a  word  of  such  instincts  as 
those  of  ants,  termites,  and  the  wasp  Sphex. 


*  '  Psychology,'  voL  ii.  p.  433. 


234  LESSONS  FBOM  NATURE.  [CHAT.  VII. 

Mr.  Lewes  tells*  us  : — 

"  In  instinct  there  is  not  intelligence,  but  what  was  once  intelligence ; 
the  specially  intelligent  character  has  disappeared  in  the  fixed  ten- 
dency. The  action  which  was  tentative,  discriminative,  has  now  become 

automatic  and  irresistible The  objection  will  doubtless  be 

raised  that  instinct  is  wholly  destitute  of  the  characteristic  of  intelli- 
gence in  that  it  has  no  choice ;  its  operation  is  fixed,  fatal.  The  reply 
is  twofold :  in  the  first  place,  the  objection,  so  far  as  it  has  validity, 
applies  equally  to  judgment,  where,  given  the  premisses,  the  conclusion 
is  fatal,  no  alternative  being  open.  Axioms,  in  this  sense,  are  logical 
instincts.  Thus,  the  higher  intellectual  process  is  on  a  level  with  this 
process  said  to  be  its  opposite.  And  in  the  second  place,  the  element  of 
choice  always  does  enter  into  instinct ;  although  the  intelligent  dis- 
crimination of  means  to  ends  may  be  almost  absent,  it  never  is  entirely. 
The  guiding  sensation  which  directs  the  impulse  is  always  selective.  If 
we  restrict  intelligence  to  the  logic  of  signs,  to  ideas,  there  cannot  of 
course  be  anything  intelligent  in  instinct ;  but  if  we  extend  it — as  we 
must — to  the  logic  of  feeling,  the  dispute  will  cease." — Problems  of 
Life  and  Mind,  p.  130,  note,  and  p.  141. 

Now,  this  passage  is  worthy  of  notice  as  the  latest  declara- 
tion of  the  Sensist  school  on  this  question.  But,  in  the  first 
place,  we  affirm  that  not  to  restrict  intelligence  to  intellect  is 
absurd — a  contradiction  in  terms — "  ideas  "  not  "  feelings  " 
being  the  exclusive  domain  of  the  intellect.  That  there  is  a 
logic  in  feeling — that  there  is  a  logic  in  even  unsentient 
nature — we  are  far  from  denying ;  but  that  logic  is  not  the 
logic  of  the  crystal  nor  of  the  brute,  but  of  their  Creator. 
Mr.  Lewes  evidently  here  means  by  "  choice  "  not  a  deliberate, 
self-conscious  process,  but  a  direct,  indeliberate  action,  such 
as  may  automatically  result  from  the  association  of  sensible 
impressions.  Indeliberate  actions  of  this  kind  are  not  to  be 
denied  to  brutes,  but  they  are  not  acts  of  Reason,  though 
they  are  often  enough  made  use  of  by  rational  beings,  just  as 
digestion  and  secretion  are  not  acts  of  "  Reason,"  though  they 
are  acts  of  a  rational  being  who  digests  and  secretes. 

Mr.  Lewes's  first  answer  ignores  the  very  main  distinction 
between  Instinct  and  Eeason — namely,  the  presence  of  self- 
conscious  intellectual  action  in  the  latter,  and  its  absence  in 


*  The  italics  are  mine. 


CHAP.  VII.]  THE  BRUTE.  235 

the  former.  Instinct  is  "  fatal,"  but  Wind  ;  it  does  not  know 
it  is  compelled,  nor  see  the  necessity  of  its  action.  Reason  is 
fatal,  but  sees  ;  it  does  know  it  is  compelled  to  draw  out  ex- 
plicitly in  a  conclusion  the  truth  implicitly  contained  in  given 
premisses,  and  does  see  the  necessity  of  intuitive  truths,  such 
as  the  principle  of  identity.  Moreover,  if  it  can  be  affirmed 
that  "  Instinct "  is  "  lapsed  intelligence,"  then  a  conscious, 
deliberative,  discriminative  faculty  must  once  have  been  exer- 
cised by  wasps,  bees,  and  ants  in  all  such  actions  as  are  now 
instinctive,  and  these  creatures  must  once  have  possessed  a 
rationality  of  which  the  course  of  ages  has  deprived  them. 

Mr.  Herbert  Spencer's  climax  is  still  more  curious,  as, 
according  to  him,  "Reason"  is  a  "failure  of  Instinct" — an 
"  imperfect  adjustment."  So  with  the  increasing  adjustment 
of  "  inner  relations  "  to  "  outer  relations,"  it  must  tend  more 
and  more  to  disappear.  But  will  and  memory  are  also 
represented  by  him  as  transient  accompaniments  of  an  in- 
complete state  of  such  adjustment;  and,  according  to  Mr. 
Spencer,  "  feeling "  must  also  disappear,  when  the  adjust- 
ment becomes  perfect,  along  with  memory  and  reason.  The 
highest  mental  condition  then,  according  to  this  writer, 
would  be  one  in  which  volition,  intelligence,  memory,  and 
even  feeling,  have  all  disappeared  in  favour  of  a  "  perfect 
adjustment."  In  other  words,  the  most  highly-developed 
human  being  would  be  an  absolutely  senseless  and  uncon- 
scious automaton.  This  is  the  "  higher  "  and  "  nobler  "  goal 
to  which  the  countless  pulsations  of  cosmic  forces  are  sup- 
posed to  be  ultimately  tending  in  their  integrating  and  con- 
structive action ;  the  object  to  promote  which  our  most 
strenuous  and  self-denying  efforts,  and  our  most  fervent 
desires,  may  most  worthily  be  directed. 

The  views  of  Mr.  Lewes  and  Mr.  Spencer  cannot  be  accepted 
by  us,  if  for  no  other  reason  than  that  they  gratuitously  de- 
mand us  to  admit,  in  bees  and  ants,  faculties  for  the  existence 
of  which  there  is  no  evidence,  and  without  which  all  their 
activities  can  be  sufficiently  explained.  Quite  another  cause 
than  "lapsed  intelligence,"  or  even  "lapsed  sensible  percep- 


236  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  VII 

tion  and  association,"  is  required  to  account  for  the  actions  of 
the  wasp  Sphex,  for  those  of  the  carpenter  bee,  and  for  our 
own  instinctive  actions ;  and  if  "  Instinct "  is  required  to  ex- 
plain these,  it  may  equally  be  used  to  explain  a  multitude  of 
other  acts  also.     The  principle  once  admitted,  all  is  admitted. 
But  how,  then,  are  we  to  understand  "  Instinct  ?  "  what  is 
•,vhat  is  in-    it  ?    r-Fne  general  notion  of  Instinct  is  that  of  an 
imparted  peculiar 

•''  impulse  urging  animals  to  the  performance  of  certain  actions  which 
are  useful  to  themselves  or  to  their  kind,  but  the  use  of  which 
they  do  not  themselves  perceive,  and  their  performance  of  which  is  a 
necessary  consequence  of  their  being  placed  in  certain  circumstances 
and  feeling  certain  sensations." — Todd's  Cyclopedia,  vol.  iii.  p.  3. 

We  have  seen,  more  or  less  clearly,  what  it  is  not,  and  by 
what  essential  differences  of  kind  it  is  distinguishable  from 
Reason.  But  its  very  existence  is  altogether  denied  by  some 
contemporary  thinkers,  in  spite  of  the  manifest  peculiarity 
of  many  animal  actions,  the  performance  of  which  cannot  be 
denied.  This  denial  is  perhaps,  in  part,  due  to  a  misappre- 
hension. Certainly  Instinct  has  no  real  substantial  existence 
at  all  distinct  from  the  life  of  the  animal  which  exhibits  it, 
just  as  "life"  itself  is  nothing  substantially  distinct  from  the 
creature  living.  Perhaps,  then,  the  great  objection  which 
many  men  seem  to  entertain  against  the  recognition  of  "  In- 
stinct" as  something  to  be  distinguished  as  existing,  and  to 
be  separately  considered  and  treated  of,  is  their  idea  that  by 
such  consideration  and  treatment  a  metaphysical  abstraction 
is  taken  for  a  substantial  entity.  Now  Instinct  as  Instinct  is, 
of  course,  a  mere  abstraction,  and  exists  only  iii  the  mind, 
though  it  exists  concretely  enough  in  animal  actions  of  a 
special  kind.  Instinct  is,  concretely,  the  animal  organism 
energizing  in  certain  ways. 

Mr.  Lewes  speaks  the  language  of  the  true  philosophy 
when  he  says  : — 

"  Co-ordination,  mind,  and  life  are  abstractions :  they  are  realities 
in  the  sense  of  being  drawn  from  real  concretes ;  but  they  are  not 
realities  existing  apart  from  their  concretes  otherwise  than  in  our  con- 


CHAP.  VII.]  THE  BEllTE.  237 

ception;  and  to  seek  their  objective  substratum  we  must  seek  the 
concrete  objects  of  which  they  are  the  symbols."  —  Problems  of  Life  and 
,  vol.  i.  p.  281. 


This  is  the  very  teaching  of  St.  Thomas. 

All  the  functions  of  each  brute  animal,  all  instinctive  ac- 
tions included,  necessarily  go  with  structure,  and  vary  with 
it,  structure  and  function  being  like  the  convexities  and  con- 
cavities of  a  curved  line,  one  necessarily  accompanying  the 
other.  To  explain  either  thoroughly  is  to  explain  both. 
The  origin  of  one  is  necessarily  the  origin  of  the  other. 
Modern  science,  by  its  investigations  of  the  simplest 
organisms,  has  abundantly  shown  that  life  cannot  be  a  con- 
sequence of  organisation  ;  but  neither  need  it  be  a  cause,  but 
an  inseparable  accompaniment  ;  life  of  a  particular  though 
merely  sensitive  kind  emerging  from  potentiality  into 
actuality  at  the  very  moment  that  matter  assumes  a  certain 
special  and  definite  condition.  "Instinct"  then,  no  more 
than  "  structure,"  can  be  explained  by  the  survival  of  the 
fittest. 

Thus  the  "instinct"  of  each  animal  is  an  abstraction  denot- 
ing the  faculty  of  performing  that  group  of  actions  what  it  is. 
which  are  the  inseparable  accompaniments  of  its  structure, 
as  stimulated  by  sensation.  But  such  "  faculty,"  again,  is, 
of  course,  nothing  distinct  from  the  "  soul  "  of  each  animal  ; 
which  soul,  once  more,  has  no  substantial  existence  apart 
from  the  living  animal  itself. 

This  is  not  the  place  to  defend  the  doctrine  that  the  "  soul  " 
of  each  animal  is  no  mere  plexus  of  physical  forces  trans- 
formed by  passing  through  a  certain  kind  of  matter  so  as  to 
simulate  a  unity,  but  is  a  real,  existing,  single  unity,  a  single 
form  of  force  (so  to  speak)  evoked  by  concurrent  circum- 
stances from  potentiality  into  actuality.  Nevertheless,  I 
may  be  permitted  to  here  affirm  my  belief  that  this  doctrine 
is  the  one  which  best  accords  with  what  science  teaches  — 
the  doctrine,  namely,  that  instinct  is  an  abstraction  denoting 
a  particular  kind  of  action  of  such  animal  soul. 

Concurrent  with  such  doctrine  is  the  view,  which  I  also 


238  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  VII. 

accept,  that  the  body  of  each  living  animal  forms  a  true 
Unityof each  unity.  The  opposite  notion,  entertained  by  many,  is 
18m'  that  each  organism  is  not  a  true  unity,  but  that  each 
organ,  each  part  of  an  organ,  and  each  physiological  unit  has 
its  own  independent  life,  one  not  subordinate  to  a  higher 
unity ;  so  that  the  whole  forms  a  moving  equilibrium  of 
groups,  of  groups,  of  groups,  of  groups  of  parts.  This  was 
the  view  which  Schwann's  famed  "  cell  theory  "  favoured — a 
theory  once  received,  especially  in  G-ermany,  with  an  en- 
thusiasm like  that  which  has  greeted  the  Darwinian  theory, 
but  which  is  now  generally  abandoned.  Now,  a  lifeless,  moving 
equilibrium — such,  e.g.,  as  a  fountain  with  a  complex  arrange- 
ment of  jets — is  manifestly  but  the  result  of  an  adjustment  of 
active  physical  powers,  continuing  for  a  longer  or  a  shorter 
period.  During  its  continuance  the  action  of  each  separate 
physical  force  can  be  distinctly  traced  in  the  result ;  there  is 
no,  even  apparent,  internal  principle  of  cohesion,  still  less  is 
there  any  tendency  to  reproduction.  Every  living  being,  on 
the  other  hand,  has  manifestly  a  tendency  to  undergo  a  de- 
finite cycle  of  changes  when  exposed  to  certain  fixed  condi- 
tions, such  cycle  ending  with  the  reappearance  of  that  form 
with  which  it  started ;  an  egg  thus  ultimately  resulting  in 
the  production  of  another  egg,  and  a  seed  of  another  seed. 
Moreover,  in  each  organism  the  varfous  parts  are  reciprocally 
ends  and  means. 

Instead,  then,  of  considering  an  animal  as  a  congeries  of 
groups  of  groups  of  independently  living  units,  it  seems  to  me 
more  accordant  with  reason  to  consider  it  as  one  living  whole, 
in  the  life  of  which  each  part,  in  its  degree,  participates. 
Thus  the  whole  organism  forms  one  continuum.  For  our 
convenience  as  anatomists  we  actually  separate  it  into  parts 
in  various  ways,  and  we  consider  it  as  made  up  of  such  parts ; 
but,  in  fact,  it  is  not  really  made  up  of  parts  at  all,  but  is  one 
whole,  locally  differentiated  in  various  ways  and  in  varying 
degrees.  To  illustrate  my  meaning  we  may  recall  the  fact 
that  the  air-vessels  of  plants  (like  the  tracheae  of  insects)  were 
once  said  to  be  kept  open  by  means  of  a  spiral  filament  within 


CHAP.  VII.]  THE  BRUTE.  239 

them,  whereas  now  it  is  recognised  that  there  is  no  such 
filament,  but  that  the  walls  of  such  tubes  are  simply,  in  fact, 
but  spiralty  thickened.  Similarly,  nerve  and  connective  tissue, 
bone  and  cartilage,  tendon  and  muscle,  are  now  recognised 
as  imperceptibly  graduating  one  into  the  other,  and  being 
actually  continuous — nay,  even  the  very  blood  merges  with, 
and  is  merged  with,  the  solid  portions  of  the  body  where  the 
latter  are  in  process  of  assimilating  and  increasing.  All  this, 
however,  is  but  natural,  seeing  that  the  whole  of  these  parts 
are  but  various  differentiations  of  the  primitive  germinal 
substance. 

Once  more  then,  instinct  appears  to  be  a  faculty  of  the 
feeling,  imagining,  operating  organically,  remem-  Definition  of 
bering  and  automatically  acting  animal  soul,  which  lnstinct- 
faculty  is  in  most  intimate  connection  with  the  organisation 
of  each  species,  so  that  upon  the  recurrence  of  certain  sensa- 
tions, external  or  internal,  a  definite  series  of  actions  is 
initiated,  which,  from  the  beginning  of  its  existence,  each 
species  is  specially  destined  to  perform,  and  for  the  perform- 
ance of  which  its  organisation  is  specially  developed.  In 
short,  it  is  action  like  reflex  action,  but  which  takes  place  in 
consequence  of  feelings  or  imaginings.  Such  instinct,  like 
the  soul,  of  which  it  is  a  faculty,  emerges  from  potentiality  to 
actuality  part  passu  with  the  assumption  by  matter  of  the 
proximately  fit  condition;  and  if  it  were  possible  for  us 
artificially  to  construct  any  given  kind  of  animal,  we  should 
necessarily  give  rise  to  the  instinct  in  giving  rise  to  the 
structure. 

But  some  of  my  readers  may  exclaim — Can  such  wonder- 
ful powers  be  latent  in  mere  brute  matter?      Is  Energyof 
it  conceivable  that  the  arrangement  of  matter,  in  matttr" 
\\luitsoever  conditions,  should  be  the  occasion  of  evoking  from 
potentiality  to  act  a  power  not  only  of  living  and  reproducing, 
but  of  feeling,  of  sensibly  cognizing,  of  forming  associations 
of  sensible  images,  of  connecting  therewith  various  emotions, 
and  be  capable  of  exhibiting  the  complex  instincts  of  the  ant, 
the  fidelity  of  the  dog,  and  the  simulation  of  reason  of  the 


240  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUKE.  [CiiAr.  VII. 

elephant  ?  To  such  objectors  I  would  reply — How  can  you 
show  that  your  conception  of  matter  as  it  exists  is  adequate  ? 
Matter  pure  and  simple,  the  materia  prima  of  philosophy, 
nowhere  exists  actually,  nor  ever  did  so  exist.  Every  form 
of  matter  known  to  us,  even  the  simplest,  possesses  certain 
active  powers,  and  is  combined  with  a  definite  "  form."  New 
combinations  and  collocations  of  matter  are  continually 
evoking  new  forms,  presenting  to  us  other  powers  before 
unknown  to  us.  What  right,  then,  has  any  one  to  deny  the 
existence  in  matter  of  latent  potentialities  which  experience 
and  reason  combine  to  show  us  are  now  actually  there,  and, 
in  all  probability,  have  been  latent  antecedently  ?  That 
matter  should  show  us  actions  which  embody  a  quasi  intel- 
ligence is  the  less  surprising  when  we  reflect  that  all  nature 
teems  with  such  unconscious  intelligence.  Keason,  order,  and 
activity  pervade  the  material  universe — the  mineral  as  well 
as  the  animal  and  vegetable  kingdoms.  But,  apart  from  man, 
A  new  en-  sucu  reason  is  in  no  material  being  conscious  of 
ergyiuman.  ^se}f .  an(j  ^he  soul  of  man  is,  as  we  have  seen,  dif- 
ferent in  kind  from  the  soul  of  every  brute,  and  may  there- 
fore, as  we  have  also  seen,  rationally  claim  another  origin. 
The  resemblance  of  the  unconscious  infant  (whose  instincts 
are  less  developed  than  those  of  many  new-born  beasts) 
to  a  mere  animal,  is  but  a  superficial  one,  and  results 
only  from  the  imperfection  of  our  powers  of  observation. 
That  from  the  first  the  whole  difference  is  latent,  the  result 
proves.  It  is  like  the  superficial  resemblance  of  an  em- 
bryonic reptile  to  an  embryonic  bird,  or  even  of  an  embryonic 
beast  to  an  embryonic  fish.  The  reptile  never  is  a  bird,  nor 
the  beast  a  fish,  though  the  immature  stages  of  development 
are  superficially  alike. 

If  the  history  of  mankind  is  sketched  out  by  that  of  the 
child's  development,  then  we  may  conclude  that  man  was 
never  a  mere  animal.  Instinct  and  Keason  seem  to  form 
two  distinct  regions — two  distinct  kinds  of  activity — whereof 
the  former  serves  as  the  material  for  the  latter.  In  order 
that  mere  instinctive  faculties  may  become  rational,  there  is 


CHAP.  VII.]  THE  BEUTE.  211 

needed  the  introduction  from  without  (as  Mr.  Lewes  well  says) 
of  a  new  form  or  force,  which  is  self-conscious,  and  so  can 
distinguish  itself  from  what  is  not  itself,  and  can  analyse 
both.  With  this  new  principle  once  introduced,  mere  sensa- 
tion is  transformed  into  conscious  sensibility ;  the  imagi- 
nation, from  being  passive,  becomes  active  and  creative ; 
appetite  becomes  passion,  and  attachment  friendship.  The 
association  of  images  prepares  the  association  of  ideas.  Asso- 
ciation becomes  inference.  In  a  word,  from  the  mere  animal, 
we  have  man ;  and  what  was  but  direct,  indeliberate,  and 
unconscious  Instinct,  becomes  reflex,  deliberate,  self-conscious 
Jieason,  with  true  memory,  intelligence,  and  will. 

Science  demands  that  nothing  should  be  deduced  from 
facts  which  such  facts  do  not  fully  warrant ;  and  if  Ground8  of 
any  phenomena  can  be  explained  by  one  agency  tha  tuls  decision- 
existence  of  which  we  know,  it  is  quite  illegitimate  to  call 
in  an  additional  and  hypothetical  one.  It  is  here  contended 
that  there  is  no  need  whatever  to  credit  b'rutes  with  in- 
tellect; first,  because  all  the  phenomena  they  do  exhibit 
can  be  accounted  for  without  it,  while  they  do  not  exhibit 
phenomena  characteristic  of  a  rational  nature.  But  besides 
this  negative  argument,  a  positive  one,  to  the  same  effect, 
may  be  drawn  from  facts  which  constitute  an  experimental 
demonstration:  for  if  the  germs  of  rationality  existed  in 
brutes,  those  germs  would  certainly  have  developed  long  ere 
this,  so  as  to  have  produced  unequivocal  evidences  of  that 
faculty  during  the  prodigious  lapse  of  past  geological  time, 
especially  if  we  were  to  accept  the  Darwinian  practical 
infinity  of  past  organic  existence. 

But  in  fact  a  book  requires  to  be  written  on  "  the  stupidity 
of  animals."  It  is  required  on  account  of  that  stnpidHyof 
tendency  to  exaggerate  so-called  animal  intelligence  a*"™*1*- 
(inverted  anthropomorphism),  and  on  account  of  that  neglect 
of  contrary  instances,  while  apparently  intelligent  actions, 
which  may  be  merely  accidental  coincidences,  are  eogerly 
seized  upon. 

Acts  which  would  be  reckoned  as  signs  of  extreme  obtuse- 


242  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VII. 

ness  and  stupidity  are  common  enough  amongst  animals 
usually  reckoned  as  the  most  intelligent.  Mr.  Darwin 
mentions,*  as  one  proof  of  the  existence  of  sympathy  in 
brutes  (which  no  one  denies),  the  familiar  fact  of  a  dog  flying 
at  his  master's  enemy.  But  in  a  sudden  scuffle  it  is  by  no 
means  unprecedented  for  a  dog  to  fly  at  his  own  master.  • 
After  all  that  author's  wonderful  tales  about  the  rationality 
of  crabs  and  snails  it  is  interesting  to  read  the  following  ad- 
mission. He  tells  us,t  on  the  authority  of  Mr.  Harrison 
Weir,  that  if  a  pair  of  birds  "  which  would  naturally  remain 
mated  for  life  be  separated  for  a  few  weeks  during  the  winter 
and  matched  with  other  birds,  the  two  when  brought  together 
again  rarely,  if  ever,  recognise  each  other." 

J3ut  what  dog,  though  he  has  seen  fuel  put  upon  fires 
again  and  again,  ever  puts  on  any  himself  to  maintain  the 
heat  he  so  greatly  enjoys  ? 

Many  readers  may  have  had  a  pet  cat  who  has  now  and 
again  got  a  fish  or  chicken  bone  fixed  between  its  back-teeth. 
The  useless  motions  the  animal  makes  with  its  paw  are  suffi- 
ciently irrational ;  but  although  the  accident  may  have  re- 
curred again  and  again  it  will  make  the  same  struggles 
against  the  removal,  by  its  master,  of  the  object  which 
distresses  it,  while  as  soon  as  it  is  removed  the  animal  will 
go  off,  licking  its  jaws,  without  a  sign  of  gratitude  for  the 
relief  afforded.  But  even  that  animal  reputed  the  wisest,  the 
elephant,  has,  quite  recently,  in  our  Zoological  Gardens, 
given  proof  of  extreme  stupidity  in  actually  pulling  off  the 
end  of  its  own  trunk  (which  had  got  caught  in  a  cord), 
instead  of  waiting  till  aid  came  or  calling  for  succour  and 
assistance  before  the  injury  instead  of  clamouring  after  it. 

It  would  be  easy  to  multiply  instances  of  conduct,  in 
animals  of  all  the  better-known  classes,  which  if  fairly  con- 
sidered are  enough  to  prove  the  distinction  in  quality 
between  the  form  or  force  which  energizes  in  each  animal 
and  that  which  we  know  to  exist  in  ourselves. 


*  'Descent  of  Man,'  vol.  i.  p.  77.  t  Op.  cit.  vol.  ii.  p.  109. 


CHAP.  VII.]  THE  BRUTE.  243 

What,  then,  is  the  conclusion  at  which  we  must  arrive 
with  respect  to  brute  animals — even  those  the  most 

.,.,,.  f.       ,TT.          Conclusion. 

like  us  or  the  most  seemingly  intelligent :  What 
is  the  lesson  which  nature  seems  to  teach  us  in  their  regard  ? 
We  may,  it  is  here  contended,  learn  from  it  and  the 
evidence  here  adduced  two  lessons.  The  first  is  that  in 
accepting  testimony  respecting  the  psychical  characters  of 
brutes,  Ave  should  be  especially  on  our  guard  against  a  certain 
common  form  of  credulity  and  tendency  to  exaggeration — 
Biological  Anthropomorphism.  The  second  lesson  is,  that 
while  we  have  abundant  evidence  of  the  sensitive  and 
imaginative  powers  of  brutes,  we  have  both  negative  and 
positive  evidence  that  the  form,  or  force,  which  energizes  in 
the  dog,  the  bee,  the  elephant,  the  ant,  or  the  gorilla,  is  one 
which  is  sentient  but  not  rational — that  it  feels  both  plea- 
sures and  pains,  but  neither  knows  nor  reflects  upon  the  one 
or  the  other.  Finally,  we  may  conclude  that  the  instinctive 
qualities  of  the  brute  may  be  more  or  less  imperfectly  under- 
stood by  means  of  those  lower  powers  of  the  human  soul 
hereinbefore  enumerated,  which  may  be  performed  without 
deliberation  and  reflex  self-consciousness,  while  all  the  efforts 
of  the  best-informed  naturalists  who  desire  to  confound  the 
nature  of  the  brute  with  that  of  man  but  serve  to  bring  out 
more  forcibly  the  profound  gulf  which  separates  psychically 
man  and  the  brute. 


CHAPTEE  VIII. 

LIKENESSES  IN  ANIMALS   AND   PLANTS. 

"  The  facts  of  mimicry  and  of  the  various  kinds  of  homology  as  ex- 
hibited in  comparative  anatomy,  teratology  and  pathology,  reveal  an 
internal  force  and  dynamic  agency,  the  soul,  in  each  animal,  which 
forms  one  indissoluble  unity  with  its  material  frame." 

IN  considering  the  form  and  structure  of  animals  and  plants, 
TWO  kinds  or  amongst  the  different  resemblances  presented  to  our 

likeness  to  be  ,  ,.,.,. 

considered,  view  there  are  two  orders  01  likeness  which  it  is 
intended  here  to  notice. 

The  first  of  these  orders  of  resemblance  is  one  which  is 
merely  external ;  namely,  the  likenesses  borne  by  different 
animals  to  others  of  more  or  less  different  nature,  to  plants 
or  to  inanimate  objects,  and  likenesses  borne  by  plants  to 
others  of  more  or  less  different  nature  or  to  animals.  This 
kind  of  resemblance  is  termed  MIMICRY. 

The  second  of  the  two  orders  of  resemblance  extends  to 
internal  structure,  and  relates  to  likenesses  of  the  kind  borne 
by  parts  of  one  animal  or  plant  to  parts  of  other  animals  or 
plants,  and  it  also  relates  to  likenesses  borne  by  one  part  of 
any  animal  or  plant  to  other  parts  of  the  same  individual. 

First  as  to  Mimicry :  "  Mimicry  "  is  a  close  and  striking, 

yet  superficial  resemblance  borne  by  some  animal 

or  plant  to  some  perhaps  very  different  object.     A 

familiar  example  of  mimicry  is  seen  in  the  bee  and  spider 

orchis,  and  in  clear-winged  moths,  which  may  be  mistaken 

for  bees.     One  of  the  most  perfect  examples  of  mimicry  is 

afforded  by  an  insect  (of  the  grasshopper  and  cricket  order) 

which  is  called,  on  account  of  the  appearance  it  presents,  the 


CHAP.  VIII.]    LIKENESSES  IN  ANIMALS  AND  PLANTS.         245 

"  walking  leaf ;"  since  both  in  form  and  colour  its  body  so 
closely  resembles  a  leaf  that  it  is  most  difficult  of  detection 
when  found  amongst  real  leaves. 

Mr.  Bates  was  the  first  to  call  attention  to  the  phenomenon 
as  it  exists  amongst  butterflies,  and  he  may  be  called  the 
discoverer  of  what  he  named  "mimicry."  Mr.  Wallace,  in 
his  work  on  '  Natural  Selections,'  has  brought  forward*  most 
interesting  examples,  serving  to  show  not  only  the  existence 
of  these  strange  likenesses  but  the  protecting  influence  which 
they,  in  many  instances,  exercise  in  favour  of  the  creatures 
which  exhibit  them.  One  of  the  most  complete  instances 
is  that  afforded  by  an  Indian  butterfly,  as  to  which  he 
remarks :  f — 

"  But  the  most  wonderful  and  undoubted  case  of  protective  resem- 
blance which  I  have  ever  seen,  is  that  of  the  common  Indian  Kallima 
inachis,  and  its  Malayan  ally  Kallima  paralecta.  The  upper  surface  of 
these  is  very  striking  and  showy,  as  they  are  of  a  largo  size,  and  are 
adorned  with  a  broad  band  of  rich  orange  on  a  deep  bluish  ground. 
The  under-side  is  very  variable  in  colour,  so  that  out  of  fifty  specimens 
no  two  can  bo  found  exactly  alike,  but  every  one  of  them  will  be  of 
some  shade  of  ash,  or  brown,  or  ochre,  such  as  are  found  among  dead, 
dry,  or  decaying  leaves.  The  apex  of  the  upper  wings  is  produced  into 
an  acute  point,  a  very  common  form  in  the  leaves  of  tropical  shrubs 
and  trees,  and  the  lower  wings  are  also  produced  into  a  short,  narrow 
tail.  Between  these  two  points  runs  a  dark  curved  line  exactly  repre- 
senting the  midrib  of  a  leaf,  and  from  this  radiate  on  each  side  a  few 
oblique  lines,  which  serve  to  indicate  the  lateral  veins  of  a  leaf.  These 
marks  are  more  clearly  seen  on  the  outer  portion  of  the  base  of  the 
wings,  and  on  the  inner  side  towards  the  middle  and  apex ;  and  it  is 
very  curious  to  observe  how  the  usual  marginal  and  transverse  striao 
of  the  group  are  here  modified  and  strengthened  so  as  to  become 
adapted  for  an  imitation  of  the  variation  of  a  leaf.  ....  But  this 
resemblance,  close  as  it  is,  would  be  of  little  use  if  the  habits  of  the 
insect  did  not  accord  with  it.  If  the  butterfly  sat  upon  leaves  as  upon 
flowers,  or  opened  its  wings  so  as  to  expose  the  upper  surface,  or  ex- 
posed and  moved  its  head  and  antenna  as  many  other  butterflies  do, 
its  disguise  would  bo  of  little  avail.  We  might  b6  sure,  however, 
from  the  analogy  of  many  other  cases,  that  the  habits  of  the  insect  are 
such  as  still  further  to  aid  its  deceptive  garb ;  but  we  are  not  obliged 
to  make  any  such  supposition,  since  I  myself  had  the  good  fortune  to 

*  Chap.  iii.  p.  45.  t  Op.  cit.  p.  59. 


216  LESSONS  FROM  NATUKE.  [CHAP.  VIIL 

observe  scores  of  Eallima  parahctajn  Sumatra,  and  to  capture  many 
of  them,  and  can  vouch  for  the  accuracy  of  the  following  details. 
These  butterflies  frequent  dry  forests,  and  fly  very  swiftly.  They 
were  seen  to  settle  on  a  flower  or  a  green  leaf,  but  were  many  times 
lost  sight  of  in  a  bush  or  tree  of  dead  leaves.  On  such  occasions  they 
were  generally  searched  for  in  vain ;  for  while  gazing  intently  at  the 
very  spot  where  one  had  disappeared,  it  would  often  suddenly  dart 
out,  and  again  vanish  twenty  or  fifty  yards  further  on.  On  one  or  two 
occasions  the  insect  was  detected  reposing,  and  it  could  then  be  seen 
how  completely  it  assimilates  itself  to  the  surrounding  leaves.  It  sits 
on  a  nearly  upright  twig,  the  wings  fitting  closely  back  to  back,  con- 
cealing the  antennae  and  head,  which  are  drawn  up  between  their 
bases.  The  little  tails  of  the  hind  wing  touch  the  branch  and  form  a 
perfect  stalk  to  the  leaf,  which  is  supported  in  its  place  by  the  claws  of 
the  middle  pair  of  feet,  which  are  slender  and  inconspicuous.  The 
irregular  outline  of  the  wings  gives  exactly  the  perspective  effect  of  a 
shrivelled  leaf.  We  thus  have  size,  colour,  form,  markings,  and  habits, 
all  combining  together  to  produce  a  disguise  which  may  be  said  to  be 
absolutely  perfect ;  and  the  protection  which  it  affords  is  sufficiently 
indicated  by  the  abundance  of  the  individuals  that  possess  it." 

Not  only  moths,  but  also  beetles  imitate  bees.  Wasps 
and  objects  the  most  strange  are  also  mimicked  by  beetles, 
such,  e.g.,  as  dung  and  drops  of  dew.  There  are  also 
creatures  called  bamboo  or  walking-stick  insects,  which 
present  a  most  striking  resemblance  to  twigs  of  bamboo. 
Concerning  these  Mr.  Wallace  tells  us  :*  "  Some  of  these  are 
a  foot  long  and  as  thick  as  one's  finger,  and  their  whole 
colouring,  form,  rugosity,  and  the  arrangement  of  the  head, 
legs  and  antennas  are  such  as  to  render  them  absolutely 
identical  in  appearance  with  dry  sticks.  They  hang  loosely 
about  shrubs  in  the  forest,  and  have  the  extraordinary  habit 
of  stretching  out  their  legs  unsymmetrically,  so  as  to  render 
the  deception  more  complete." 

But  there  are  facts  yet  more  extraordinary.  Some  insects 
which  mimic  leaves, .  mimic  even  the  marks  made  upon 
leaves  by  the  ravages  of  other  insects  or  by  mould.  As 
to  this  Mr.  Wallace  further  informs  us:f  "One  of  these 
creatures  obtained  by  myself  in  Borneo  (Ceroxylus  laceratus) 

*  Op.  cit.  p.  64.  t  Loc.  cit.  p.  G4. 


CHAP.  VIII.]    LIKENESSES  IN  ANIMALS  AND  PLANTS.         217 

was  covered  over  with  foliaceous  excrescences  of  a  clear 
olive-green  colour,  so  as  exactly  to  resemble  a  stick  grown 
over  by  a  creeping  moss  or  jungerrnannia.  The  Dyak  who 
brought  it  me  assured  me  it  was  grown  over  with  moss 
although  alive,  and  it  was  only  after  a  most  minute  exami- 
nation that  I  could  convince  myself  it  was  not."  In  speaking 
of  a  leaf-butterfly  he  tells  us  that  :*  "  We  come  to  a  still 
more  extraordinary  part  of  the-  imitation,  for  we  find  repre- 
sentations of  leaves  in  every  stage  of  decay,  variously 
blotched,  and  mildewed,  and  pierced  with  holes,  and  in 
many  cases  irregularly  covered  with  powdery  black  dots, 
gathered  into  patches  and  spots,  so  closely  resembling  the 
various  kinds  of  minute  fungi  that  grow  on  dead  leaves,  that 
it  is  impossible  to  avoid  thinking  at  first  sight  that  the 
butterflies  themselves  have  been  attacked  by  real  fungi." 

These  facts  appeared  to  me  some  years  ago  to  be  of  a  nature 
which  no  amount  of  accidental  minute  indefinite  Nottobeex. 


variations  acted  on  by  the  destroying  agencies  ^cid^tuf 
of  nature  (inducing  the  "survival  of  the  fittest")  ™^lo»s- 
could  possibly  account.  I  then  saidf  (opposing  the  Darwinian 
hypotheses  of  the  origin  of  species  by  natural  selection)  : 
"  Now  let  us  suppose  that  the  ancestors  of  these  various 
animals  were  all  destitute  of.  the  very  special  protections 
they  at  present  possess,  as  on  the  Darwinian  hypothesis  we 
must  do.  Let  it  also  be  conceded  that  small  deviations  from 
the  antecedent  colouring  or  form  would  tend  to  make  some 
of  their  ancestors  escape  destruction  by  causing  them  more 
or  less  frequently  to  be  passed  over,  or  mistaken  by  their 
persecutors.  Yet  the  deviation  must,  as  the  event  has 
shown,  in  each  case  be  in  some  definite  direction,  whether 
it  be  towards  some  other  animal  or  plant,  or  towards  some 
dead  organic  matter.  But  as,  according  to  Mr.  Darwin's 
theory,  there  is  a  constant  tendency  to  indefinite  variation, 
and  as  the  minute  incipient  variations  will  be  in  all  directions, 


*  Op.  dt.  p.  CO. 

t  '  (Genesis  of  Species'  (Maciuilluu),  2nd  edition,  p  38. 


218  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  Y11I. 

they  must  tend  to  neutralise  each  other,  and  at  first  to  form 
such  unstable  modifications  that  it  is  difficult,  if  not  im- 
possible, to  see  how  such  indefinite  oscillations  of  insig- 
nificant beginnings  can  ever  build  up  a  sufficiently  appre- 
ciable resemblance  to  a  leaf,  bamboo,  or  other  object,  for 
'Natural  Selection'  to  seize  upon  and  perpetuate.  This 
difficulty  is  augmented  when  we  consider  how  necessary  it  is 
that  many  individuals  should  be  modified  simultaneously  " 
and  similarly  in  order  that  slightly  favourable  variations 
may  hold  their  own  against  the  overwhelming  force  and 
influence  of  mere  number.  A  consideration  insisted  on  in 
the  '  North  British  Review '  for  June  1867,  p.  286  ;  a  con- 
sideration of  which  review  has  compelled  Mr.  Darwin  to 
modify  his  views  very  importantly,  and  he  has  himself 
confessed  that  until  reading  this  article  he  did  not  "  appre- 
ciate how  rarely  single  variations,  whether  slight  or  strongly 
marked,  could  be  perpetuated." 

"  In  these  cases  of  mimicry  it  seems  difficult  indeed  to 
imagine  a  reason  why  variations  tending  in  a  minute  degree 
in  any  special  direction  should  be  preserved.  All  variations 
would  be  preserved  which  tended  to  obscure  the  perception 
of  an  animal  by  its  enemies,  whatever  direction  these  varia- 
tions might  take,  and  the  common  preservation  of  conflicting 
tendencies  would  greatly  favour  their  mutual  neutralisation 
and  obliteration,  if  we  may  rely  on  the  many  cases  which 
have  been  brought  forward  by  Mr.  Darwin  with  regard  to 
domestic  animals." 

As  to  the  last  cited  examples  of  the  imitation  of  mildew, 
&c.,  I  added  :*  "  How  this  double  mimicry  can  importantly 
aid  in  the  struggle  for  life  seems  puzzling  indeed,  but  much 
more  so  how  the  first  faint  beginnings  of  the  imitation  of 
such  injuries  in  the  leaf  can  be  developed  in  the  animal  into 
such  a  complete  representation  of  them — a  fortiori,  how 
simultaneous  and  similar  first  beginnings  of  imitations  of 
such  injuries  could  ever  have  been  developed  in  several 

*  Op,  cit.  p.  41. 


CHAP.  VIII.]    LIKENESSES  IN  ANIMALS  AND  PLANTS.        249 

individuals,  out  of  utterly    indifferent   and    indeterminate 
variations  in  all  conceivable  directions." 

Further  consideration  and   fresh   observation   have  con- 
vinced me  more  and  more  of  the  justice  of  the  TOS^,^ 
above  remarks.     Their  justice  is  however  remark-  by  Plants- 
ably  substantiated  by  the  facts  concerning  mimicry,  as  it 
exists  in  plants,  brought  forward*  by  Mr.  Alfred  W.  Bennett. 
These  facts  concern  two  kinds  of  mimicry,  one  kind  relating 
to  the  whole  habit  and  mode  of  growth  of  the  plants,  and  the 
other  referring  to  the  development  of  some  particular  organ 
or  part. 

As  to  the  first  kind,  amongst  other  instances  he  refers  to 
the  imitation  of  Cacti  by  the  Euphorbias,  found  in  Africa. 
He  says :  "  Except  when  they  are  in  flower,  it  is,  indeed, 
difficult  to  believe  that  these  African  Euphorbias  are  not  in 
reality  Cacti:  and  the  resemblance  is  not  merely  a  general 
one ;  particular  groups,  and  even  species,  of  African  Eu- 
phorbia imitate  particular  groups  or  species  of  American 
Cacti  in  the  form  and  habit  of  the  stem  and  the  arrangement 
of  the  spines,  so  that  it  is  almost  impossible  to  distinguish 
between  them." 

As  to  the  second  kind  of  plant  mimicry,  he  mentions  that 
Kunge,  a  great  authority  on  ferns,  "  considered  the  curious 
Stangeria  paradoxa  a  cycad,"  and  that  Berthold  Seemann 
found  in  the  Sandwich  Islands  a  variety  of  Solanum  Nelsoni, 
"  which  looked  for  all  the  world  like  Thomasia  solanacea,"  a 
resemblance  as  striking  as  that  pointed  out  by  Bates  "  between 
a  certain  moth  and  a  humming-bird." 

The  objection  that  such  instances  are  not  parallel  to  animal 
mimicry  because  not  occurring  between  plants  which  inhabit 
the  same  area,  is  rebutted  by  Mr.  Bennett,  who  brings  in- 
stances to  the  contrary.  Amongst  these  may  be  mentioned 
the  resemblance  between  the  Eucalypti  and  Mimosa?,  both 
Australian  forms,  and  that  between  the  winged-fruits  (each  a 
"  Samara  ")  of  four  genera  of  plants  belonging  to  three  dis- 


Sce  '  Popular  Science  Review,'  Januaj-y,  1872  p.  1. 
12 


2-30  LESSONS  FROM  NATUKE.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

tinct  natural  orders,  all  large  shrubs  or  trees,  and  all  natives 
of  Brazil.  He  says :  "  Not  only  the  form  of  the  wing, 
but  its  very  texture  and  the  arrangement  of  the  veins,  are 
reproduced  most  accurately  in  all  the  species,  a  dissection  of 
the  fruit  alone  showing  their  essential  difference  in  structure. 
So  close,  indeed,  and  deceptive  is  this  resemblance  when  the 
plant  is  not  in  flower,  that  the  very  specimen"  from  which 
Mr.  Bennett's  drawing  is  made,  "  in  the  Berlin  Herbarium,  is 
labelled  by  so  experienced  a  botanist  as  Klotzsch  as  Securi- 
daea;  and  Walpers,  in  his  *  Reper  tori  urn,'  has  erroneously 
described  five  species  of  Seguiera  as  Securidacas" 

Mr.  Bennett's  verdict  as  to  all  such  cases  of  mimicry  is  to 
the  effect  that  "no  conjunction  of  external  circumstances 
will  avail  to  account  for  them,  whether  acting  through 
natural  selection  or  any  other  known  process." 

As  to  the  bee  orchis  he  observes :  "  It  might  well  be  as- 
sumed that  the  extraordinary  resemblance  of  the  flower  of 
this  singular  plant  to  the  body  of  a  bee  was  designed  to 
attract  these  insects  to  the  flower ;  but,  unhappily  for  this 
theory,  the  bee  orchis  appears  to  be  one  of  the  comparatively 
small  number  of  plants  that  are  independent  of  insect  agency 
for  the  maturing  of  their  seeds."  Yet  surely  for  minute  acci- 
dental variations  to  have  built  up  such  a  striking  resemblance 
to  insects  we  ought  to  find  the  preservation  of  the  plant  or 
the  continuance  of  its  race  depending  on  relations  between 
bees  and  it.  It  has  indeed  been  suggested,  in  opposition  to 
this  contention,  that  there  is  no  real  resemblance,  but  that  the 
likeness  is  ''fanciful!"  The  denial,  however,  in  the  interests 
of  an  arbitrary  hypothesis,  of  the  fact  of  a  resemblance  which 
has  struck  so  many  observers,  reminds  one  of  the  French 
philosopher's  estimate  of  facts  hostile  to  his  theory — "  Tant 
pis  pour  les  faits !" 

It  seems,  then,  that  these  facts*  of  mimicry  reduce  us  to 
the  acceptance  of  a  belief  in  an  innate  tendency  implanted 


*  I  have  a  note,  which  I  am  unable  at  Ihis  moment  to  verify,  of  the  occur- 
rence, near  Mentone,  of  galls  simulating  cones  on  a  juniper. 


CHAP.  VIII.]    LIKENESSES  IN  ANIMALS  AND  PLANTS.        251 

in  certain  races  of  animals  and  plants  to  assume  the  external 
semblance  of  creatures  very  different  from  them — a  tendency 
the  existence  of  which  is  to  be  explained  by  no  mechanical 
conceptions,  though  in  many  instances  the  destructive 
agencies  in  nature  must  tend  to  keep  true  and  to  intensify 
such  resemblances. 

We  may  now  turn  to  the  second  order  of  resemblance 
found  in  animals,  i.e.,  likenesses  in  internal  struc-  second  order 
ture  as  well  as  external  form — agreements  and  dif-  of  llkcnesse8- 
ferences  respecting  which  various  very  different  explanations 
have  been  offered.  The  real  existence,  however,  of  the  dif- 
ferent kinds  of  resemblance  about  to  be  referred  to,  as  facts, 
cannot  be  denied. 

In  however  many  directions  the  human  mind  sends  forth 
its  energy  upon  surrounding  nature,  its  activity  The™,,,,!*,, 
brings  just  so  many  vistas  of  agreement  underlying  ^dtS 
difference  before  its  ken.  Indeed,  as  Mr.  Lewes  J^uon^our 
says,*  with,  perhaps,  some  exaggeration  of  expres-  al 
sion :  "  Science  is  in  no  respect  a  plain  transcript  of  reality 
.  .  .  but  ...  an  ideal  construction  in  which  the  manifold 
relations  of  reals  are  taken  up  and  assimilated  by  the 
mind,  and  there  transformed  into  relations  of  ideas,  so  that 
the  world  of  sense  is  changed  into  the  world  of  thought." 
And  again  he  declares  :|  "  What  we  call  laws  of  nature  are 
not  objective  existences,  but  subjective  abstractions."  We 
say  that  these  expressions  are  somewhat  exaggerated,  because 
what  is  the  product  of  the  "  manifold  relations  of  reals"  must 
have  some  real  foundation  and  some  objective  validity  in  the 
eyes  of  those  who  admit,  as  it  seems  Mr.  Lewes  does  not,  the 
known  existence  of  an  external  world  (of  more  than  feelings) 
at  all.  Any  one  who  admits  such  existence  must  also  admit 
that  the  various  ideal  entities  which  are  ultimately  justified 
to  reason  as  true  ideals,  have  their  foundation  in  their  agree- 
jiinit  with  real  objective  existence,  "truth"  being  a  relation 
between  "  Being  "  and  "  an  Intellect." 


'  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,'  vol.  i.  p.  342.  f  Op.  cit.  p.  300. 


252  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

The  various  groups  into  which  animals  and  plants  have 
Natural  cias-  been  divided  are  of  this  nature,  i.e.,  are  ideal 
uficauon.  entities  with  an  objective  basis.  Classes,  orders, 
families,  genera,  and  species  exist  as  such  only  in  a  mind. 
Objectively,  there  is  nothing  but  individual  animals  and 
plants.  Nevertheless,  the  different  biological  groups  also 
exist  objectively  in  those  facts  of  structure  which  various 
individual  animals  and  plants  present,  and  which  serve  for  the 
definitions  of  such  different  groups.  What  Mr.  Lewes  says  * 
(before  quoted)  of  certain  other  abstractions  applies  here 
with  perfect  correctness :  "  They  are  realities  in  the  sense 
of  being  drawn  from  real  concretes ;  but  they  are  not  realities 
existing  apart  from  their  concretes  otherwise  than  in  our  con- 
ception ;  and  to  seek  their  objective  substitution,  we  must 
seek  the  concrete  objects  of  which  they  are  the  symbols." 

Natural  classification,  indeed,  though  formed  by  the  mind, 
does  not  depend  on  the  mind.  It  is  not  arbitrary,  but  is 
governed  by  the  external  realities  of  things.  It  is  not  that  we 
choose  to  separate  bats  and  whales  from  birds  and  fishes  re- 
spectively, and  put  them  both  in  the  same  class  as  that  which 
contains  also  the  lion  and  the  antelope.  We  are  compelled, 
by  the  multitudinous  facts  of  animal  structure,  so  to  separate 
and  so  to  class  them.  Moreover,  such  zoological  classification 
is  only  possible  because  different  animals  are  found  to  have 
like  parts  (parts  alike  as  to  their  relations  of  position  to  other 
parts)  which  can  be  compared  and  contrasted,  and  can,  by 
the  agreements  and  differences  they  present,  furnish  us  with 
the  determining  and  limiting  characters  of  the  different 
natural  groups. 

As  it  is  with  respect  to  the  various  groups  of  animals  and 
or  parts  and  plants,  so  it  is  with  respect  to  the  parts  and  organs 
which  together  compose  each  individual  animal  or 
plant.  As  the  human  mind  surveys  these  parts  and  organs 
in  different  lights,  it  finds  different  series  of  unlikenesses  and 
likenesses,  extending  along  that  line  of  thought  which  it 

*  Op.  cit.  p.  281. 


CIJAP.  VIII.]     LIKENESSES  IX  ANIMALS  AND  PLANTS.        253 

elects  to  follow.  Here  again,  however,  the  resulting  groups 
of  likenesses  cannot  be  freely  and  arbitrarily  established,  but 
must  follow  objective  reality.  It  is  thus  that  fanciful  notions 
which  do  not  respond  to  the  realities  of  things  have  to 
succumb  and  give  place  to  conceptions  which  do  harmonize 
with  such  realities. 

Every  bird  and  beast,  every  fish  and  insect,  is  formed  of  a 
complex  aggregation  of  parts  which  are  grouped  together 
into  an  harmonious  interdependency  and  have  a  multitude 
of  relations,  amongst  themselves,  of  different  kinds.  The 
mind  detects  a  certain  number  of  these  relations  as  it  con- 
templates the  various  component  parts  of  any  individual 
animal  in  different  ways — as  it  follows  up  different  lines  of 
thought. 

These  perceived  relations,  though  subjective  as  relations, 
have  nevertheless  an  objective  foundation  in  real  parts,  or 
conditions  of  parts,  of  real  wholes,  and  it  is  their  correspond- 
ence with  such  objective  foundations  which  gives  to  ideal 
relations  whatever  truth  they  may  possess.  To  detect  the 
most  hidden  laws  of  unity  underlying  the  differences  pre- 
sented by  animal  structure,  is  the  work  of  "  Philosophical 
Anatomy." 

Speculative  and  creative  minds,  imbued  with  natural  know- 
ledge, have  pursued  with  avidity  this  kind  of  Philosophical 
inquiry.  While  more  ordinary  minds  have  been  anaU)nulits- 
content  with  observing  the  facts  of  animal  structure,  the 
few  have  ever  tried  to  solve  the  problems  of  the  "how"  and 
the  "  why." 

An  inquiry  of  this  kind  into  the  nature  of  the  skeleton  is 
the  anatomical  question,  which  has  specially  occupied  Goethe, 
Oken,  Spix,  Carus,  De  Blainville,  Geoffrey  St.  Hilaire,  and 
Owen.  It  may  not  bo  uninteresting  to  consider  whether  the 
attempt  to  solve  such  problems  is,  as  so  many  persons  have 
come  to  believe,  an  altogether  vain  one ;  and  if  it  does  not 
appear  to  be  a  vain  pursuit,  then  to  inquire  what  is  the 
nature  of  the  answer  which  reason  and  observation  combine 
to  furnish. 


254  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

By  a  singular  coincidence,  the  casual  finding  of  the  muti- 
The  verte-  lated  skull  of  a  Ruminant  helped  to  evolve,  inde- 
of  the  skuii.  peiidently,  from  the  minds  of  Goethe  and  of  Oken,  full 
and  distinct  conceptions  of  a  new  theory  of  the  bony  frame- 
work of  the  head.  Each  of  these  thinkers  conceived  the  idea 
that  the  skull,  instead  of  being  (as  had  been  universally  sup- 
posed) an  altogether  peculiar  structure,  was  in  reality  similar 
in  composition  to  the  backbone,  or  spinal  column.  The  back- 
bone is  made  up  of  a  series  of  rings  of  bone  mutually  adjusted, 
called  vertebrae.  Goethe  and  Oken  conceived  that  the  skull 
was  also  made  up  of  a  series  of  vertebras — much  altered, 
however,  as  to  size  and  shape,  from  those  which  form  the 
spinal  column.  This  idea,  once  emitted,  was  rapidly  taken 
up  by  Oken's  countrymen  (as  at  later  periods  they  have 
vehemently  taken  up  the  idea  of  Schwann  and  of  Darwin) ; 
and  Spix,  Bojanus,  and  0.  G.  Carus  further  developed  and 
modified  the  original  idea.  Nor  did  Oken's  countrymen  by 
any  means  stand  alone ;  for  De  Blainville  and  Geoffrey  St. 
Hilaire  in  France,  and  Goodsir,  Maclise,  and  Owen  in  the 
British  Isles,  more  or  less  accepted  and  modified,  in  different 
ways,  the  hypothesis  propounded.  Oken,  indeed,  at  once 
pushed  his  speculation  to  extremes :  expecting,  on  a  priori 
grounds,  to  find  the  whole  trunk,  with  its  appendages,  repre- 
sented in  the  head.  He  was  by  no  means  content  with  assi- 
milating the  skull  to  the  backbone,  but  insisted  on  finding 
the  arms  and  legs,  the  hands  and  feet,  even  the  fingers 
and  toes,  of  the  head;  imagining  that  the  last-mentioned 
members  (fingers  and  toes)  were  represented  by  the  teeth ! 
Such  a  conception  may  be  taken  as  a  good  example  of  those 
fanciful  notions,  before  referred  to,  which,  not  being  sustained 
by  objective  facts,  are  surely  destined,  as  was  this,  to  die  out, 
and  to  disappear. 

The  vertebral  theory  of  the  skull,  in  an  amended  form, 
became  advocated  in  England  through  Professor  Owen,  and 
anatomical  science  in  this  country  will  ever  be  very  deeply 
indebted  to  him  for  his  attempt  to  familiarise  the  English 
mind  with  "  Philosophical  Anatomy,"  since  all  must  at  least 


CHAP.  VIII.]    LIKENESSES  IN  ANIMALS  AND  PLANTS.        255 

admit  that  it  has  been  the  occasion  of  an  important  scientific 
advance,  through  the  efforts  it  occasioned  to  support,  to 
modify,  or  to  refute  it.  According  to  Professor  Owen's 
hypothesis,  the  skull  of  every  backboned  animal,  from,  man 
to  the  cod-fish,  was  really  made  up  of  four  modified  vertebra?, 
each  being  provided  with  an  inferior  arch,  like  those  which 
in  the  trunk  are  formed  by  the  ribs.  The  skeleton  of  every 
existing  vertebrate  animal  was  represented  as  being  formed 
from  some  modification  of  an  ideal  archetypal  skeleton, 
which  was  again  represented  as  composed  of  a  series  of  ideal 
archetypal  vertebrae.  This  notion  for  a  time  met  with  very 
general  acceptance,  but  was,  ere  long,  attacked,  as  being  in- 
consistent with  the  facts  of  development.  It  was  said  that  if 
the  skull  was  made  up  of  modified  vertebrae,  its  vertebrate 
character  should  be  plainest  in  its  earliest  and  least  modified 
stages;  and  that  yet  such  stages  had  no  resemblance  to 
vertebral  at  all.  Indeed,  it  was  triumphantly  shown  that,  as 
soon  as  the  backbone  begins  to  be  a  backbone,  the  skull 
begins  to  be  something  very  different.  In  fact,  that. the  skull 
is  never  segmented,  as  is  the  primitive  vertebral  column,  but 
mainly  consists,  in  its  earlier  stage,  of  a  mass  of  cartilage, 
from  which  two  cartilaginous  rods  (the  irdbeculse  cranii)  ex- 
tend forwards  along  the  base  of  the  brain-case,  quite  unlike 
anything  found  in  the  incipient  vertebral  column.  Yet  other 
suggestions  were  made  by  Professor  Seeley  and  by  Mr. Herbert 
Spencer,  to  account  mechanically  (by  the  necessary  action 
of  pressure  and  strains  on  a  frequently  flexed,  elongated 
cylindrical  body)  for  the  simultaneous  existence  of  a  seg- 
mented backbone  and  a  non-segmented  skull.  Finally,  a 
flood  of  ridicule  and  sarcasm  was  poured  on  the  vertebrate 
theory  of  the  skull,  and  the  doctrine  of  archetypal  ideas  was 
sii|)|K>sed  to  be  once  for  all  disposed  of  by  means  of  the 
hypothesis  of  evolution.  Mr.  Darwin's  'Natural  Selection' 
\sas  lauded  as  having  given  the  coup  de  grace  to  such  fancies  ; 
and,  lastly,  appeared  '  Pangenesis,'  to  slay  the  slain,  and  to 
make  fortuitous  compounds  of  atoms  occupy  the  vacant 
thrones  of  the  deposed  prototypal  divine  ideas.  Evolution 


25G  LESSONS  FROM  N  A  TUBE.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

seemed  to  so  many  persons  to  have  this  destructive  effect 
because,  by  and  through  it,  similarities  existing  between  the 
parts  of  different  animals  came  to  be  represented  as  ex- 
clusively due  to  blood-relationship  between  them.  It  was  no 
longer  a  wonder  that  the  skulls  of  a  monkey  and  a  mud-fish 
were  essentially  similar,  if  both  these  animals  were  the 
diverging  descendants  of  some  ancient  common  ancestor. 
A  distinction  had  long  been  recognised,  had  been  plainly 
put  forth  by  Professor  Owen,  between  parts  which 
and  humoio-  resembled  each  other  in  their  function — analogous 

gous  parts. 

parts — and  parts  which  resembled  each  other  in 
their  position  with  regard  to  neighbouring  bodily  structures 
— homologous  parts.  The  wing  of  the  humming-bird  and  the 
wing  of  the  humming-bird  hawk-moth  are  analogous  parts — 
they  perform  the  same  function — as,  in  a  less  perfect  degree, 
does  the  parachute  of  the  little  lizard  (Draco  volans).  But 
the  bones  which  sustain  that  parachute  and  the  ribs  of  the 
humming-bird  are  homologous  parts— i.e.,  they  have  similar 
relations  of  position  to  neighbouring  bodily  structures.  The 
parachute-bones  and  the  wing-bones,  on  the  contrary,  are 
analogous  parts.  Such  fa'cts  of  "  homology "  had  been 
deemed  deep  mysteries.  No  a  priori  reason  could  be  given 
why  animals  of  the  most  different  modes  of  life  should  have 
been  formed  on  similar  patterns.  The  man,  the  horse,  the 
whale,  and  the  bat,  all  have  the  pectoral  limb — whether  arm, 
fore-leg,  paddle,  or  wing — formed  on  one  type,  diverse  as  are 
the  uses  to  which  these  limbs  are  applied.  Again,  the 
butterfly  and  the  shrimp,  different  as  they  are  in  appearance 
and  mode  of  life,  are  constructed  on  one  common  plan,  of 
which  they  exhibit  diverging  manifestations.  These  facts 
were  recognised  as  facts,  though  no  explanation  of  them 
could  be  offered.  But  they  became  readily  explicable  on  the 
assumption  of  a  blood-relationship,  through  actual  generation 
and  descent  from  common  ancestors.  Here,  then,  appeared 
to  be  the  end  of  mystery  with  respect  to  homology — a  ready, 
clear  and  sufficient  explanation  seemed  to  have  been  supplied. 
A  new  definition  of  homologous  parts  thus  suggested  itself. 


CHAP.  VIII.]    LIKENESSES  IN  ANIMALS  AND  PLANTS.        257 

They  might  be  simply  described  as  parts  which  resembled 
each  other,  because  they  were  alike  descended  from  one 
single  part  in  a  remote  common  ancestor. 

Soon,  however,  investigation  rendered  necessary   further 
analysis,  with  respect  to  parts  said  to  be  homologous. 

,  ,      ,  ,  , .,  Likenesses 

It  came  to  be  recognised  that  there  are  likenesses  not  due  to 
between  different  animals  and  different  parts  of  the 
same  animal,  which  a  theory  of  common  descent  cannot  ex- 
plain ;  and  "  similarity  in  relative  position  "  had  to  be  once 
more  had  recourse  to,  as  a  definition  of  what  was  meant  by 
homology,  such  similarity  being,  in  certain  cases,  explicable 
by  "  descent,"  and  in  others  not  so  explicable. 

A  very  obvious  example  of  likeness  not  explicable  by 
"  descent "  is  the  familiar  one  between  our  right  hand  and  our 
left.  This  likeness  is  part  of  that  general  correspondence 
which  exists  between  the  right  and  left  sides  of  most  animals, 
and  which  is  spoken  of  as  "bilateral  symmetry,"  or  lateral 
homology.  Another  example  is  that  likeness  which  sometimes 
exists  between  parts  placed  one  above  another,  as  between 
the  upper  and  lower  parts  of  the  tail-fin  of  most  fishes.  Such 
likeness  is  an  example  of  "  vertical  symmetry,"  or  vertical 
liomology.  Another  kind  of  "likeness,"  or  homology,  is 
termed  "  serial."  It  is  chiefly  in  our  limbs  that  this  kind  of 
homology  is  manifested  externally  in  us,  but  it  is  plainly 
enough  to  be  seen  in  the  human  skeleton  (or  in  that  of  any 
backboned  animal),  in  the  ribs  or  in  that  series  of  generally 
similar  bones  (vertebras)  which  make  up  the  vertebral 
column  or  backbone.  Our  limbs,  however,  do  present,  even 
externally,  a  certain  degree  of  similarity,  the  thigh,  leg,  and 
foot  of  the  lower  limb  evidently  more  or  less  repeating  the 
upper  arm,  arm,  and  hand  of  the  upper  limb. 

Mr.  Herbert  Spencer,  in  his  '  First  Principles  of  Biology,' 
attempts  to  explain  these  and  all  facts  of  structure,  Mr.  spencer's 
not  due  to  inheritance,  by  the  action  upon  each  e*PlanallonB- 
organism  of  its  environment.  Thus  he  explains  the  very 
general  absence  of  symmetry  between  the  dorsal  and  ventral 
(upper  and  lower)  surfaces  of  most  animals  by  the  different 


258  LESSONS  FROM  NATUliE.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

conditions  to  which  these  two  surfaces  are  respectively  ex- 
posed. But  it  may  be  objected  that  this  is  no  real  explana- 
tion, but  a  mere  restatement  of  the  facts.  No  reasons  have 
been  given  by  him  showing  either  how  or  why  each  organism 
so  responds  to  such  external  differences  of  environment,  or  how 
such  differences  in  environment  tend  to  produce  such  particular 
modifications.  Mr.  Spencer,  indeed,  beautifully  illustrates 
that  correlation  which,  however  produced,  all  must  admit  to 
exist  between  the  structure  of  organisms  and  their  surround- 
ing conditions,  but  he  quite  fails  to  show  that  such  conditions 
are  the  cause  of  such  structure.  His  argument  is,  indeed,  an 
example  of  the  old  fallacy  post  hoc  ergo  propter  hoc.  I 
believe  the  cause  to  be  not  external  but  internal.  If 
animals  and  plants  respond  so  readily  to  the  action  of  ex- 
ternal incident  forces,  it  must  be  the  case  that  conditions 
exist  in  such  animals  and  plants  which  dispose  and  enable 
them  so  to  respond,  according  to  the  maxim,  Quicquid 
recipitur,  recipitur  ad  modum  recipients,  as  the  same  rays  of 
light  which  bleach  a  piece  of  silk  blacken  nitrate  of  silver. 
If,  therefore,  we  attribute  the  external  forms  of  organisms  to 
the  action  of  external  conditions,  we  but  remove  the  difficulty 
a  step  back,  since  we  must  conceive  an  internal  power  and 
tendency  occasioning  such  ready  modifiability  of  structure. 
But,  indeed,  it  is  not  at  all  easy  to  see  how  the  influence  of 
the  surface  of  the  ground,  or  any  conceivable  similar  external 
condition  or  influence,  can  produce  such  differences  as  those 
existing  between  the  dorsal  and  ventral  shields  of  the  shell 
of  a  tortoise. 

The  likenesses,  then,  which  exist  between  arm  and  leg,  and 
between  hand  and  foot,  are  hardly  to  be  explained  by  any  mere 
action  of  the  environment.  But  serial  homology  is  much  better 
exemplified  in  a  very  different  group  of  animals  from  back- 
boned creatures — namely,  the  group  to  which  all  insects, 
lobsters,  centipedes,  leeches,  and  earth-worms  belong — the 
group  of  Annulose  animals.  In  the  centipede,  the  body  (ex- 
cept at  its  two  ends)  consists  of  a  longitudinal  series  of 
similar  segments.  Each  segment  supports  a  pair  of  limbs, 


CHAP.  VIII.]    LIKENESSES  IN  ANIMALS  AND  PLANTS.         259 

and  the  appendages  of  all  the  segments  (except  at  each  end 
of  the  body)  are  completely  alike.  In  most  other  creatures 
of  the  Annulose  group,  the  fundamental  similarity  between 
the  successive  segments  of  -which  the  body  is  composed  is 
more  or  less  disguised.  Thus,  for  example,  in  the  lobster  a 
number  of  the  anterior  segments  of  the  body  are  united 
together  into  one  solid  mass,  while  only  in  the  abdomen  (the 
so-called  tail)  do  the  segments  remain  distinct.  The  limbs 
also,  which  at  first  are  all  similar,  assume,  with  the  develop- 
ment of  the  young  lobster,  different  forms  and  become  re- 
spectively jaws,  claws,  legs,  and  swimming-feet.  The  peculiar 
and  strongly  marked  serial  homology  of  these  Annulose 
animals  has  been  the  subject  of  an  exceedingly  ingenious 
suggestion  by  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer.  In  his  work  just  re- 
ferred to  he  has  attempted  to  explain  such  serial  homologies 
thus: — Some  animals  of  a  very  low  grade  propagate  them- 
selves by  spontaneous  fission — one  individual  spontaneously 
dividing,  and  so  becoming  two  distinct  individuals.  If 
certain  creatures  found  benefit  from  this  process  of  division 
remaining  incomplete,  they  would  (oa  the  theory  of  Natural 
Selection)  transmit  to  their  posterity  a  naturally  selected 
tendency  to  such  incomplete  division.  It  is  conceivable  that 
certain  animals  might  thus  have  come  to  assume  the  form  of 
a  chain  of  similar  segments — i.e.,  a  chain  of  imperfectly 
separated  individuals.  Such  a  chain  would,  of  course,  in  one 
kind  of  animal  be  the  equivalent  of  a  series  of  perfectly 
separated  individuals  of  another  kind  of  animal  in  which  the 
process  of  fission  was  completely  carried  through.  In  other 
words,  Mr.  Spencer  would  explain  the  serial  homology  of 
Annulose  animals  by  the  supposed  coalescence  (through  im- 
perfect fission)  of  organisms  of  very  simple  structure,  such  as 
the  small  aquatic  worms  called  Planarite,  in  one  aggregated, 
longitudinal  series  through  the  survival  of  the  fittest  aggre- 
gation. This  is  a  very  ingenious  speculation,  yet  not  only  is 
there  no  evidence  that  Planarite  propagate  by  fission,  but 
there  is  positive  evidence  which  directly  conflicts  with  Mr. 
Spencer's  hypothesis.  Mr.  Mosely,  in  his  investigations  of 


260  LESSONS  FKOM  NATUBE.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

the  land  Planarise  of  India,  has  brought  forward  evidence 
that  a  single  Planaria  is  the  equivalent  not  of  a  segment  of 
a  leech  but  of  a  whole  leech.  Yet  a  leech  is  the  morpho- 
logical equivalent  of  a  whole  centipede,  lobster,  or  other 
higher  Annulose  animal,  and  therefore  each  higher  Annulose 
animal  must  be  regarded  as  itself  a  morphological  unit,  and 
not  an  aggregation  of  such  units. 

Moreover,  even  lateral,  vertical  and  serial  homology  do  not 
independent  exhaust  the  kinds  of  likeness  (homologies)  which 
ues'  have  arisen  independently  of  descent:  for  struc- 
tures are  continually  being  discovered  (in  animals  of  different 
kinds)  so  strikingly  alike  that  their  resemblance  would 
naturally  be  taken,  on  the  theory  of  evolution,  for  a  sign  of 
genetic  affinity,  and  yet  the  circumstances  under  which  they 
occur  preclude  any  such  explanation.  The  resemblance 
which  exists  between  the  ankle-bones  of  such  widely  different 
animals  as  frogs,  and  the  small  African  lemurs,,  termed 
Galago?,  may  be  taken  as  an  example  of  such  uninherited 
likeness.  In  a  genus  of  the  frog  order  (namely,  Pelobates), 
and  in  the  turtle,  a  bony  expansion  covers  over  that  hollow 
at  the  side  of  the  head  which  is  called  the  "  temporal  fossa." 
A  similar  expansion  has  lately  been  found  to  exist  in  a  certain 
African  animal  of  the  rat  order  (namely,  Lophiomys),  though 
it  exists  in  no  other  known  beast.  The  resemblance  which 
exists  between  Pelobates,  the  turtle,  and  Lophiomys  must  be 
supposed  to  have  been  occasioned  independently,  and  not  by 
inheritance.  Again,  the  African  ant-eater,  the  aard-vark 
(Orycteropus),  has  each  tooth,  though  apparently  simple, 
really  composed  of  a  closely-set  bundle  of  very  fine,  long, 
cylindrical  teeth  united  together  side  by  side.  Such  a  struc- 
ture exists  in  no  other  genus  of  the  same  class,  but  is  found 
in  the  class  of  fishes — namely,  in  the  skate  (Myliolatis).  Yet 
the  aard-vark  can  have  no  special  relation  of  genetic  affinity 
with  these  fishes.  The  shape  of  the  teeth  in  kangaroos  is 
similar  to  that  of  certain  shrew-like,  insect-eating  African 
beasts  (of  the  genus  Macroscelides),  which  also  agree  with 
kangaroos  in  having  the  hind-legs  and  feet  much  elongated 


CHAP.  Yin.]    LIKENESSES  IN  ANIMALS  AND  PLANTS.         261 

and  a  jumping  mode  of  progression;  yet  this  double  similarity 
is  almost  evidently  induced  and  not  inherited.  The  only 
beasts  of  burthen  known  in  South  America  when  it  was  dis- 
covered by  the  Spaniards,  were  the  Llamas,  animals  which 
present  a  singular  structure  as  to  the  course  of  their  vertebral 
arteries  which  pierce  the  neck-bones  on  their  inner  sides. 
The  very  same  condition,  however,  occurs  again  in  the  great 
ant-eater,  also  an  inhabitant  of  South  America.  Yet  it  is  im- 
possible to  believe  that  any  special  affinity,  through  descent, 
can  connect  such  strangely  divergent  forms.  It  is  also  note- 
worthy that  this  character  can  hardly  have  been  due  to  any 
action  of  "  natural  or  sexual  selection."  The  examples  cited 
are  but  a  few  of  many  which  might  be  adduced  as  evidence  in 
this  matter. 

It  is  thus  forced  upon  our  attention  (alike  by  the  facts 
of  lateral  and  serial  homology,  as  well  as  by  Homopiasts 
such  as  those  just  cited)  that  there  are  likenesses  piasy. 
or  homologies  which  cannot  be  due  to  inheritance,  and 
which  have  to  be  distinguished  from  others  which  are,  or 
which  may  be,  so  due.  With  the  new  mental  conception 
came,  as  was  fitting,  the  new  oral  expression.  We  have  to 
thank  Professor  Ray  Lankester  for  the  introduction,  of  the 
terms  "  homoplasy "  and  "  homoplast,"  to  express  such 
uniuherited  resemblance  and  such  resembling  parts,  as  well 
as  for  the  antithetical  terms  "  homogeny  "  and  "  homogen," 
to  express  inherited  resemblance  and  the  parts  which  mani- 
fested it. 

For  my  part,  experience  more  and  more  convinces  mo 
that  the  number  of  similarities  which  have  arisen  inde- 
pendently (i.e.,  cases  of  homoplasy)  is  prodigious,  as  well 
M  that  very  great  caution  is  needed  in  endeavouring  to 
discriminate  between  likenesses  which  may  be  due  to  in- 
heritance, and  those  which  are  due  to  some  other  cause. 
The  elaborate  investigations  of  the  first  of  our  English 
embryologists  (my  friend  Professor  Parker),  constantly 
make  manifest  the  existence  of  an  apparently  inexhaustible 
number  of  complex  cross  relations  between  widely  different 


2G2  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

animals,  and  show  more  and  more  plainly  the  entangled  inter- 
dependencies  of  their  structure.  The  notion,  once  popular 
with  Evolutionists,  that  "  similarity  of  structure  "  necessarily 
implies  "genetic  affinity,"  can  certainly  now  be  maintained, 
as  a  biological  axiom,  by  no  well-informed  naturalist. 

Indeed,  the  distinction  between  homogeny  and  homoplasy 
(between  the  influence  of  a  common  descent  and  that  which 
produced  independent  similarity)  has  its  importance  much 
reduced  through  the  power  which  the  latter  possesses  of 
simulating  the  former.  The  degree  to  which  homoplasy 
can  rival  homogeny  in  the  degree  of  likeness  produced,  is 
shown,  not  only  by  the  instances  cited,  but  also  by  the 
likenesses  existing  between  some  of  the  bones  of  the  skull 
in  beasts  and  in  osseous  fishes.  Probably  but  few  naturalists 
would  now  dispute  the  independent  origin  of  the  bones  of 
the  skull  in  these  two  classes  of  animals.  Yet  their  cranial 
bones  are  in  many  instances  indisputably  homologous,  while 
in  others  their  homology  is  a  subject  of  keen  discussion. 

If  it  be  asked  what  is  meant  by  parts  being  "  homolo- 
gous," if  they  are  not  "homogenetic,"  it  may  be  replied 
that  it  means  they  show  a  complex  likeness,  or  agreement, 
as  to  their  relative  positions  to  other  surrounding  parts. 
This  likeness,  or  agreement,  may  be  of  different  kinds,  ac- 
cording as  we  follow  different  lines  of  thought.  An  intellect 
of  a  higher  order  than  that  of  man  would  probably  detect 
an  indefinite  number  of  relations  between  two  animals  and 
between  their  component  parts,  which  relations  escape  our 
observation  altogether,  though  we  can  readily  enough  ap- 
prehend a  considerable  number  of  such  relations. 

Thus  we  may  enumerate  as  examples  of  different  kinds  of 
catalogue  of  homology  :— 

1.  Parts  which  have  a  similarity  of  function  but 
differ  structurally  in  their  relations  to  all  the  rest  of  the 
body  (i.e.,  differ  in  their  relative  position  to  the  rest  of  the 
body) — e.g.,  the  legs  of  a  lizard  and  of  a  lobster. 

2.  Parts  which  are  similar  both  as  to  function  and  relative 
position — e.g.,  the  wings  of  a  bat  and  of  a  bird. 


CHAP.  VIII.]    LIKENESSES  IN  ANIMALS  AND  PLANTS.        2Go 

3.  Parts   which,  upon  the   hypothesis  of  evolution,   are 
descendants  of  some  ancient  similar  structure — e.g.,  the  arm 
and  leer  bones  of  the  horse  and  of  the  rhinoceros. 

o 

4.  Parts  which  are  similar  as  to  their  mode  of  origin  in 
the  individuals  compared,  whatever  be  their  racial  genetic 
relations — e.g.,  the  occipital  skull-bones  of  a  panther  and  of 
a  perch. 

5.  Parts  which  do  not  arise  similarly  in  the  individuals 
compared,  whether  or  not  they  are  the  descendants  of  cor- 
responding parts  in  some  one  common  ancestral  form — e.g., 
the   legs  of  different  kinds  of  fly — these  insects  differing 
strangely  in  their  modes  of  attaining  their  adult  structure. 

C.  Laterally  homologous  parts. 

7.  Vertically  homologous  parts. 

8.  Serially  homologous  parts. 

(These  last  three  kinds  of  homology  have  been  already 
sufficiently  explained.) 

9.  Parts  of  the  same  individual   which   have  a   certain 
likeness  and  correspondence  though  placed  at  opposite  ends 
of  the  body — e.g.,  buccal  and  anal  chambers. 

10.  Parts  of  one  individual  which  repeat  each  other  and 
which  radiate  from  a  central  point — e.g.,  any  two  arms  of  a 
star-fish. 

11.  Parts  which  agree  with  each  other  as  being  successive 
subdivisions  or  segments  of  some  part  or  organ — as  of  a  limb 
or  insect's  feeling-organ  (antenna) — and  which  are  thus  serial 
homologues  of  a  subordinate   kind,    or  subordinate  serial 
homologues. 

12.  Parts  of  such   subordinate  serial  homologues,  which 
parts  stand  to  each  other  in  a  secondary  serial  relation,  as, 
lor  example,  does  the  root  segment  of  the  leg  of  a  lobste^  to 
the  root  segment  of  one  of  its  swimming  appendages. 

13.  Parts  which  stand  to  each  other  in  a  tertiary  serial  re- 
lation as  being  annexed  to  such  subordinate  serial  homologues 
as  stand  to  each  other  in  a  secondary  serial  relation. 

14.  Special  homologues,  which  are  parts  existing  in  differ- 
ent animals,  but  belonging  to  the  same  special  skeletal  cafe- 


26-1  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

gory  —  as,  e.g.,  the  nail  of  a  man's  middle  toe  and  the  hoof  of 
a  horse's  hind  foot. 

15.  General  homologues,  which  are  parts  belonging  to 
the  same  general  skeletal  category  —  as,  e.g.,  when  we  say  of  a 
part  that  it  is  a  limb,  or  of  another  that  it  is  a  rib,  or  of 
a  third  that  it  is  a  vertebra.  We  may  distinguish  then 
different  kinds  and  degrees  of  relationship,  which  are 
severally  perceived  according  as  the  mind  is  directed  along 
one  line  of  inquiry  or  another,  and  whether  concerning 
different  individuals  or  different  parts  of  the  same  indi- 
vidual. 

Now  I  contend  that  it  is  against  reason  to  suppose 
Not  due  to  that  mere  indefinite  variation,  together  with  the 
"survival  of  the  fittest,"  could  ever  have  built 


up  all  these  serial,  lateral,  and  other  homologues  without 
the  action  of  some  innate  power  or  tendency  so  to  build  up 
possessed  by  the  organism  itself  in  each  case. 

What  can  be  more  wonderful  than  the  symmetry  of  those 
lowly  but  beautiful  organisms,  the  Acanihometree—o.  sym- 
metry for  which  it  is  difficult  to  conceive  any  external 
cause.  Hardly,  if  at  all,  less  wonderful  is  the  radial  sym- 
metry of  the  Echinoderms  (the  sea-stars,  sea-eggs,  and  sea- 
urchins)  with  their  multitudinous  variety  of  component 
parts.  If,  then,  internal  forces  can  build  up  such  varied 
structures  as  these,  they  may  well  be  also  capable  of  pro- 
ducing the  various  serial,  lateral,  and  vertical  symmetries 
which  higher  animals  exhibit. 

We  may  next  consider  whether  there  are  not  other  ex- 
ternal evidences  (besides  the  homologues  themselves)  of  the 
existence  of  such  an  internal  power,  by  the  action  of  which 
the|p  recondite  "  likenesses  "  may  be  conceived  to  be  brought 
about.  It'is  here  contended  that  there  is  good  evidence  of 
the  existence  of  some  such  special  internal  power,  which 
evidence  may  be  gathered  from  three  sources  :  1,  Compara- 
tive anatomy;  2,  the  science  of  monstrous  births,  or  tera- 
tology; and  3,  the  science  of  diseased  structures,  or  pa- 
thology. 


CHAP.  VIII.]    LIKENESSES  IN  ANIMALS  AND  PLANTS.        205 

First,  as  to  comparative  anatomy,  one  example  may  be 
selected  where  others   can  be   easily  adduced,   if  Evidcnce8 

r^miirprl  *  from  com- 

reqill    ea.  paraiive 

On  the  hypothesis  of  evolution,  tortoises  must  be  anatomy- 
reckoned  as  very  far  indeed  from  being  the  first  and  earliest 
kinds  of  quadrupeds.  Yet,  certain  tortoises  exhibit  the 
most  extraordinary  resemblance  and  correspondence  between 
their  anterior  and  posterior  limbs.  This  degree  of  likeness 
and  correspondence,  then,  must  be  the  effect  of  a  spon- 
taneous development,  and  cannot  be  merely  due  to  inherit- 
ance, because  it  does  not  exist  in  other  forms  which,  upon 
evolutionary  principles,  are  more  nearly  related  to  the 
hypothetical  root-forms. 

As  to  teratology,  it  is  notorious  that  serially  homologous 
parts  tend  to  be  similarly  affected — great  toes  shar-  p^  tera. 
ing  abnormalities  of  structure  with  thumbs,  and  tol°sy- 
ankles  with  wrists,  knees  with  elbows,  and  so  on.  Professor 
Uurt  Wilder  has  recorded  six  cases  in  which  both  the  little 
lingers  and  both  the  little  toes  were  similarly  affected,  and  one 
case  in  which  serial  symmetry  was  alone  exhibited,  the  right 
little  finger  and  the  right  little  toe  being  the  only  ones 
affected.  But  perhaps  the  most  curious  and  instructive 
instances  are  those  in  which  the  feet  of  pigeons  or  fowls  are 
abnormally  feathered,  or,  as  it  is  termed,  furnished  with 
"boots."  These  extra  feathers  are  developed  along  the 
very  parts  of  the  foot  which  correspond  to  (i.e.,  are  serially 
homologous  with)  those  parts  of  the  bird's  hand  which  bear 
the  wing-feathers,  so  that  these  "  boots  "  are  plainly  a  serial 
repetition  of  the  true  wing-feathers.  These  foot-feathers 
have,  indeed,  been  sometimes  proved  to  exceed  the  wing- 
fruthers  in  length.  Moreover,  the  foot-feathers  resemble 
tlio  true  wing-feathers  in  structure,  and  are  quite  unlike  the 
down  which  naturally  clothes  the  legs  of  such  birds  as 
grouse  and  owls.  But  there  is  a  more  striking  correspond- 
ence still,  for  in  pigeons  which  are  thus  "booted"  the  two 


*  For  others,  see  'Genesis  of  Spccics,l  chap,  yiii 


26(i  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  YI1L 

outer  digits  (toes)  become  more  or  less  connected  by  skin, 
as  is  also  the  case  with  the  corresponding  digits  of  the 
pigeon's  hand. 

As  regards  pathology,  Sir  James  Paget  has  declared, 
From  path-  speaking  of  symmetrical  diseases,  that  "  a  certain 
ology-  morbid  change  of  structure  on  one  side  of  the 
body  is  repeated  in  the  exactly  corresponding  part  of  the 
opposite  side" — i.e.,  we  have  a  spontaneous  manifestation 
of  lateral  homology.  In  the  pelvis  of  a  certain  lion  affected 
with  a  kind  of  rheumatism  Sir  James  remarked  a  deposit 
which  had  formed  a  pattern  more  complex  and  irregular 
than  the  spots  upon  a  map,  while  not  one  spot  or  line  on 
one  side  failed  to  be  represented  with  daguerreotype  ex- 
actness on  the  other.  He  also  considers  that  parts  which 
are  serially,  as  well  as  those  which  are  laterally  homologous, 
are  likely  to  be  affected  in  a  similar  manner.  Such  serially 
homologous  parts  are  the  back  of  the  hand  and  the  corre- 
sponding surface  of  the  foot,  and  these  are  likely  to  be  both 
modified  in  the  same  manner,  as  also  are  the  palms  and 
soles,  the  elbows  and  knees,  together  with  the  other  serially 
corresponding  parts  of  the  arms  and  legs. 

What  explanation  can  be  offered  of  these  phenomena  ? 
To  say  that  they  exhibit  a  "  nutritional  relation,"  brought 
about  by  a  "  balancing  of  forces,"  is  but  a  statement  of  the 
fact,  and  affords  no  explanation  of  it  whatever.  The  changes 
are,  of  course,  brought  about  by  a  "nutritional  "  process,  and 
the  symmetry  is  undoubtedly  the  result  of  a  "  balance  of 
forces ;"  but  to  say  so  is  to  affirm  a  truism.  The  question 
is,  what  is  the  cause  of  this  "nutritional  balancing?"  It 
seems  impossible  not  to  concede  the  existence  of  an  internal 
force.  If  this  power  be  referred,  as  it  seems  Mr.  Spencer 
would  refer  it,  to  certain  physiological  units  of  which  he 
imagines  each  organism  to  be  composed,  there  must  none 
the  less  be  recognised  an  innate  power  possessed  by  such 
units  of  inheriting  the  effects  of  ancestral  modification. 
It  is  not  easy  to  see  the  advantage  of  Mr.  Spencer's  reference. 
It  seems  easier,  simpler,  and  more  consonant  with  known 


CHAP.  VIII.]    LIKENESSES  IN  ANIMALS  AND  PLANTS.        2G7 

facts,  to  recognise  in  each  organism  as  a  whole  (which  is 
visibly  a  unity)  an  innate  power,  tending  to  development 
of  a  special  kind,  though  the  actual  results  of  the  develop- 
ing force  must  be  modified  by  the  external  conditions 
which  happen  to  exist  in  each  case  during  the  process  of 
development. 

Amongst  the  results  of  the  recognition  of  such  innate 
powers  and  tendencies  are  an  increased  support  to  Teleology 
and  a  rehabilitation  of  "  Philosophical  Anatomy."  With 
such  recognition,  indeed,  it  is  much  less  difficult  than  with- 
out it,  to  conceive  (if  "  purpose  "  in  nature  be  recognised  at 
all)  that  results  which  become  manifest  only  at  last,  and 
after  complex  changes  which  do  not  seem  to  foreshadow  them, 
may  have  been  latent  and  pre-ordained  from  the  first. 

"\Vhen  "Philosophical  Anatomy"  fell  in  general  esteem, 
in  the  manner  already  related,  it  did  not  fall  alone. 
Teleology,  or  the  doctrine  of  final  causes,  had  been 
a  favourite  subject  with  Professor  Owen ;  and  with  Tele- 
ology, the  doctrine  of  evolution  appeared  to  many  to  wage  a 
battle  a  entrance.  It  was  not  that  this  or  that  explanation 
was  disputed ;  but  the  whole  conception  fell  into  utter  dis- 
esteem,  and  the  "  purposelessness "  of  the  organic  world 
became  with  some  persons  almost  an  article  of  faith,  as  it 
has  come  to  form  a  special  branch  of  study,  with  its  proper 
scientific  title  of  "  dysteleology." 

This  materialistic  and  atheistic  spirit  of  negation  has  been, 
however,  modified,  and  seems  destined  to  be  more  affected 
hereafter,  by  that  very  study  which  at  first  came  so  aptly  to 
its  aid. 

The  further  prosecution  of  embryological  research,  so  fatal 
to  "  Philosophical  Anatomy"  in  its  earlier  form,  is  calculated 
to  have  this  anti-materialistic  effect.  The  mazy  complexity 
<>f  developmental  changes,  the  half-revealed  affinities,  thus 
seen  to  radiate  in  all  directions,  have  convinced  more  than 
one  of  our  most  eminent  observers  that  no  series  of  hap- 
hazard changes  is  thus  offered  to  their  ken,  but  that  they 
have  before  them  the  evidences  of  an  orderly  and  predeter- 


2G8  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

mined  evolution.  One  such  observer,  at  least,  has  been 
thus  turned  from  crass  materialism,  if  not  to  theism,  yet  to 
the  belief  in  a  Pantheistic  Demiurge  ever  weaving  Protean 
matter  into  structures,  the  cross  relations  and  affinities  of 
which  are  too  complex  for  the  sharpest  of  human  observers 
to  unravel.  Thus,  time  has  brought  about  strange  changes. 

"  Jam  rcdit  et  Virgo,  redeunt  Saturnia  rcgna." 

From  the  same  professorial  chair  whence  Professor  Owen, 
A  resurrec-  i11  1S49,  promulgated  his  views  as  to  "  Philosophical 
tion.  Anatomy,"  Professor  Huxley,  in  1870,  gave  out  in 

turn  his  quasi-vertebral  theory  of  the  skull,  followed  four 
years  later  by  Professor  Parker.  Moreover,  Professor  Huxley 
has  not  only  eloquently  proclaimed  the  complete  compati- 
bility of  "Teleology"  with  "Evolutionism,"  but  even  the 
utter  impotence  of  the  latter  to  weaken,  in  however  small  a 
degree,  the  position  of  the  teleologist.  If  such  results  are 
admitted  by  those  who  are  at  once  zealous  evolutionists  and 
Develop-  eminent  advocates  of  the  supreme  importance  of 
the  study  of  development,  they  may  well  be  yet 
more  apparent  to  those  who,  on  principle,  deny  that  the 
study  of  development  is  the  one  key  whereby  may  be  un- 
locked the  mysteries  of  animal  organization.  Useful,  highly 
useful  in  its  degree,  as  is  the  study  of  development,  its  im- 
portance seems  to  me  to  have  been  of  late  somewhat  over- 
estimated. For,  in  the  first  place,  it  is  manifest  that  if  our 
embryological  researches  be  carried  back  as  far  as  possible, 
we  shall  not  find  in  the  incipient  germ  any  available  cha- 
racters at  all,  while  at  later  stages  diversities  in  the  inter- 
pretation of  nascent  structures  are  almost  always  possible. 
In  backboned  animals,  when  the  skull  begins  to  assume  the 
consistence  of  cartilage,  the  meaning  of  the  initial  changes 
of  that  process  must  be  elucidated  through  the  changes 
which  take  place  at  subsequent  stages.  Thus  Professor 
Huxley  has  lately*  testified,  referring  to  the  development  of 


Sec  '  Proceedings  of  the  Zoological  Sociity,'  for  1871,  Part  ii.  p.  103. 


CHAP.  VIII.]    LIKENESSES  IN  ANIMALS  AND  PLANTS.        269 

the  skull  of  the  American  gilled  eft,  Menobranchus,  that,  in 
his  opinion,  "  No  definite  answer  can  be  given  "  to  the  ques- 
tion \vhether  the  trabeculae  "  grow  into  adjacent  tissues,  as  a 
tree  pushes  its  roots  into  the  soil,"  or  whether  their  apparent 
extension  does  not  "arise  rather  from  a  chondrification  of 
the  pre-existing  tissue  in  the  immediate  neighbourhood  of 
the  trabecular  cartilage  ?" 

Secondly,  when  ossification  begins  to  set  in,  the  meaning 
of  the  several  ossific  centres  as  they  arise  must  be  interpreted 
by  their  later  stages,  or  subsequent  adult  conditions  in  the 
same  animal  or  in  other  animals.  How  else  could  epiphyses 
ever  be  discriminated  from  other  ossific  centres  ?  Again, 
the  circumstance  of  a  bone  or  cartilage  making  its  appear- 
ance as  a  single  element  may  in  any  case  be  due  to  the 
junction  of  its  incipiently  distinct  parts  at  a  period  anterior 
to  possible  observation ;  in  other  words,  it  may  be  made  up 
of  parts  \\hich  are  called  connate — i.e.,  never  distinct  to 
observation,  though  judged  from  analogy  to  be  essentially 
compound.  Of  such  rationally  inferred,  but  invisible,  distinct- 
ness, botany  offers  us  a  multitude  of  examples. 

The  stages  passed  through  by  the  larvae  of  moths  and 
butterflies  throw  but  a  doubtful  light  on  their  adult  con- 
dition ;  and  what  misleading  ideas  might  not  be  suggested 
by  the  development  of  the  Sitaris  beetle?  This  insect, 
instead  of  at  first  appearing  in  its  grub  stage,  and  then  after 
a  time  putting  on  the  adult  form,  is  at  first  active  and  fur- 
nished with  six  legs,  two  long  antennae,  and  four  eyes. 
Hatched  in  the  nests  of  bees,  it  at  first  attaches  itself  to  one 
of  the  males,  and  then  crawls,  when  an  opportunity  offers, 
upon  a  female  bee.  When  the  female  bee  lays  her  eggs, 
the  young  Sitaris  springs  upon  them  and  devours  them. 
Then,  losing  its  eyes,  legs,  and  antennae,  it  sinks  into  an 
ordinary  grub-like  form,  and  feeds  on  honey,  ultimately 
undergoing  another  transformation,  re-acquiring  its  legs  and 
antennae,  and  emerging  a  perfect  beetle. 

Surely  the  results  of  development  are  as  much  to  be  con- 
sidered as  are  its  earlier  stages.  I  am  far  indeed  from 


270  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

denying  that  the  study  of  embryology  is  of  great  importance, 
that  the  investigation  as  to  "  how  things  become  "  is  a  most 
interesting  and  valuable  inquiry;  but  I  deny  that  it  is 
all-important.*  Aristotle  declares  the  essence  of  a  thing  to 
be  "  what  it  is  to  be,"  and  the  outcome  of  development  is, 
to  our  mind,  the  important  matter.  If  the  apes  of  the 
old  world  and  of  the  new  have  descended  from  radically 
different  stocks,  are  they  on  that  account  not  to  be  classed 
together  as  apes?  If  it  turns  out  that  birds  have  come, 
not  from  one  but  several  distinct  reptilian  sources,  are 
they  not  all  as  much  "  birds "  for  all  such  divergence  in 
origin  ? 

My  view  as  to  each  organism  is,  thajb  it  is,  dynamically 
considered,  a  single  form  or  force,  which  the  human  mind 
is  unable  to  thoroughly  comprehend  and  appreciate.  Partial 
apprehensions  of  it  are  to  be  obtained  by  different  modes  of 
study  and  contemplation — one  such  mode  being  the  study 
of  the  development  of  such  organism.  But  a  synthesis  of  all 
our  modes  of  study  is  the  necessary  preliminary  to  our  ob- 
taining the  least  imperfect  apprehension  which  is  possible 
for  us  of  any  animal  or  plant.  We  cannot  grasp  it  in  its 
totality  and  unity — in  its  essence — we  can  only  comprehend 


*  The  wide-spread  tendency  now  existing  to  sacrifice  other  and  more  im- 
portant considerations,  to  considerations  as  to  origin,  is  noted  by  Mr.  Morley, 
in  his  work  on  'Compromise,'  1874.  He  tells  us  (p.  23)  :  "Curiosity  with 
reference  to  origins,  is  for  various  reasons  the  most  marked  element  among 
modern  scientific  tendencies Character  is  considered  less  with  refer- 
ence to  its  absolute  qualities,  than  as  an  interesting  scene,  strewn  with 
scattered  rudiments,  survivals,  inherited  predispositions.  Opinions  are 
counted  rather  as  phenomena  to  be  explained  than  as  matters  of  trutli  or 
falsehood.  Of  usages  we  are  beginning,  first  of  all,  to  think  where  they  came 
from,  and  secondarily,  whether  they  are  the  most  fitting  and  convenient  that 
men  could  be  got  to  accept.  In  the  last  century,  men  asked  of  a  belief  or  a 
story,  Is  it  true  ?  We  now  ask,  How  did  men  come  to  take  it  for  true  ?  In 
short,  the  relations  among  social  phenomena  which  now  engage  most  atten- 
tion, are  relations  of  original  source,  rather,  than  those  of  actual  consistency 
in  theory,  and  actual  fitness  in  practice.  The  devotees  of  the  current  method 
are  more  concerned  with  (he  pedigree  and  genealogical  connections  of  an  ide:i, 
than  with  its  own  proper  goodness  or  badness,  its  strength  or  its  weakness." 
The  author  goes  on  to  show,  from  his  point  of  view,  some  of  the  evils  attendant 
on  this  method,  such  as  "  its  tendency,  if  uncorrected,  to  make  men  shrink 
from  importing  anything  like  absolute  quality  into  their  propositions,"  and 
"to  place  individual  robustness  ami  initiative  in  the  light  of  superfluities 
with  which  a  world  that  goes  by  evolution  can  very  well  dispense." 


CHAP.  Yin.]    LIKENESSES  IN  ANIMALS  AND  PLANTS.         271 

it  approximative^,  as  we  approach  it,  intellectually,  on  as 
many  different  sides  as  we  can,  and  as  nearly  as  we  can. 

To  return  to  the  question  of  the  vertebral  or  non- vertebral 
nature  of  the  skull :  the  result  of  all  the  contro-  Arc  there 

.  ,  .  .  cranial  verte- 

versy  on  the  subject  up  to  the  present  time  is  that  brae? 
such  vertebral  nature  may  be  affirmed  in  one  sense  and 
denied  in  another,  according  to  the  line  of  thought  which  is 
followed. 

The  whole  body  of  every  animal  with  a  distinct  skull  and 
backbone  exists  at  first  as  a  rounded,  almost  structureless 
mass  of  tissue,  in  which  the  first  clear  indication  of  such 
animal  is  a  longitudinal  furrow  marking  the  place  of  the 
future  spinal  marrow  and  brain.  Beneath  this  furrow,  a  rod 
made  up  of  cells  (the  chorda  dorsalis)  comes  to  lay  the 
foundation  of  the  future  spinal  column.  From  each  side  of 
the  groove  a  fold  extends  upwards,  the  two  folds  being  called 
the  laminsc  dorsales,  and  these  folds,  meeting  together  above, 
form  a  canal.  It  is  within  that  part  of  the  laminie  dorsales 
which  form  the  spine,  that  first  the  cartilages  and  then  the 
bones  are  developed  which  form  the  sides  of  the  vertebral 
arches.  Similarly,  it  is  within  that  part  of  the  laminss  dor- 
sales  which  form  the  skull  that  first  the  cartilages  and  then 
the  bones  are  developed  which  form  the  sides  of  the  skull 
arches,  and  thus  there  is  an  undeniable  similarity  between 
these  two  parts.  Moreover,  in  subsequent  development,  the 
bones  of  the  skull — especially  in  the  higher  animals — pre- 
sent a  singular  reminiscence  of  vertebra?  in  the  three  serially 
successive  arches  which  they  form.  Certainly,  if  the  essence 
of  vertebra?  consists  in  their  being  a  series  of  bony  rings 
fitted  together,  and  enclosing  the  nervous  centres  along  the 
dorsal  region  of  the  frame,  then  it  must  be  asserted  that  the 
skull  is  in  part  composed  of  three  bony  vertebra?. 

In  certain  fishes  the  transition  from  the  spinal  column  to 
the  skull  is  so  gradual  that  it  is  easy  to  mistake  part  of  that 
column  for  part  of  the  skull.  Thus,  in  the  sturgeon,  the 
cartilaginous  representatives  of  true  vertebra?  coalesce  into 
one  mass  with  the  cartilaginous  skull ;  and  in  the  Siluroid 


272  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

fish  Bagrus  the  bony  vertebra)  next  the  head  are  greatly 
expanded,  and  join  each  other  by  the  same  mode  of  union 
(by  suture)  as  do  true  cranial  bones;  and  this  shows  how 
undoubted  vertebras  may  simulate  cranial  walls. 

There  are,  however,  various  elements  which  enter  into 
the  composition  of  the  brain-case  (or  skull)  which  do  not 
enter  into  that  of  the  spinal-marrow-case  (or  vertebral 
column),  and  there  are  differences  as  to  development ;  but, 
after  all,  the  existence  of  a  remarkable  secondary  and  induced 
resemblance  between  these  skeletal  parts  is  undeniable. 

As  to  development,  it  has  always  been  affirmed  that  while 
the  spinal  column  is  essentially,  and  in  almost  its  earliest 
stages,  a  serially  segmented  structure,  the  primitive  skull 
presents  no  serial  segmentation.  It  is  indeed  true  that  parts 
which  temporarily  or  permanently  represent  in  cartilage  the 
bony  skull  are  never  serially  segmented;  and  more  than 
this,  the  cartilaginous  precursors  of  the  bones  on  one  side 
may  be  completely  separated  by  an  interspace  of  softer 
substance  from  their  fellows  of  the  opposite  side — a  single 
fore-and-aft  segmentation  in  the  skull  thus  violently  con- 
trasting with  the  manifold  transverse  segmentation  of  the 
spine.  But  a  most  interesting  point  has  lately  been  noticed* 
— namely,  that  in  the  young  eft  and  Axolotl,  before  the  base 
of  the  future  skull  has  become  cartilaginous,  an  indication  of 
transverse  segmentation  is  to  be  traced  in  the  soft  tissue  of 
that  region — a  proof  of  what  oversights  may  be  committed  by 
relying  too  hastily  on  development  as  our  guide.  The  con- 
tinuous chondrification  of  the  base  of  the  skull  before  ob- 
served had  led  to  a  denial  of  all  fundamental  transverse 
segmentation  of  that  region  by  the  opponents  of  the  verte- 
bral theory  of  the  skull,  while  the  assertors  of  that  theory 
regarded  such  continuity  as  an  induced  and  adaptive  mask- 
ing of  a  segmentation,  visible  to  the  eye  of  the  intellect, 
though  not  to  that  of  the  sense.  The  latter  view  now  turns 


*  See  the  Paper  before  referred  to, '  Proc.  Zool.  Soc.'  1874,  p.  190,  p!.  xx\i. 
figs.  1  and  2. 


CHAP.VJIL]    LIKENESSES  IN  ANIMALS  AND  PLANTS.        273 

out  to  have  been  the  right  one ;  and  a  latent  tendency 
speculatively  divined  has  now  been  made  palpably  evident. 
How  many  other  latent  tendencies  may  not  exist  which 
never  render  themselves  visible !  Might  it  not  be  contended 
that  the  ultimate  segmentation  of  the  bony  cranium  of 
mammals  is  one  mode  of  expression,  disguised  and  highly 
modified,  of  such  latent  earliest  tendency  to  serial  seg- 
mentation ? 

But  most  striking  of  all  recent  phenomena  concerning  the 
vertebral  archetype  is  the  return  just  made  by  Pro- 

•  .  ,  Amphioxus. 

fessor  Huxley  *  to  the  conception  so  long  ago  advo- 
cated by  Professor  Owen,  that  serial  segmentation,  however 
latent  and  disguised,  extended  primitively  and  fundamentally 
to  quite  the  anterior  end  of  the  head.  The  first-named 
Professor  here  advocates  the  view  that  we  have  an  approxi- 
mation to  the  early  form  of  the  vertebrate  skull  in  that  very 
exceptional  little  fish  the  Lancelet  (Amphioxus),  in  which 
the  front  end  of  the  body  is,  like  all  the  rest  of  it,  made  up 
of  a  series  of  similar  segments,  although  the  part  representing 
the  bodies  of  the  vertebras  of  higher  animals  is  itself  unseg- 
mented.  The  general  resemblance  of  the  new  concrete  type 
of  Professor  Huxley  to  the  old  type,  as  exhibited  in  the  well- 


*  See  'Proceedings  of  the  Royal  Society,'  No.  157,  p.  127.  The'  author's 
determination  of  the  homologies  he  seeks  to  establish,  rests  upon  the  con- 
stancy <it'  position  of  the  velum palati  which  he  has  selected  as  his  fixed  point. 
A  certain  hesitation  in  assenting  to  the  new  view  may  be  justified  by  the 
absence  (as  far  as  >yet  known)  of  the  auditory  organ  in  the  Amphioxus.  I( 
1h  ere  is  one  thing  which  is  constant  in  the  vertebrata  it  is  the  auditory 
capsule,  and  the  figures  on  the  Paper  referred  to  show  it  relatively  largest  in 
tin;  youngest  condition  of  the  Ammocsetes  chosen  for  comparison.  The  dis- 
tribution of  the  cranial  nerves  can  hardly  be  said  to  afford  decisive  characters, 
since  as  there  are  myotomes,  if  nerves  are  supplied  to  them  laterally  from  a 
central  nervous  trunk,  each  nerve  must  divide  into  a  dorsal  and  a  ventral 
branch  to  supply  each  muscular  segment.  Similarly  nervous  supply  must  be 
sent  to  the  front  end  of  the  body ;  and  if  the  so-called  eye-spot  of  Amphioxus 
be  an  eye-spot,  the  circumstance  that  this  nerve  passes  over  it,  though  a 
striking  fact,  is  scarcely  sufficient  to  identify  it  with  the  ophthalmic  division  of 
the  fifth  nerve  of  fishes  and  higher  vertebrates. 

The  constantly  increasing  number  of  instances  of  the  independent  origin 
of  similar  structures  makes  us  think  it  far  from  impossible  that  vertebrate 
genetic  affinity  may  lie  at  least  as  much  in  the  direction  of  the  annelid  worms 
as  in  that  of  the  ascidians,  and  that  there  are  hardly  as  yet  data  to  determine 
which  of  the  curious  cross  relationships  exhibited  by  the  Lancelet,  are  due  to 
genetic  affinity,  and  which  to  homoplasy. 

13 


274  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

known  plate  of  Professor  Owen's  book  on  the  Archetype  of 
the  Vertebrate  Skeleton,  is  striking  enough. 

It  is  none  the  less  true  that  there  are  profound  differences 
between  the  two  conceptions.  According  to  the  recently  put 
forth  view,  the  skull  of  the  higher  vertebrates  is  really  made 
up  of  something  less  than  twenty  segments,  each  of  Avhich 
has  a  morphological  value  equivalent  to  a  spinal  vertebra 
with  its  annexed  parts.  Again,  the  recent  conception  does 
not  repose  upon  a  speculative  basis,  but  presents  us  with  a 
concrete  type  instead  of  an  abstract  ideal.  And  yet  even 
the  concrete  Amphioxus  must  be  idealised  to  serve  as  the 
type  of  vertebrate  structure,  since  though  its  body  is  seg- 
mented as  a  whole,  the  central  part  of  the  spinal  column  is 
not  segmented,  but  presents,  like  the  embryos  of  the  higher 
animals,  a  continuous  chorda  dorsalis. 

The  conception  of  cranial  vertebrae,  then,  like  conceptions 
of  serial,  bilateral,  special,  and  general  homolo£v, 

The  answer.  G<7  ' 

all  forming  parts  of  "  Philosophical  Anatomy,  are 
subjective  apprehensions  of  relations  which  have  an  objective 
existence  in  nature.  Such  conceptions  are  similar  to  our 
conceptions  of  "  types,"  the  very  name  of  which  is  dis- 
tasteful to  so  many.  It  is  true  that  types,  as  types,  are  not 
real  objective  entities.  But  though,  as  types,  they  are  ideal, 
they  have  none  the  less  a  basis  in  reality.  The  fact  that  they 
have  no  complete  concrete  being  as  types,  is  no  more  a  reason 
for  refusing  to  recognise  their  existence  than  is  the  non-exist- 
ence objectively  of  species,  as  species,  a  reason  for  refusing  to 
recognise  the  individual  realisation  of  a  species  or  to  make  use 
of  zoological  and  botanical  specific  names.  The  acceptance 
of  the  theory  of  evolution  forms  no  bar  to  the  reception  of 
that  view  which  represents  all  organic  forms  as  having  been 
created  according  to  certain  fixed  ideal  types.  The  two  beliefs, 
far  from  being  reciprocally  exclusive,  can  and  do  co-exist  in 
perfect  harmony  in  one  and  the  same  individual  mind. 

But  have  the  conceptions  of  philosophical  anatomy  any 
other  existence  besides  that  subjective  existence  in  the  human 
mind,  and  that  objective  foundation,  in  the  natural  world, 


CHAP.  Vm.]     LIKENESSES  IN  ANIMALS  AND  PLANTS.        275 

neither  of  which  can  be  denied  ?    The  answer  to  this  must 
depend  upon  the  philosophical  system  of  him  who  A  decper 
answers  the  question,  and  especially  on  his  accept-  tiuesllou- 
ance  of  and  his  mode  of  conceiving  a  first  cause. 

The  teaching  of  what  I  regard  as  true  philosophy  is, 
that  the  types  shadowed  forth  to  our  intellects  by  material 
existences,  are  copies  of  divine  originals,  and  respond  to  pro- 
totypal ideas  in  God.  Those  who  deny  the  existence  of  God, 
or  who  deny  that  we  can  know  anything  as  to  such  ex- 
istence, may,  of  course,  consistently  enough  deny  or  doubt 
the  existence  of  such  prototypal  ideas,  On  the  other  hand, 
the  teaching  referred  to  has  been  ridiculed  as  if  the  main- 
tamers  of  it  must  necessarily  either  pretend  to  possess  some 
far-reaching  intellectual  power  not  shared  by  most  natu- 
ralists, or  else  assert  that  the  very  natural  phenomena  were 
themselves  sufficient  to  make  manifest  such  transcendent 
conceptions.  But,  in  fact,  the  acceptance  of  such  prototypal 
ideas  follows  as  a  consequence,  not  upon  the  investigation  of 
irrational  nature  considered  by  itself,  but  upon  its  investiga- 
tion considered  as  a  portion  of  one  great  whole,  of  which  the 
human  mind,  endowed  with  intelligence  and  free-will,  forms 
a  part,  and  which  is  consequently  to  be  viewed  as  the  creation 
of  God.  Let  the  idea  of  God  be  once  accepted,  and  then  it 
becomes  simply  a  truism  to  say  that  the  mind  of  the  Deity 
contains  all  that  exists  in  the  human  mind,  and  infinitely 
more.  Thus  it  is  that  such  human  conceptions,  gathered 
from  nature,  must,  so  considered,  be  asserted  to  be  ideas  in 
the  divine  mind  also,  just  as  every  separate  individual  that 
has  been,  is,  or  shall  be,  is  present  to  the  same  mind.  Nay, 
more,  such  human  conceptions  can  be  but  faint  and  obscure 
adumbrations  of  corresponding  ideas  which  must  exist  in 
perfection  and  in  fulness  in  the  mind  of  God. 

We  have  seen  that  even  by  viewing  organisms  from  all 
the  points  of  view  possible  to  us,  we  can  but  attain  to  a  very 
imperfect  comprehension  of  such  organisms.  But  the  wider 
and  wider  generalizations  of  broader  and  better-informed 
minds  continually  advance  our  power  of  comprehension.  All 


276  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  VIIJ. 

then  who  admit  that  the  natural  world  is  the  product  of  a 
divine  mind  must  also  admit,  since  such  mind  is  infinitely 
above  all  human  minds,  that  it  possesses  in  perfection  what 
the  most  perfectly  developed  human  minds  possess,  as  it 
were,  in  germ. 

Thus  viewed,  the  questions  of  philosophical  anatomy  acquire 
a  fresh  value,  and  it  becomes  plain  that  we  owe  a  debt  of 
gratitude  to  those  who,  years  ago,  forced  questions  such  as 
these  upon  willing  and  unwilling  ears.  Not  less  plain  is 
the  justification  which  the  most  modern  views  afford  them. 
Platonic  and  Peripatetic  conceptions  are  far  indeed  from 
having  been  overthrown  by  the  rising  tide  of  a  revived 
Ionian  philosophy — a  flood  of  which  has  slightly  covered  part 
of  our  land,  and  deeply  submerged  Germany.  Philosophical 
anatomy,  types,  divine  prototypal  ideas  are  one  by  one 
emerging  and  reappearing,  refreshed  and  invigorated  by  the 
bath  of  Darwinian  Evolutionism  through  which  they  have 
been  made  to  pass.  It  is  again  becoming  manifest  that 
nature,  when  broadly  surveyed,  confirms  and  accords  with 
the  speculations  of  philosophy,  though  never  without  a 
certain  want  of  minute  agreement ;  so  opening  fresh  vistas 
which  invite  the  intellect  to  further  advance  and  to  the 
solution  of  more  and  more  recondite  problems  which  it  is  the 
task  of  philosophical  anatomy  perpetually  to  strive  after,  to 
elucidate  in  part,  but  never,  in  this  life,  exhaustively  to  solve. 

The  existence,  then,  of  these  various  homologies,  serial, 
Homoiogy  lateral,  &c.,  render  it  plain  to  any  one  who  ponders 

reveals  inter-  '  '  *  ,.,..,,. 

nai  forces,  over  them  that  there  is  in  each  individual  animal 
a  peculiar  form  or  energy  which  actually  results  in  the 
complex  phenomena  above  described.  And  just  as  species 
and  genera  do  not  exist  as  species  and  genera  except  men- 
tally, and  yet  really  exist  objectively  in  those  individual 
characteristics  which  furnish  specific  and  generic  characters ; 
just  so  the  peculiar  force  referred  to  may  be  spoken  of  as 
that  of  the  species,  though  of  course  it  has  no  existence  really 
except  in  the  organic  activities  of  the  individuals  which 
compose  such  species.  To  adopt,  for  illustration,  the  mode 


CHAP.  VIII.]    LIKENESSES  IN  ANIMALS  AND  PLANTS.        277 

of  speech  now  current  respecting  force  and  its  so-called 
"  transformations,"  it  may  be  said  that  the  cosmical  forces  of 
all  kinds  unite  and  "transform"  themselves  in  each  living 
creature  into  a  single  force  which,  regarded  abstractedly, 
may  be  said  to  be  the  dynamical  side  of  such  creature. 

If  we  use  the  mode  of  speech  of  an  older  philosophy,  we 
may  say  that  the  active  powers  of  the  cosmos  exer-  or«8oui"iu 
cising  themselves  upon  matter  in  a  duly  prepared  w 
condition,  evolve  from  a  latent  potential  state,  into  active, 
temporary  existence,  a  peculiar  active  power,  the  "  soul "  of 
an  individual  animal  or  plant,  which  endures  as  long  as  and 
no  longer  than  the  corporeal  frame  of  the  organism  preserves 
its  due  integrity,  that  integrity  and  that  activity  necessarily 
arising,  co-existing,  varying  and  disappearing  together,  like 
the  convexities  and  concavities  of  a  vessel  of  blown  glass.  It 
has  been  urged  in  the  preceding  chapter  that  the  body  of 
each  living  animal  is  really  a  unity,  a  continuum,  one  living 
whole.  Congruous  with  this  conception  is  the  belief  that 
the  active  force  of  each  living  animal  is  really  a  unity,  one 
indivisible  whole — that  it  is  not  a  plexus  of  different  forces 
temporarily  aggregated,  but  a  single  form  of  force  resulting 
for  a  time  from  the  play  of  all  other  forces,  and  destined  to 
disappear  when,  simultaneously  with  such  disappearance,  the 
active  powers  of  the  various  substances  into  which  the 
animal's  body  decomposes  show  themselves  again  as  the 
various  chemical  and  other  physical  forces  which  are  the 
activities  of  the  substances  into  which  the  body  dissolves. 

The  reasonableness  of  this  view  is  corroborated  by  some 
excellent  remarks  made  by  Mr.  Lewes  on  a  kindred 
subject.     It  is  commonly  asserted  that  substances 
such  as  oxygen  and  hydrogen  in  water  really  persist,  though 
.-reining  to  have  disappeared,  and  their  reappearance  on  the 
dissolution  of  water  is  held  to  be  a  proof  of  their  never  having 
(•(used  to  exist.     This  view  (which  Mr.  Lewes  disputes)  may 
be  said  to  be  a  parallel  view  to  that  which  represents  an 
apparently  single  force  (a  living  animal)  to  be  not  what  it 
appears  to  be,  but,  instead,  a  mere  plexus  of  physical  forces. 


278  LESSONS  FBOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  VIII. 

And  this  latter  view  may  be  disputed  by  considerations  similar 
to  those  put  forward  by  Mr.  Lewes.    That  writer  says  :* — 

"  What  is  the  plain  inference  from  sensible  experience  ?  It  is  that 
both  oxygen  and  hydrogen  have  in  combination  lost  all  their  specific 
qualities,  and  have  acquired  new  qualities.  They  have  not  only  lost 
that  amount  of  molecular  agitation  which  kept  them  in  their  gaseous 
state,  they  have  lost  those  qualities,  or  modes  of  reaction,  which  dis- 
tinguished them  from  other  gases  and  solids.  The  oxygen  will  not  now 
oxidize,  the  hydrogen  will  not  flame.  If  this  is  not  destruction, 
destruction  has  no  meaning ;  if  this  is  not  change,  nothing  is  change- 
able. Theory  declares  that  the  oxygen  has  not  changed;  and  fact 
declares  that  the  oxygen  has  utterly  changed.  Theory  infers  that 
oxygen  is  indestructible,  in  spite  of  the  fact  that  oxygen  has  been 
destroyed The  surprising  recovery  of  all  the  original  cha- 
racters, after  the  element  has  undergone  a  multiplicity  of  changes 
destructive  of  those  characters,  is  supposed  to  prove  that  what  is  thus 
recovered  could  not  have  been  lost.  Hence  the  conclusion  is  drawn 
that  throughout  its  apparent  changes  the  element  has  really  preserved 
its  integrity.  But  looked  at  closely  it  is  seen  that  all  which  remains 
the  same  is  the  possibility  of  restoration  ....  that  what  is  now 
lost  will  reappear  whenever  the  requisite  conditions  of  its  appearance 
are  restored.  The  house  will  reappear  when  the  bricks  are  re-arranged." 

This  is,  once  more,  exactly  the  scholastic  philosophy ;  form 
or  force  passes  from  the  active  condition  ("in  actu")  to  the 
condition  of  possibility  ("  in  poteutia ")  to  re-emerge  in  act, 
simultaneously  with  the  acquisition  by  matter  of  the  condition 
proximate  for  its  manifestation. 

We  may  here  shortly  survey  the  ground  we  have  as  yet 
traversed.  The  course  we  have  already  pursued  has 

Conclusion. 

shown  us  that  m  each  01  us  there  energizes  a  force 
which  feels,  thinks,  remembers  and  wills — that  expresses  its 
thoughts  by  external  signs,  can  perceive  amongst  its  percep- 
tions moral  worth,  and  is  essentially  the  same  in  all  men. 
Secondly,  we  have  recognised  that  outside  us  really  exists  an 
external  world,  part  of  which  consists  of  individual,  active 
wholes — concrete  unities,  \vhich  live  (as  all  plants),  or  which 
live  and  feel  (as  the  dog  and  the  bee),  or  which  live,  feel,  and 
also  think  (as  man).  We  have  also  seen  that  the  force  which 


*  '  Problems  of  Life  aud  Blind,'  vol.  ii.  p.  55. 


CHAP.  VIII.]     LIKENESSES  IN  ANIMALS  AND  PLANTS.        279 

energizes  in  each  such  irrational  sentient  being  is  one  (as  that 
which  we  know  acting  in  ourselves  is  one) — a  true  unity,  which 
manifests  itself  besides  feeling,  in  organic  activity  (growth, 
development,  and  instinct),  giving  evidence  to  the  intellect  of 
rational  man  of  deep  and  mysterious  powers  and  tendencies 
(expressed  by  us  as  the  different  kinds  of  homology  and  homo- 
pi  asy  as  well  as  mimicry),  and  revealing  to  the  contem- 
plative mind  which  has  risen  to  the  recognition  of  a  First 
Cause  the  existence  of  Divine  prototypal  ideas,  capable  in- 
deed of  being  but  very  imperfectly  apprehended  by  us,  yet 
existing  as  the  seminal  principles  of  that  teeming  world  of 
animals  and  plants  which  affords  so  vast  and  inexhaustible  a 
field  for  the  exercise  of  our  delight  and  admiration  as  well  as 
of  our  observing  and  reasoning  energies. 


CHAPTER  IX. 

NATURAL   SELECTION. 

"  The  hypothesis  of  natural  selection  originally  put  forward  as  the 
origin  of  species  has  been  really  abandoned  by  Mr.  Darwin  himself, 
and  is  untenable.  It  is  a  misleading  positive  term  denoting  negative 
effects,  and  as  made  use  of  by  those  who  would  attribute  to  it  the 
origin  of  Man,  is  an  irrational  conception." 

AT  the  close  of  the  preceding  chapter,  the  outcome  was 
Futility  of  glanced  at  of  those  lessons  which  had  already  been 
l^meinter-  gathered  from  nature.  They  were  recognised  as 
'ce8'  teaching  that  there  exists  in  each  animal  and  plant 
a  unity  of  force  corresponding  with  its  unity  of  frame,  each 
living  organism  manifesting,  by  unmistakable  external  signs, 
the  presence  of  such  internal  power  the  mysterious  nature  of 
which  it  was  sought  to  bring  home  by  a  consideration  of  those 
deep-lying  tendencies  revealed  in  the  facts  of  serial  and 
other  homology. 

This  notion  of  an  "  internal  force "  is  very  repugnant  to 
some  contemporary  writers.  But  it  is  absolutely  impossible 
to  get  rid  of  the  idea  of  innate  powers  and  tendencies  the 
existence  of  which  is  everywhere  manifested,  not  only  in  the 
organic  world  but  in  the  inorganic  world  also.  To  conceive 
the  universe  as  consisting  of  atoms  acted  on  by  external 
forces  but  having  in  themselves  no  power  of  coherence  or 
response  to  such  external  actions,  is  a  manifest  absurdity. 
No  one  thing  can  act  on  any  other,  except  that  in  such  other 
there  is  an  innate  capacity  of  being  acted  on.  Mr.  Herbert 
Spencer  conceives  each  animal  as  being  built  up  of  a  multi- 
tude of  "  physiological  units,"  each  of  which  is  credited  with 


CHAP.  IX.]  NATUEAL  SELECTION.  281 

"  an  innate  tendency  "  to  evolve  the  parent  form  from  which 
it  sprang.  Mr.  Darwin  conceives  each  animal  and  plant  to 
be  built  up  of  a  number  of  "  gemmules,"  each  gemmule  being 
the  seat  of  powers,  special  tendencies  and  elective  affinities 
of  a  most  complex  kind.  In  fact,  as  Mr.  Lewes  says,  we  have 
thus  "  the  very  power  which  was  pronounced  mysterious  in 
larger  organisms."  It  seems,  as  before  said,  simpler  and  far 
more  natural  to  regard  each  animal  as  the  seat  of  one 
governing  force  than  as  itself  made  up  of  a  number  of  living 
creatures  so  minute  as  to  be  invisible  to  the  highest  power  of 
the  microscope,  and  each  animated  by  a  governing  force  of 
its  own.  Surely  this  is  to  multiply  difficulties  of  conception 
against  both  sense  and  reason  alike. 

The  great  question  as  to  how  the  different  kinds  of  animals 
and  plants  which  now  people  this  planet  first  arose  Origin  of 
has  been  answered  at  various  times  in  various  ways,  ^ws"18 

My  own  view  has  been  expressed  as  follows  :* —    view< 

"  It  is  quite  conceivable  that  the  material  organic  world  may  be  so 
constituted  that  the  simultaneous  action,  upon  it  of  all  known  forces, 
mechanical,  physical,  chemical,  magnetic,  terrestrial,  and  cosmical, 
together  with  other  as  yet  unknown  forces — which  probably  exist,  may 
result  in  changes  which  are  harmonious  and  symmetrical ;  just  as  the 
internal  nature  of  .vibrating  plates  causes  particles  of  sand  scattered 
over  them  to  assume  definite  and  symmetrical  figures  when  made  to 
oscillate  in  different  ways  by  the  bow  of  a  violin  being  drawn  along 
their  edges.  The  results  of  these  combined  internal  powers  and 
external  influences  might  be  represented  under  the  symbols  of  complex 
."cries  of  vibrations  (analogous  to  those  of  sound  or  light)  forming  a 
most  complex  harmony  or  a  display  of  most  varied  colours.  In  such  a 
way  the  reparation  of  local  injuries  might  be  symbolized  as  a  filling-up 
and  completion  of  an  interrupted  rhythm.  Thus  also  monstrous 
aljerrations  from  typical  structure  might  correspond  to  a  discord,  and 
sterility  from  crossing  bo  compared  with  the  darkness  resulting  from 
the  interference  of  waves  of  light. 

"  Such  symbolism  will  harmonize  with  the  peculiar  reproduction, 
l>efore  mentioned,  of  heads  in  the  body  of  certain  annelids,  with  the 
facts  of  serial  homology,  as  well  as  those  of  bilateral  and  vertical  sym- 
metry. Also,  as  the  atoms  of  a  resonant  body  may  be  made  to  give 
out  sound  by  the  juxtaposition  of  a  vibrating  tuning-fork,  so  it  is  con- 


*  '  Genesis  of  Species,'  2nd  edition,  p.  261. 


282  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  IX. 

ccivable  that  the  physiological  units  of  a  living  organism  may  be  so 
influenced  by  surrounding  conditions  (organic  and  other)  that  the 
accumulation  of  these  conditions  may  upset  the  previous  rhythm  of 
such  units,  producing  modifications  in  them — a  fresh  chord  in  the 
harmony  of  nature — a  new  species !" 

For  the  arguments  by  which  this  view  is  supported  and 
antagonistic  hypotheses  contested,  the  reader  is  referred  to 
the  work  from  which  the  passage  just  quoted  has  been 
taken.  Here  it  can  be  only  incidentally  defended,  yet 
one  passing  remark  may  be  now  made.  That  characters 
of  importance  suddenly  appearing  are  not  really  unlikely  to 
persist,  is  confirmed  by  an  observation  made  by  Mr.  Darwin 
himself,  who  tells  us  (in  his  '  Descent  of  Man,'  vol.  i.  p.  233)  : 
"  When  any  character  has  suddenly  appeared  in  a  race 
or  species  as  the  result  of  a  single  act  of  variation  .... 
and  this  race  is  crossed  with  another  not  thus  characterized, 
the  characters  in  question  do  not  commonly  appear  in  a 
blended  condition  in  the  young,  but  are  transmitted  to  them 
either  perfectly  developed  or  not  at  all." 

The  view  of  specific  genesis  which  I  support,  though 
arrived  at  in  complete  independence,  is  more  or  less  similar 
to  that  enunciated  fifteen  years  ago  by  Professor  Theophilus 
Parsons,  of  Harvard  University  in  the  United  States.  It  also 
agrees  in  many  respects  with  the  views  advocated  by  Pro- 
fessor Owen  in  the  last  volume  of  the  *  Anatomy  of  Verte- 
brates,' under  the  term  "  derivation."  He  there  says : 
"  Derivation  holds  that  every  species  changes  in  time,  by 
virtue  of  inherent  tendencies  thereto." 

Mr.  Darwin,  as  every  one  knows,  has  attempted  to  account 
Mr.  Darwin's  for  the  appearance  of  new  forms  of  animals  and 
view,  plants  by  a  certain  special  process  called  by  him 

"Natural  Selection;"  an  hypothesis  which  may  be  thus 
shortly  stated : — 

Every  organism  tends  to  multiply  geometrically  and  to 
transmit  a  general  likeness,  with  individual  differences,  to  its 
offspring.  No  two  individuals  are  quite  alike.  Past  time  is 
practically  infinite.  Each  individual  which  survives  to  breed 


CIIAP.  IX.]  NATURAL  SELECTION.  283 

does  so  through  circumstances  which  favour  him  by  enabling 
him  to  escape  the  destructive  agencies  of  nature.  Thus 
happy  variations  cause  survival  and  transmission,  and  thus 
new  species  result  from  survival  of  which  are  the  fittest  to 
live,  as  shown  by  the  event.  The  title  of  his  well-known 
book  is :  '  On  the  Origin  of  Species  by  Means  of  Natural 
Selection.'  This  is  equally  the  title  of  the  last  edition  as 
of  the  first,  and  the  words  "by  means  of"  appear  in  each 
case.  At  the  end  of  the  Introduction  of  the  first  edition  he 
says :  "  1  am  convinced  that  natural  selection  has  been  the 
main,  but  not  the  exclusive  means  of  modification."  In  the 
last  edition  he  says : "  I  am  convinced  that  natural  selection  has 
been  the  most  important,  but  not  the  exclusive  means  of  modi- 
fication." Before  the  appearance  of  the  last  edition,  however, 
Mr.  Darwin  published  his '  Descent  of  Man ;'  and  a  consideration 
of  this  last  work  in  conjunction  with  his  '  Origin  of  Species ' 
will  afford  the  best  means  of  considering  his  whole  position. 
It  can  by  such  a  proceeding  be  seen  what,  if  any,  modifica- 
tions have  taken  place  in  his  views,  and  the  value  of  his 
judgment  may,  it  is  obvious,  be  most  fairly  estimated  by 
examining  his  own  declarations  with  respect  to  his  earlier 
beliefs  and  assertions. 

Our  attention,  then,  may  first  be  directed  to  his  earlier 
statements,  in  order  that  we  may  see  whether  he  has  modified 
his  views,  and,  if  so,  how  far  and  with  what  results.  If  he 
has,  even  by  his  own  showing  and  admission,  been  over-hasty 
and  seriously  mistaken  previously,  we  must  be  the  more 
careful  how  we  commit  ourselves  to  his  guidance  now.  It 
is  here  contended  that  Mr.  Darwin's  convictions  have  under- 
gone grave  modifications,  and  that  the  opinions  adopted  by 
him  now  are  quite  distinct  from,  and  even  subversive  of,  the 
views  he  originally  put  forth.  The  assignment  of  the  law 
of  "  natural  selection  "  to  a  subordinate  position  is  virtually 
an  abandonment  of  the  Darwinian  theory ;  for  the  one  dis- 
tinguishing feature  of  that  theory  was  the  "most  important" 
or  "main"  position  assigned  to  "natural  selection."  Not 
the  less,  however,  may  we  thank  Mr.  Darwin  for  bringing 


284  LESSONS  FEOM  NAT  DEE.  [CHAP.  IX. 

forward  that  theory,  and  for  forcing  on  men's  minds  a  recog- 
nition of  the  probability,  if  not  more,  of  evolution  and  of  the 
certainty  of  the  action  of  "  natural  selection."  For  though 
the  "  survival  of  the  fittest"  is  a  truth  which  readily  presents 
itself  to  any  one  who  considers  the  subject ;  and  though  its 
converse,  the  destruction  of  the  least  fit,  was  recognised 
thousands  of  years  ago,  yet  to  Mr.  Darwin,  and  (through  Mr. 
Wallace's  reticence)  to  Mr.  Darwin  alone,  is  due  the  credit 
of  having  first  brought  it  prominently  forward  and  demon- 
strated its  truth  in  a  volume  which  will  doubtless  form  a 
landmark  in  the  domain  of  zoological  science. 

We  find  even  in  the  third  edition  of  his  'Origin  of 
Species '  the  following  passages  :  "  Natural  selection  can  act 
only  by  taking  advantage  of  slight  successive  variations ; 
she  can  never  take  a  leap,  but  must  advance  by  short  and 
slow  stages"  (p.  214).  Again  he  says:  "If  it  could  be 
demonstrated  that  any  complex  organ  existed  which  could 
not  possibly  have  been  formed  by  numerous,  successive, 
slight  modifications,  my  theory  would  absolutely  break  down. 
But  I  can  find  out  no  such  case  "  (p.  208).  He  adds : — 

"  Every  detail  of  structure  in  every  living  creature  (making  some 
little  allowance  for  the  direct  action  of  physical  conditions)  may  be 
viewed,  either  as  having  been  of  special  use  to  some  ancestral  form, 
or  as  being  now  of  special  use  to  the  descendants  of  this  form — either 
directly,  or  indirectly  through  the  complex  laws  of  growth  ;"  "  and  if 
it  could  be  proved  that  any  structure  of  any  one  species  had  been 
formed  for  the  exclusive  good  of  another  species,  it  would  annihilate 
my  theory,  for  such  could  not  have  been  produced  through  natural 
selection." 

And  the  words  last  cited  occur  on  page  162  of  his  very  last 
edition. 

It  is  almost  impossible  for  Mr.  Darwin  to  have  used  words 
by  which  more  thoroughly  to  stake  the  whole  of  his  theory 
on  the  non-existence  or  non-action  of  causes  equal  in  efficiency 
to  natural  selection.  For  why  should  such  a  phenomenon 
"  annihilate  his  theory  ?"  Because  the  very  essence  of  his 
theory,  as  at  first  stated,  is  to  recognise  only  the  con- 
servation of  minute  variations  directly  beneficial  to  the 


CHAP.  IX.]  NATUEAL  SELECTION.  285 

creature  presenting  them,  by  enabling  it  to  obtain  food, 
escape  enemies,  and  propagate  its  kind.  But  once  more  he 
says : — 

"  We  have  seen  that  species  at  any  one  period  are  not  indefinitely 
variable,  and  are  not  linked  together  hy  a  multitude  of  intermediate 
gradations,  partly  because  the  process  of  natural  selection  will  always 
be  very  slow,  and  will  act,  at  any  one  time,  only  on  a  very  few  forms ; 
and  partly  because  the  very  process  of  natural  selection  almost  implies 
the  continual  supplanting  and  extinction  of  preceding  and  intermediate 
gradations." — p.  223. 

Such  are  Mr.  Darwin's  earlier  statements.  At  present 
we  read  as  follows  : —  Hjs  later 

views 

"  I  now  admit,  after  reading  the  essay  by  Nageli  on  plants,  and  the 
remarks  by  various  authors  with  respect  to  animals,  more  especially 
those  recently  made  by  Professor  Broca,  that  in  the  earlier  editions  of 
my  '  Origin  of  Species '  I  probably  attributed  too  much  to  the  action  of 
natural  selection  or  the  survival  of  the  fittest I  had  not  for- 
merly sufficiently  considered  the  existence  of  many  structures  which 
appear  to  be,  as  far  as  we  can  judge,  neither  beneficial  nor  injurious; 
and  this  I  believe  to  be  one  of  the  greatest  oversights  as  yet  detected  in 
my  work." — Descent  of  Man,  vol.  i.  p.  152. 

A  still  more  remarkable  admission  is  that  in  which  he 
says  of  the  causes  of  change  in  organisms  : — 

"  We  can  only  say  they  relate  much  more  closely  to  the  constitution 
of  the  varying  organism,  than  to  the  nature  of  the  conditions  to  which 
it  has  been  subjected.  An  unexplained  residuum  of  change,  perhaps  a 
large  one,  must  be  left  to  the  assumed  action  of  those  unknown  agencies, 
which  occasionally  induce  strongly  marked  and  abrupt  deviations  of 
structure  in  our  domestic  productions." — vol.  i.  p.  154. 

But  perhaps  the  most  glaring  contradiction  is  presented  by 
the  following  passage : — 

"  No  doubt  man,  as  well  as  every  other  animal,  presents  structures 
which,  as  far  as  we  can  judge  with  our  little  knowledge,  are  not  now 
of  any  service  to  him,  nor  have  been  so  during  any  former  period  of 
his  existence,  either  in  relation  to  his  general  conditions  of  life,  or  of 
one  sex  to  the  other.  Such  structures  cannot  be  accounted  for  by  any 
f,na  of  selection,  or  by  the  inherited  eifects  of  the  use  and  disuse  of 
parts.  Wo  know,  however,  that  many  strange  and  strongly  marked 
peculiarities  of  structure  occasionally  appear  in  our  domesticated  pro- 
ductions ;  and  if  the  unknown  causes  which  produce  them  were  to  act 


286  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUKE.  [CHAP.  IX. 

more  uniformly,  they  would  probably  become  common  to  all  the  indi- 
viduals of  the  species." — vol.  ii.  p.  387. 

Mr.  Darwin,  indeed,  seems  now  to  admit  the  existence  of 
internal,  innate  powers,  for  he  goes  on  to  say : — 

"  We  may  hope  hereafter  to  understand  something  about  the  causes 
of  such  occasional  modifications,  especially  through  the  study  of  mon- 
strosities  In  the  greater  number  of  cases  we  can  only  say 

that  the  cause  of  each  slight  variation  and  of  each  monstrosity  lies 
much  more  in  the  nature  or  constitution  of  the  organism  than  in  the 
nature  of  the  surrounding  conditions  ;  though  new  and  changed  con- 
ditions certainly  play  an  important  part  in  exciting  organic  changes  of 
all  kinds." 

Mr.  Darwin  even  admits  the  existence  of  different  innate 
laws  in  different  species.  He  says  (vol.  ii.  p.  177),  "  That 
the  degree  of  limitation  should  differ  in  different  species  of 
the  same  group  will  not  surprise  any  one  who  has  studied 
the  laws  of  inheritance,  for  they  are  so  complex  that  they 
appear  to  us  in  our  ignorance  to  be  capricious  in  their 
action." 

He  also  says,  as  to  the  disappearance  of  juvenile  stripes 
and  markings  in  adult  pigs  and  tapirs :  "  But  whether  this 
change  was  effected  through  sexual  or  natural  selection,  or 
was  due  to  the  direct  action  of  the  conditions  of  life  or  some 
other  unknown  cause,  it  is  impossible  to  decide." 

Also,  in  a  note  (vol.  i.  p.  223),  he  speaks  of  "  incidental 
results  of  certain  unknown  differences  in  the  constitution  of 
the  reproductive  system." 

Thus,  then,  it  is  admitted  by  our  author  that  wo  may  have 
"  abrupt,  strongly  marked  "  changes,  "  neither  beneficial  nor 
injurious "  to  the  creatures  possessing  them,  produced  "  by 
unknown  agencies  "  lying  deep  in  "  the  nature  or  constitution 
of  the  organism,"  and  which,  if  acting  uniformly,  would 
"probably"  modify  similarly  "all  the  individuals  of  a 
species."  If  this  is  not  an  abandonment  of  "natural  se- 
lection," it  would  be  difficult  to  find  terms  more  cal- 
culated to  express  it.  But  Mr.  Darwin's  admissions  of 
error  do  not  stop  here.  In  the  fifth  edition  of  his  '  Origin 


CHAP.  IX.]  NATURAL  SELECTION.  287 

of  Species '  (p.  104)  he  says,  "  Until  reading  an  article  in 
the  '  North  British  Keview  '  (1867),  I  did  not  appre-  and  admlt_ 
ciate  how  rarely  single  variations,  whether  slight  or  ted  errors- 
strongly  marked,  could  be  perpetuated."  Again:  he  was 
formerly  "  inclined  to  lay  much  stress  on  the  principle  of 
protection,  as  accounting  for  the  less  bright  colours  of  female 
birds  "  ('  Descent  of  Man,'  vol.  i.  p.  198) ;  but  now  he  speaks 
as  if  the  correctness  of  his  old  conception  of  such  colours 
being  due  to  protection  was  unlikely.  "  Is  it  probable,"  he 
asks,  "  that  the  head  of  the  female  chaffinch,  the  crimson  on 
the  breast  of  the  female  bullfinch,  the  green  of  the  female 
chaffinch,  the  crest  of  the  female  golden-crested  wren,  have 
all  been  rendered  less  bright  by  the  slow  process  of  selection 
for  the  sake  of  protection  ?  I  cannot  think  so  "  [the  italics 
are  mine].  (Vol.  ii.  p.  176.) 

Once  more  Mr.  Darwin  shows  us  (vol.  i.  p.  125)  how  he  has 
been  over-hasty  in  attributing  the  development  of  certain 
structures  to  reversion.  He  remarks,  "  In  my  *  Variations  of 
Animals  under  Domestication '  (vol.  ii.  p.  57)  I  attributed 
the  not  very  rare  cases  of  supernumerary  mammae  in  women 
to  reversion."  "  But  Professor  Preyer  states  that  mammae 
erraticee  have  been  known  to  occur  on  the  back  ;  so  that  the 
force  of  my  argument  is  greatly  weakened  or  perhaps  quite 
destroyed." 

Finally,  we  have  a  postscript  in  the  second  volume  of  the 
Descent  of  Man '  which  contains  an  avowal  more  remark- 
able than  even  what  has  been  cited.     He  therein  declares : — 

"  I  have  fallen  into  serious  and  unfortunate  error,  in  relation  to  the 
sexual  differences  of  animals,  in  attempting  to  explain  what  seemed  to 
me  a  singular  coincidence  in  the  late  period  of  life  at  which  the  neces- 
sary variations  have  arisen  in  many  cases,  and  the  late  period  at  which 
sexual  selection  acts.  The  explanation  given  is  wholly  erroneous,  as  I 
have  discovered  by  working  out  an  illustration  in  figures." 

It  would  be  idle  to  dissemble,  and  disingenuous  not  to 
declare,   the  amount  of  distrust  with  which  such  consequent 
repeated  over-hasty  conclusions  and  erroneous  cal-  fui  crUidJm. 
culations  should  properly  inspire  his  readers.     When  then 


288  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  IX. 

Mr.  Darwin  comes  before  them  anew  (as  he  does  in  Lis 
'  Descent  of  Man '),  with  opinions  and  conclusions  still  more 
startling,  and  calculated,  in  a  yet  greater  degree,  to  disturb 
convictions  reposing  upon  the  general  consent  of  the  majority 
of  cultivated  men,  we  may  well  pause  before  we  trust  our- 
selves unreservedly  to  a  guidance  which  thus  again  and  again 
declares  its  own  reiterated  fallibility.  Mr.  Darwin's  con- 
clusions may  be  correct,  but  we  feel  we  have  now  indeed  a 
right  to  demand  that  they  shall  be  proved  before  we  assent 
to  them ;  and  that  since  what  Mr.  Darwin  before  declared 
"must  be,"  he  now  admits  not  only  to  be  unnecessary 
but  untrue,  we  may  justly  regard  with  extreme  distrust 
the  multitude  of  his  statements  and  calculations  which 
are  recommended  by  a  mere  "  may  be."  This  is  the  more 
necessary,  as  the  Author,  starting  at  first  with  an  avowed 
hypothesis,  constantly  asserts  it  as  an  undoubted  fact, 
and  claims  for  it,  in  the  spirit  of  an  evangelical  preacher 
rather  than  of  a  philosopher,  that  it  should  be  received 
as  an  article  of  faith  though  incapable  of  proof.  Thus 
the  formidable  objection  to  Mr.  Darwin's  theory,  that  the 
great  break  in  the  organic  chain  between  man  and  his 
nearest  allies,  which  cannot  be  bridged  over  by  any  extinct 
or  living  species,  is  answered  simply  by  an  appeal  "  to  a 
belief  in  the  general  principle  of  evolution  "  (vol.  i.  p.  200), 
or  by  a  confident  statement  that  "  we  have  every  reason  to 
Relieve  that  breaks  in  the  series  are  simply  the  result  of  many 
forms  having  become  extinct "  (vol.  i.  p.  187),  though  the 
reasons  are  not  given.  So,  in  like  manner,  we  are  assured 
that  "  the  early  progenitors  of  man  were,  no  doubt,  once 
covered  with  hair,  both  sexes  having  beards;  their  ears 
were  pointed  and  capable  of  movement;  and  their  bodies 
were  provided  with  a  tail,  having  the  proper  muscles."  And, 
finally,  we  are  told,  with  a  dogmatism  little  worthy  of  a 
philosopher,  that,  "  unless  we  wilfully  close  our  eyes,"  we  must 
recognise  our  parentage  (vol.  i.  p.  213). 

To  criticisms  such    as  the  foregoing,   as    expressed  in 
'  Genesis  of  Species '  and  in  the  '  Quarterly  Review,'  Pro- 


CHAP.  IX.]  NATURAL  SELECTION.  289 

fessor  Huxley  has  replied   in  his  paper  on  "Mr.  Darwin's 
critics"  in  the    'Contemporary  Review'   for  No-  Professor 
vember  1871.  defend.8 

In  that  article  Professor  Huxley  does  not  so  much  dispute 
the  truth  of  the  foregoing  conclusions  concerning  the  Origin 
of  Species  as  deny  their  distinctness  from  those  at  which 
Mr.  Darwin  himself  has  arrived,  or  indeed  originally  put 
forth,  asserting  that  my  view  of  Specific  Genesis  is  but  "  an 
iteration  of  the  fundamental  principle  of  Darwinism." 

I  may  be  pardoned  then  if  I  shortly  endeavour  to  show  more 
distinctly  wherein  my  view  radically  differs  from  that  first 
propounded  by  Mr.  Darwin,  and  still  maintained,  or  at  least 
not  distinctly  repudiated  by  him ;  though  the  admissions  he 
has  of  late  made  amount  to  a  virtual,  but  certainly  not  to  an 
explicit,  abandonment  of  his  theory. 

The  Professor  expresses  his  doubt  as  to  the  existence  of 
an  "absolute  and  pure  Darwinian" — a  doubt  which  was 
certainly  surprising,  as  he  had  been  always  understood  as 
guarding  himself  carefully  against  the  identification  of  his 
own  views  with  those  of  Mr.  Darwin,  and  as  allowing  that  it 
was  one  thing  to  hold  the  doctrine  of  evolution  and  another 
to  accept  the  Darwinian  hypothesis.  In  a  lecture*  delivered 
in  1868  at  the  Eoyal  Institution,  he  observed,  "  I  can  testify, 
from  personal  experience,  it  is  possible  to  have  a  complete 
faith  in  the  general  doctrine  of  evolution,  and  yet  to  hesitate 
in  accepting  the  Nebular,  or  the  Uniformitarian,  or  the 
Darwinian  hypotheses  in  all  their  integrity  and  fulness." 

It  is  plain  then  that  at  a  recent  period  Professor  Huxley 
distinguished  himself  from  thorough-going  disciples  of  Mr. 
Darwin ;  implying  by  this  distinction  a  recognition  of  the 
existence  of  such  disciples,  pure  Darwinians,  like  those  of 
whom  he  in  his  paper  ignores  the  existence. 

The  very  essence  of  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  as  to  the  "  origin 
of  species"  was,  the  paramount  action  of  the  destructive 
powers  of  nature  over  any  direct  tendency  to  vary  in  any 


*  See  '  Proceedings  of  the  Royal  Institution,'  vol.  v.  p.  279. 


290  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  IX. 

certain  and  definite  line,  whether  such  direct  tendency 
resulted  mainly  from  internal  predisposing  or  external  ex- 
citing causes. 

The  benefit  of  the  individual  in  the  struggle  for  life  was 
announced  as  the  one  determining  agent,  fixing  slight  bene- 
ficial variations  into  enduring  characters,  and  the  evolution 
of  species  by  such  agency  is  justly  and  properly  to  be  termed 
formation  by  "  natural  selection." 

That  in  this  Mr.  Darwin  is  not  misrepresented  is  evident 
from  his  own  words  before  quoted : 

"  If  it  could  be  demonstrated  that  any  complex  organ  existed,  which 
could  not  possibly  have  been  formed  by  numerous,  successive,  slight 
modifications,  my  theory  would  absolutely  break  down."*  Also : 
"  Every  detail  of  structure  in  every  living  creature  (making  some  little 
allowance  for  the  direct  action  of  physical  conditions)  may  be  viewed, 
either  as  having  been  of  special  use  to  some  ancestral  form,  or  as  being 
now  of  special  use  to  the  descendants  of  this  form — either  directly,  or 
indirectly,  through  the  complex  laws  of  growth ;"  and  "  if  it  could  be 
proved  that  any  part  of  the  structure  of  any  one  species  had  been 
formed  for  the  exclusive  good  of  another  species,  it  would  annihilate 
my  theory,  for  such  could  not  have  been  produced  by  natural  selec- 
tion." f 

I  repeat,  emphatically,  Mr.  Darwin  could  hardly  have 
employed  words  by  which  more  thoroughly  to  stake  the 
whole  of  his  theory  on  the  non-existence  or  non-action  of 
causes  of  any  such  importance  as  that  assigned  by  him  to 
natural  selection.  For  why,  we  may  ask  once  more,  should 
such  a  phenomenon  "  annihilate  his  theory  "?  Because  the 
very  essence  of  his  theory,  as  originally  put  forth,  is,  as 
before  said,  to  recognise  only  the  conservation  of  slight 
variations  directly  beneficial  to  the  creature  presenting  them, 
by  enabling  it  to  obtain  food,  escape  enemies,  and  propagate 
its  kind. 

Such  being  the  case,  my  object  was  to  show  not  only  that 
"  natural  selection  "  is  inadequate  to  the  task  assigned  it,  but 


*  '  Origin  of  Species,'  p.  208. 
t  Op.  cit.  p.  220. 


CHAP.  IX.]  NATUKAL  SELECTION.  201 

that  there  is  much  positive  evidence  of  the  direct  action  both 
of  external  influences  sufficient  to  dominate  and  overpower 
in  certain  instances  the  ordinary  processes  of  "  natural  selec- 
tion," and  also  of  still  more  influential  internal  powers ;  more- 
over, that  these  latter  powers  are  so  efficient  as  to  present 
themselves  as  probably  the  main  determining  agent  in  specific 
evolution,  although  it  was  admitted  that  a  certain  subordinate 
action  of  natural  selection  plainly  obtained. 

The  various  arguments  advanced  space  does  not  now  allow 
the  reproduction  of,  but  referring  to  the  '  Genesis  of  Species,' 
it  may  here  bo  pointed  out  that  therein  the  object  aimed  at 
was  to  show : — 

1.  That  no  mere  survival  of  the  fittest  accidental  variations 
can  account  for  the  incipient  stages  of  structures  Points  con- 
useful  enough  when  once  developed.     Such,  e.  g.,  tu"  author.' 
as  the  whalebone  of  the  whale's  mouth,  the  larynx  of  the 
kangaroo,  pedicellnria?  and  bird's-head  processes,  and  many 
other  structures. 

2.  That  the  sexual  colours  of  apes,  the  beauty  of  shell- 
fish, and  the  complex  mechanisms  by  which  fertilisation  is 
effected  in  many  orchids,  are  quite  beyond  the  power  of 
natural  selection  to  develop. 

3.  That  modes  of  formation,  such  as  in  the  human  eye 
and  ear,  in  that   they  spring  from  simultaneous  and  con- 
current modifications  of  distinct  parts,  have  a  remarkable 
significance. 

4.  That  the  independent  origin  of  similar  structures  in 
very  different  animal  forms  should  be  noted,  and  evidence  was 
adduced  to  show  that  similar  modifications  are  sometimes 
directly  induced  by  obscure  external  conditions,  as  in  the 
sudden  acclimatisation  of  English  greyhounds  in  Mexico, 
and  in  the  loss  of  the  tail  in  certain  butterflies  of  certain  re- 
gions, and  in  the  direct  modification  of  young  English  oysters 
when  transported  to  the  shore  of  the  Mediterranean.     More- 
over, it  was  shown  that  certain  groups  of  organic  forms  exhibit 
a  common  tendency  to  remarkable  developments  of  particular 
kinds,  as  is  the  case  with  birds  of  paradise. 


292  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  IX. 

5.  That  facts  may  be  cited  to  support  the  theory  of  specific 
stability  (different  in  degree  in  different  species),  and  to  de- 
monstrate that  reversion  may  take  place  in  spite  of  the  most 
careful  selection  in  breeding.    The  value  of  the  facts  of  sterility 
in  hybrids  was  also  considered. 

6.  That  data  bearing  on  the  relation  of  species  to  time  may 
be  brought  forward,  apparently  fatal  to  their  origin  by  the 
action  of  natural  selection. 

7.  That  the  significant  and  important  facts  of  the  deep- 
seated  resemblances  existing  not  only  between  different  indi- 
vidual animals,  but  between  different  parts  of  one  and  the 
same   individual,   should   be   pondered   over;   these  points 
being,  as  was  shown,   capable  of  reinforcement  by  others 
drawn  from  the  abnormalities  of  monstrous  births,  and  the 
symmetrical  character  of  certain  diseases. 

From  all  these  considerations,  a  cumulative  argument 
seemed  to  arise  conclusive  against  the  theory  that  species 
have  had  their  specific  characters  fixed  mainly  by  the  action 
of  "  natural  selection." 

This  hypothesis,  in  fact,  may  be  expressed  as  follows :  that 
just  as  all  admit  the  universe  to  have  been  so  ordered — or  to 
so  exist — that  on  the  mixing  of  chemical  substances  under 
certain  conditions  new  and  perfectly  definite  species  of  mine- 
rals are  suddenly  evolved  from  potentiality  to  existence,  and 
as  by  the  juxtaposition  of  inorganic  matters  under  certain 
influences*  a  new  form  of  force — "vitality" — appears  upon 
the  scene — so  also  in  animals,  the  concurrence  of  certain 
external  exciting  causes  acts  in  such  a  manner  on  internal 
predisposing  tendencies  as  to  determine  by  a  direct  seminal 
modification  the  evolution  of  a  new  specific  form.  The 
action  of  so-called  "  natural  selection "  was  admitted  to  be 
real  and  necessary  but  an  altogether  subordinate  role  was 
ascribed  to  it. 


*  Though  Professor  Huxley  is  disinclined  as  yet  to  admit  that  such 
evolution  of  living  things  takes  place  now,  he  none  tlie  less  admits  the  prin- 
ciple, though  he  relegates  such  evolution  to  a  remote  epoch  of  the  world's 
history.  See  '  Address  to  the  British  Association,  Liverpool,  1 870,'  p.  17. 


CHAP.  IX.]  NATURAL  SELECTION.  293 

This  view  may  be  true  or  false,  but  it  is  a  very  different 
one  from  that  advocated  by  the  author  of  the  Differ  from 

/•  /-v    •     •          ^    oi          •       »         j    T  i  j          Mr.  Darwin's 

*  Orjgiu  oi  bpecies,  and  1  am  at  a  loss  to  under-  view, 
stand  how  Professor  Huxley  could  really  consider  it  identical 
with  Mr.  Darwin's,  more  especially  as  (at  p.  237)  the  points 
in  which  this  theory  coincides  with  Professor  Owen's  '  Deri- 
vation,' and  differs  from  that  of  the  author  of  the  *  Origin  of 
Species,'  had  been  enumerated.     It  seems  to  me  strange  that 
Professor  Huxley  should  now  assert  the  "very  pith  and 
marrow"  of  Darwinism  to  have  been  the  affirmation  that 
"  species  have  been  evolved  by  variation,  aided  by  the  subor- 
dinate action  of  natural  selection,"  when  he  himself,  in  his 

*  Lay  Sermons '    (p.  321),  has  enunciated  simply  that  Mr. 
Darwin's  hypothesis  is  the  origin  of  species  "  by  the  process  of 
natural  selection,"  without  one  word  of  qualification ;  and  five 
pages  farther  on,  has  considered  the  possibility  of  the  refuta- 
tion of  Mr.  Darwin's  view  by  the  discovery  of  residual  pheno- 
mena*  not  explicable  by  "natural  selection" — just  such 
phenomena  as  I  have  endeavoured  to  call  attention  to  in  my 
book. 

There  is  no  evidence  that  Mr.  Darwin  even  now  does  admit 
that  "  natural  selection "  has  only  a  subordinate  action,  and, 
as  we  have  seen,  in  the  last  edition  of  the  '  Origin  of  Species ' 
he  still  speaks  of  it  as  "  the  most  important  means."  I  do  not 
recollect  to  have  met  with  any  declaration  that  it  is  only  a 
subordinate  means,  although  such  a  declaration  should  logi- 
cally follow  from  the  various  admissions  ho  has  latterly  made. 
If  he  does  admit  it,  then  .a  cause  which  is  subordinate  cannot 
be  the  determining  agent.  If  he  does  not  admit  it,  then 
there  is  a  radical  difference  between  my  hypothesis  and 
Mr.  Darwin's. 

Mr.  Darwin  has,  in  fact,  changed  his  ground  without,  at 
the  same  time,  disavowing,  as  he  should  have  done,  "  natural 
selection  "  as  the  origin  of  species. 

This  restatement  of  facts  has  been  called  for  by  the  un- 

*  His  words  arc — "  What  if  species  should  offer  residual  phenomena,  here 
and  there,  not  explicable  by  natural  selection  ?"  ('  Lay  Sermons,'  p.  326.) 


294  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  IX. 

scrupulous  audacity  with  which  they  have  been  denied.  It 
is  but  an  act  of  justice  to  endeavour  to  prevent  the  public 
attaching,  in  mere  deference  to  Mr.  Darwin's  authority,  a 
greater  weight  to  his  assertions  than  the  evidence  adduced 
warrants.  It  has  been  sought  to  do  this  by  showing,  by 
Mr.  Darwin's  own  words,  he  has  been  compelled  to  admit 
that  "  abrupt  strongly  marked  changes  "  may  occur  "  neither 
beneficial  nor  injurious"  to  the  creatures  possessing  them, 
produced  "  by  unknown  agencies  "  lying  deep  in  "  the  nature 
of  the  organism."  In  other  words,  that  Mr.  Darwin  has  in 
fact,*  though  not  in  express  words,  abandoned  his  original 
theory  of  the  "  origin  of  species." 

I  am  grateful,  however,  to  Professor  Huxley  for  having 
spoken  of  "  injustice  "  in  connection  with  Mr.  Darwin.  I  am 
so  because  it  affords  me  an  opportunity  for  declaring  myself 
more  fully.  The  struggle  between  my  inclination  to  praise 
and  to  acquiesce,  and  my  sense  of  duty  which  impelled  me 
to  dissent,  led  me  to  express  myself  very  imperfectly,  and  I 
thank  Professor  Huxley  for  having  given  me  occasion  to 
acknowledge  my  regret  that  these  sentiments  should  have 
led  me  to  give  in  my  '  Genesis  of  Species '  such  very  inade- 
quate expression  to  my  dissent  from,  and  reprobation  of, 
Mr.  Darwin's  views,  especially  as  manifested  in  their  later 
developments. 

As  to  the  principles  embodied  in  Mr.  Darwin's  c  Origin  of 
Species,'  the  further  study  of  them  more  and  more  brings 
home  to  me  their  unsatisfactoriness.  Indeed,  "  natural  selec- 
tion," as  the  agent  for  the  determination  of  specific  animal 
forms,  is,  I  am  convinced,  utterly  insufficient  to  the  task 


*  Professor  Huxley  now  tells  us  that  Mr.  Darwin  is  inclined  to  admit  that 
varieties  can  "  be  perpetuated,  or  even  intensified,  when  selective  conditions 
are  indifferent,  or  perhaps  unfavourable "  to  their  "  existence."  Surely,  if 
species  may  be  evolved  in  the  teeth  of  nil  the  opposition  "  natural  selection  " 
can  offer,  it  is,  to  say  the  least,  somewhat  paradoxical  to  affirm  that  neverthe- 
less natural  selection  is  their  cause.  For  all  this  Mr.  Darwin  has  not,  I 
believe,  expressly  said  that  the  action  of  "natural  selection  "is  only  sub- 
ordinate, though  he  asserts  it  to  be  co-ordinate.  So  that  though  he  has 
virtually  given  up  his  original  theory,  his  view  does  not  yet  coincide  with 
mine,  as  far  as  I  can  gather  from  his  words. 


CHAP.  IX.]  NATUEAL  SELECTION.  295 

assigned  it ;  while  the  reasoning  employed  in  the  *  Descent 
of  Man '  to  support  the  hypothesis  of  our  ape  origin*  seems 
to  me,  to  say  the  least,  unworthy  of  Mr.  Darwin's  earlier 
productions. 

Professor  Huxley  attributes  "  peculiar  notions  of  proba- 
bility "  to  whoever  affirms  that  if  all  animals  below  what  is  and 
man  have  been  evolved  one  from  the  other,  then  a  !„  mlnTaS 
close  resemblance  in  man's  body  to  any  particular  m 
animal's  does  not  increase  that  a  priori  probability  as  to  his 
bodily  evolution  which  springs  from  the  fact  of  his  being  "  an 
animal  at  all."  But  surely  if  it  was  of  the  essence  of  an  animal 
to  be  "  evolved,"  so  that  to  be  an  animal  implied  being  a  crea- 
ture formed  by  evolution,  then  the  fact  of  man  being  an  animal 
would  necessarily  have  a  similar  implication,  and  I  fail  to  see 
what  additional  force  that  probability  would  obtain  through 
any  particular  resemblance.  On  the  other  hand,  if  there  is 
authority  for  believing  that  man's  body  was  miraculously 
created,  such  particular  resemblance  would  not  render  such  a 
miracle  one  bit  less  credible ;  for  there  is  no  necessity,  on 
the  hypothesis  of  such  miraculous  creation,  for  more  than 
even  a  specific  difference  between  his  body  and  that  of  some 
other  animal. 

Professor  Huxley  declares  the  assertion  that  man  differs 
more  from  an  ape  than  does  an  ape  from  inprganic  matter 
is  the  sign  of  the  "  absence  of  a  sound  philosophical  basis  " 
in  its-assertor.  But  surely  this  is  the  position  every  one 
must  assume  who  believes  that  man  is  immortal,  and  has 
a  moral  responsibility  to  God.  For  it  is  manifest  tlmt 
such  distinctions  (e.g.,  growth,  nutrition,  locomotion,  &c.) 
as  exist  between  apes  and  minerals  are  as  nothing  com- 
pared with  the  transcendent  distinction  above  referred  to. 
If,  then,  in  saying  this  we  are  in  "philosophical  error," 
\v<!  share  that  error  with  all  those  who  assert  the  immor- 
tality of  the  soul,  and  a  moral  responsibility  of  each  man 


*  The  much-ridiculed  Lord  Monboddo  lias  been  successfully  redeemed  from 
very  unjust  depreciation  in  an  interesting  article  which  has  lately  appearc.l. 
See  (he  '  Month  for  November  1871. 


296  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  IX. 

to  God  such  as  no  brute  possesses.  We  can  also  claim 
as  more  or  less  on  our  side  even  one  of  the  originators 
of  the  theory  of  "  natural  selection  "  itself,  and  his  followers ; 
for  Mr.  Wallace,  if  I  understand  him  rightly,  teaches  us 
that  for  the  evolution  of  man's  body  special  spiritual  agencies 
were  required,  which  were  not  needed  for  the  rest  of  the 
organic  world.  So  that,  according  to  this  view,  man  is 
marked  off  from  all  the  rest  of  nature  by  a  very  special 
distinction. 

And  here,  the  name  of  Mr.  Wallace  having  been  mentioned, 
Mr  wai-  I  mus*  refer  to  Professor  Huxley's  criticism  on  a 
to^rl^a-1119  remark  made  through  my  desire  to  do  justice  to 
aiity.  -yfa.  Wallace.  It  is  an  undoubted  fact  that  there 

are  many  men  who,  if  they  had  thought  out  natural  selection 
simultaneously  with  Mr.  Darwin,  would  have  clamor- 
ously sought  a  recognition  of  the  fact,  and  have  lost  no 
opportunity  of  asserting  simultaneity.  No  one  can  affirm 
that  Mr.  Wallace  has  shown  the  faintest  inclination  of  the 
kind,  while  no  one  can  deny  that  if  he  had  followed  the 
clamorous  path,  his  name  would  have  been  more  widely 
known  and  more  popularly  associated  with  natural  selection 
than  has  been,  in  fact,  the  case. 

It  is  a  gratuitous  assertion  on  the  part  of  Professor 
Huxley  to  say  I  suggested  that  Mr.  Darwin's  eminence  is 
due  to  Mr.  Wallace's  modesty  in  any  other  sense  than  as 
now  explained,  namely,  that  had  Mr.  Wallace  put  himself 
more  prominently  forward,  he  would  have  been  seen  more 
distinctly  by  the  popular  eye — an  assertion  no  one  can 
"question. 

As  a  fact,  I  believe  that  Mr.  Wallace,  in  the  passage 
quoted  by  Professor  Huxley,  allows  his  modesty  to  deceive 
him.  From  what  I  know  of  Mr.  Wallace,  I  venture  to  affirm 
he  underrates  his  powers,  and  I  am  convinced  he  could  have 
written  as  good  a  defence  of  natural  selection  as  even  the 
1  Origin  of  Species.'  There  are  not  wanting  those  who, 
though  they  have  carefully  studied  Mr.  Darwin's  work,  only 
fully  understood  his  theory  when  presented  to  their  minds 


CHAP.  IX.]  NATUEAL  SELECTION.  297 

in  the  clear,  lucid,  and  admirable  writings  of  Mr.  Wallace. 
In  this  matter  I  have  the  support  of  an  eminent  Darwinian, 
for  Dr.  Hooker,  in  his  address  to  the  British  Association  at 
Norwich,  made  the  following  remarks  on  this  subject :  "  Of 
Mr.  Wallace  and  his  many  contributions  to  philosophical 
biology,  it  is  not  easy  to  speak  without  enthusiasm;  for 
putting  aside  their  great  merits,  he,  throughout  his  writings, 
with  a  modesty  as  rare  as  I  believe  it  to  be  in  him  un- 
conscious, forgets  his  own  unquestioned  claims  to  the  honour 
of  having  originated,  independently  of  Mr.  Darwin,  the 
theories  which  he  so  ably  defends."* 

Having,  then,  examined  the  meaning  and  nature  of  the 
hypothesis  of  "  Natural  Selection,"  it  is  necessary  Mr  Darwin.s 
to  call  attention  to  the  mode  and  manner  of  its  8tyle- 
advocacy  by  its  author — a  style  calculated  to  impress,  by 
authority  of  tone,  minds  easily  dominated,  and  not  prepared 
by  special  studies  to  accurately  weigh  the  evidence  put 
before  them.  Two  objections  may  be  made  to  Mr.  Darwin's 
mode  of  advocacy.  The  first  is  a  too  great  tendency  to 
dogmatic  assertions.  The  second  is  a  habit  of  quietly 
slipping  in,  or  assuming,  in  his  arguments  the  presence 
of  some  power  or  quality  when  its  existence  is  the  very 
point  in  dispute.  This  applies  as  much,  or  more,  to  his 
remarks  on  the  distinctive  mental  qualities  of  man  as  to 
those  on  questions  of  the  structure  or  habits  of  animals. 

Thus,  to  take  for  instance  the  theory  of  the  descent  of 
man  from  some  inferior  form,  he  says  :  "  The  grounds  upon 
which  this  conclusion  rests  will  never  be  shaken "  (vol.  ii. 
p.  385),  and  "  the  possession  of  exalted  mental  powers  is  no 
insuperable  objection  to  this  conclusion"  (vol.  i.  p.  107). 
Also  (vol.  i.  p.  32) :  "It  is  only  our  natural  prejudice  "  "  which 
leads  us  to  demur  to  this  conclusion."  Yet  we  might  surely 
be  led  to  demur  by  the  conviction  that  not  to  do  so  would 
be  to  contradict  evident  truths.  Speaking  of  sympathy, 
he  boldly  remarks :  "  This  instinct  no  dovikt  was  originally 


*  See  'Report'  for  1868,  p.  Ixxi. 
14 


298  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  IX. 

acquired,  like  all  the  other  social  instincts,  through  natural 
selection "  (vol.  i.  p.  164:) ;  and  "  the  fundamental  social 
instincts  were  originally  thus  gained  "  (vol.  i.  p.  173). 

He  tells  us  (vol.  i.  p.  155)  :  "  The  pollen-collecting  appa- 
ratus, or  the  sting  of  the  worker-bee,  or  the  great  jaws  of 
soldier-ants  have  been  thus  acquired,"  i.e.,  by  natural 
selection. 

It  is  rarely  that  Mr.  Darwin  fails  in  courtesy  to  his  oppo- 
nents ;  and  one  may  well  therefore  be  surprised  at  the  tone 
of  the  following  passage  (vol.  ii.  p.  386) :  "  He  who  is  not 
content  to  look  like  a  savage,  -at  the  phenomena  of  nature  as 
disconnected,  cannot  any  longer  believe  that  man  is  the  work 
of  a  separate  act  of  creation.  He  will  be  forced  to  admit " 
the  contrary.  What  justifies  Mr.  Darwin  in  taking  this  tone 
of  superiority,  and  in  his  assumption  that  to  suppose  the  soul 
of  man  to  have  been  specially  created,  is  to  regard  the 
phenomena  of  nature  as  disconnected  ? 

Secondly,  as  an  instance  of  Mr.  Darwin's  too  frequent 
He  begs  the  practice  of  begging  the  question  at  issue,  the  fol- 

questiou  he      F 

argues.  lowing  assertion  may  be  quoted:  "Any  animal 
whatever,  endowed  with  well-marked  social  instincts,  would 
inevitably  acquire  a  moral  sense  or  conscience,  as  soon  as  its 
intellectual  powers  had  become  as  well  developed,  or  nearly 
as  well  developed,  as  in  man"  (vol.  i.  p.  71).  This  is  either 
a  monstrous  assumption  or  a  mere  truism ;  it  is  a  truism,  for 
of  course,  any  creature  with  the  intellect  of  a  man  would 
perceive  the  qualities  men's  intellect  is  capable  of  perceiving, 
and,  amongst  them — moral  worth. 

Mr.  Darwin,  in  a  passage  before  quoted  (vol.  i.  p.  86)  slips 
in  the  whole  of  absolute  morality,  by  employing  the  phrase 
"  appreciation  of  justice."  Again  (vol.  i.  p.  168),  when  he 
speaks  of  aiding  the  needy,  he  remarks:  "Nor  could  we 
check  our  sympathy,  if  so  urged  by  hard  reason,  without 
deterioration  in  the  noisiest  part  of  our  nature."  How  noblest  ? 
According  to  Mr.  Darwin,  a  virtuous  instinct  is  a  strong  and 
permanent  one.  There  can  be,  according  to  his  views,  no 
other  elements  of  quality  than  intensity  and  duration.  Mr. 


CHAP.  IX.]  NATUEAL  SELECTION.  293 

Darwin,  in  fact,  thus  silently  introduces  the  moral  element 
into  his  "  social  instinct,"  and  then,  of  course,  has  no  diffi- 
culty in  finding  in  this  latter  what  he  had  previously  put 
there. 

Mr.  Darwin's  hypothesis  has  been  examined  at  length  by 
me  in  the  '  Genesis  of  Species/  and  the  causes  have  been 
there  assigned  which  have  determined  me  to  reject  it  in 
favour  of  the  conception  of  an  internal  force — a  conclusion 
which  has  also  been  arrived  at  by  various  other  naturalists  ; 
Professor  Owen,  as  has  been  said,  amongst  them. 

Dr.  Carpenter  has  observed  (in  a  periodical  called  '  II 
Earth '),  of  the  origin  of  new  species  by  the  appearance  of 
modified  individuals:  "Natural  selection  is  asssuredly  not 
that  cause."  "Consequently  we  must  look  to  forces  acting 
cither  within  or  without  the  organism  as  the  real  agents." 
"  This  much  seems  to  me  clear :  that  just  as  there  is  at  the 
present  time  a  determinate  capacity  for  a  certain  fixed  kind 
of  development  in  each  germ,  in  virtue  of  which  one  evolves 
itself  into  a  zoophyte,  and  another  (though  not  originally 
distinguishable  from  it)  into  a  man,  so  must  the  primordial 
germs  have  been  endowed  each  with  its  determinate  capacity 
for  a  particular  course  of  development ;  in  virtue  of  which  it 
has  evolved  the  whole  succession  of  forms  that  has  ultimately 
proceeded  from  it.  That  the  'accidents'  of  Natural  Selec- 
tion should  have  produced  that  orderly  succession,  is  to  my 
own  mind  inconceivable." 

It  cannot  then  be  contested  that  the  far-famed  "  Oiigin  of 
Species"  that,  namely,  by  " Natural  Selection,"  has 

,  ,.,,.,,".,  ,  ,         Conclusion  as 

been  repudiated,  in  fact,  though  not  expressly,  to -Natural 
even  by  its  own  author.  This  circumstance,  which 
is  simply  undeniable,  might  dispense  us  from  any  further 
consideration  of  the  hypothesis  itself.  But  the  "conspiracy 
of  silence  "  which  has  accompanied  the  repudiation  tends  to 
lead  the  unthinking  many  to  suppose  that  the  same  im- 
portance still  attaches  to  it  as  at  first.  On  this  account  it 
may  be  worth  while  to  ask  the  question,  what,  after  all,  is 
"Natural  Selection"? 


300  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  IX. 

The  answer  may  seem  surprising  to  some,  but  it  is  none 
the  less  true,  that  "  Natural  Selection  "  is  simply  nothing.  It 
is  an  apparently  positive  name  for  a  really  negative  effect, 
and  is  therefore  an  eminently  misleading  term.  By  "  Natural 
Selection  "  is  meant  the  result  of  all  the  destructive  agencies 
of  nature,  destructive  to  individuals  and  to  races  by  destroy- 
ing their  lives  or  their  powers  of  propagation.  Evidently 
the  cause  of  the  distinction  of  species  (supposing  such  dis- 
tinction to  be  brought  about  in  natural  generation)  must  be 
that  which  causes  variation,  and  variation  in  one  determinate 
direction  in  at  least  several  individuals  simultaneously.  At 
the  same  time  it  is  freely  conceded  that  the  destructive 
agencies  of  nature  do  succeed  in  preventing  the  perpetua- 
tion of  monstrous,  abortive,  and  feeble  attempts  at  the 
performance  of  the  evolutionary  process,  that  they  remove 
rapidly  antecedent  forms  when  new  ones  are  evolved  more 
in  harmony  with  surrounding  conditions,  and  that  their 
action  results  in  the  promotion  of  new  characters  when  these 
have  once  attained  sufficient  completeness  to  be  of  real 
utility  to  their  possessor. 

Continued  reflection,  and  five  years'  further  pondering 
over  the  problem  of  specific  origin,  have  more  and  more 
convinced  me  the  conception  that  the  origin  of  all  species, 
"  man  included,"  is  due  simply  to  conditions  which  are 
(to  use  Mr.  Darwin 's  own  words)  "  strictly  accidental,"  is 
a  conception  utterly  irrational.  This  conception  is  not  that 
of  Mr.  Wallace,  who  makes  of  inan  a  special  exception. 
With  regard  to  the  conception  as  now  put  forward  by 
Mr.  Darwin,  however,  I  cannot  truly  characterize  it  but  by 
an  epithet  which  I  employ  only  with  much  reluctance.  I 
weigh  my  words,  and  have  present  to  my  mind  the  many 
distinguished  naturalists  who  have  accepted  the  notion,  and 
yet  I  cannot  hesitate  to  call  it  a  "  puerile  hypothesis."  I  call 
it  puerile  and  not  infantine,  because  in  the  infancy  of  nations 
as  of  individuals  the  tendency  is  to  explain  each  visible 
action  by  a  direct  supernatural  intervention.  Keaction  from 
this  infantine  condition  tends  to  the  exclusion  from  our 


CIIAP.  IX.]  NATUEAL  SELECTION.  301 

conception  of  the  First  Cause,  of  knowledge,  purpose  and 
will  altogether,  as  in  the  Ionian  Philosophy  which  re- 
appears amongst  us  to-day — the  puerile  view.  This  puerile 
view  results  from  a  want  of  appreciation  of  human  reason. 
Maturity  reconciles  the  apparently  diverging  truths  contained 
in  each  assertion  and  represents  the  material  universe  as 
always  and  everywhere  sustained  and  directed  by  an  infinite 
Cause,  for  which  to  us  the  word  MIND  is  the  least  iuadequate 
and  misleading  of  symbols. 


CHAPTER  X. 

SEXUAL   SELECTION. 

"  Sexual  selection  is  an  hypothesis  which  neither  has  been  nor  can  bo 
proved  true,  but  the  falsehood  of  which  is  demonstrated  by  a  mass  of 
zoological  data." 

THE  hypothesis  of  "natural  selection"  having  been  found 
sexual  seiec-  ^7  ^s  author  unequal  for  the  task  he  had  as- 
c^r^hypo-  signed  it,  that  of  serving  as  the  explanation  of 
thesis.  specific  origin,  he  subsequently  brought  forward  to 
its  aid  a  subordinate  hypothesis,  which  he  termed  "  sexual 
selection"  The  present  chapter  will  be  devoted  to  the  con- 
sideration of  what  lessons  we  can  derive  from  nature  as  to 
the  existence  and  action  of  this  process. 

In  considering  the  Origin  of  Man,  Mr.  Darwin  brings  in  his 
addition  of  "  sexual  selection"  to  the  aid  of  "  natural  selection." 
We  need  not  here  further  consider  the  action  of  "  natural 
selection ;"  but  since  Mr.  Darwin  is  convinced  that  the  action 
of  "  sexual  selection  "  is  necessary  to  account  for  man's  origin 
and  present  condition,  it  will  be  necessary  to  consider  "  sexual 
selection  "  at  some  length.  It  plays  the  most  important  part 
in  the  "  descent  of  man,"  according  to  Mr.  Darwin's  views.  He 
maintains  that  we  owe  to  it  our  power  of  song  and  our  hair- 
lessness  of  body,  and  that  also  to  it  is  due  the  formation  and 
conservation  of  the  various  races  and  varieties  of  the  human 
species.  Indeed  "sexual  selection"  is  now  the  corner-stone 
of  Mr.  Darwin's  theory.  It  occupies  three-fourths  of  his 
work  on  Man;  and  unless  he  has  clearly  established  this 
point,  the  whole  fabric  falls  to  the  ground.  It  is  impossible, 
therefore,  to  estimate  his  views  adequately  without  entering 
fully  into  the  subject. 


CHAP.  X.]  SEXUAL  SELECTION.  303 

Under  the  head  of  "  sexual  selection  "  Mr.  Darwin  includes, 
however,  two  very  distinct  processes.     One  of  these  Has  been 
consists  in  the  action  of  superior  strength  or  activity,  ci  ie  two"" 
by  which  one  male  succeeds  in  obtaining  possession  things! 
of  mates  and  in  keeping  away  rivals.     This  is,  undoubtedly, 
a  vera  causa,  but  may  be  more  conveniently  reckoned  as  one 
mode  of  "natural  selection"  than  as  a  branch  of  "sexual 
selection."     The  second  process  consists  in  alleged  preference 
or  choice,  exercised  freely  by  the  female  in  favour  of  parti- 
cular males  on  account  of  some  attractiveness  or  beauty  of 
form,  colour,  odour,  or  voice,  which  such  males  may  possess. 
It  is  this  second  form  of  "  sexual  selection  "  (and  which  alone 
deserves  the  name)  that  is  important  for  the  truth  of  Mr. 
Darwin's  views,  but  the  validity  of  which  has  to  be  proved. 

Now,  to  prove  the  existence  of  such  a  power  of  choice  Mr. 
Darwin  brings  forward  a  multitude  of  details  respecting  the 
sexual  phenomena  of  animals  of  various  classes  ;  but  it  is  the 
class  of  birds  which  is  mainly  relied  on  to  afford  evidence  in 
support  of  the  exercise  of  this  power  of  choice  by  female 
animals.  It  is  contended,  however,  that  not  only  is  the 
evidence  defective  even  with  respect  to  birds,  but  that  much 
of  his  own  evidence  is  in  direct  opposition  to  his  views  ;  while 
the  unquestionable  fact,  that  male  sexual  characters  (horns, 
mane,  wattles,  &c.  &c.)  are  developed  in  many  cases  where 
sexual  selection  has  certainly  not  acted,  renders  it  probable, 
a  priori,  that  the  unknown  cause  which  has  operated  in  these 
numerous-  cases  has  operated  in  those  instances  also  which 
seem  to  favour  the  hypothesis  Mr.  Darwin  supports.  Still  he 
contends  that  the  greater  part  of  the  beauty  and  melody  of 
the  organic  world  is  due  exclusively  to  this  selective  process, 
by  which,  through  countless  generations,  the  tail  of  the 
peacock,  the  throat  of  the  humming-bird,  the  song  of  the 
nightingale,  and  the  chirp  of  the  grasshopper  have  been 
developed  through  the  females,  age  after  age,  selecting  for 
their  mates,  males  possessing  in  a  more  and  more  perfect 
degree  characters  which  must  thus  have  been  continually  and 
constantly  preferred. 


304  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  X. 

Yet,  after  all,  Mr.  Darwin  concedes  in  principle  the  very 
Marked  cha-  point  in  dispute,  and  yields  all  for  which  his  oppo- 
triniyaiise  nents  need  argue,  when  he  allows  that  beautiful  and 
d"nuynofn.  harmonious  variations  may  occur  spontaneously  and 
at  once,  as  in  the  dark  or  spangled  bars  on  the  feathers  of 
Hamburg  fowls  ('  Descent  of  Man,'  vol.  i.  p.  281).  For  what  dif- 
ference is  there,  other  than  mere  difference  of  degree,  between 
the  spontaneous  appearance  of  a  few  beautiful  new  feathers 
with  harmonious  markings  and  the  spontaneous  appearance 
of  a  whole  beautiful  clothing  like  that  of  the  Tragopans  ? 

Again,  on  Mr.  Darwin's  own  showing,  it  is  manifest  that 
male  sexual  characters,  such  as  he  would  fain  attribute  to 
sexual  selection,  may  arise  without  any  such  action  whatever. 
Thus  he  tells  us  :  u  There  are  breeds  of  the  sheep  and  goat, 
in  which  the  horns  of  the  male  differ  greatly  in  shape  from 
those  of  the  female;"  and  "with  tortoise-shell  cats,  the 
females  alone,  as  a  general  rule,  are  thus  coloured,  the  males 
being  rusty-red"  (vol.  i.  p.  283).  Now,  if  these  cats  were 
only  known  in  a  wild  state,  Mr.  Darwin  would  certainly  bring 
them  forward  amongst  his  other  instances  of  alleged  sexual 
selection,  though  we  now  know  the  phenomenon  is  not  due 
to  any  such  cause.  A  more  striking  instance,  however,  is 
the  following :  "  With  the  pigeon,  the  sexes  of  the  parent 
species  do  not  differ  in  any  external  character ;  nevertheless, 
in  certain  domesticated  breeds  the  male  is  differently  coloured 
from  the  female.  The  wattle  in  the  English  carrier-pigeon, 
and  the  crop  in  the  pouter,  are  more  highly  developed  in  the 
male  than  in  the  female ;"  and  this  has  arisen,  "  not  from,  but 
rather  in  opposition  to,  the  wishes  of  the  breeders !"  This 
amounts  to  a  positive  demonstration  that  sexual  characters 
may  arise  spontaneously,  and,  be  it  noted,  in  the  class  of 
birds. 

As  to  intestinal  worms,  he  says,  on  the  authority  of  Dr. 
Baird : — 

"  The  males  of  certain  Entozoa  differ  slightly  in  colour  from  the 
females ;  but  we  have  no  reason  to  suppose  that  such  differences  have 
been  augmented  through  sexual  selection." 


CHAP.  X]  SEXUAL  SELECTION.  305 

But  if  sexual  character  is  here  allowed  to  be  due  to  some 
other  cause,  why  is  it  not  so  due  elsewhere  also  ?  The  question 
suggests  itself  after  reading  the  following  sentence : — 

"  Many  corals,  sea-anemones,  some  jelly-fishes,  Planariae,  Ascidians, 
starfishes,  Echini,  &c.,"  "  are  ornamented  with  the  most  brilliant  tints, 
or  are  shaded  and  striped  in  an  elegant  manner ;"  yet  here  "  we  may 
conclude  that  such  colours  have  not  been  acquired  through  sexual  selec- 
tion."—Vol.  i.  p.  321. 

The  uncertainty  which  besets  these  speculations  of  Mr. 
Darwin  is  evident  at  every  turn.  "What,  at  first, 
could  be  thought  a  better  instance  of  sexual  selec- 
tion than  the  light  of  the  glowworm,  exhibited  to  attract  her 
mate  ?  Yet  the  discovery  of  luminous  larva?,  which  of  course 
have  no  sexual  action,  leads  Mr.  Darwin  to  observe  that  "  It 
is  very  doubtful  whether  the  primary  use  of  the  light  is  to 
guide  the  male  to  the  female  "  (vol.  i.  p.  345).  Again,  as  to 
certain  British  field-bugs,  he  says, "  If  in  any  species  the  males 
had  differed  from  the  females  in  an  analogous  manner,  we  might 
have  Tjeen  justified  in  attributing  such  conspicuous  colours  to 
sexual  selection  with  transference  to  both  sexes"  (vol.  i. 
p.  350).  As  to  the  stridulating  noises  of  insects  (which  is 
assumed  to  be  the  result  of  sexual  selection),  Mr.  Darwin 
remarks  of  a  certain  Neuropteron:  "It  is  rather  surprising  that 
both  sexes  should  have  the  power  of  stridulating,  as  the  male 
is  winged  and  the  female  wingless "  (vol.  i.  p.  366) ;  and  he 
is  again  surprised  to  find  that  this  power  is  not  a  sexual 
character  in  many  Coleoptera  (vol.  i.  p.  382),  i.e.,  not  different 
in  the  two  sexes. 

Moths  and  butterflies,  however,  are  the  insects  which  Mr. 
Darwin  treats  of  at  the  greatest  length  in  support  of  sexual 
selection.  Yet  even  here  he  supplies  us  with  a  thorough 
demonstration  that  in  certain  cases  beauty  does  not  charm 
the  female.  Ho  tells  us : — 

"  Some  facts,  however,  are  opposed  to  the  belief  that  female  butter- 
flies prefer  the  more  beautiful  males ;  thus,  as  I  have  been  assured  by 
several  observers,  fresh  females  may  frequently  be  seen  paired  with 
battered,  faded,  or  clingy  males." — Vol.  i.  p.  400. 


306  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  X. 

As  to  the  Botnbycidcc  he  adds  : — 

"  The  females  lie  in  a  torpid  state,  and  appear  not  to  evince  the  least 
choice  in  regard  to  their  partners.  This  is  the  case  with  the  common 
silk-moth  (B.  mori).  Dr.  Wallace,  who  has  had  such  immense  experi- 
ence in  breeding  Bombyx  cynthia,  is  convinced  that  the  females  evince 
no  choice  or  preference.  He  has  kept  above  three  hundred  of  these 
moths  living  together,  and  has  often  found  the  most  vigorous  females 
mated  with  stunted  males." 

Nevertheless,  we  do  not  find,  for  all  this,  any  defect  of 
colour  or  markings,  for,  as  Mr.  Wallace  observes  ('  Nature,' 
March  15,  1871,  p.  182),  "  the  Bombyces  are  amongst  the 
most  elegantly  coloured  of  all  moths." 

Mr.  Darwin  gives  a  number  of  instances  of  sexual  charac- 
ters, such  as  horns,  spines,  &c.,  in  beetles  and  other  insects  ; 
but  there  is  no  fragment  of  evidence  that  such  structures  are 
in  any  way  due  to  feminine  caprice.  Other  structures  are 
described  and  figured  which  doubtless  do  aid  the  sexual  act, 
as  the  claws  of  certain  Crustacea  ;  but  these  are  often  of  such 
size  and  strength  (e.g.,  in  CaUianassa  and  Orcliestid)  as  to 
render  any  power  of  choice  on  the  part  of  the  female  in  the 
highest  degree  incredible. 

Similarly  with  the  higher  classes,  i.e.,  fishes,  reptiles,  and 
Fishes  and  beasts,  we  have  descriptions  and  representations  of 
Kepuics.  a  number  of  sexual  peculiarities,  but  no  evidence 
whatever  that  such  characters  are  due  to  female  selection. 
Often  we  have  statements  which  conflict  strongly  with  any 
such  action.  Thus,  e.g.,  Mr.  Darwin  quotes  Mr.  II.  Buist, 
Superintendent  of  Fisheries,  as  saying  that  male  salmon 

"are  constantly  fighting  and  tearing  each  other  on  the  spawning- 
beds,  and  many  so  injure  each  other  as  to  cause  the  death  of  numbers, 
many  being  seen  swimming  near  the  banks  of  the  river  in  a  state  of 
exhaustion,  and  apparently  in  a  dying  state ;  and  that  the  keeper  of 
Stormontfield  found  in  the  northern  Tyne  about  three  hundred  dead 
salmon,  all  of  which,  with  one  exception,  were  males ;  and  he  was  con- 
vinced that  they  had  lost  their  lives  by  fighting." — Vol.  ii.  p.  3. 

The  female's  choice  must  here  be  much  limited,  and  the 
only  kind  of  sexual  selection  which  can  operate  is  that  first 


CHAP.  X.]  SEXUAL  SELECTION.  307 

kind  due  to  direct  conflict,  which,  we  before  observed,  must 
rather  be  ranked  as  a  kind  of  "  natural  selection."  Even  with 
regard  to  this,  however,  we  may  well  hesitate,  when  Mr. 
Darwin  tells  us,  as  he  does,  that,  seeing  the  habitual  contests 
of  the  males,  "it  is  surprising  that  they  have  not  generally 
become,  through  the  effects  of  sexual  selection,  larger  and 
stronger  than  the  females  ;"  and  this  the  more  as  "  the  males 
suffer  from  their  small  size,"  being  "  liable  to  be  devoured  by 
the  females  of  their  own  species"  (vol.  ii.  p.  7).  The  cases 
cited  by  our  author  with  regard  to  fishes  do  not  even  tend 
to  prove  the  existence  of  sexual  selection,  and  the  same  may 
be  said  as  to  the  numerous  details  given  by  him  about  reptiles 
and  amphibians.  Nay,  rather  the  facts  are  hostile  to  his  views. 
Thus  he  says  himself,  "  It  is  surprising  that  frogs  and  toads 
should  not  have  acquired  more  strongly-marked  sexual  dif- 
ferences ;  for,  though  cold-blooded,  their  passions  are  strong" 
(vol.  ii.  p.  26).  But  he  cites  a  fact,  than  which  it  would  be 
difficult  to  find  one  less  favourable  to  his  cause,  seeing  that 
amphibians  have  some  sexual  characters  after  all.  He  adds : 
"  Dr.  Giiuther  informs  me  that  he  has  several  times  found  an 
unfortunate  female  toad  dead  and  smothered  from  having 
been  so  closely  embraced  by  three  or  four  males."  If  female 
selection  was  difficult  in  the  case  of  the  female  salmon,  it 
must  be  admitted  to  have  been  singularly  infelicitous  to  the 
female  toad. 

We  may  now  notice  some  facts  brought  forward  by  Mr. 
Darwin  with  regard  to  beasts.  And  first,  as  to  the 
existence  of  choice  on  the  part  of  the  females,  it 
must  be  noted  that  "  Mr.  Blenkiron,  the  greatest  breeder  of 
racehorses  in  the  world,  says  that  stallions  are  so  frequently 
capricious  in  their  choice,  rejecting  one  mare  and  without  any 
apparent  cause  taking  to  another,  that  various  artifices  have 
to  be  habitually  used."  "He  has  never  'known  a  mare  to 
reject  a  horse;"  though  this  has  occurred  in  Mr.  Wright's 
stable. 

Mr.  Darwin  allows  (vol.  ii.  p.  276)  that  the  loud  voice  of 
the  stag  is  not  due  to  sexual  selection  ;  but  some  of  the  most 


308  LESSONS  FKOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  X. 

marked  sexual  characters  found  amongst  mammals  are  those 
which  exist  in  apes.  These  are  abundantly  noticed  by  Mr. 
Darwin,  but  his  treatment  of  them  seems  to  show  his  inability 
to  bring  them  within  the  scope  of  his  theory. 

It  is  well  known  that  certain  apes  are  distinguished  by  the 
lively  colours  or  peculiarities  as  to  hair  possessed  by  the 
males,  while  it  is  also  notorious  that  their  vastly  superior 
strength  of  body  and  length  of  fang  would  render  resistance 
on  the  part  of  the  female  difficult  and  perilous,  even  were  we 
to  adopt  the  utterly  gratuitous  supposition,  that  at  seasons  of 
sexual  excitement  the  female  shows  any  disposition  to  coyness. 
Mr.  Darwin  has  no  argument  to  bring  forward  to  prove  the 
exercise  of  any  choice  on  the  part  of  female  apes,  but  gives 
in  support  of  his  views  the  following  remarkable  passage : — 

"  Must  we  attribute  to  mere  purposeless  variability  in  the  male  all 
these  appendages  of  hair  and  skin  ?  It  cannot  be  denied  that  this  is 
possible ;  for,  with  many  domesticated  quadrupeds,  certain  characters, 
apparently  not  derived  through  reversion  from  any  wild  parent-form, 
have  appeared  in,  and  are  confined  to,  the  males,  or  are  more  largely 
developed  in  them  than  in  the  females, — for  instance,  the  hump  in  the 
male  zebu-cattle  of  India,  the  tail  in  fat- tailed  rams,  the  arched  outline 
of  the  forehead  in  the  males  of  several  breeds  of  sheep,  the  mane  in  the 
ram  of  an  African  breed,  and,  lastly,  the  mane,  long  hairs  on  the  hinder 
legs,  and  the  dewlap  in  the  male  alone  of  the  Berbura  goat." — vol.  ii. 
p.  284. 

If  these  are  due,  as  is  probable,  to  simple  variability,  then, 
he  adds — 

"  It  would  appear  reasonable  to  extend  the  same  view  to  the  many 
analogous  characters  occurring  in  animals  under  a  state  of  nature. 
Nevertheless  I  cannot  persuade  myself  that  this  view  is  applicable  in 
many  cases,  as  in  that  of  the  extraordinary  development  of  hair  on  the 
throat  and  fore-legs  of  the  male  Ammotragus,  or  of  the  immense  beard 
of  the  Pithecia  (monkey)." — vol.  ii.  p.  285. 

But  one  naturally  asks,  Why  not  ?  Mr.  Darwin  gives  no 
reason  (if  it  may  be  called  such)  beyond  that  implied  in  the 
gratuitous  use  of  the  epithet  "  purposeless  "  in  the  passage 
cited,  and  to  which  we  shall  return. 

In  the  Rhesus  monkey  the  female  appears  to  be  more 
vividly  coloured  than  the  male ;  therefore  Mr.  Darwin  infers 


CHAP.  X.]  SEXUAL  SELECTION.  309 

(grounding  his  inference  on  alleged  phenomena  in  birds)  that 
sexual  selection  is  reversed,  and  that  in  this  case  the  male 
selects.  This  hypothetical  reversion  of  a  hypothetical  process 
to  meet  an  exceptional  case  will  appear  to  many  rash  indeed, 
when  they  reflect  that  as  to  teeth,  whiskers,  general  size,  and 
superciliary  ridges  this  monkey  "  follows  the  common  rule  of 
the  male  excelling  the  female"  (vol.  ii.  p.  284). 

To  turn  now  to  the  class  on  which  Mr.  Darwin  especially 
relies,  we  shall  find  that  even  birds  supply  us  with 
numerous  instances  which  conflict  with  his  hypo- 
thesis. Thus,  speaking  of  the  battling  of  male  waders,  our 
author  tells  us:  "Two  were  seen  to  be  thus  engaged  for  half 
an  hour,  until  one  got  hold  of  the  head  of  the  other,  which 
would  have  been  killed  had  not  the  observer  interfered ;  the 
female  all  the  time  looking  on  as  a  quiet  spectator"  (vol.  i. 
p.  40).  As  these  battles  must  take  place  generally  in  the 
absence  of  spectators,  their  doubtless  frequently  fatal  ter- 
mination must  limit  greatly  the  power  of  selection  which 
Mr.  Darwin  attributes  to  the  females.  The  same  limit  is 
certainly  imposed  in  the  majority  of  gallinaceous  birds,  the 
cocks  of  which  fight  violently  ;  and  there  can  be  little  doubt 
but  that,  as  an  almost  invariable  rule,  the  victorious  birds 
mate  with  the  comparatively  passive  hens. 

Again,  how  can  we  explain,  on  Mr.  Darwin's  hypothesis,  the 
existence  of  distinguishing  male  sexual  marks,  where  it  is  the 
male  and  not  the  female  bird  which  selects  ?  Yet  the  wild 
turkey-cock,  a  distinguished  bird  enough,  is  said  by  Mr. 
Darwin  (vol.  ii.  p.  207)  to  be  courted  by  the  females ;  and  he 
quotes  (vol.  ii.  p.  120)  Sir  K.  Heron  as  saying,  "  that  .with 
peafowl  the  first  advances  are  always  made  by  the  female." 
And  of  the  capercailzie  he  says,  "  The  females  flit  round  the 
male  while  he  is  parading,  and  solicit  his  attention." 

But  though,  of  course,  the  sexual  instinct  always  seeks  its 
gratification,  does  the  female  ever  select  a  particular  plumage  ? 
The  strongest  instance  given  by  Mr.  Darwin  is  as  follows  : — 

"  Sir  R.  Heron  during  many  years  kept  an  account  of  the  habits  of 
the  peafowl,  which  ho  bred  in  large  numbers.  Ho  states  that  the  hens 


310  LESSONS  FBOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  X. 

have  frequently  great  preference  for  a  particular  peacock.  They  were 
all  so  fond  of  an  old  pied  cock,  that  one  year,  when  he  was  confined 
though  still  in  view,  they  were  constantly  assembled  close  to  the 
trellis-walls  of  his  prison,  and  would  not  suffer  a  japanned  peacock  to 
touch  them.  On  his  being  let  out  in  the  autumn,  the  oldest  of  the 
hens  instantly  courted  him,  and  was  successful  in  her  courtship.  The 
next  year  he  was  shut  up  in  a  stable,  and  then  the  hens  all  courted  his 
rival.  This  rival  was  a  japanned  or.  black- winged  peacock,  which  to 
our  eyes  is  a  more  beautiful  bird  than  the  common  kind." — vol.  ii. 
p.  120. 

Now  no  one  disputes  as  to  birds  showing  preferences  one 
for  another ;  but  it  is  quite  a  gratuitous  suggestion  that  the 
pied  plumage  of  the  venerable  paterfamilias  was  the  charm 
which  attracted  the  opposite  sex ;  and  even  if  such  were  the 
case,  it  would  seem  (from  Mr.  Darwin's  concluding  remark) 
to  show  either  that  the  peahen's  taste  is  so  different  from 
ours,  that  the  peacock's  plumage  could  never  have  been 
developed  by  it,  or  (if  the  taste  of  these  peahens  was  different 
from  that  of  most  peahens)  that  such  is  the  instability  of  a 
vicious  feminine  caprice,  that  no  constancy  of  coloration 
could  be  produced  by  its  selective  action. 

Another  instance,  which  Mr.  Darwin  considers  a  "  striking 
case,"  is  that  "a  male  silver-pheasant,  who  had  been  tri- 
umphant over  the  other  males,  and  was  the  accepted  lover 
of  the  females,  had  his  ornamental  plumage  spoiled.  He 
was  then  immediately  superseded  by  a  rival,  who  got  the 
upper  hand,  and  afterwards  led  the  flock."  But,  in  the  first 
place,  what  is  the  meaning  of  "  got  the  upper  hand  "  ?  If 
this  means  "  conquered  in  fight,"  the  whole  case  is  simple 
enough ;  and  without  such  conquest  it  is  difficult  to  see  how 
the  second  male  could  have  "  afterwards  led  the  flock."  But 
even  if  it  does  not  mean  conquest,  it  need  only  mean  that 
the  change  of  plumage  caused  an  interruption  in  the  asso- 
ciated sensations  of  the  females,  such  that  they  mistook  his 
identity,  and  no  longer  recognised  their  mate.  But  a  solitary 
observation  of  Dr.  Jaeger  requires  confirmation,  and  is  indeed 
of  little  value  in  supporting  what,  if  it  be  correct,  is  but  a 
hypothetical  interpretation  of  its  meaning,  while  numerous 


CHAP.  X.]  SEXUAL  SELECTION.  311 

other  observations  directly  contradict  any  such  hypothesis. 
Thus  Mr.  Darwin  himself  says  of  fowls : — 

"  I  have  received  long  letters  on  this  subject  from  Messrs.  Hewitt 
and  Tegetmeier,  and  almost  an  essay  from  the  late  Mr.  Brent.  It  will 
be  admitted  by  every  one  that  those  gentlemen,  so  well  known  from 
their  published  works,  are  careful  and  experienced  observers.  They 
do  not  believe  that  the  females  prefer  certain  males  on  account  of  tho 
beauty  of  their  plumage."  "  Mr.  Tegctmeier  is  convinced  that  a  game- 
cock, though  disfigured  by  being  dubbed  with  his  hackles  trimmed, 
would  be  accepted  as  readily  as  a  male  retaining  all  his  natural  orna- 
ments." As  to  pigeons,  "  Mr.  Tegetmeier,  at  my  request,  stained  some 
of  his  birds  with  magenta,  but  they  were  not  much  noticed  by  the 
others."— vol.  ii.  pp.  117, 118. 

But  there  are  remarkable  instances  of  sexual  characters 
which  cannot  be  due  to  female  selection  or  to  selection  at  all. 
Thus  Mr.  Darwin  was  shown  by  Mr.  Bartlett  that  the  inside 
of  the  mouth  of  the  hornbill,  B.  bicornis,  "  is  black  in  the 
male  and  flesh-coloured  in  the  female"  (vol.  ii.  p.  129). 
Again,  we  learn  that  "  the  females  of  Paradisea  apoda  and 
P.  papuana  differ  from  each  other  more  than  do  their  re- 
spective males  "  (vol.  ii.  p.  192).  And  again,  "  The  males  of 
two  species  of  Oxynotus  (shrikes),  which  represent  each  other 
in  the  islands  of  Mauritius  and  Bourbon,  differ  but  little  in 
colour,  whilst  the  females  differ  much."  Moreover,  Mr. 
Darwin  compares  these  with  "  certain  sub-breeds  of  the  game 
fowl,  iu  which  the  females  are  very  different,  whilst  the  males 
can  hardly  be  distinguished" — differences  which  he  allows 
ice  cannot  explain.  And  indeed  the  fact  that  sexual  plumage 
may  arise  without  any  sexual  selection  whatever,  or  indeed 
selection  of  any  kind,  is  abundantly  demonstrated  by  the 
case  of  the  pigeons  before  noticed,  and  by  the  fact  that  in 
fowls  "  the  two  sexes  of  pencilled  Hamburgs  differ  greatly 
from  each  other,  and  from  the  two  sexes  of  the  aboriginal 
Gallus  lankiva"  (vol.  ii.  p.  158). 

Mr.  Darwin  bases  his  theory  of  sexual  selection  greatly  on 
tho  fact  that  the  male  birds  display  the  beauty  of  their 
plumage  with  elaborate  parade  and  many  curious  and  un- 
couth gestures.  But  this  display  is  not  exclusively  used  in 


312  LESSONS  FBOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  X. 

attracting  and  stimulating  the  hens.  Thus  he  admits  that 
"  the  males  will  sometimes  display  their  ornaments  when  not 
in  the  presence  of  the  females,  as  occasionally  occurs  with 
the  grouse  at  their  balz-places,  and  as  may  be  noticed  with 
the  peacock ;  this  latter  bird,  however,  evidently  wishes  for  a 
spectator  of  some  kind,  and  will  show  off  his  finery,  as  I  have 
often  seen,  before  poultry  or  even  pigs"  (vol.  ii.  p.  86). 
Again,  as  to  the  brilliant  Bupicola  crocea,  Sir  B.  Schomburgk 
says :  "  A  male  was  capering  to  the  apparent  delight  of  several 
others  "  (vol.  ii.  p.  87). 

Mr.  Darwin  considers  singing  as  well  as  display  of  plumage 
to  be  one  of  the  attractions  for  which  males  are 

Voice. 

selected  by  females,  and  that  in  consequence  of  this 
the  faculty  has  been  developed  in  certain  species  to  the  degree 
of  perfection  which  we  now  find  it  has  attained.  There  are, 
however,  reasons  for  thinking  that  it  is  by  no  means  the 
sexual  instinct  alone  which  occasions  this  exercise  of  the  vocal 
powers.  Our  author  himself  admits  (vol.  ii.  p.  52),  that  at 
any  rate  "  many  naturalists  believe  that  the  singing  of  birds 
is  almost  exclusively  '  the  effect  of  rivalry  and  emulation,' 
and  not  for  the  sake  of  charming  their  mates ;"  and  in  con- 
firmation of  this  he  mentions  an  instance  of  "  a  sterile  hybrid 
canary  bird,"  which  by  its  singing  demonstrated  that  the 
habit  is  at  least  "  sometimes  quite  independent  of  love." 

It  is  difficult  to  suppose  that  sexual  selection  can  have 
simultaneously  developed  in  a  high  degree  both  power  of 
song  and  singularity  of  plumage.  Yet  the  Umbrella  bird 
has  both  :— 

"  It  has  an  immense  top-knot,  formed  of  bare  white  quills  surmounted 
by  dark-blue  plumes,  which  it  can  elevate  into  a  dome  no  less  than 
five  inches  in  diameter,  covering  the  whole  head.  This  bird  also  has 
on  its  neck  a  long,  thin,  cylindrical,  fleshy  appendage,  which  is  thickly 
clothed  with  scale-like  blue  feathers.  It  probably  serves  in  part  as  an 
ornament,  but  likewise  as  a  resounding  apparatus,  for  Mr.  Bates  found 
that  it  is  '  connected  with  an  unusual  development  of  the  trachea  and 
vocal  organs.'  The  bird  utters  a  singularly  deep,  loud,  and  long-sus- 
tained fluty  note."— Vol.  ii.  p.  58. 

Again,  the  Bell  bird  is  an  instance  of  the  simultaneous 


CIIAP.  X.]  SEXUAL  SELECTION.  313 

existence  of  "  extreme  contrast  in  colour  between  the  sexes  " 
(vol.  ii.  p.  79) — the  male  being  pure  white  while  the  female 
is  dusky-green —  with  remarkable  vocal  powers,  for  its  note 
"  can  be  distinguished  at  the  distance  of  nearly  three  miles, 
and  astonishes  every  one  who  first  hears  it."  But  why  may 
not  both  the  song  of  birds  and  their  display,  be  phenomena 
analogous  to  the  voice  of  the  stag  or  the  lion,  the  develop- 
ment of  which  Mr.  Darwin  does  not  by  any  means  consider 
due  to  sexual  selection?  He  says : — 

"  The  loud  voice  of  the  stag  does  not  seem  to  be  of  any  special 
service  to  him,  either  during  his  courtship  or  battles,  or  in  any  other 
way.  But  may  we  not  believe  that  the  frequent  use  of  the  voice, 
under  the  strong  excitement  of  love,  jealousy,  and  rage,  continued 
during  many  generations,  may  at  last  have  produced  an  inherited 
effect  on  the  vocal  organs?" — Vol.  ii.  p.  276. 

But  if  this  may  be  the  case  in  the  stag,  an  extension  of 
the  same  principle  would  sufficiently  account  for  the  song  of 
birds.  In  a  parallel  way  we  may  conceive  that  the  male 
pheasants  instinctively  display  themselves  at  the  breeding 
season,  without  any  necessity  of  attributing  their  success  in 
wooing  to  their  plumage,  when  we  have  seen  how  often  it 
must  rather  be  due  to  their  strength  and  prowess.  Indeed, 
Mr.  Darwin  himself  somewhat  singularly  remarks  (vol.  ii. 
p.  95)  :  "  We  must,  however,  be  cautious  in  concluding  that 
the  wings  are  spread  out  solely  for  display,  as  some  birds  act 
thus  whose  wings  are  not  beautiful;"  and  he  adds,  "  All  male 
birds  of  the  same  species  display  themselves  exactly  in  the 
same  manner."  So  again  the  Howling  monkeys  have  been 
considered  to  perform  their  sonorous  if  not  melodious  concert 
for  its  own  sake,  apart  from  any  intention  of  female  captiva- 
tion.  Mr.  Darwin  says :  "  An  excellent  observer,  Eenggcr, 
could  not  perceive  that  they  were  excited  to  begin  their  con- 
cert by  any  special  cause  ;  he  thinks  that,  like  many  birds, 
they  delight  in  their  own  music,  and  try  to  excel  each  other  " 
(vol.  ii.  p.  277). 

From  the  fact  of  "  display  "  Mr.  Darwin  concludes  that  "  it 
is  obviously  probable  that  the  females  appreciate  the  beauty 


314  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CiiAi-.  X. 

of  their  suitors"  (vol.  ii.  p.  111).  Our  author,  however,  only 
ventures  to  call  it  "probable,"  and  he  significantly  adds:  "  It 
is,  however,  difficult  to  obtain  direct  evidence  of  their  capacity 
to  appreciate  beauty."  And  again  he  says  of  the  hen  bird :  "  It 
is  not  probable  that  she  consciously  deliberates ;  but  she  is 
most  excited  or  attracted  by  the  most  beautiful,  or  melodious, 
or  gallant  males"  (vol.  ii.  p.  123).  No  doubt  the  plumage, 
song,  &c.,  all  play  their  parts  in  aiding  the  various  processes 
of  life ;  but  to  stimulate  the  sexual  instinct,  even  supposing 
this  to  be  the  object,  is  one  thing — to  supply  the  occasion 
for  the  exercise  of  a  power  of  choice  is  quite  another.  Cer- 
tainly we  can  never  admit  what  Mr.  Darwin  strongly  affirms 
(vol.  ii.  p.  124),  that  an  "  even  occasional  preference  by  the 
female  of  the  more  attractive  males  would  almost  certainly 
lead  to  their  modification." 

A  singular  instance  is  given  by  Mr.  Darwin  (vol.  ii.  p.  Ill) 
in  support  of  his  view,  on  the  authority  of  Mr.  J.  Weir.  It 
is  that  of  a  bullfinch  which  constantly  attacked  a  reed-bunt- 
ing, newly  put  into  the  aviary ;  and  this  attack  is  attributed 
to  a  sort  of  jealousy  on  the  part  of  the  blackheaded  bullfinch 
of  the  black  head  of  the  bunting.  But  it  is  somewhat  diffi- 
cult to  know  how  the  bullfinch  became  aware  of  the  colour 
of  the  top  of  his  own  head  ! 

Mr.  Alfred  Wallace  has,  in  the  following  passage,  well  ex- 
Mr.  Wallace  pressed  two  objections  to  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  of 
Darwin.  sexual  selection  which  have  also  occurred  to  the 
minds  of  others  : — 

"  There  are  two  difficulties  in  the  way  of  accepting  Mr.  Darwin's 
wide  generalisation  as  to  the  agency  of  sexual  selection  in  producing 
the  greater  part  of  the  colour  that  adorns  the  animal  world.  How  are 
we  to  believe  that  the  action  of  an  ever-varying  fancy  for  any  slight 
change  of  colour  could  produce  and  fix  the  definite  colours  and  mark- 
ings which  actually  characterize  species  ?  Successive  generations  of 
female  birds  choosing  any  little  variety  of  colour  that  occurred  among 
their  suitors  would  necessarily  lead  to  a  speckled  or  piebald  and  un- 
stable result,  not  to  the  beautiful  definite  colours  and  markings  we 
see.  .  .  .  How  can  the  individual  tastes  of  hundreds  of  successive 
generations  of  female  birds  produce  any  such  definite  or  constant 
effect  ?  Some  law  of  necessary  development  of  colour  in  certain  parts 


CHAP.  X.]  SEXUAL  SELECTION.  315 

of  the  body  and  in  certain  hues  is  first,  required,  and  then  perhaps,  in 
the  case  of  birds,  the  female  might  choose  the  successive  improvements 
as  they  occurred ;  though  unless  other  variations  were  altogether  pre- 
vented, it  seems  just  as  likely  that  they  would  mar  the  effect  the  law 
of  development  of  colour  was  tending  to  produce." 

"  The  other  objection  is,  that  there  are  signs  of  such  a  tendency, 
which,  taken  in  connection  with  the  cases  of  caterpillars,  of  shells,  and 
other  very  low  organisms,  may  cover  the  whole  ground  in  the  case  of 
insects,  and  render  sexual  selection  of  colour  as  unnecessary  as  it  is 
unsupported  by  direct  evidence.  In  many  islands  of  the  Malay  Archi- 
pelago, species  of  widely  different  genera  of  butterflies  differ,  in.  precisely 
the  same  way  [the  italics  are  ours]  as  to  colour  or  form,  from  allied 
species  in  other  islands.  The  same  thing  occurs  to  a  less  degree  in 
other  parts  of  the  world.  Here  we  have  indications  of  some  local 
modifying  influence  which  is  certainly  not  sexual  selection.  So,  the 
production  in  the  males  only  of  certain  butterflies  of  a  peculiar  neura- 
tion  of  the  wings,  of  differently  formed  legs,  and  especially  of  groups 
of  peculiarly  formed  scales  only  to  be  detected  by  microscopical  exami- 
nation, indicate  the  existence  of  some  laws  of  development  capable  of 
differentiating  the  sexes  other  than  sexual  selection." 

But  it  is  not  only  insects,  but  also  birds,  which  present 
similar  parallel  variations  connected  with  locality,  and  cer- 
tainly not  due  to  sexual  selection.  The  element  of  caprice, 
\\hich  Mr.  Wallace  urges  as  an  objection,  is  admitted  by  Mr. 
Darwin  himself,  for  he  speaks  of  sexual  selection  as  depend- 
ing "  on  an  element  eminently  liable  to  change — namely,  tho 
taste  or  admiration  of  the  female  "  (vol.  ii.  p.  192). 

Mr.  Wallace  himself  accounts  for  the  brilliant  colours  of 
caterpillars  and  many  birds  in  another  way.  The  Htshypo- 

•n  i  •    i  T  c  i  •        i      thesis  as  to 

caterpillars  which  are  distasteful  must  have  gamed,  colour. 
if  "  some  outward  sign  indicated  to  their  would-be  destroyer 
that  its  prey  was  a  disgusting  morsel."  As  to  birds,  he 
believes  that  brilliance  of  plumage  is  developed  where  not 
hurtful,  and  that  the  generally  more  sober  plumage  of  the 
hens  has  been  produced  by  natural  selection  killing  off  the 
more  brilliant  ones  exposed  during  incubation  to  trying 
conditions. 

Now  as  Mr.  Wallace  disposes  of  Mr.  Darwin's  views  by 
his  objections,  so  Mr.  Darwin's  remarks  tend  to  refute 
Mr.  Wallace's  positions,  and  the  result  seems  to  point  to 


310  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  X. 

the  existence   of  some   unknown  innate   and  internal  law 
Mr  Darwin    which  determines  at  the  same  time  both  coloration 


an(i  its  transmission  to  either  or  to  both  sexes. 
hypothesis.  ^  j.jie  same  time  these  authors  plainly  show  the 
harmony  of  natural  laws  and  processes  one  with  another,  and 
their  mutual  interaction  and  aid. 

Thus  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  whatever  cause  has 
produced  brilliant  colour  in  either  fishes  or  caterpillars  may 
have  produced  them  in  both.  But  so  far  from  brilliancy  pro- 
ducing concealment  in  coral-reef  frequenting  fishes,  as  Mr. 
Wallace  believes,  Mr.  Darwin  says,  "  According  to  my  recol- 
lection they  were  thus  rendered  highly  conspicuous."  As  to 
their  so  giving  evidence  of  being  unpalatable,  he  adds,  "  It 
is  not,  I  believe,  known  that  any  fish,  at  least  any  freshwater 
fish,  is  rejected  from  being  distasteful  to  fish-devouring  ani- 
mals "  (vol.  ii.  p.  18).  This,  of  course,  does  not  prevent  the 
brilliancy  of  caterpillars  being  due  to  its  warning-off  power, 
but  it  tends  to  show  that  it  can  exist  without  any  such  cause  ; 
while  mere  brilliancy  is  by  no  means  all  that  has  to  be 
accounted  for,  but  a  variety  of  stripes,  spots,  and  definite  pat- 
terns, the  evolution  of  which,  as  they  are  not  protective  or 
selected,  must  be  referred  to  some  internal  law. 

As  to  the  dulness  of  female  birds  being  due  to  protective 
"  natural  selection,"  Mr.  Darwin  objects  (vol.  ii.  p.  21)  that 
fish  which  sit  and  hatch  their  young  are  brilliant  enough. 
Quoting  from  Agassiz,  he  says  :  "  It  ought  to  be  observed 
that  these  sitters  are  among  the  brightest  species  of  their 
respective  families  ;  for  instance,  Hygrogonus  is  bright  green, 
with  large  black  ocelli,  encircled  with  the  most  brilliant 
red."  Again  of  the  pipe-fishes:  "The  genus  Solenostoma 
offers  a  very  curious  exceptional  case,  for  the  female  is  much 
more  vividly  coloured  and  spotted  than  the  male,  and  she 
alone  has  a  marsupial  sack  and  hatches  the  eggs."  Again, 
in  some  lizards  we  meet  with  the  same  phenomena  as  in  so 
many  birds,  namely,  a  greater  soberness  of  colour  in  the 
females.  As  Mr.  Darwin  most  justly  remarks  :  "  The  less 
conspicuous  colours  of  the  females  in  comparison  with  those 


CHAP.  X.]  SEXUAL  SELECTION.  317 

of  the  males  cannot  be  accounted  for,  as  Mr.  Wallace  believes 
to  be  the  case  in  birds,  by  the  exposure  to  danger  of  the 
females  during  incubation"  (vol.  ii.  p.  37). 

But  if  in  these  cold-blooded  classes  we  have  this  sexual 
difference  developed  by  an  innate  law,  why  may  not  a  similar 
cause  produce  the  phenomena  in  question  in  the  class  of 
birds  also  ? 

We  may  indeed  well  ask  this  question,  since  varieties  arise 
from  time  to  time  possessing  sexually  distinct  plumage  which 
obviously  cannot  be  due  to  any  protecting  action  of  female 
sobriety  of  colour.  Thus  u  there  are  breeds  of  the  pigeon  in 
Belgium  in  which  the  males  alone  are  marked  with  black 
stria),"  and  "  in  the  case  of  the  fowl  variations  of  colour 
limited  in  their  transmission  to  the  male  sex  habitually  occur" 
(vol.  ii.  p.  157).  Certainly  the  large  crop  and  wattles  of 
male  pigeons  are  not  due  to  the  cause  assigned  by  Mr. 
Wallace,  nor  indeed  to  sexual  selection  either,  "  for  fanciers 
have  not  selected  one  sex  more  than  the  other,  and  have  had 
no  wish  that  these  characters  should  be  more  strongly  dis- 
played in  the  male  than  in  the  female,  yet  this  is  the  case 
with  both  breeds."  But  even  more  may  be  said ;  for,  as  Mr. 
Darwin  justly  remarks,  if  the  brightly-coloured  females  had 
been  continually  destroyed,  then  the  effect  would  not  be  the 
forming  a  strong  contrast  between  male  and  female  birds,  but 
rather  "  the  lessening  or  annihilation  of  the  bright  colours  of 
the  males,  owing  to  their  continually  crossing  with  the  duller 
females"  (vol.  ii.  p.  160).  There  are  also  many  striking 
instances  in  which  the  relation  which  Mr.  Wallace  supposes 
to  exist  between  a  covered  nest  and  female  plumage  as  bright 
as  that  of  the  male  does  not  obtain.  "  Thus  the  male  house- 
sparrow  (Passer  domesticus)  differs  much  from  the  female, 
the  male  tree-sparrow  (P.  montanus)  differs  hardly  at  all, 
and  yet  both  build  well-concealed  nests.  The  two  sexes  of 
the  common  fly-catcher  (Muscicapa  grisola)  can  hardly  be 
distinguished,  whilst  the  sexes  of  the  pied  fly-catcher  (-If.  luc- 
tuosa)  differ  considerably,  and  both  build  in  holes.  The 
female  blackbird  (Turdus  merula)  differs  much,  the  female 


318  LESSONS  FKOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  X. 

ring-ouzel  (T.  torquatus)  differs  less,  and  the  female  common 
thrush  (  T.  musicus)  hardly  at  all  from  their  respective  males ; 
yet  all  build  open  nests.  On  the  other  hand,  the  not  very 
distantly-allied  water-ouzel  (Cinclus  aquaticus)  builds  a  domed 
nest,  and  the  sexes  differ  about  as  much  as  in  the  case  of  the 
ring-ouzel.  The  black  and  red  grouse  (Tetrao  tetrix  and  T. 
scoticus)  build  open  nests,  in  equally  well-concealed  spot?, 
but  in  the  one  species  the  sexes  differ  greatly,  and  in  the 
other  very  little."  He  also  points  out  (vol.  ii.  p.  199)  it  is  a 
•  very  strange  and  unlikely  circumstance,  if  the  females  have 
been  rendered  dull-coloured  by  the  destruction  of  the  brightly- 
coloured  (although  all  the  individuals  of  the  species  tend  to 
be  bright),  that  not  only  the  females,  but  the  young  males 
also,  are  always,  or  almost  always,  dull-coloured  like  their 
mothers — a  quite  unaccountable  condition. 

As  to  insects,  it  is  well  known  many  butterflies  benefit  by 
mimicking  other  kinds.  Now  in  certain  species  the  females 
are  brilliant  mimics,  but  the  males  are  dull.  This  seems  to 
conflict  with  the  hypotheses  of  both  Mr.  Darwin  and  Mr. 
Wallace.  For  the  brilliancy  is  on  the  part  of  the  supposed 
selector  according  to  Mr.  Darwin,  who  admits  "  it  cannot  be 
supposed  that  the  males  have  been  kept  dull-coloured  by  the 
females  rejecting  the  individuals  which  were  rendered  as 
beautiful  as  themselves ;"  nor,  as  he  observes,  can  we  under- 
stand how  Mr.  Wallace's  "  natural  selection "  could  have 
kept  the  males  dull,  "  for  it  would  surely  not  have  been  in 
any  way  injurious  to  each  individual  male  to  have  partaken 
by  inheritance  of  the  protective  colours  of  the  female,  and 
thus  to  have  had  a  better  chance  of  escaping  destruction  " 
(vol.  i.  p.  414).  Dragon-flies  are  very  often  brilliantly 
coloured,  and  the  males  of  some  of  the  Agrionidse  are  blue, 
with  black  wings,  while  the  females  are  green,  with  colourless 
wings.  In  Agrion  Rarriburii,  however,  "  these  colours  are 
exactly  reversed  in  the  two  sexes."  Surely  neither  Mr. 
Wallace's  nor  Mr.  Darwin's  hypothesis  will  account  for  this 
singular  interchange.  Certainly  it  is  incredible  that  females 
of  one  species  should  have  persistently  preferred  such 


CHAP.  X.1  SEXUAL  SELECTION.  319 

males  as  happened  most  to  resemble  the  females  of  another 
species ! 

From  the  foregoing  facts  and  considerations  it  seems  to 
follow  that  we  must  of  necessity  admit  the  action  of  some 
internal  force.  It  cannot  be  pretended  that  there  is  any 
evidence  for  sexual  selection  except  in  the  class  Birds. 
Certain  of  the  phenomena  which  Mr.  Darwin  generally 
attributes  to  such  selection  must  be  due  to  other  causes, 
and  Vhere  is  no  proof  that  sexual  selection  acts,  even  amongst 
birds. 

But  in  other  classes,  as  we  have  seen,  sexual  characters 
are  as  marked  as  they  are  in  the  feathered  group.  Need  of  an 
Thus,  with  regard  to  certain  apes,  Mr.  Darwin  force, 
himself  says,  "  Several  authors  have  used  the  strongest 
expressions  in  describing  these  resplendent  colours,  which 
they  compare  with  those  of  the  most  brilliant  birds  "  (vol.  ii. 
p.  293).  And  yet  there  are  no  grounds  for  believing  that 
female  apes  select,  while  there  are  very  strong  reasons 
against  a  belief  in  the  exercise  of  any  such  selective  action. 
Mr.  Darwin,  indeed,  argues  that  birds  select,  and  assumes 
that  their  sexual  characters  have  been  produced  by  such 
s ••lection,  and  that,  therefore,  the  sexual  characters  of  beasts 
have  been  similarly  evolved.  But  we  may  turn  the  argu- 
ment round,  and  say  that  sexual  characters  not  less  strongly 
marked  exist  in  many  beasts,  reptiles,  and  insects,  which 
characters  cannot  be  due  to  sexual  selection ;  that  it  is,  there- 
fore, probable  the  sexual  characters  of  birds  are  not  due  to 
sexual  selection  either,  but  that  some  unknown  internal 
cause  has  equally  operated  in  each  case.  The  matter,  in- 
deed, stands  thus.  Of  animals  possessing  sexual  characters 
there  are  some  in  which  sexual  selection  cannot  have  acted ; 
others  in  which  it  may  possibly  have  acted;  others  again 
in  which,  according  to  Mr.  Darwin,  it  has  certainly  acted. 
It  is  a  somewhat  singular  conclusion  to  deduce  from  this 
that  sexual  selection  is  the  one  universal  cause  of  sexual 
characters  when  similar  effects  to  those  it  is  supposed  to 
cause  take  place  in  its  absence. 


320  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  X. 

But,  indeed,  what  are  the  grounds  on  which  Mr.  Darwin 
builds  as  regards  birds  ?  As  before  said,  they  are  "  display  " 
by  the  males,  their  "  greater  brilliancy  and  ornamentation," 
and  the  "  occasional  preference  "  by  females  in  confinement 
for  particular  males.  What  value  is  there  in  this  founda- 
tion for  such  a  superstructure  ?  In  the  first  place,  in  insects, 
e.g.,  butterflies,  we  have  often  many  brilliant  males  crowding 
in  pursuit  of  a  single  female.  Yet,  as  Mr.  Wallace  justly 
observes,  "  Surely  the  male  who  finally  obtains  the  female 
will  be  either  the  most  vigorous,  or  the  strongest-winged,  or 
the  most  patient — the  one  who  tires  out  or  beats  off  the 
rest."  Similarly  in  birds  strength  and  perseverance  will,  no 
doubt,  generally  reward  the  suitor  possessing  those  qualities. 
Doubtless,  also,  this  will  generally  be  the  most  beautiful  or 
most  melodious ;  but  this  will  simply  be  because  extra 
beauty  of  plumage,  or  of  song,  will  accompany  supereminent 
vigour  of  constitution  and  fulness  of  vitality.  What  has 
been  before  said  as  to  the  fierce  combats  of  cock-birds  must 
be  borne  in  mind. 

But  that  internal  spontaneous  powers  are  sufficient  to 
its  sum-  produce  all  the  most  varied  or  bizarre  sexual  cha- 
aency-  racters  which  any  birds  exhibit  is  actually  demon- 
strated by  the  class  of  insects,  especially  caterpillars,  which 
from  their  sexless  undeveloped  state  can  have  nothing  to  do 
with  the  kind  of  selection  Mr.  Darwin  advocates.  Yet 
amongst  caterpillars  we  not  only  find  some  ornamented  with 
spots,  bands,  stripes,  and  curious  patterns,  "  perfectly  definite 
in  character  and  of  the  most  brilliantly  contrasted  hues.  We 
have  also  many  ornamental  appendages;  beautiful  fleshy 
tubercles  or  tentacles,  hard  spines,  beautifully  coloured  hairs 
arranged  in  tufts,  brushes,  starry  clusters,  or  long  pencils, 
and  horns  on  the  head  and  tail,  either  single  or  double, 
pointed  or  clubbed."  Mr.  Wallace  adds :  "  Now  if  all  these 
beautiful  and  varied  ornaments  can  be  produced  and  ren- 
dered constant  in  each  species  by  some  unknown  cause  ^uite 
independent  of  sexual  selection,  why  cannot  the  same  cause 
produce  the  colours '  and  many  of  the  ornaments  of  perfect 


CHAP.  X.]  SEXUAL  SELECTION.  321 

insects  ?"    We  nmy  also  add,  the  colours  and  ornaments  of 
all  other  animals  also,  including  birds  ? 

There  is,  however,  another  reason  determining  Mr.  Darwiu 
to  accept  sexual  selection ;  and  it  is  probably  this  Mr  Darwln 
which,  in  his  mind,  mainly  gives  importance  to  the  jj'j^f1  by 
facts  mentioned  as  to  the  plumage  and  motions  of  views> 
birds.  He  says  of  "  display,"  "  It  is  incredible  that  all  this 
display  should  be  purposeless "  (vol.  ii.  p.  399) ;  and  again 
(vol.  ii.  p.  93),  he  declares  that  any  one  who  denies  that  the 
female  Argus  pheasant  can  appreciate  the  refined  beauty  of 
the  plumage  of  her  mate,  "  will  be  compelled  to  admit  that 
the  extraordinary  attitudes  assumed  by  the  male  during  the 
act  of  courtship,  by  which  the  wonderful  beauty  of  his 
plumage  is  fully  displayed,  are  purposeless ;  and  this  is  a 
conclusion  which  I  for  one  will  never  admit."  It  seems  then 
that  it  is  this  imaginary  necessity  of  attributing  purposeless- 
ness  to  acts  which  determines  him  to  attribute  that  peculiar 
and  special  purpose  to  birds'  actions  which  he  does  attribute 
to  them.  But  surely  this  difficulty  is  a  mere  chimaora.  Let 
it  be  granted  that  the  female  does  not  select;  yet  the 
display  of  the  male  may  be  useful  in  supplying  the  necessary 
degree  of  stimulation  to  her  nervous  system,  and  to  that  of 
the  male.  As  Mr.  Darwin  says  (p.  275),  the  lion  enraged 
"  tries  to  make  himself  as  terrible  as  possible."  But  he 
does  not  know  that  he  is,  and  therefore  does  not  intend 
to  be  terrible.  Is  not  this  a  parallel  case  to  the  display 
of  male  pheasants?  Pleasurable  sensation,  perhaps  very 
keen  in  intensity,  may  thence  result  to  both.  There 
would  be  no  difficulty  in  suggesting  yet  other  purposes 
if  we  were  to  ascend  into  higher  speculative  regions.  Mr. 
Darwin  gives  us  in  one  place  a  very  remarkable  passage; 
he  says : — 

"  \Vith  respect  to  female  birds  feeling  a  preference  for  particular 
mules,  we  must  bear  in  mind  that  we  can  judge  of  choice  An  niustra- 
1  ic ing  exerted  only  by  placing  ourselves  in  imagination  Uon- 
in  the  same  position.    If  an  inhabitant  of  another  planet  were  to 
lohold  a  number  of  young  rustics  at  a  fair,  courting  and  quarrelling 

15 


322  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  X. 

over  a  pretty  girl,  like  birds  at  one  of  their  places  of  assemblage,  he 
would  be  able  to  infer  that  she  had  the  power  of  choice  only  by 
observing  the  eagerness  of  the  wooers  to  please  her,  and  to  display 
their  finery." — vol.  ii.  p.  122. 

Now  here  it  must  be  observed  that,  as  is  often  the  case, 
Mr.  Darwin  assumes  the  very  point  in  dispute,  unless  he 
means  by  "  power  of  choice "  mere  freedom  of  physical 
power.  If  he  means  an  internal,  mental  faculty  of  choice, 
then  the  observer  could  attribute  such  power  to  the  girl  only 
if  he  had  reason  to  attribute  to  the  rustics  an  intellectual 
and  moral  nature  similar  in  kind  to  that  which  he  possessed 
himself.  Such  a  similarity  of  nature  Mr.  Darwin,  of  course, 
does  attribute  to  rational  beings  and  to  brutes;  but  those 
who  do  not  agree  with  him  in  this  would  require  other  tests 
than  the  presence  of  ornaments,  and  the  performance  of 
antics  and  gestures  unaccompanied  by  any  evidence  of  the 
faculty  of  articulate  speech. 

Such,  then,  is  the  nature  of  the  evidence  on  which  sexual 
selection  is  supposed  to  rest.  To  me,  the  action  of  sexual 
selection  scarcely  seems  more  than  a  possibility,  the  evidence 
rarely  raising  it  to  probability.  It  cannot  be  a  "  sufficient 
cause  "  for  the  phenomena  which  it  is  intended  to  explain, 
nor  can  it  even  claim  to  be  taken  as  a  vera  causa  at  all. 
Yet  Mr.  Darwin  again  and  again  speaks  as  if  its  reality  and 
cogency  were  indisputable. 

The  uncertainty  of  the  alleged  facts  asserted  in  its  favour 
uncertain-  is  glaring.  Thus  Mr.  Darwin  makes  much  of  the 
hypothesis,  greater  number  of  male  Lepidoptera,  and  yet  admits 
that 

"Mr.  Stainton,  who  has  paid  such  close  attention  during  many 
years  to  the  smaller  moths,  informs  me  that  when  he  collected  them 
in  the  imago  state,  he  thought  that  the  males  were  ten  times  as 
numerous  as  the  females,  but  that  since  he  has  reared  them  on  a  large 
scale  from  the  caterpillar  state,  he  is  convinced  that  the  females  are  the 
most  numerous" — vol.  i.  p.  310. 

Another  passage  which  illustrates  the  great  uncertainty 
regarding  the  complex  facts  considered,  is  one  relating  to 


CHAP.  X.]  SEXUAL  SELECTION.  323 

the  action  of  colour  on  the  safety  of  woodpeckers,  and  is  full 
of  "possibilities"  and  "doubts:" — 

"  As  in  several  woodpeckers  the  head  of  the  male  is  bright  crimson, 
whilst  that  of  the  female  is  plain,  it  occurred  to  me  that  this  colour 
might  possibly  make  the  female  dangerously  conspicuous,  whenever 
she  put  her  head  out  of  the  hole  containing  her  nest,  and  consequently 
that  this  colour,  in  accordance  with  Mr.  Wallace's  belief,  had  been 
eliminated.  This  view  is  strengthened  by  what  Malherbe  states  with 
respect  to  Indopfcus  carlotta  ;  namely,  that  the  young  females,  like  the 
young  males,  have  some  crimson  about  their  heads,  but  that  this  colour 
disappears  in  the  adult  female,  whilst  it  is  intensified  in  the  adult  male. 
Nevertheless,  the  following  considerations  render  this  view  extremely 
doubtful :  the  male  takes  a  fair  share  in  incubation,  and  would  be  thus 
far  almost  equally  exposed  to  danger;  both  sexes  of  many  species 
have  their  heads  of  an  equally  bright  crimson ;  in  other  species  the 
difference  between  the  sexes  in  the  amount  of  scarlet  is  so  slight  that 
it  can  hardly  make  any  appreciable  difference  in  the  danger  incurred ; 
and  lastly,  the  colouring  of  the  head  in  the  two  sexes  often  differs 
slightly  in  other  ways." — vol.  ii.  p.  174. 

As  to  the  alleged  action  of  sexual  selection  on  our  own 
species  two  points  mav  be  noticed.  Mr.  Darwin  sexuaiseiec- 

,  .  „  ,    tlon  and 

considers  that  we  owe  to  it  our  power  or  song  and  man. 
our  hairlessness  of  body,  and  that  also  to  it  is  due  the  for- 
mation and  conservation  of  the  various  races  and  varieties  of 
the  human  species. 

First,  as  to  the  absence  of  hair.  This  is  a  character  which 
Mr.  Darwin  admits  cannot  be  accounted  for  by  "  natural 
selection,"  because  manifestly  not  beneficial;  it  is  therefore 
attributed  to  "  sexual  selection,"  incipient  man  being  sup- 
posed to  have  chosen  mates  with  less  and  less  haiiy  bodies  ; 
and  the  possibility  of  such  action  is  thought  by  Mr.  Darwin 
to  be  supported  by  the  fact  that  certain  monkeys  have  parts 
of  the  body  naked.  Yet  it  is  a  fact  that  the  highest  apes 
have  not  this  posterior  nakedness,  or  have  it  in  a  much 
smaller  degree. 

As  to  the  races  of  mankind,  Mr.  Darwin's  theory,  indeed, 
requires  the  alternation  of  constancy  and  caprice  to  account 
for  the  selection  first,  and  subsequently  the  conservation,  of 
marked  varieties.  In  order  that  each  race  may  possess  and 


324  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  X. 

preserve  its  own  ideal  standard  of  beauty,  we  require  the 
truth  of  the  hypothesis,  that  "  certain  tastes  may  in  the 
course  of  time  become  inherited ;"  and  yet  Mr.  Darwin 
candidly  admits  (vol.  ii.  p.  353),  "  I  know  of  no  evidence  in 
favour  of  this  belief."  On  the  other  hand,  he  says  (p.  370), 
As  soon  as  tribes  exposed  to  different  conditions  came  to 
vary,  "each  isolated  tribe  would  form  for  itself  a  slightly 
different  standard  of  beauty,"  which  "  would  gradually  and 
inevitably  be  increased  to  a  greater  and  greater  degree."  But 
why  have  not  the  numerous  tribes  of  North  American 
Indians  diverged  from  each  other  more  conspicuously,  in- 
habiting, as  they  do,  such  different  climates,  and  surrounded 
by  such  diverse  conditions  ? 

Again,  far  from  each  race  being  bound  in  the  trammels  of 
its  own  features,  all  cultivated  Europeans,  whether  Celts, 
Teutons,  or  Slaves,  agree  in  admiring  the  Hellenic  ideal  as 
the  highest  type  of  human  earthly  beauty.  Nevertheless, 
this  appreciation  does  not  appear  to  result  in  such  action 
as  is  needful  to  support  Mr.  Darwin's  view  that  beauty  has 
been  developed  by  the  agency  of  female  selection.  Mr. 
Darwin  (p.  374)  says  women  would  generally  choose  "the 
handsomer  men,  according  to  their  standard  of  taste."  But 
experience  shows  us  (however  much  men,  judging  a,  priori 
by  their  own  sentiments,  may  naturally  be  disposed  to  think 
the  contrary)  that  beauty  is  a  veiy  small  matter  in  women's 
eyes,  as  in  the  well-known  cases  of  Wilkes  and  Mirabeau. 

Mr.  Darwin  says  (p.  399) :  "  It  seems  to  me  almost  certain 
that  if  the  individuals  of  one  sex  were  during  a  long  series 
of  generations  to  prefer  pairing  with  certain  individuals  of 
the  other  sex,  characterized  in  some  peculiar  manner,  the 
offspring  would  slowly  but  surely  become  modified  in  this 
same  manner."  There  can  be  little  doubt  of  this ;  but  there 
is  "  wonderful  virtue  in  an  if." 

Moreover,  Mr.  Darwin  tells  us  that  (vol.  ii.  pp.  350,  351) 
"  Captain  Burton,  a  most  experienced  observer,  believes  that 
a  woman  whom  we  consider  beautiful  is  admired  throughout 
the  world ;"  and  "  Mr.  Winwood  Reade,"  whose  opportunities 


CHAP.  X.]  SEXUAL  SELECTION.  325 

of  observation  have  been  ample  as  to  negroes,  "  is  convinced 
that  their  ideas  of  beauty  are  on  the  whole  the  same  as 
ours."  Whether  or  not  these  observers  are  justified  in  the 
strength  of  their  remarks,  it  cannot  be  doubted  that  their 
evidence  demonstrates  that  the  admiration  of  low  types 
of  men  for  their  own  race  is  certainly  far  from  constant  and 
universal. 

Secondly,  with  regard  to  man's  power  of  song,  Mr.  Darwin's 
views  are  thus  expressed :  All  the  facts  as  to  the  deep  and 
mysterious  emotions  and  feelings  excited  by  music 

"become  to  a  certain  extent  intelligible,  if  we  may  assume  that 
musical  tones  and  rhythm  were  used  by  the  half-human  progenitors  of 
man,  during  the  season  of  courtship,  when  animals  of  all  kinds  are 
excited  by  the  strongest  passions.  In  this  case,  from  the  deeply-laid 
principle  of  inherited  associations,  musical  tones  would  be  likely  to 
excite  in  us,  in  a  vague  and  indefinite  manner,  the  strong  emotions  of 
a  long-past  age.  Bearing  in  mind  that  the  males  of  some  quadru- 
manous  animals  have  their  vocal  organs  much  more  developed  than  in 
the  females,  and  that  one  anthropomorphous  species  pours  forth  a 
whole  octave  of  musical  notes  and  may  be  said  to  sing,  the  suspicion 
does  not  appear  improbable  that  the  progenitors  of  man,  either  the 
males  or  females,  or  both  sexes,  before  they  had  acquired  the  power  of 
expressing  their  mutual  love  in  articulate  language,  endeavoured  to 
charm  each  other  with  musical  notes  and  rhythm.  So  little  is  known 
about  the  use  of  the  voice  by  the  Quadrumana  during  the  season  of 
love,  that  we  have  hardly  any  means  of  judging  whether  the  habit  of 
singing  was  first  acquired  by  the  male  or  female  progenitors  of  man- 
kind. Women  are  generally  thought  to  possess  sweeter  voices  than 
men,  and,  as  far  as  this  serves  as  any  guide,  we  may  infer  that  they 
first  acquired  musical  powers  in  order  to  attract  the  other  sex.  But  if 
so,  this  must  have  occurred  long  ago,  before  the  progenitors  of  man 
had  become  sufficiently  human  to  treat  and  value  their  women  merely 
as  useful  slaves.  The  impassioned  orator,  bard,  or  musician,  when 
with  his  varied  tones  and  cadences  he  excites  the  strongest  emotions  in 
his  hearers,  little  suspects  that  ho  uses  the  same  means  by  which,  at 
un  extremely  remote  period,  his  half-human  ancestors  aroused  each 
other's  ardent  passions,  during  their  mutual  courtship  and  rivalry." — 
vol.  ii.  pp.  336,  337. 

This  seems  to  be  one  of  the  most  purely  gratuitous  of 
the  many  degrading  suppositions  so  unscrupulously  emitted 
by  Mr.  Darwin.  There  is  not  the  slightest  evidence  that 
the  lowest  savages  sing  to  their  loves;  and  Mr.  Wallace 


326  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CuAP.  X. 

assures  us  that  they  never  choose  their  wives  for  their 
voices,  but  for  health  and  physical  beauty.  But  Mr.  Darwin's 
theory  not  only  does  not  account  for,  but  positively  conflicts 
with  the  facts.  Music  is  capable  of  producing  the  most 
noble  and  lofty  emotions,  and  especially  harmonizes  with  and 
gratifies  the  religious  instincts.  Were  his  theory  correct, 
it  would  be  rather  the  most  sensual  and  brutal  instincts  to 
which  music  should  minister. 

While  considering  the  question  of  sexual  selection,  it  may 
Mr.  Francis  be  worth  while  to  note  in  passing  some  passages  of 
view.,  Mr.  Darwin's  writing  which  conflict  with  the  view 

maintained  by  Mr.  Francis  Galton  with  respect  to  the  injury 
inflicted  on  society  by  the  abstinence  from  marriage  of  in- 
dividuals who  have  devoted  their  lives  to  the  practice  and 
propagation  of  beneficence.  He  says  :* — 

"Admitting  for  the  moment  that  virtuous  tendencies  are  inherited, 
it  appears  probable,  at  least  in  such  cases  as  chastity,  temperance, 
humanity  to  animals,  &c.,  that  they  become  first  impressed  on  the 
mental  organization  through  habit,  instruction,  and  example,  continued 
during  several  generations  in  the  same  family,  and  in  a  quite  subordi- 
nate degree,  or  not  at  all,  by  the  individuals  possessing  such  virtues, 
having  succeeded  best  in  the  struggle  for  life.  My  chief  source  of 
doubt  with  respect  to  any  such  inheritance,  is  that  senseless  customs, 
superstitions, -and  tastes,  such  as  the  horror  of  a  Hindoo  for  unclean 
food,  ought  on  the  same  principle  to  be  transmitted. 

"Although  this  in  itself  is  perhaps  not  less  probable  than  that 
animals  should  acquire  inherited  tastes  for  certain  kinds  of  food  or  fear 
of  certain  foes,  I  have  not  met  with  any  evidence  in  support  of  the 
transmission  of  superstitious  customs  or  senseless  habits." 

This  is  an  important  admission  indeed!  Again  he  tells 
us  :f — 

"  A  man  who  was  not  impelled  by  any  deep,  instinctive  feeling,  to 
sacrifice  his  life  for  the' good  of  others,  yet  was  roused  to  such  actions 
by  a  sense  of  glory,  would  by  his  example  excite  the  same  wish  for 
glory  in  other  men,  and  would  strengthen  by  exercise  the  noble  feeling 
of  admiration. 

"  He  might  thus  do  fur  more  yo<.>d  to  hi*  tribe  than  by  begetting  off- 
spring with  a  tendency  to  inherit  his  own  high  character." 


*  'Desceut  of  Man,'  vol.  i.  p.  102.  f  Op.  c'd.  p.  165. 


CHAP.  X.]  SEXUAL  SELECTION.  327 

Also  :*- 

"  Great  lawgivers,  the  founders  of  beneficent  religions,  great  philoso- 
phers and  discoverers  in  science,  aid  the  progress  of  mankind  in  a  far 
higher  degree  by  their  works  than  by  leaving  a  numerous  progeny." 

Finally,  he  adds  :f — 

"  The  Western  nations  of  Europe,  who  now  so  immeasurably  surpass 
their  former  savage  progenitors,  and  stand  at  the  summit  of  civilisa- 
tion, owe  little  or  none  of  their  superiority  to  direct  inheritance  from 
the  old  Greeks  ;  though  they  owe  much  to  the  written  works  of  this 
wonderful  people." 

As  ill  considering  "  Natural  Selection "  we  felt  bound  to 
call  attention  to  Mr.  Darwin's  dogmatic  style,  so  Mr.  Darwin's 
calculated  to  overbear  and  unduly  impress  the  minds  Btyle> 
of  those  readers  who  from  their  want  of  special  knowledge 
ought  to  be  most  upon  their  guard,  so  here  we  are  compelled 
to  call  attention  to  analogous  confident  assertions  and  mis- 
leading assumptions  of  the  very  positions  about  which  Mr. 
Darwin  is  at  the  same  time  arguing. 

Thus,  speaking  of  certain  birds  in  which  the  females  are 
the  more  remarkable,  he  attributes  the  fact  to  "  the  females 
having  become  the  more  eager  in  courtship,  the  males 
remaining  comparatively  passive,  but  apparently  selecting, 
as  we  may  infer  from  the  results,  the  more  attractive  females. 
Certain  females  have  thus  been  rendered  more  highly  coloured 
or  otherwise  ornamented,  as  well  as  more  powerful  and  pug- 
nacious than  the  males,  these  characters  being  transmitted 
to  the  female  offspring  alone  "  (vol.  i.  p.  276). 

In  vol.  ii.  p.  15,  he  remarks :  "  If  we  may  assume  that 
female  fishes  have  the  power  of  exerting  a  choice,  and  of 
selecting  the  more  highly  ornamented  males,  the  facts 
become  intelligible  through  the  principle  of  sexual  selection." 
No  doubt,  if  we  may  assume  a  fact  for  which  there  is  hot  a 
tittle  of  evidence,  but  which,  as  we  have  seen,  is  abundantly 
contradicted  by  what  evidence  there  is,  it  is  difficult  to  say 
what  might  not  be  explained  by  a  series  of  parallel  assump- 

*  Op.  cit.  p.  172.  t  Op.  tit.  p.  178. 


328  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  X. 

tions.  Again  (p.  141)  he  says:  "Many  female  progenitors 
of  the  peacock  must,  during  a  long  line  of  descent,  have 
appreciated  this  superiority  ;  for  they  have  unconsciously,  by 
the  continued  preference  of  the  most  beautiful  males,  rendered 
the  peacock  the  most  splendid  of  living  birds." 

He  also  remarks  (p.  262) :  "  The  females  are  most  excited 
by,  or  prefer  pairing  with  the  more  ornamented  males,  or 
those  which  are  the  best  songsters,  or  play  the  best  antics." 
But  do  they  do  so?  That  they  have  preferences  is  likely 
enough,  but  that  such  preferences  are  determined  as  Mr. 
Darwin  says  they  are,  is  the  very  thing  to  be  proved,  and 
against  which  we  have  cited  (e.g.,  Sir  R.  Heron's  peacocks) 
rebutting  evidence.  Again,  at  p.  37,  vol.  ii.  he  says :  "  On 
the  whole  we  may  conclude  with  tolerable  safety  that  the 
beautiful  colours  of  many  lizards,  as  well  as  various  ap- 
pendages and  other  strange  modifications  of  structure,  have 
leen  gained  by  the  males  through  sexual  selection  for  the  sake 
of  ornament,  and  have  leen  transmitted  either  to  their  male 
offspring  alone  or  to  both  sexes." 

Once  more,  as  to  the  stridulatiug  organs  of  insects,  he  says : 
"No  one  who  admits  the  agency  of  natural  selection,  will 
dispute  that  these  musical  instruments  have  been  acquired 
through  sexual  selection."  Speaking  of  the  peculiarities  of 
humming-birds  and  pigeons,  Mr.  Darwin  observes,  "  The  sole 
difference  between  these  cases  is,  that  in  one  the  result  is 
due  to  man's  selection,  whilst  in  the  other,  as  with  humming- 
birds, birds  of  paradise,  &c.,  it  is  due  to  sexual  selection, — 
that  is,  to  the  selection  by  the  females  of  the  more  beautiful 
males"  (vol.  ii.  p.  78).  Of  birds,  the  males  of  which  are 
brilliant,  but  the  hens  only  slightly  so,  he  remarks :  "  These 
cases  are  almost  certainly  due  to  characters  primarily  acquired 
by  the  male,  having  been  transferred,  in  a  greater  or  less 
degree,  to  the  female  "  (vol.  ii.  p.  128).  "  The  colours  of  the 
males  may  safely  be  attributed  to  sexual  selection  "  (vol.  ii. 
p.  194).  As  to  certain  species  of  birds  in  which  the  males 
alone  are  black,  we  are  told  "  there  can  hardly  be  a  doiibt, 
that  blackness  in  these  cases  has  been  a  sexually  selected 


CHAP.  X.j  SEXUAL  SELECTION.  329 

character"  (vol.  ii.  p.  226).  The  following,  again,  is  far 
too  positive  a  statement  : — "  Other  characters  proper  to 
the  males  of  the  lower  animals,  such  as  bright  colours  and 
various  ornaments,  have  "been  acquired  by  the  more  attractive 
males  having  been  preferred  by  the  females.  There  are, 
however,  exceptional  cases,  in  which  the  males,  instead  of 
having  been  selected,  have  leen  the  selectors  "  (vol.  ii.  p.  371). 
He  also  affirms  (p.  191)  :  "Hardly  any  fact  in  nature  shows  us 
more  clearly  how  subordinate  in  importance  is  the  direct 
action  of  the  conditions  of  life,  in  comparison  with  the  ac- 
cumulation through  selection  of  indefinite  variations,  than 
sexual  differences  of  birds."  Again,  at  p.  226  he  says :  "  Some 
species  which  are  manifestly  coloured  for  the  sake  of  protec- 
tion" "are  likewise  marked  and  shaded,  according  to  our 
standard  of  taste,  with  extreme  elegance.  In  such  cases  we 
may  conclude  that  botli  natural  and  sexual  selection  have 
acted  conjointly  for  protection  and  ornament."  As  to 
monkey  tufts  being  acquired  as  ornaments,  Mr.  Darwin  adds 
(p.  2SG) :  "If  this  view  is  correct  there  can  be  little  doubt  that 
they  have  been  acquired,  or  at  least  modified,  through  sexual 
selection."  Lastly  he  says  (p.  314)  :  "  When  the  colours  are 
diversified  and  strongly  pronounced,  when  they  are  not  de- 
veloped until  near  maturity,  and  when  they  are  lost  after 
emasculation,  we  can  hardly  avoid  the  conclusion  that  they 
have  been  acquired  through  sexual  selection." 

To  this  catalogue  of  expressions,  both  too  reiterated  and 
too   confident,   may   be  added  an  enumeration  of 
the  more  or  less  gratuitous  hypotheses  introduced  by™tSs 
to  support  the  figment  of  "  sexual  selection."   Thus 
to  account  for  the  songs  of  birds  in  a  state  of  widowhood 
we  have  (vol.  ii.  p.  54),  1st,  the  hypothesis  that  "  the  feed- 
ing of  such  birds  in  confinement  disturbs  the  reproductive 
functions."     2nd,  "  Singing  is  one  of  the  functions  capable 
of  being  so  disturbed."      To  account  for  the  loud  voices 
of  many  male  birds  we  have,  3rd,  "  the  strong  voices  pro- 
duced by   passion   may   be   inherited."     4th   (p.  154),   we 
Lave   the  hypothesis  of  sexual   transmission  of  variations. 


330  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  X. 

5th  (p.  218),  "that  an  ancient  style  of  plumage,  partially 
modified  through  the  transference  of  some  characters  from 
the  summer  plumage,  has  been  retained  by  the  adults  during 
the  winter."  6th  (p.  220),  to  account  for  the  young  of  two 
species  of  humming-birds  of  Juan  Fernandez,  we  have  the 
following  hypothetical  suggestion :  "  If,  then,  we  might 
assume  that  during  some  former  lengthened  period  the  males 
of  the  Juan  Fernandez  species  had  greatly  exceeded  the 
females  in  number;  but  that  during  another  lengthened  period 
the  females  had  greatly  exceeded  the  males,  we  could  under- 
stand how  the  males  at  one  time,  and  the  females  at  another 
time,  might  have  been  rendered  beautiful  by  the  selection  of 
the  brighter-coloured  individuals  of  either  sex;  both  sexes 
transmitting  their  characters  to  their  young  at  a  rather 
earlier  age  than  usual."  7th  (p.  337),  that  "  the  varied  tones 
and  cadences  "  of  the  "  impassioned  orator,  bard,  or  musician," 
are  the  development  of  the  inarticulate  cries  of  brutes.  8th, 
This  last  idea  reposes  on  yet  another  hypothesis,  namely, 
that  apes  may  have  developed  their  more  extraordinary  vocal 
organs  in  connection  with  the  sexual  instinct,  and  this  in 
spite  of  Mr.  Darwin's  own  admission  that  "  little  is  known 
about  the  use  of  the  voice  in  the  Quadrumana  during  the 
season  of  love/'  9th  (a  second  hypothesis  ancillary  to  the 
seventh  hypothesis),  that  "  musical  tones  and  rhythm  were 
used  by  the  half-human  progenitors  of  man  during  the  season 
of  courtship."  10th  (a  third  hypothesis  ancillary  to  the 
seventh  hypothesis),  that  if  strong  sexual  emotions  become 
connected  with  musical  tones  in  certain  animals,  then  these 
same  tones  may  become  connected  with  quite  other  emotions 
in  their  descendants.  llth  (p.  370),  that  races  of  men 
separating  into  tribes,  each  isolated  tribe  would  form  for 
itself  a  different  standard  of  beauty.  12th,  and  lastly,  "that 
certain  tastes  as  to  beauty  may  in  the  course  of  time  become 
inherited." 

Now  there  is  no  intention  here  of  asserting  that  none  of 
these  hypotheses  are  true,  but  certainly  a  theory  which  re- 
quires so  many  hypothetical  props  can  hardly  be  deemed 


CHAP.  X.]  SEXUAL  SELECTION.  331 

itself  to  have  a  very  secure  foundation.     la  fact,  reviewing 
what   has  been  said  in  preceding  chapters,  I  am  Conclusion 
confident  in  the  belief,  and  I  think  it  can  be  fully  selection. 
proved : — 

1.  That  it  is  evident,  on  strictly  scientific  grounds,  that 
Mr.  Darwin's    hypothesis,   sexual   selection   (the   action   of 
which  he  now  exaggerates  as  he  formerly  exaggerated  that 
of  natural  selection,  according  to  his  own  present  admission), 
cannot  be  maintained,  and  refutes  itself. 

2.  That   the   opposition  to   Mr.   Darwin's  hypothesis   of 
sexual  selection  will  be  (like  that  to  natural  selection  has 
been)  due  to  this  exaggeration,  i.e.,  to  the  representation  of 
it  as  a  main  cause  instead  of  a  merely  subordinate  aid. 

3.  That  Mr.  Darwin  utterly  misses  the  point  concerning 
the  real  difficulty  as  to  man's  origin  through  evolution,  and 
consequently  does  not  even"  tend,  in  the  faintest  degree,  to 
surmount  the  moral  barrier  separating  man  from  brutes. 

I  am  also  persuaded  that  the  failure  of  Mr.  Darwin  and 
his  coadjutors  in  their  attempt  to  establish  a  mechanical  ex- 
planation of  the  phenomena  of  the  living  world  amounts 
almost  to  a  demonstration  of  the  impossibility  of  any  such 
explanation,  and  therefore  that  essentially  distinct  vital 
powers  and  principles  really  exist  in  nature. 

Such  powers  may,  I  believe,  be  made  evident  to  every  un- 
prejudiced mind  who  studies  the  world  of  men,  of  animals, 
and  of  plants — the  world  of  Biology. 

This  is  the  lesson  which  nature  seems  to  me  to  teach  us 
as  to  the  processes  of  life  in  the  living  beings  we  see  about 
us.  It  remains  to  consider  what,  if  anything,  can  be  learned 
from  nature  as  to  its  own  causes. 


CHAPTER  XT. 

AN   EPISODE. 

"  Mr.  Chauncey  Wright's  criticism  of  the  author's  views  having  been 
republished  and  widely  circulated  by  Mr.  Darwin,  the  reply  to  that 
criticism  is  here  reproduced." 

THE  subjects  of  natural  and  sexual  selection  having  been 
A  digression   treated  of,  that  which  should  come  next  (the  ques- 


as  to  causes)  would  be  immediately  entered 
cumstauces.  UpOD)  }jU^  {hat  exceptional  circumstances  induce  a 
digression  which  may  have  the  effect  of  confirming  and 
substantiating  views  put  forward  in  the  last  two  chapters. 
These  circumstances  are  :  (1)  The  publication  in  the  '  North 
American  Review/  for  July  1871,  of  an  elaborate  criticism  of 
the  'Genesis  of  Species/  by  a*  distinguished  writer  of  the  United 
States,  Mr,  Chauncey  Wright;  (2)  The  fact  that  Mr.  Darwin 
has  had  this  criticism  republished  in  England  and  very  ex- 
tensively circulated,  a  copy  having  been  sent  to  almost  every 
known  naturalist  in  the  British  Isles  or  abroad. 

By  the  courtesy  of  the  editor  of  the  'North  American 
Review/  I  was  enabled  to  publish  a  reply  to  Mr.  Chauncey 
Wright's  criticism  in  the  form  of  a  letter  at  the  end  of  the 
235th  number  of  that  Review,  that  for  April  1872.  Never- 
theless, the  diffusion  of  that  reply  must  necessarily  have  been 
much  less  than  the  diffusion  of  the  criticism  in  its  original  and 
its  ropublished  form.  On  this  account  I  think  it  well  to 
reproduce  it  here  ;  but  there  are  also  other  reasons  which 
determine  me  to  do  so.  (1)  Mr.  Darwin  must  have  thought 
Mr.  Chauncey  Wright's  defence  of  him  extremely  important, 
to  have  taken  the  steps  he  did  in  reference  to  it.  It  cannot 


CHAP.  XI.]  AN  EPISODE.  333 

therefore  but  be  interesting  to  many  to  see  the  sort  of  defen- 
sive arguments  upon  which  Mr.  Darwin  relies.  (2)  I  attach  a 
very  special  value  to  the  opinions  formed  in  the  United 
States.  I  do  so  on  account  of  the  warm  esteem  I  feel  for 
Americans  I  have  had  the  good  fortune  to  meet,  and  because 
I  look  forward  to  most  important  philosophical  progress 
through  the  people  of  the  United  States.  I  am  therefore 
anxious  that  my  reply  to  the  one  hostile  critic  I  have  there 
found  should  be  as  widely  diffused  as  possible. 

At  the  same  time  this  republication   necessarily  entails 
considerable  repetition,  both  of  remarks  and  quota-  Ma  ^ 
tions,  and  on  this  account  this  chapter  may  be  ^houtdTiri- 
passed  over  by  any  of  my  readers  without  detriment  ^ge^rai 
to  the  course  of  the  argument  followed  out  in  the  arsument- 
other  chapters.     Only  such  persons  need  read  it  as  are  inter- 
ested in  the  Darwinian  controversy,  or  who  feel  yet  undecided 
as  to  "  natural  selection,"  or  who  are  curious  to  consider  the 
points  raised  by  Mr.  Darwin's  "selected"  champion. 

My  reply  was  as  follows : — 

"  The  rapid  growth  of  physical  science  and  the  constant 
publication  of  ever-new  observations,  make  such  Mr.  chaun- 
demands  on  the  time  of  naturalists,  that  an  author  criticism. 
actively  engaged  upon  a  subject  covering  the  whole  field  of 
biology  cannot  be  expected  to  reply  directly  to  critics,  unless 
under  very  exceptional  circumstances. 

"  I  have  to  thank  Mr.  Chauncey  Wright  for  having  been 
so  obliging  as  to  devote  much  space,  and  necessarily  a  con- 
siderable portion  of  his  valuable  time,  to  an  examination  of 
my  recent  work,  the  '  Genesis  of  Species.'  Nevertheless  I 
must  confess  that,  with  all  respect  for  his  conspicuous  talents 
and  for  his  deserved  reputation,  I  should  not  have  undertaken 
the  following  few  words  of  explanation  but  for  his  paper's 
wide  circulation  in  England  and  elsewhere  by  Mr.  Darwin. 

"  Mr.  Wright's  criticism  touches  upon  so  many  matters  of 
detail,  that  it  is  not  altogether  easy  to  ascertain  his  main 
objects.  Having,  however,  considered  his  remarks  with  that 
cure  which  my  esteem  for  his  opinions  makes  incumbent  on 


334  LESSONS  FKOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  XI. 

me,  I  venture  to  express  my  belief  that,  neglecting  minor 
matters,  his  criticism  is  mainly  directed  to  the  assertion  of 
two  points. 

"  One  of  these  is,  that  I  have  misrepresented  Mr.  Darwin's 
Mainly  ad-  views,  and  have  been  guilty  of  involuntary  injustice 

dressed  to...  .  *  i   «    i  T 

two  points,  with  respect  to  t lie  natural  forces  which,  according 
to  our  great  naturalist,  have  determined  specific  forms. 

"  The  other  is,  that  I  have  attributed  an  irreligious  ten- 
dency to  Mr.  Darwin's  writings  which,  they  do  not,  in  fact, 
possess;  and  that  this  is  in  part  owing  to  my  defective 
knowledge,  in  part  to  early  prejudices. 

"  Thus  Mr.  Wright  speaks  of  my  '  theological  education ' 
and  my  'schooling  against  Democritus.'  It  is  a  matter 
of  wonder  to  me  who  could  have  so  misled  Mr.  Wright. 
Though  reluctant,  in  the  extreme,  to  obtrude  such  private 
and  personal  matters  on  the  public,  I  must  nevertheless,  in 
justice,  observe,  that  my  schooling  has  been  of  the  very  oppo- 
site character,  and  perfectly  in  unison  with  that  which  Mr. 
Darwin  himself  would  favour.  Only  at  length,  and  with  dif- 
ficulty, have  I  struggled  out  of  that  philosophy  of '  nescience,' 
the  evils  and  the  fallacies  of  which  are  so  apparent  to  me 
because,  at  one  time,  its  doctrines  so  completely  possessed  my 
assent. 

"  With  regard  to  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  of  the  origin  of 
The  first  of  species,  I  should  hasten  eagerly  to  acknowledge  my 
error  if  I  had  been  guilty  of  injustice  with  respect  to 
it,  and  also  to  thank  any  critic  who  had  been  so  kind  as  to 
call  my  attention  to  such  unintentional  unfairness.  I  must 
confess,  however,  that  I  cannot  detect  that  misrepresentation 
in  my  '  Genesis  of  Species '  which  Mr.  Wright  seems  to  there 
discover. 

"  In  common  with  so  many  others,  I  was,  at  one  time,  a 
hearty  and  thorough-going  disciple  of  Mr.  Darwin,  and  I 
accepted  from  him  the  view  that  Natural  Selection  was  '  the 
origin  of  species.'  It  was  only  by  degrees,  and  through  the 
evidence  of  a  multitude  of  biological  facts,  that  an  opposite 
conclusion  was  gradually  forced  upon  me.  Having  come  to 


CHAP.  XI.]  AN  EPISODE.  335 

that  conclusion,  on  scientific  grounds  only,  after  careful  re- 
consideration of  those  grounds  and  much  discussion  of  the 
subject,  I  ventured  to  publish  my  '  Genesis  of  Species.' 
Therein  I  endeavoured  to  bring  before  tli£  public  the  leading 
facts  which  had  produced  the  conviction  in  my  own  mind 
that  Natural  Selection  was  not  the  origin  of  species,  not  the 
main  determining  agent  in  the  fixation  of  specific  characters ; 
although  I  allowed  that  it  played,  and  necessarily  must  play, 
a  certain  subordinate  part. 

"  This  conviction  had  forced  itself  on  many  minds  before 
the  publication  of  my  book,  and  since  then  has  approved 
itself  to  the  minds  of  many  more.  Indeed,  Mr.  Darwin 
himself  seems  to  have  come  round  substantially,  though  not 
avowedly,  to  the  same  opinion,  and  has,  in  his  '  Descent  of 
Man,'  implicitly  admitted,  though  he  has  not  yet  explicitly 
declared,  that  Natural  Selection  is  not  the  origin  of  species.  I 
cannot  but  confess  that  it  appears  to  me  even  Mr.  Chauncey 
Wright  himself  concedes  all  that  for  which  I  contend,  though 
he  at  the  same  time  seems  to  imagine  that  he  asserts  the 
validity  of  Mr.  Darwin's  original  position. 

"No  one  could  be  less  disposed  than  I  am  to  detract  from 
the  great  merit  unquestionably  due  to  Mr.  Darwin,  or  to 
ignore  the  vast  impetus  which  his  views  have  given  to  the 
wide  reception  of  the  doctrine  of  evolution.  Nevertheless, 
we  must  not  allow  our  just  admiration  for  the  zeal  and  genius 
of  Mr.  Darwin  to  blind  our  eyes  to  two  facts.  One  of  these 
is  that  an  important  part  of  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  was  not  new, 
but,  on  the  contrary,  very  old.  The  other  is,  that  though 
the  popular  acceptance  of  evolution  has  been  brought  about 
through  him,  yet  that  the  minds  of  scientific  men  were  well 
prepared  for,  and  disposed  towards,  evolution  years  before 
the  appearance  of  '  The  Origin  of  Species.' 

"  Biological  facts,  by  their  gradual  accumulation,  had  long 
been  predisposing  scientific  minds  to  the  acceptance  of  this 
theory.  I  myself,  indeed,  fully  accepted  it,  and  I  found  that 
a  similar  acceptance  existed  in  the  minds  of  others,  notably 
in  that  of  Professor  Owen.  Mr.  Wright,  therefore,  is  cer- 


"30  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUBE.  [CiiAP.  XI. 

tainly  correct  in  this  sense  when  he  says  that  '  it  is  not  to 
what  is  now  known  as  "  Darwinism  "  that  the  prevalence  ot 
the  doctrine  of  evolution  is  to  be  attributed,  or  indirectly 
assigned.'  The  part  of  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  which  is  old  is 
that  which  attributes  so  much  importance  to  the  destructive 
powers  of  nature,  a  view  advocated  by  Lucretius  and  treated 
of  by  Aristotle  in  the  passage  quoted  in  my  book. 

"  What,  however,  was  unquestionably  Mr.  Darwin's  own, 
was  the  remarkable  conception  that  this  exterminating 
power,  acting  upon  organisms  presenting  slight  variations, 
so  overbore  all  other  influences  as  to  occasion  the  survival  of 
the  fittest  variations,  and  in  this  way  (by  a  process  of  cutting 
off  and  limiting)  fixed  the  characters  of  the  different  organic 
species,  thus  becoming  their  origin.  The  origin,  not,  of  course, 
of  the  slight  variations,  but  of  the  fixing  of  these  in  definite 
lines  and  grooves. 

"Gradually,  however,  the  arguments  of  opponents  have 
forced  upon  Mr.  Darwin's  active  mind  modifications  of  his 
views,  till,  as  I  have  said,  he  has  come  to  admit  in  principle  that 
Natural  Selection  is  not  the  origin  of  species.  I  cannot  myself 
see  that  there  is,  in  this  change  of  view,  anything  at  all  dero- 
gatory to  Mr.  Darwin ;  and  for  my  part,  my  esteem  is  strength- 
ened rather  than  weakened  when  I  read  candid  admissions  of 
antecedent  error.  These  admissions  should  not  be  brought 
forward,  save  when  an  unscientific  appeal  is  made  to  his 
authority,  or  when  an  advocate  more  zealous  than  judicious 
attempts  to  deny  that  Mr.  Darwin's  opinions  have  undergone 
any  grave  modifications.  Then  indeed  truth  and  justice 
demand  the  production  of  such  admissions.  They  do  so  since 
the  assignment  of  the  law  of  Natural  Selection  to  a  sub- 
ordinate place  is  manifestly  an  abandonment  of  the  Dar- 
winian  theory  as  originally  proposed ;  for  how  can  that  be  said 
to  be  the  origin  of  species  which  only  co-operates,  in  an  infe- 
rior and  comparatively  uninfluential  manner,  in  determining 
that  origin  ? 

"Mr.  Chauncey  Wright's  remarks  seem  to  me  then  to 
render  necessary  a  reference  to  the  earlier  statements  of  Mr. 


CHAP.  XL]  AN  EPISODE.  3,77 

Darwin.  A  number  of  such  statements  * — not,  indeed,  his 
earliest,  but  from  the  third  edition  of  '  The  Origin  of  Species' 
— were  brought  forward  in  the  July  number  of  the  *  Quar- 
terly Review.'  They  were  published  for  the  purpose  of 
guarding  the  public  from  a  hasty  acceptance  of  Mr.  Darwin's 
dogmatic  expressions,  merely  in  deference  to  his  authority, 
and  without  a  careful  estimate  of  the  value  of  the  facts 
brought  forward  by  him. 

"The  passages  referred  to,  seem  to  me  to  contain  state- 
ments amply  sufficient  to  repel  Mr.  Wright's  charge  against 
me  of  injustice  to  Mr.  Darwin,  and  to  show,  on  the  one  hand, 
that  the  original  theory  of  the  origin  of  species  was  such  as  I 
have  represented  it  to  have  been ;  and,  on  the  other,  that 
Mr.  Darwin  has,  in  fact,  abandoned  the  position  which  he 
originally  took  up. 

"  We  have,  however,  yet  more  explicit  declarations  as  to 
the  occurrence  of  characters  for  which  not  only  his  theory 
will  not  account,  but  which,  in  his  own  words,  annihilate  his 
theory.  He  has  told  us  in  '  The  Origin  of  Species '  that  this 
fatal  consequence  would  ensue  from  the  discovery  of  cha- 
racters not  produced  by  slight  beneficial  modifications,  and 
yet  we  now  read : — 

" '  No  doubt  man,  as  well  as  every  other  animal,  presents  structures 
which,  as  far  as  we  can  judge  with  our  little  knowledge,  are  not  now 
of  any  service  to  him,  nor  have  been  so  during  any  former  period  of 
his  existence,  either  in  relation  to  his  general  conditions  of  life,  or  of 
one  sex  to  the  other.  Such  structures  cannot  be  accounted  for  by  any 
form  of  selection,  or  by  the  inherited  effects  of  the  use  and  disuse  of 
parts.' 

"  L'esides  all  this,  in  the  fifth  edition  of  '  The  Origin  pf 
Species,'  p.  104,  we  find  the  following  significant  passage: — 

" '  Until  reading  an  able  and  valuable  article  in  the  '  North  British 
Euview'  (1867),  I  did  not  appreciate  how  rarely  simple  variations, 
whether  slightly  or  strongly  marked,  could  be  perpetuated.' 

*  "  Those  tire  to  be  found  in  'The  Origin  of  Species,'  3rd  edition,  pp.  208, 
214,  220,  223;  5th  edition,  p.  104.  The  Descent  of  Man,'  vol.  i.  pp.  125, 
152,  154,  223;  vol.  ii.  pp.  170,  198,  387,  and  the  postscript  at  the  beginning  of 
the  volume.  '  Auiuisils  und  Plants  under  Doinc'stic.itiun,'  vol.  ii.  p.  67. 


338  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  XI. 

"  Finally,  Mr.  Darwin  recognises  that  he  was  formerly 
'  inclined  to  lay  too  much  stress  on  the  principle  of  protec- 
tion, as  accounting  for  the  less  bright  colours  of  female 
birds/  and  speaks  now  as  if  what  he  at  one  time  favoured  in 
this  respect  was  quite  an  unlikely  matter,  saying : — 

" '  Is  it  probable  that  the  head  of  the  female  chaffinch,  the  crimson  on 
the  breast  of  the  female  bullfinch,  the  green  of  the  female  chaffinch,  the 
crest  of  the  female  golden-crested  wren,  have  all  been  rendered  less 
bright  by  the  slow  process  of  selection  for  the  sake  of  protection  ?  / 
cannot  think  so.' 

"  I  also  cannot  think  so,  nor  can  I  so  think  with  regard  to 
those  numerous  instances  brought  forward  in  my  book  as 
examples  of  characters  for  the  origin  and  development  of 
which  Natural  Selection  will  not,  I  believe,  account. 

"  Deference  ought  doubtless  to  be  shown  to  a  naturalist 
such  as  Mr.  Darwin,  but  deference  has  its  limits  and  must 
not  be  exercised  to  the  sacrifice  of  truth,  and  truth  compels 
the  recognition  of  the  important  modifications  above  noticed. 
It  is  not  only,  however,  critics  that  dissent  from  Mr.  Darwin's 
views  who  recognise  the  existence  of  these  changes.  Mr. 
Darwin's  authorized  interpreter,  Professor  Huxley,  has  lately 
told  us  the  highly  significant  fact  that  Mr.  Darwin  is  even 
inclined  to  reply  in  the  affirmative  to  the  question  whether 
a  variety  '  can  be  perpetuated,  or  even  intensified,  when 
selective  conditions  are  indifferent,  or  perhaps  unfavourable 
to  its  existence?  A  more  complete  repudiation  in  principle 
of  the  origin  of  species  by  Natural  Selection  it  would  be 
difficult  if  not  impossible  to  imagine. 

"  Mr.  Darwin  has  not,  however,  so  far  as  I  know,  explicitly 
declared  what  Professor  Huxley  tells  us  he  is  inclined  to 
admit.  He  has  certainly  made  many  important  and  sig- 
nificant admissions,  but  there  is  one  more  which  consistency 
seems  to  demand  as  the  logical  outcome  of  others  above 
cited :  I  mean  the  admission  that  the  attribution  to  Natural 
Selection  of  the  main  determining  office  in  the  fixation  of 
specific  characters  has  also  been  '  a  serious  error,'  whether  it 
be  not  rather  a  fortunate  than  an  '  unfortunate '  one. 


CIIAP.  XL]  AN  EPISODE.  339 

"  Mr.  Wriglit  challenges  the  production  of  a  sudden  adap- 
tive modification  of  a  race,  wild  or  domesticated, 
*  not  referable  by  known  physiological  laws  to  the  two  moumc£ 
past  history  of  the  race  on  the  theory  of  evolution.' 
In  this  statement  I  must  in  the  first  place  object  to  the 
introduction  of  the  words  '  on  the  theory  of  evolution,'  as  that 
theory,  far  from  being  opposed,  is,  on  the  contrary,  adopted 
and  contended  for  by  me,  and  I  do  not.  understand  how  Mr. 
Wright  can  have  inserted  them  unless  by  inadvertence. 
Instances,  however,  of  modifications,  the  production  of  which 
he  desiderates,  can  readily  be  supplied.  Thus  the  Cashmere 
sheep,  when  transferred  to  Europe,  lost  their  long. wool  in  a 
fow  generations,  and  this  could  not  possibly  have  been  due 
to  Natural  Selection.  Again,  the  marine  animals  now  living 
in  Swedish  lakes  have  become  remarkably  transformed,  and 
the  instance  noticed  by  Mr.  Darwin  as  to  the  Mediterranean 
oyster,  though  not  evidently  adaptive,  is  probably  so,  and  if 
so  would  be  in  point.  There  was  however  no  need  to  bring 
such  cases  forward,  for  surely  it  was  fair  to  take  Mr.  Darwin's 
own  estimate  of  what  facts  lie  would  consider  fatal,  and  such 
facts  I  claim  to  have  brought  forward,  in  sufficient  number, 
in  my  book.  I  can  only  express  my  profound  regret  that  I 
should  be  so  unfortunate  as  to  seem  to  Mr.  Chauncey  Wright 
to  have  made  an  *  unfathomable  translation '  of  the  theory  of 
Natural  Selection.  Mr.  Darwin  nowhere  himself  says,  with 
Mr.  Wright,  that  the  '  slightness '  of  the  variations  he  speaks 
of  '  is  only  relative  to  the  differences  between  the  characters 
of  the  species ;'  and  I  cannot  but  think  Mr.  Wright  himself 
misconceives  Mr.  Darwin's  meaning,  for  I  believe  the  latter 
gentleman  would  not  speak  of  the  sudden  development  of  a 
large  proboscis,  like  that  of  Semnopithecus  nasalis,  as  a 
'  slight '  variation. 

"An  admission  which  Mr.  Darwin  makes,  and  which  I 
considered  and  consider  to  be  important,  is  sought  Im  ro  er  ,n 
to  be  explained  away  by  Mr.  Chauncey  Wright  *n>rctatioi.s. 
in  a  mode  I  cannot  think  permissible.  He  tells  us  that 
when  Mr.  Darwin  gays  thut  the  goose  'seems  to  have  a  sin- 


3-10  LESSONS  FKOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  XL 

gularly  inflexible  organization,'  Mr.  Darwin's  '  obvious  mean- 
ing '  is  '  that  the  goose  lias  been  much  less  changed  by  domes- 
tication than  other  domestic  birds.'  Certainly  if  Mr.  Darwin 
had  meant  this,  he  would  not  have  used  the  word  *  inflexible,' 
but '  unmodified,'  '  inflexed,'  or  some  equivalent  expression. 
To  have  a  '  singularly  inflexible  organization '  is  to  have  one 
which  cannot  without  great  difficulty  be  modified,  not  one 
which,  "as  a  fact,  has  not  been  modified. 

"  Similarly  where  Mr.  Darwin  speaks  of  '  a  whole  organism 
having  become  plastic  and  tending  to  depart  from  the  pa- 
rental type,'  Mr.  Wright  asserts  that  Mr.  Darwin  means 
'  capable  of  being  moulded,  or  fashioned  to  the  purpose,  as 
clay.'  This  is  to  credit  Mr.  Darwin  with  the  enunciation  of 
a  truism  which  I  am  sure  he  would  never  have  written.  The 
words  '  tends  to  depart '  *  are  plainly  a  repetition  and  expla- 
nation of  the  epithet  'plastic,'  and  fix  its  meaning.  Mr. 
Darwin  here  evidently  predicates  an  existing  predisposition, 
and  not  a  mere  state  of  indifference.  By  '  tends  to  depart ' 
he  cannot  mean  '  capable  of  being  made  to  depart,'  for  that 
would  not  indicate  any  influence  which  has  effected  the 
'  whole  organization,'  as  by  his  hypothesis  every  organism  is 
'  capable '  of  being  modified. 

"I  will  now  turn  to  the  second  matter  of  argument,' that 
Mr.  Wright's  m  which  Mr.  Cliauncey  Wright  treats  of  the  alleged 
second  point.  p0ssjbiy  irreligious  tendencies  of  Mr.  Darwin's 
theory,  and  of  my  incompetency  in  physics  and  ignorance 
of  the  experimental  philosophy. 

"He  says: — 

" '  Mr.  Mivart  has  made  the  mistake,  which  nullifies  nearly  the  whole 
of  his  Criticism,  of  supposing  that "  the  theory  of  Natural  Selection  may 
(though  it  need  not)  be  taken  in  such  a  way  as  to  lead  men  to  regard 
the  present  organic  world  as  formed,  so  to  speak,  accidentally,  beautiful 
and  wonderful  as  is  confessedly  the  haphazard  result "  (p.  33).  Mr. 
Mivart,  like  many  another  writer,  seems  to  forget  the  age  of  the  world 


*  "  The  omission  of  Ihe  words  '  in  a  slight  degree '  in  my  book  was  purely 
accidental.  As,  however,  the  question  is  one  of  principle,  I  do  not  see  that 
the  omission  was  of  any  importance. 


CHAP.  XL]  AN  EPISODE.  341 

in  which  he  lives  and  for  which  he  -writes — the  age  of  "  experimental 
philosophy,"  the  very  standpoint  of  which,  its  fundamental  assumption, 
is  the  universality  of  physical  causation.  This  is  so  familiar  to  minds 
bred  in  physical  studies,  that  they  rarely  imagine  that  they  may  be 
mistaken  for  disciples  of  Democritus,  or  for  believers  in  "  the  fortuitous 
concourse  of  atoms,"  in  the  sense,  at  least,  which  theology  has  attached 
to  the  phrase.' 

"  I  feel  a  little  difficulty  in  replying  to  this  criticism, 
because  I  cannot  bring  myself  to  attribute  to  Mr.  Wright 
such  a  misapprehension  either  of  my  meaning  or  of  that 
of  the  school  of  Democritus  as  seems  necessary  to  ex- 
plain it. 

"I  would  willingly  suppose  that  an  obscurity  of  expression 
on  my  part  is  alone  to  blame  ;  but  in  using  the  word  '  acci- 
dentally '  I  qualified  it  by  the  prefix  *  so  to  speak.'  But  even 
had  I  not  done  so,  I  could  not  have  imagined  that  any  one 
would  think  me  unaware  that  the  various  phenomena  which 
we  observe  in  nature  have  their  respective  phenomenal  ante- 
cedents. It  is  extremely  difficult  to  me  to  think  that  Mr. 
Wright  can  suppose  I  held  the  opinion  that  the  phenomena 
of  variation,  &c.,  are  not  determined  by  definite  physical 
antecedents.  Yet,  if  he  does  not  so  suppose,  how  can  he 
assert  that  when  I  use  the  expression  'accidentally'  I  mean 
anything  antagonistic  to  physical  causation  ? 

"  On  the  other  hand,  Mr.  Wright  cannot  suppose  that  the 
old  atheistic  philosophy  held  events  to  be  accidental  in  the 
strict  sense,  for  he  knows  very  well  that  Democritus  and 
Empedocles  and  their  school.no  more  held  phenomena  to  be 
undetermined  or  unpreceded  by  other  phenomena  than  do 
their  successors  at  the  present  day. 

"  My  meaning,  which  I  rashly  imagined  plain  enough,  was 
that  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  might  be  so  taken  as  to  nesi    ^ 
oppose  the  conception  of  design  in  the  same  way  as  acclaent- 
the   old   Ionian  theory  opposed  that  conception.     That  I 
was  fully  justified  in  expressing  such  an  opinion  is,  I  con- 
ceive, plain,  from  the  language  employed   by  Mr.  Darwin 
himself.     In  his  work  on  Animals  and  Plants  under  Domes- 
tication, Mr.  Darwin  considers  the  building  of  an  edifice 


342    '  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  XL 

from  broken  fragments  of  rock,  and  makes  use  even  of  strong 
expressions  of  the  kind  referred  to.  He  says : — 

" '  In  regard  to  the  use  to  which  the  fragments  may  be  put,  their 

shape  may  STRICTLY  be  said  to  be  accidental If  the   various 

laws  which  have  determined  the  shape  of  each  fragment  were  not  pre- 
determined-for  the  builder's  sake,  can  it  with  any  greater  probability 
be  maintained  that  He  specially  ordained,  for  the  sake  of  the  breeder, 
each  of  the  innumerable  variations  in  our  domestic  animals  and 
plants  ?  .  .  .  .  But,  if  we  give  up  the  principle  in  one  case — if  we  do 
not  admit  that  the  variations  of  the  primeval  dog  were  intentionally 
guided,  in  order  that  the  greyhound,  for  instance,  that  perfect  image 
of  symmetry  and  vigour,  might  be  formed — no  shadow  of  reason  can 
be  assigned  for  the  belief  that  the  variations,  alike  in  nature,  and  the 
result  of  the  same  general  laws,  which  have  been  the  groundwork 
through  Natural  Selection  of  the  formation  of  the  most  perfectly 
adapted  animals  in  the  world,  MAN  INCLUDED,  were  intentionally  and 
specially  guided.  However  much  we  may  wish  it,  we  can  hardly  follow 
Professor  Asa  Gray  in  his  belief  that  "  variation  has  been  led  along 
certain  beneficial  lines,"  like  a  stream  "  along  definite  and  useful  lines  of 
irrigation." ' 

"  Not  only  then  may  the  organic  world,  on  the  Darwinian 
theory,  be  conceived  as  formed  in  some  sense  accidentally, 
but  we  have  Mr.  Darwin's  own  words  for  viewing  that  for- 
mation as  '-STKICTLY  ACCIDENTAL.'  I  say  '  his  words,'  because 
I  am  far  from  desiring  to  bind  Mr.  Darwin  in  anti-teleological 
fetters.  I  have  carefully  given  him  credit  for  every  theistic 
expression  I  noticed,  as  it  was  at  once  my  duty  and  my 
pleasure  to  do. 

"  Here  I  take  the  opportunity  of  acknowledging,  as  I  have 
also  done  in  my  second  edition,  that  an  American  naturalist — 
Professor  Theophilus  Parsons,  of  Harvard  University — put 
forth,  more  than  ten  years  ago,  views  *  very  similar  to  those 
I  enunciated  in  my  '  Genesis  of  Species,'  though  they  were  of 
course  unknown  to  me  when  I  published  my  first  edition. 
Mr.  Wright,  however,  is  mistaken  when  he  states  that  I  am 
'  indebted  to  Mr.  Galton '  for  my  conception  of  specific 
genesis,  although  I  made  use,  with  due  acknowledgment,  of 


*  "  See  the  July  number  of  the  '  American  Jcmrnal  of  Science  and  Art '  for 
1860. 


CHAP.  XI.]  AN  EPISODE. 

that  gentleman's  illustration  of  a  conception  analogous  to 
mine. 

"  Mr.  Wright  has  been  so  unfortunate  as  to  misapprehend 
Mr.  Murphy  also.  Speaking  of  spheres  and  crystals,  Misappre- 
that  gentleman  is  quoted  as  saying  :  — 

"  'Attraction,  whether  gravitative  or  capillary,  produces  the  spherical 
form  ;  the  spherical  form  does  not  produce  attraction.' 

"  Upon  this  Mr.  Wright  remarks  :  — 

"  '  No  abstraction  ever  produced  any  other  abstraction,  much  less  a 
concrete  thing.  The  abstract  laws  of  attraction  never  produced  any 
body,  spherical  or  polyhedral.' 

"  But  really  not  only  has  Mr.  Murphy  not  said  they  did, 
Lut  his  very  expression  Mr.  Wright  will,  I  am  sure,  regret  to 
see,  has  been  changed  by  my  critic  ;  and  the  result  is,  that 
Mr.  Murphy  is  unlucky  enough  to  be  blamed  for  what  he 
never  said,  or  apparently  thought  of  saying.  This  is  all  the 
more  hard  because  Mr.  Wright  goes  on  to  observe,  '  it  was 
actual  forces  acting  in  definite  ways  that  made  the  sphere  or 
crystal,'  which  is  precisely  what  Mr.  Murphy  himself  said.' 

"  Mr.  Wright  goes  on  to  make  a  statement  which  I  confess 
is  utterly  beyond  me.  He  says  :  — 

"  '  Moreover,  in  the  case  of  crystals,  neither  these  forces  nor  the  al> 
stract  law  of  their  action  in  producing  definite  crystals  reside  in  the 
finished  bodies,  but  in  the  properties  of  the  surrounding  media,  portions 
of  whose  constituents  are  changed  into  crystals,  according  to  these 
properties  and  to  other  conditioning  circumstances.' 

"  If  this  is  so,  then  when  a  broken  crystal  completes  itself, 
the  determining  forces  reside  exclusively  in  the  media,  and 
not  at  all  in  the  crystal  with  its  broken  surface  !  The  first 
atoms  of  a  crystal  deposited  arrange  themselves  entirely  ac- 
cording to  the  forces  of  the  surrounding  media,  and  their  own 
properties  are  utterly  without  influence  or  effect  in  the 


"To  my  mind,  I  confess,  it  would  appear  manifest  that 
those  marvellously  delicate  and  complex  ice  mosses,  which 
at  this  season  occasionnlly  fringe  our  walls  and  palings,  are 


3-14  LESSONS  FROM  NATDEE.  [CHAP.  XL 

not  due  to  forces  residing  in  the  atmosphere  only,  but  also  in 
the  crystalline  particles  already  deposited  and  in  course  of 
deposition. 

"  Professor  Tyndall's  teaching  differs  widely  from  that  of 
Mr.  Chauncey  Wright.  Speaking  of  the  formation  of  pyra- 
midal crystals  of  salt,  he  says : — 

" '  The  scientific  idea  is  that  the  molecules  act  upon  each  other,  .... 
that  they  attract  each  other  and  repel  each  other  at  certain  definite 
points  or  poles,  and  in  certain  definite  directions,  and  that  the  pyramidal 
form  is  the  result  of  this  play  of  attraction  and  repulsion.'  * 

"  Mr.  Wright  seeks  to  refute  the  parallelism  asserted  by 
Mr.  Murphy  and  by  me  to  exist  between  crystals  and 
organisms,  saying : — 

"  'In  organisms  no  doubt,  as  we  may  be  readily  convinced  with- 
out resort  to  analogy,  there  is  a  great  deal  that  is  really  innate,  or 
dependent  on  actions  in  the  organism,  which  diversities  of  external 
conditions  modify  very  little,  or  affect  at  least  in  a  very  indeterminate 
manner,  so  far  as  observation  has  yet  ascertained.' 

"  Here  Mr.  Murphy  and  I  are  fortunately  at  liberty  to 
invoke  in  our  favour  the  authority,  once  more,  of  Professor 
Tyndall,  who  can  hardly  be  deemed  even  by  Mr.  Chauncey 
Wright  as  incompetent  in  '  experimental  philosophy,'  or  as 
likely  to  forget  '  the  age  of  the  world  in  which  he  lives.'  In 
the  little  work  already  quoted,  he  tells  us  :f — 

" '  This  tendency  on  the  part  of  matter  to  organize  itself,  to  grow  into 
shape,  to  assume  definite  forms  in  obedience  to  the  definite  action  of 
force,  is,  as  I  have  said,  all-pervading.  It  is  on  the  ground  on  which 
you  tread,  in  the  water  you  drink,  in  the  air  you  breathe.  Incipient 
life,  as  it  were,  manifests  itself  throughout  the  whole  of  what  we  call 
inorganic  nature.' 

"  Speaking  of  a  living  grain  of  corn,  and  comparing  it  with 
a  crystal,  he  tells  us  we  are  bound  'to  conclude  that  the 
molecules  of  the  corn  are  self-posited  by  the  forces  with 
which  they  act  upon  each  other.  It  would  be  poor  philosophy 

*  " '  Essays  on  the  Use  and  Limit  of  the  Imagination  in  Science,'  2nd 
edition,  1871,  p.  57. 
"  Ibid.  p.  58. 


CHAP.  XL]  AN  EPISODE.  345 

to  invoke  an  external  agent  in  the  one  case  and  to  reject  it  in 
the  other.' 

"  Mr.  Wright,  however,  as  I  have  shown,  invokes  what  is 
innate  in  the  case  of  organisms  and  rejects  it  in  the 

.  .  .  Innate  force. 

case  of  crystals,  and  asserts  that  in  organisms  what 
is  innate  is  so  predominant  in  its  action  that  external  con- 
ditions '  modify  '  them  '  very  little.' 

"  Passing  over  how  important  an  admission  this  is  against 
any  effective  action  of  Natural  Selection,  let  us  see  how  it 
tells  against  the  analogy  maintained. 

"  Is  not  the  innate  force,  as  existing  in  each  organism,  that 
which  has  been  educed  by  antecedent  combinations  and  con- 
ditions, just  as  much  and  no  more  external  to  it  than  are  the 
forces  of  the  medium  to  each  atom  of  a  crystal  ?  And  how 
does  this  tell  in  the  least  against  the  analogy  which  has 
been  asserted,  and  which  really  does  exist  between  each  che- 
mical unit  and  each  organic  unit  ?  Not  of  course  that  it  is 
for  a  moment  contended  that  there  is  not,  as  common  ob- 
servation tells  us  there  is,  a  distinct  power  and  principle 
*  vitality,'  in  the  one  which  is  wanting  in  the  other,  as  well 
as  more  or  less  complexity  of  organization. 

"Again,  we  are  told,  as  to  organisms,  ' external  conditions 
are,  nevertheless,  essential  factors  in  development,  as  well  as 
in  mere  increase  of  growth.  No  animal  or  plant  is  developed, 
nor  do  its  developments  acquire  any  growth,  without  very 
special  external  conditions.'  Surely  I  hardly  needed  to  be 
solemnly  informed  of  so  very  elementary  a  truth. 

"  Regarding  the  rules  of  the  '  inductive  philosophy,'  Mr. 
Wright  remarks :— - 

" '  A  stricter  observance  of  these  by  Mr.  M nrphy  and  our  Thp  „  induc. 
author  might  have  saved  them  from  the  mistake  we  have  tive  phUo- 
noticcd,  and  from  many  others — the  "  realism  "  of  ascribing  sop  y< 
efficacy  to  an  abstraction,  making  attraction  and  polarity  produce 
structures  and  forms  independently  of  the  products  and  of  the  concrete 
matters  and  forces  in  them.' 

"  In  whom,  or  in  what  ?    and    what  are   attraction   and 
polarity,  if  they  be  not  forces?     Who  ever  considered  them 
16 


S4G  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CiiAr.  XI. 

as  acting  independently  of  themselves  ?  Would  Mr.  Wright 
prefer  that  the  earth's  orbit  should  be  spoken  of  not  as  the 
resultant  of  gravity  and  centrifugal  force,  but  as  produced  by 
'  coming  together '  and  '  flying  away '  ?  I  have,  of  course,  no 
objection  to  that  mode  of  expression,  but  I  see  no  special 
advantage  in  it  warranting  such  a  departure  from  usage.  It 
is  singular  that  Mr.  Wright  himself,  on  the  next  page,  em- 
ploys the  very  '  abstractions '  he  blames  others  for  making  use 
of.  He  there  quotes  approvingly  the  expressions  '  impene- 
trability,' 'mobility,'  and  'impulsive  force  of  bodies,'  and 
says  '  that  gravity  does  really  exist  and  act  according  to '  its 
laws.  It  is  difficult  to  see  the  greater  sin  in  speaking  of  the 
'real  existence'  of  polarity  than  of  'gravity.'  Not  only, 
however,  does  Mr.  Wright  quote  such  expressions,  but  he 
uses  them  himself  with  the  greatest  freedom  and  without 
scruple  whenever  they  suit  his  purpose.  Thus  he  tells  -us 
'  that  variability  and  selection  do  really  exist  and  act,'  which 
appear  to  me  quite  as  much  abstractions  as  polarity  or 
attraction. 

"  Mr.  Wright  divides  '  intellectual  genius '  into  three 
Mr.  Wright  classes :  No.  1, '  that  which  pursues  successfully  the 
tuai  genius."  researches  for  unknown  causes  by  the  skilful  use 
of  hypothesis  and  experiment ;'  No.  2,  '  that  which,  avoiding 
the  use  of  hypotheses  and  preconceptions  altogether,  and 
the  delusive  influence  of  names,  brings  together  in  clear  con- 
nections and  contrasts  in  classification  the  objects  of  nature 
in  their  broadest  and  realest  relations  of  resemblance ; '  and 
No.  3,  '  that  which  seeks  with  success  for  reasons  and  authori- 
ties in  support  of  cherished  convictions.' 

"I  might  remark  on  the  purely  arbitrary  character  of 
this  classification.  But  letting  this  pass,  it  must  be  said 
that  class  No.  1  is  but  a  poor  monster  without  No.  2; 
and  that  No.  1  is  frequently,  consciously  or  unconsciously, 
also  No.  3,  nor  would  it  be  difficult  to  bring  forward  an 
example. 

"  A  more  real  distinction  is  that  to  be  drawn  between  the 
'  scientific '  and  the  '  philosophical '  habits  of  mind,  and  under 


CHAP.  XL]  AN  EPISODE.  347 

these  two  great  genera  come  subordinate  distinctions  of  dif- 
ferent degrees  of  importance.  Now  a  naturalist  may  attain 
great  scientific  eminence  without  being  anything  of  a  phi- 
losopher, and  similarly  a  philosopher  need  have  little  ac- 
quaintance with  physical  science,  but  from  the  nature  of 
their  respective  pursuits  a  different  character  of  mind  tends 
to  be  developed.  It  is  from  this  distinction  that  we  find  (as 
we  might  a  priori  expect  to  be  the  case)  such  breadth  of 
view,  freedom  of  handling,  and  flexibility  of  mind  on  the 
part  of  philosophers  who  are  not  naturalists  as  compared 
with  men  great  in  physical  science,  who  are  not  at  the  same 
time  philosophers ;  a  certain  rigidity  and  narrowness  seeming 
to  result  from  the  exercise  of  the  mind  merely  in  the  arena 
of  physics. 

"  Passing  to  details  of  criticism,  Mr.  Wright  proceeds  to 
consider  the  question  of  the  giraffe's  neck,  and  I  Thoglraffo.g 
am  asked  a  rather  startling  question :  '  Can  Mr.  neck- 
Mivart  suppose  that,  having  fairly  called  in  question  the 
importance  of  the  high-feeding  use  of  the  giraffe's  neck,  he 
has  thereby  destroyed  the  utility  of  the  neck  altogether,  not 
only  to  the  theory  of  Natural  Selection,  but  also  to  the  animal 
itself?'  At  the  first  glance  this  looks  as  if  I  had  brought 
myself  within  the  grasp  of  the  Society  for  the  Prevention  of 
Cruelty  to  Animals.  But  I  may,  perhaps,  be  permitted  to 
ask,  in  return,  can  Mr.  Wright  suppose  that  I  ever  dreamed 
that  the  structures  of  animals  are  not  useful  to  them,  or  that 
my  position  is  an  altogether  anti-teleological  one  ?  Appa- 
rently possessed  with  some  such  idea,  Mr.  Wright  proceeds 
to  exhibit  the  giraffe's  neck  in  the  character  of  a  *  watch- 
tower.'  But  this  leaves  the  question  just  where  it  was  before. 
Of  course  I  concede  most  readily  and  fully  that  it  is  a  most 
admirable  watch-tower,  as  it  also  is  a  most  admirable  high- 
reaching  organ,  but  this  tells  us  nothing  of  its  origin.  In 
both  cases  the  long  neck  is  most  useful  when  you  have  got  it : 
but  the  question  is  how  it  arose,  and  in  this  species  alone. 
And  similar  and  as  convincing  arguments  could  bo  brought 
against  the  watch-tower  theory  of  origin  as  against  the  high- 


348  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  XL 

reaching  theory,  and  not  only  this,  but  also  against  every 
other  theory  which  could  possibly  be  adduced. 

"  In  reply  to  my  objection  as  to  different  rate  of  increase 
of  strength  and  mass  as  the  animal  increases  in  size  by  the 
supposed  transformation,  Mr.  Wright  remarks,  that  '  the 
neck  may  have  grown  at  the  expense  of  the  hind  parts  in  the 
ancestors  of  the  giraffe ;'  and  adds,  '  if  we  met  with  a  man 
with  a  longer  neck  than  usual,  we  should  not  expect  to  find 
him  heavier,  or  relatively  weaker,  or  requiring  more  food  on 
that  account/  I  reply,  that  if  we  should  not  do  so  it  would 
only  be  from  ignorance ;  for  if,  casteris  paribus,  a  man's  neck 
was  a  quarter  of  an  inch  longer,  he  would  necessarily  and 
inevitably  be  heavier,  less  strong,  and  requiring  more  food, 
minute  though  the  differences  in  these  respects  might  be. 

"  In  considering  criticisms  on  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  drawn 
An  adran-  fr°m  animal  structures  we  must  not  forget  how  very 
llSfedby  great  an  advantage  Mr.  Darwin  has.  He  has  de- 
?heo^a™b!d!  vised  a  theory  according  to  which  any  possible 
periy'b^onT  utility  of  any  organ  is  enough  to  account  for  its 
formation.  It  is  amazing,  then,  that  anything 
whatever  should  be  found  for  which  his  theory  does  not 
readily  account.  Much  wonder  and  admiration  with  regard 
to  that  theory  has  been  expressed,  because  of  the  way  it 
accounts  for  so  many  phenomena,  forgetting  that  this  is  the 
necessary  consequence  of  the  standpoint  he  has  taken  up. 
Let  us  suppose,  for  argument's  sake,  that  the  theory  is 
utterly  wrong ;  yet,  let  but  the  world  be  preponderatingly 
governed  by  intelligence  and  beneficence,  then  the  results  of 
that  very  intelligence  and  beneficence  exhibited  in  organisms 
can  be  made  use  of  to  destroy  the  conception  of  those  qualities 
in  their  supreme  cause,  and  to  substantiate  a  theory  which? 
by  our  supposition,  is  utterly  devoid  of  truth.  It  is  on  this 
account  that  Natural  Selection  can  never  be  completely  proved 
or  disproved  by  physical  science  in  a  posteriori  investigation, 
for  it  will  be  always  open  to  one  side  to  say  the  utility 
not  yet  shown  in  any  given  structure  will  be  shown  later, 
and  to  the  other  side  to  say  whatever  utility  you  show, 


CHAP.  XI.]  AN  EPISODE.  349 

though  existing  iu  an  organ,  was   not  the   cause   of  that 
organ. 

"  This  was  no  doubt  felt  by  the  earlier  opponents  of  Mr. 
Darwin,  who  naturally  opposed  him  on  a  priori  grounds,  and 
the  same  feeling  has  led  his  supporters  to  desiderate  criticism 
from  the  physical-science  standpoint,  which  can  never  be 
quite  conclusive,  and  can  only  be  approximative^  so  by  going 
into  great  detail.  And  this,  when  done,  they  in  turn  affect 
to  sneer  at  as  ' minute' 

Mr.  Chauncey  Wright's  remarks  on  mimicry  do  not  call 
for  reply,  as   it   is  now  conceded   that   imitation  cnticai  de- 
occurs  where  Natural   Selection   cannot   have   de-  talls> 
veloped  it.     In  reply  to  my  criticism  as  to  the  origin  of  the 
mammary  gland,  my  opponent  suggests  that  its  development 
may  have  been  produced  by  a  young  mammal's  clinging  by 
suction  to  the  body  of  its  dam,  this  clinging  causing  sebaceous 
glands  to  be  hypertrophied,  and  this  hypertrophy  causing  their 
secretion  to  become  nutritious.     I  confess  this  seems  to  me  an 
extreme  supposition. 

"  With  regard  to  sexual  selection,  Mr.  Chauncey  Wright 
asks,  '  Is  it  credible  Mr.  Mivart  can  suppose  that  the  higher 
or  spiritual  emotions,  like  affection,  taste,  conscience,  ever 
act  directly  to  modify  or  compete  with  the  more  energetic 
lower  impulses,  and  not  rather  by  forestalling  and  indirectly 
regulating  them  ?'  I  answer,  unhesitatingly,  '  Yes ;'  and  iu 
return  say,  '  Is  it  credible  Mr.  Chauncey  Wright  can  suppose 
they  do  not?' 

"  As  to  apes,  it  is  enough  to  reply,  that  other  animals  are 
also  kept  in  cages,  but  do  not  exhibit  the  phenomena  to  which 
I  iv!l>rred. 

"  Passing  to  the  hoods  and  rattles  of  poisonous  snakes,  Mr. 
Wright  asserts  that  if  '  their  "  warnings  "  are  also  used  against 
intended  victims,  they  can  only  be  used  either  to  paralyse 
them  with  terror  or  allure  them  from  curiosity,'  &c.  Has 
Mr.  Wright  then  never  observed  the  tail  of  a  cat  when  the 
animal  is  watching  a  mouse? 

"  A  somewhat  singular  exhibition  of  the  use  of  the  imagi- 


350  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  XI. 

nation  occurs  where  Mr.  Wright  tells  ns  it  may  be  that  '  the 
rattle  will  serve  all  the  purposes  that  drums,  trumpets,  and 
gongs  do  in  human  warfare.  The  swaying  the  body  and 
vibrating  tongue  of  most  snakes,  and  the  expanding  neck, 
and  the  hood  of  the  cobra,-  may  serve  as  banners.'  I  must 
submit  to  be  blamed  for  my  *  poverty  of  resources '  by  one 
whose  '  reason '  is  supplemented  by  so  active  an  imaginative 
faculty. 

"  In  reviewing  my  chapter  on  Independent  Similarities  of 

An  objection   Structure,  Mr.  Wright  replies  to  my  remarks  as  to 

mathema-na   characters  in  placental  and  implaceutal  mammals 

which  are  similar,  indeed,  but  not  similar  through 

inheritance : — 

"  '  Our  author  ....  has  incautiously  left  a  hostile  force  in  his 
rear.  He  has  claimed  in  the  preceding  chapter  for  Natural  Selection 
that  it  ought  to  have  produced  several  independent  races  of  long- 
necked  Ungulates,  as  well  as  the  giraffe ;  so  that,  instead  of  pursuing 
his  illustrations  any  further,  we  may  properly  demand  his  surrender.' 

"  But  such  a  demand  would  be  futile ;  the  cases,  in  fact, 
being  quite  diesi:nilar.  WTith  regard  to  the  Ungulates  wo 
have  the  action  of  similar  causes  upon  organisms  which,  by 
the  hypothesis,  are  closely  alike ;  in  the  case  of  the  placental 
and  implacental  beasts  we  have  similar  causes  acting  upon 
organisms  which,  by  the  hypothesis,  are  fundamentally 
different. 

"  Certainly,  then,  if  Mr.  Darwin's  theory  is  true,  we  ought 
to  have,  in  the  first  case,  many  similar  forms  developed ;  and 
we  ought  not  to  have  such  in  the  second  case.  Jt  is  just  the 
difference  between  adding  equals  to  equals  and  equals  to 
unequal  s. 

"  Passing  over  Mr.  Chauncey  Wright's  exposition  *  of  our 
Lord's  discourse  to  Nicodemus  (iu  which,  I  fear,  few  Dar- 


*  "  Mr.  Wright  speaks  of '  the  symbols  water  ami  the  Spirit,  which  Christians 
have  ever  since  worshipped.'  It  is  certainly  difficult  to  remember  the  mul- 
titude of  sects  which  have  appeared  since  the  dawn  of  Christianity,  but  the 
existence  of  any  body  of  water-worshippers  strikes  me  as  a  novelty. 


CHAP.  XL]  AN  EPISODE.  ool 

wiuians  will  take  any  interest),   I  proceed  to  notice  what 
Mr.  Wright  exhibits  as  '  a  good  illustration  '  of  the  An  iUustra. 
origin  of  species  by  Natural  Selection  in  the  shape  g^Vtho'ra 
of '  the  growth  of  a  tree.'     It  is  so,  he  tells  us : — 

"  'For  its  branches  arc  selected  growths,  or  few  out  of  many  thousands 
that  have  begun  in  buds ;  and  this  rigorous  selection  has  been  effected 
by  the  accidents  that  have  determined  superior  relations  in  surviving 
growths  to  their  supplies  of  nutriment  in  the  trunk,  and  in  exposure 
to  light  and  air.  This  exposure  (as  great  as  is  consistent  with  secure 
connection  with  the  sources  of  sap)  seems  actually  to  be  sought,  and 
the  form  of  the  tree  to  be  the  result  of  some  foresight  in  it.  But  the 
real  seeking  process  is  budding,  and  the  geometrical  regularity  of  the 
production  of  buds  on  twigs  has  little  or  nothing  to  do  with  the 
ultimate  selected  results,  the  distributions  of  the  branches,  which  are 
different  for  each  individual  tree.' 

"  Now,  I  willingly  accept  this  illustration,  which  I  propose 
to  turn  round  and  make  use  of  against  its  author's  view,  and 
for  the  purpose  of  showing  that  it  exemplifies,  not  '  the  origin 
of  species  by  Natural  Selection,'  but  the  origin  of  species  by 
innate  law,  modified  by  the  subordinate  action  of  Natural 
Selection. 

"  For,  in  fact,  does  not  every  one  know  that,  in  spite  of  theso 
external  influences,  each  kind  of  tree  has  a  certain  general 
character  of  growth  which  is  definite  and  unmistakable.  The 
oak,  the  fir,  the  birch,  &c.,  each  has  its  own  special  fades. 
Mr.  Wright  does  not  deny  this ;  he  says : — 

" '  The  general  resemblance  of  trees  of  a  given  kind  depends  on  no 
formative  principle  other  than  physical  and  physiological  properties  in 
the  woody  tissue,  and  is  related  chiefly  to  the  tenacity,  flexibility,  and 
vascularity  of  this  tissue,  the  degrees  of  which  might  almost  be  inferred 
from  the  general  form  of  the  tree.' 

"  Precisely  so.  But  on  what  do  these  physical  and  physio- 
logical properties  depend?  It  is  useless  to  endeavour  to 
avoid  the  admission  ;  we  shall  always  be  compelled  by  reason 
to  confess  the  existence,  in  each  seed,  of  a  principle,  an 
intimius  prinripium  conditioning  the  evolution  of  the  plant 
according  to  its  nature  and  laws.  To  deny  that  there  is 
a  something  giving  unity  to  the  composite  whole,  and  unity 


352  LESSONS  FKOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  XI. 

of  a  definite  kind,  is  to  contradict  the  plain  evidence  of  our 
senses  and  our  reason. 

"  This  internal  principle  it  is  which  produces  the  character 
of  each  tree's  growth,  while  the  special  details  are  determined 
by  the  action  of  external  influences  upon  it.  Just  in  the 
same  way,  I  believe,  that  an  innate  predisposing  cause  pro- 
duces the  evolution  of  new  species  ;  the  special  details  being 
determined  by  subordinate  agencies,  and  amongst  them  that 
of  Natural  Selection.  Mr.  Wright's  illustration  suits  me  so 
well  I  will  pursue  it  yet  further.  He  observes : — 

" '  If  we  could  study  the  past  and  present  forms  of  life,  not  only  in 
different  continents,  which  we  may  compare  to  different  individual 
trees  of  the  same  kind,  or  better,  perhaps,  to  different  main  branches 
from  the  same  trunk  and  roots,  but  could  also  study  the  past  and 
present  forms  of  life  in  different  planets,  then  diversities  in  the  general 
outlines  would  probably  be  seen  similar  to  those  which  distinguish  dif- 
ferent kinds  of  trees,  as  the  oak,  the  elm,  and  the  pine ;  dependent,  as 
in  these  trees,  on  differences  in  the  physical  and  physiological  properties 
of  living  matters  in  the  different  planets — supposing  the  planets,  of 
course,  to  be  capable  of  sustaining  life,  like  the  earth,  or,  at  least,  to 
have  been  so  at  some  period  in  the  history  of  the  solar  system.' 

"  Precisely  so  once  more !  In  each  case  forms  would  be 
evolved  in  accordance  with  that  innate  potentiality  which 
God  has  implanted  in  each  case  in  the  matter  of  which  such 
planet  was  composed.  Not  that  there,  any  more  than  here, 
all  that  was  potential  would  become  actual,  but  that  the 
innate  potentiality,  modified  by  external  influences,  would  be 
determined  in  special  forms  in  the  production  of  which  the 
innate  power,  not  the  external  conditions,  would  be  the  main 
evolving  agent. 

"  Mr.  Wright  seems  to  consider  that  the  use  of  such  words 
as 'polarity'  and  'luminosity'  tends  to  discourage 
the  investigation  of  the  laws  and  conditions  by  and 
through  which  such  properties  are  manifested.  Mr.  Wright 
tells  us  somewhat  dogmatically  that  '  definite  vital  aggrega- 
tions and  definite  actions  of  vital  forces  exist,  for  the  most 
part,  in  a  world  by  themselves.'  I  should  be  the  last  to 
deny  the  distinctness  of  'vitality,'  but  that  certain  con- 


CHAP.  XL]  AN  EPISODE.  353 

ditions  may  determine  its  sudden  and  definite  manifestation, 
is  maintained  more  strongly  than  ever  by  some  men  of 
science,  and  amongst  them  Dr.  Bastian.  There  is  one  ex- 
pression of  Mr.  Wright's  which  it  will  be  well  to  notice ;  he 
says  :  '  It  is  not  impossible  that  vital  phenomena  themselves 
include  orders  of  forces  as  distinct  as  the  lowest  vital  are  from 
chemical  phenomena.  May  not  the  contrast  of  merely  vital 
or  vegetative  phenomena  with  those  of  sensibility  be  of  such 
order  ?'  I  notice  with  pleasure  this  hopeful  expression.  It 
is  most  true  that  there  are  these  differences  of  order,  but 
there  is  one  more  yet.  The  intellectual  or  rational  order  is 
as  distinct  from  the  merely  sensible  as  is  the  sensible  from 
the  vegetative,  or  this  last  from  the  chemical.  Here  we 
touch  the  one  great  and  fatal  error  of  so  many  of  our  leading 
naturalists.  The  confusion  of  intellect  with  sensation,  of 
reason  with  the  association  of  sensible  images  is,  I  am  per- 
suaded, the  fundamental  speculative  vice  of  the  day.  Before 
concluding  this  reply  there  are  a  few  more  objections  which 
Mr.  Wright  does  me  the  honour  to  make,  that  must  be 
noticed  one  after  the  other. 

"  I  am  represented  as  passing  an  unfair  judgment  because 
I  say  that,  though  feeling  myself  incompetent  to  Verbal  criti. 
advance  an  opinion  as  to  the  correctness  of  Sir  cism8* 
William  Thomson's  astronomical  calculations,  I  yet  assert 
*  that  the  fact  that  they  have  not  been  refuted  pleads  strongly 
in  their  favour,  when  we  consider  how  much  they  tell  against 
the  theory  of  Mr.  Darwin.'  For  my  part  I  am  unable  to  see 
how  an  incompetence  for  judging  astronomical  calculations 
necessarily  carries  with  it  an  incompetence  for  judging  of 
the  probability  of  their  truth,  resulting  from  their  non-refuta- 
tion by  those  whose  interest  would  lead  them  to  refute,  and 
who  possess  the  knowledge  and  ability  to  enable  them  ably 
to  handle  the  requisite  questions  and  calculations. 

"  Again,  Mr.  Wright  does  not  *  see  how,  with  such  uncer- 
tain "  fortuitous,  occasional,  and  intermitting  "  elements,'  I 
'  could  have  succeeded  in  making  any  calculations  at  all.'  I 
venture  to  think,  however,  that  an  inability  to  determine  the 


LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAI>.  XL 

positive  time  required  for  the  occurrence  of  certain  phenomena 
in  no  way  involves  an  inability  to  fix  a  minimum  period  for 
their  development. 

"  Again,  in  criticising  the  use  of  the  words  '  contrivance ' 
and  *  purpose,'  Mr.  Wright  tells  us, '  the  relations  of  a  ma- 
chine to  its  uses  may  be  considered  in  good  sound  English  as 
contrivances  and  purposes  without  thinking  of  what  the  in- 
ventor intended.1  Now  I  deny  that  we  can  so  speak  without 
implicit  reference  of  the  kind,  though  we  need  not  make 
direct  or  explicit  reference.  We  are  also  told  that  '  the 
proper  meaning  of  the  word  "  intention  " '  is  '  concentration,  and 
the  not  intending  of  something  else.'  I  should  be  glad  of 
some  reference  to  authorities  as  regards  this  assertion.  As 
a  fact  the  word  is  used  in  the  sense  I  have  assigned  to  it. 
Finally  Mr.  Wright  gives  us  the  application  of  these  new 
definitions.  He  affirms  that  Mr.  Darwin  is  not  irrational  in 
asking  whether  '  the  Creator  intentionally  ordered '  certain 
phenomena  because  we  cann<3t  reasonably  make  use  of  the 
term  '  intention '  in  reference  to  the  Creator  at  all. 

"It  is  evident,  however,  that  in  Mr.  Darwin's  opinion  we 
can  speak  of  Divine  intention  in  some  things,  otherwise  he 
would  not  ask  whether  we  could  do  so  or  not  even  in  these. 
It  would  be  quite  superfluous  for  any  one  who  believed  we 
could  do  so  in  no  case  to  ask  the  question  with  regard  to 
certain  special  cases.  The  criticism  merely  amounts  to  saying 
that  both  Mr.  Darwin  and  I,  instead  of  .using  the  word 
'intention,'  should  employ  some  other  word,  possibly  'ad- 
vertence.' This  leaves  the  substance  of  my  remarks  and 
rny  criticism  of  Mr.  Darwin  quite  unimpaired  and  in  full 
force. 

"  Thus  I  venture  to  urge,  in  opposition  to  my  critic,  that 

far  from  misinterpreting  Mr.  Darwin,  I  have  been 

enabled  to  bring  out  more  clearly  what  are  his  exact 

position  and  teaching  now,  by  defining  more  exactly  what 

was  his  original  theory  of  the  origin  of  species. 

"Also,  that  though  by  no  means  necessarily  involving 
irreligious  or  anti-teleological  conceptions,  there  is  no  slight 


CHAP.  XI.]  AN  EPISODE.  u55 

clanger  of  the  strengthening  of  these  errors  by  a  certain  use  of 
the  Darwinian  theory. 

"  My  little  book  was  directed  to  two  objects — one  to  show 
that  Natural  Selection  is  not  Hie  origin  of  species ;  the  other, 
that  evolution  is  perfectly  compatible  with  the  strictest 
Christian  orthodoxy:  and,  in  spite  of  my  esteem  for  Mr. 
Cliauncey  Wright,  and  a  careful  and  respectful  consideration 
of  all  that  he  has  urged,  I  cannot  at  present  see  my  way  to 
retracting  or  even  modifying,  in  deference  to  his  criticism, 
even  a  single  passage  of  iny  work  on  '  The  Genesis  of 
Species.' " 


CHAPTER  XII. 

CAUSES. 

"  Truths  vouched  for  by  the  intellect  as  positively  necessary  truths, 
compel  our  acceptance  of  a  First  Cause  with  power,  knowledge,  wisdom 
and  goodness,  and  therefore  prove  the  existence  of  final  causes  also — 
the  existence  of  a  personal  God  being  the  ultimate  lesson  taught  by 
Nature,  that  as  to  its  own  cause." 

AT  the  end  of  the  tenth  chapter  it  was  said  that  the  task  of 
The  axiom  of  considering  what,  if  anything,  can  be  learned  from 
causation.  Nature  as  to  its  own  Causes  yet  remained.  This 
great  question  has  (unavoidably  as  it  seems)  been  already 
incidentally  adverted  to  and  briefly  noticed,  but  it  is  no\v 
tjme  to  consider  it  deliberately  and  expressly. 

In  the  second  chapter  it  was  sought  to  establish  the  pro- 
position that  what  the  mind  positively  declares  to  be  abso- 
lutely, necessarily,  and  universally  true,  -is  true.  One  such 
proposition  is  that  respecting  causation,  as  any  one  can  test  by 
an  act  of  introspection.  The  proposition  referred  to,  is  the 
axiom  that "  every  new  existence  and  every  change  must  liave  a 
cause"  and  another,  equally  evident,  is  that  everything  must 
either  he  absolute  or  caused. 

The  natural  world  displays  before  our  eyes  an  indefinitely 
continuous  series  of  phenomenal  changes,  all  of  which  wo 
know  have  their  appropriate  physical  causes — causes  very 
generally  capable  of  discovery  by  the  physical  sciences, 
science  Science  reveals  to  us  an  apparently  endless  series 

points  to  no  »  J  J       . 

beginning,  of  passed  phenomenal  changes  and  indicates  an 
indefinite  series  to  come,  but  it  does  not  distinctly  and 
unequivocally  point  to  any  beginning.  It  is  quite  con- 


CHAP.  XII.]  CAUSES. '  357 

ceivable  that  the  stellar  universe  may  iu  aeons  of  time 
unceasingly  pulsate  alternately  to  and  fro  from  a  condition  of 
scattered  suns,  planets,  and  satellites,  such  as  we  are  frag- 
nientarily  acquainted  with  now,  to  the  condition  of  an  uni- 
versally diffused  nebular  mist.  It  is  also  conceivable  that  a 
similar  change  may  eternally  creep  over  the  Cosmos  of  suns 
and  worlds,  so  that  each  part  in  its  turn,  but  never  the  whole 
simultaneously,  may  undergo  such  transformation.  Keason 
certainly  does  not  affirm  that  such  changes  may  not  have 
proceeded  in  cycles  from  all  eternity,  owing  to  an  eternal 
collocation  of  causal  factors.  If  such  collocation  But  either  to 
and  factors  be  the  absolute,  then  the  universe  and  First'cause,'0 
its  cause  are  one — in  a  word  we  have  Pantheism. 

The  consideration  of  Pantheism  cannot  be  entered  on 
here  ;  that  Protean  form  of  error,  as  I  believe,  requires  con- 
sideration in  a  separate  work.  It  may  however  be  at  once 
remarked  that,  apart  from  other  a  priori  considerations  of 
reason,  by  which  I  believe  that  it  can  be  adequately  re- 
futed, it  can  be  so  by  the  positive  declarations  of  our  reason 
in  the  matter  of  morality.  Introspection  has  shown  us  that 
there  is  an  absolute  distinction  between  good  and  evil ;  but 
Pantheism  necessarily  denies  that,  with  every  other  absolute 
distinction.  Therefore  unless  the  positive  declarations  of  our 
intellect  as  to  necessary  truth  deceive  us  (in  which  case  wo 
are  driven  into  scepticism  and  can  argue  no  longer,  nor  even 
conclude  that  we  cannot  conclude),  Pantheism  must  be  false. 

If  we  accept  the  other  alternative,  if,  that  is,  we  say  that 
such  collocation  and  factors  are  not  the  absolute,  then  they, 
like  everything  else,  must  be  caused.  That  they  can  be  really 
fortuitous,  is  what  no  modern  philosopher  would  assert, 
chance  being  now  everywhere  recognised  as  a  mere  term 
denoting  our  ignorance  of  causes  and  conditions. 

But  if  such  collocation  and  factors  (which  lie  as  it  were  at 
the  base  of  the  phenomenal  universe)  be  caused,  oronedis- 

'  .  tinct  from  the 

they  cannot  be  caused  by  all  that  series  of  phe-  universe, 
nomena  of    which    they  are   the   condition,    still    less  by 
any  part  of  that  series.     They  must  therefore  bo  caused 


358  :  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CiiAr.  XII. 

by  something  external  to  them ;  i.e.,  by  something  dis- 
tinct from  the  phenomenal  series  itself.  But  if  the  phe- 
nomenal universe  be  eternal,  this  cause  must  also  be 
eternal.  It  must  be  absolute,  as  the  cause  of  everything 
phenomenal  and  relative.  It  must  be  orderly  and  intelligent, 
as  the  first  and  absolute  cause  of  an  orderly  series  of  phe- 
nomena which  reveals  to  us  an  objective  intelligence  in  the 
Bee  and  the  Ant,  which  is  not  that  of  the  animals  them- 
selves, and  which  harmDnizes  with  and  is  recognised  by  our 
own  intellect.  It  must  be  adequate  to  produce  all  the  phe- 
nomena which  our  powers  of  observation  and  introspection 
tell  us  have  been  produced,  such  as  power,  intelligence, 
morality,  and  will.  We  thus,  as  it  seems,  arrive  necessarily 
at  the  conception  of  an  absolute  First  Cause,  and  an  accept- 
ance of  that  conception  as  a  truth  demonstrated  to  us  by 
Reason.  But  an  absolute  First  Cause,  which  amongst  its 
attributes  has  power,  intelligence,  goodness,  and  volition, 
such  as  find  their  faint  and  inadequate  types  in  our  own 
faculties,  necessarily  involves  another  and  second  kind  of 
causation.  It  must,  as  "Will,"  have  such  an  intensity  of 
"  purpose  "  that  no  human  purpose  can  be  comparable  with 
Toother  it.  Hence  necessarily  follows  the  second  kind  of 

with  final  ,  * 

causation.  causation  just  referred  to,  namely,  final  causality— 
the  enchainment  of  all  phenomena  and  their  adapta- 
tion to  ends  in  a  hierarchy  of  augmenting  activities  from 
celestial  revolutions  and  the  attractions  and  cohesions  of 
sidereal  masses  through  vegetable  life  and  animal  sen- 
tiency  up  to  self-consciousness  and  free  volition;  so  that 
from  kingdom  to  kingdom  (mineral,  vegetable,  animal  and 
rational)  the  creation  may  rise  towards  an  ideal,  by  suc- 
cessively higher  degrees  of  participation  in  the  perfection  of 
the  First  Cause  itself. 

Whether  this  teleological  conception,  this  idea  of  final 
causation,  can  be  gathered  from  mere  irrational  nature 
directly  or  not,  it  can  most  certainly  be  obtained  from  a 
consideration  of  nature  in  its  broadest  sense — nature  of 
which  our  own  self-consciousness  forms  a  part.  This,  then, 


CHAP.  XII.]  CAUSES.  o59 

is  the  last  and  the  highest  lesson  which  Nature  has  to  teach 
us — the  revelation  of  its  own  causation  and  the  indication 
(through  the  sentient  and  rational  faculties  of  creatures)  of 
the  being  and  attributes  of  its  First  Cause  and  Author, 
which,  as  absolute  Power,  Intelligence,  Goodness,  and  Will, 
is  and"  must  be  God. 

But  does  this  conception  afford  us  any  natural  key  where- 
with to  unlock  the  mysteries  of  the  mode  of  God's  Thussuppiy- 
loanifestation  in  nature,  the  meaning  of  the  un-  Evolution, 
censing  changes  it  presents  —  the  great  process  of  Evolu- 
tion ?  I  believe  it  does.  The  First  Cause  must  not  only 
have  a  purpose,  but,  as  intelligent,  he  cannot  be  self- 
contradictory,  and  hence  necessarily  follows  the  continuity 
of  cosinical  evolution.  By  the  union  of  -these  two  laws, 
(1)  continuity  and  (2)  final  causality,  the  whole  phenomena 
of  the  universe — physical,  biological,  political,  moral,  and 
religious — may  be  explained  and  understood  as  a  continuous 
evolution  towards  a,  preordained  end. 

Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  has  elaborated  a  vast  and  coherent 
conception  of  the  whole  process  of  evolution,  which  Mr.spencer-s 

,  .1-1  T  •      evolutionary 

he  represents  as  taking  place  according  to  an  uni-  formula. 
versal  law  of  progress  from  a  state  of  unstable  uniformity 
having  few  and  indefinite  characters  to  a  state  of  stable 
diversity  with  a  multitude  of  definite  characters.  He  con- 
ceives that  everything  in  the  material  universe  is  proceeding, 
in  his  own  words,  "from  an  indefinite  incoherent  homogeneity 
to  a  definite  coherent  heterogeneity"  He  brings  forward,  how- 
ever, no  explanatory  basis  of  this  law.  His  system  enables 
us  to  see  neither  the  origin,  the  ultimate  future,  nor  the  sus- 
taining principle  of  such  evolutionary  process.  The  philo- 
sophy here  advocated,  on  the  contrary,  shows  us  the  origin, 
basis,  and  outcome  of  this  great  process,  by  means  of  those 
fundamental  truths  which  occupied  us  in  the  first  two 
chapters.  By  means  of  our  knowledge  of  the  self-conscious, 
persistent  Ego,  with  its  power  of  knowing  positive,  objective, 
necessary  truth,  we  have  arrived  at  the  conception  of  a 
necessary  First  Cause  with  intelligence  and  will,  and  conse- 


3GO  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  XIL 

quently,  as  just  said,  the  cause  of  an  universe  with  both 
continuity  and  purpose. 

We  have  also  seen,  in  the  succeeding  chapters,  how  the 
-Purpose-     process  of  evolution,  as  carried  through  the  material 

as  sbown  in111  111  /»  •    -i  • 

Nature.  world,  shows  us  the  development  irom  potentiality 
into  actuality  of  successively  new  forms.  We  cannotlndeed 
imagine  the  ultimate  "  how  "  of  their  production  (which  as 
being  beyond  experience  is  necessarily  beyond  imagination), 
but  we  recognise  the  fact  that  they  are  so  evolved ;  and  \ve 
have,  in  some  cases,  already  gleaned  a  few  of  the  conditions 
of  their  evolution.  In  passing  to  the  vegetable  world  from 
the  mineral  kingdom,  we  behold  manifested,  for  the  first 
time,  a  vital  form,  or  force.  In  passing  to  the  animal  world 
from  the  vegetable  kingdom,  we  behold  manifested,  for  the 
first  time,  a  sentient  form.  In  passing  to  the  human  world 
from  the  kingdom  of  brute  animals,  we  behold  manifested, 
for  the  first  time,  a  rational  form. 

Thus  modern  science  shows  us  plainly  the  truth  proclaimed 
of  old — that  a  successively  increasing  fulfilment  of  purpose 
runs  through  the  irrational  creation  up  to  man.  The  in- 
organic world  can  do  without  the  organic,  but  not  vice  versa.  ^ 
The  vegetable  world  can  exist  without  the  animal,  but  not 
vice  versa.  The  animal  world  can  do  without  the  rational 
world  as  experienced  by  us,  but  not  vice  versa.  Cosmical 
entities  and  their  laws  do,  then,  serve  organic  being  more 
than  inorganic,  sentient  being  more  than  insentient,  rational 
being  more  than  sentient.  Therefore  if  there  is  inten- 
tion and  will  in  the  First  Cause  at  all  (and  we  have  seen 
that  to  deny  it  is  to  contradict  reason),  He  must  have 
willed  most  service  to  man  of  all  the  multitude  of  creatures 
which  our  senses  make  known  to  us.  It  is  not  surprising 
then  that  we  find  the  same  law  of  progress  to  extend  through 
the  evolution  of  human  society.  In  politics,  in  law,  in  science, 
in  art,  and  in  religion,  we  find  the  same  law  of  evolution — 
continuity  and  final  causality  resulting  in  the  manifestation  of 
increasingly  stable,  coherent,  definite,  and  complex  varieties 
of  being. 


CHAP.  XII.]  CAUSES.  3(-l 

Hence  we  get  the  formal  law  of  Cosinical  Evolution — 
whereof  Mr.  Spencer's  law  is  the  material  expres-  Fom,aUaw 
sion.  This  formal  law  may  be  defined  as  .the  con-  of  tvolution- 
tinuous  progress  of  the  material  universe  by  the  unfolding 
of  latent  potentialities  through  the  action  of  incident  forces 
(i.e.,  through  the  interaction  of  its  parts)  in  harmony  with 
a  preordained  end,  such  unfolding  exhibiting  a  succession 
of  changes  from  indefinite,  incoherent  homogeneity  to  definite 
coherent  heterogeneity. 

But  if  the  conception  of  an  Infinite  and  Absolute  Being, 
Omniscient,  Omnipotent,  and  Holv.  be  thus  taught  Non-theistic 

1_      XT  i  ii  •"  views :  Mr. 

by  JNature,  what  are  the  causes  ot  its  non-acceptance  spencer-s. 
by  prominent  teachers  of  science  and  philosophy  in  our  own 
clay  ?     What  reasons  are  brought  forward  against  it  ? 

Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  is  the  most  decided  upholder  of  the 
necessity  and  truth  of  a  conception  of  a  First  Cause.  But 
this  he  speaks  of  as  the  Unknowable,  and  denies  our  right 
to  ascribe  to  it  any  attribute  other  than  existence,  or  to 
attribute  to  it  personality.  But,  in  the  first  place,  not  to 
speak  of  it  by  that  term  is  practically  to  degrade  it  to  a  lower 
level  than  ourselves,  though  this  is  by  no  means  Mr.  Spencer's 
intention.  It  has  this  practical  effect,  because  we  cannot 
conceive  anything  as  impersonal  and  yet  of  a  higher  nature 
than  our  own.  And,  indeed,  this  circumstance  is  not  owing 
to  a  mere  mental  impotence,  but  to  a  positive  and  clear  per- 
ception. For  to  be  a  person,  means  to  be  a  being  possessing 
knowledge  and  will;  and  any  being  which  has  not  these 
faculties  must  be  indefinitely  inferior  to  one  which  has  them. 
The  First  Cause,  as  the  cause  of  all  knowledge — including 
knowledge  of  good  and  evil,  and  all  power  of  will — must  be 
adequate  to  their  production.  He  must  possess  therefore 
attributes  analogous  to  these  qualities  as  known  in  ourselves, 
though  of  course  infinite  in  degree.  Personality  therefore 
must  be  predicated  of  the  First  Cause,  under  pain  of  violating 
the  primary  dicta  of  our  reason. 

The  inadequacy  and,  to  speak  plainly,  the  absurdity  of  this 
"Unknowable"  has  been  considered  in  the  twelfth  chapter 


362  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  XII. 

of  the  '  Genesis  of  Species,'  as  also  its  bearing  on  our  con- 
ceptions of  religion,  which  Mr.  Spencer  pretends  through 
it  to  reconcile  with  science ;  though  as  to  such  reconciliation 
Mr.  Lewes  truly  observes  *  that  we  can  never  "  successfully 
found  a  Religion  on  the  admission  of  this  unknowable ;  for 
Eeligion,  wkich  is  to  explain  the  universe  and  regulate  life, 
must  be  founded  on  the  known  and  knowable  relations." 
But,  indeed,  Mr.  Spencer's  system  necessarily  negatives  every 
form  of  religion,  since  he  distinctly  affirms  that  "  Theism  " 
is  "  incredible,"  and  that  no  "  form  of  Religion  "  is  "  even 
thinkable." 

Professor  Huxley,  however,  tells  us  that  the  necessity  of  a 
Processor  belief  in  a  personal  God,  in  order  to  a  religion  worthy 
Huxley's.  o£  ^  name? «  js  a  matter  of  opinion !"  Of  course  the 
word  religion  may  be  employed  in  some  unusual  sense.  I  re- 
collect reading  of  a  certain  Emersonian  who,  having  accom- 
panied his  wife  to  see  Fanny  Elsler  dance,  and  being  charmed, 
remarked  to  her  during  the  performance — "Margaret,  this 
is  poetry."  To  which  his  wife  replied — "No,  Paul,  it  is 
religion  ! "  Of  such  religion  I  willingly  make  a  present  to 
Professor  Huxley.  But,  apart  from  such  bizarre  employ- 
ments of  the  word,  I  firmly  adhere  to  my  proposition.  I 
know  that  Buddhism,  though  "a  religion,"  is  sometimes 
asserted  to  be  atheistic ;  but  the  Buddhistic  conception  of  a 
power  or  principle  apportioning  after  death  rewards  and 
punishments  according  to  a  standard  of  virtue,  necessarily 
involves  the  existence  of  an  entity,  which,  as  being  most 
powerful,  intelligent,  and  good,  is  virtually,  and  logically,  a 
personal  God,  whatever  may  be  the  name  habitually  applied 
to  it. 

I  do  not  know  what  precise  meaning  Professor  Huxley 
himself  would  give  to  the  word  religion.  He  speaks  of 
"  worship,  '  for  the  most  part  of  the  silent  sort,'  at  the  altar 
of  the  Unknown  and  Unknowable,"  but  he  has  not  (as  far  as 
I  recollect)  explained  to  us  as  yet  the  full  and  exact  nature 


'  Problems  of  Life  and  Miud,'  vol.  ii.  p.  453. 


CHAP.  XII.]  CAUSES.  363 

and  tenets  of  that  religion  the  ritual  of  which  is  thus  hinted 
at.  Mr.  Darwin's  conception  of  religion  is,  however,  suffi- 
ciently definite.  He  tells  us*  that  it  consists  "of  love,  com- 
plete submission  to  an  exalted  and  mysterious  superior,  a 
strong  sense  of  dependence,  fear,  reverence,  gratitude,  hope 
lor  the  future,  and  perhaps  other  elements." 

Let  us  apply  this  to  the  Unknown  and  the  Unknowable. 
*•  Love  "  for  that  of  which  we  can  by  no  possibility  The  Un, 
know  anything  whatever,  and  to  which  we  may  as  knowable- 
reasonably  attribute  hideousness  and  all  vileness,  as  beauty 
and  goodness!  "Dependence"  on  that  of  which  treachery 
and  mendacity  may  be  as  much  characteristics  as  are  faith- 
fulness and  truth  !  "  Beverence  "  for  an  entity,  whose  quali- 
ties, if  any,  may  resemble  as  much  all  we  despise  as  all 
we  esteem,  and  which,  for  all  we  know,  may  be  indebted 
to  our  faculties  for  any  recognition  of  its  existence  at  all ! 
"  Gratitude  "  to  that  which  we  have  not  the  faintest  reason 
to  suppose  ever  willingly  did  anything  for  us,  or  ever  will ! 
"  Jlope "  in  what  we  have  no  right  whatever  to  believe 
may  not,  with  equal  justice,  be  a  legitimate  cause  for  despair 
as  pitiless,  inexorable,  and  unfeeling,  if  capable  of  any  sort 
of  intelligence  whatever. 

This  is  no  exaggeration.  Every  word  here  put  down  is 
strictly  accurate,  for  if  that  which  underlies  all  things  is  to  us 
the  unknowable,  then  there  can  be  no  reason  to  predicate  of 
it  any  one  character  rather  than  its  opposite.  If,  on  the 
other  hand,  we  have  any  reason  to  predicate  goodness  rather 
than  malice,  nobility  rather  than  vileness,  then  let  preachers 
of  the  unknowable  abandon  their  unmeaning  jargon,  for  it  is 
no  longer  with  the  unknowable  we  have  to  deal,  and  we  are 
plunged  at  once  into  a  whole  world  of  as  distinctly  dogmatic 
theology  as  can  be  conceived — a  theology  the  dogmas  of 
which  are  profoundly  mysterious,  while  they  are  even  more 
trying,  and  at  the  same  time  more  illuminating,  to  the 
reason,  than  any  others  of  the  whole  catena  which  logically 

follow.  

*  '  Descent  of  Man,'  vol.  i.  p.  63. 


364  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUKE.  [CiiAr.  XII. 

The  objections  drawn  from  natural  science  to  a  belief  in 
Fiveobjeo  a  Divine  First  Cause,  which  have  been  of  late  made 

tions  to  .  ,  1-11  oil 

Theism.        popular,  seem  to  be  reducible  to  nve  heads. 

The  first  of  these  is  that  "  wisdom  "  and  "  purpose  "  are 
not  discernible  in  nature ;  but  rather  that  its  failures,  and 
the  prodigal  waste  (as  of  germs)  which  it  shows,  contradict 
the  conception  of  final  causes  altogether. 

The  second  objection  is  that  "  Omnipotence "  cannot  be 
predicated  of  a  rational  and  good  Author  of  Nature,  because 
of  the  failures  just  referred  to  and  the  suffering  which  every- 
where exists. 

The  third  objection  is  that  "  morality  "  must  be  denied  to 
the  First  Cause  on  account  of  the  pain  and  death  strewn 
broadcast  over  the  world,  and  on  account  of  the  unworthiness 
of  some  natural  productions. 

The  fourth  objection  is  one  which  really  applies  only  to 
those  who  feel  themselves  rationally  compelled  to  regard  the 
First  Cause  as  a  Creator.  But  as  a  distinguished  school  of 
philosophy,  though  not  that  advocated  here,  accepts  that 
view,  and  as  it  is  one  necessarily  held  by  Christians  as  a 
revealed  truth,  it  may  be  well  here  to  refer  to  it.  This 
fourth  objection  is  that  the  acceptance  of  Evolution  negatives 
a  belief  in  Creation. 

The  fifth  objection  is  that  the  conception  of  a  personal 
God  is  a  pure  figment  of  the  human  imagination,  and,  as 
anthropomorphic,  is  necessarily  false  ;  as  also  that  it  is  belied 
by  the  material  world,  which  evidently  is  not  formed  and 
governed  (if  governed  at  all)  as  it  would  be  by  an  Anthro- 
pomorphic Deity. 

The  position  here  taken  up  is  the  same  as  that  maintained 
in  the  'Genesis  of  Species' — namely,  that  the  attributes  of 
the  first  cause  are  (as  has  been  before  said)  to  be  gathered  from 
the  consideration  of  nature  as  a  whole,  of  nature  including 
man,  and  not  from  the  consideration  of  irrational  nature  only. 

A  Divine  First  Cause  is  recognised  by  our  intellect  as  a 
necessary  consequence  of  our  perception  of  necessary  truth 
and  of  absolute  morality. 


CHAP.  XIL]  CAUSES.  365 

This  Divine  First  Cause,  thus  recognised  by  our  intellect 
as  necessarily  existing,  is  more  or  less  qualitatively  revealed 
to  us  in  the  material  universe  according  as  we  extend  the 
sphere  of  our  observations.  It  is  concealed  most  completely 
when  the  inanimate  creation  is  alone  considered.  It  seems 
to  assume  a  Pantheistic  form  when  we  rise  no  higher  than 
the  brute  creation.  If  man  alone  occupies  our  attention,  a 
narrow  anthropomorphic  Deism  may  be  the  result ;  but  from . 
a  sympathetic  study  of  the  whole  universe — the  mineral, 
vegetable,  animal,  and  human  creations,  including  intellect, 
morality,  and  will — the  conception  of  Almighty  God  becomes 
naturally  and  distinctly  revealed  to  the  human  intellect. 

Sir  William  Hamilton  has  said :  *  "  Nature  conceals  God, 
and  man  reveals  Him."  This  is  too  unqualified  a  statement. 
Rather,  physical  nature  reveals  to  us  one  side  of  the  Deity, 
while  the  moral  world  brings  us  in  contact  with  another, 
and  at  first,  to  our  apprehension,  a  very  different  one; 
though  the  difference  may  be  soon  perceived  to  proceed,  not 
from  reason,  but  from  a  want  of  flexibility  of  the  imagina- 
tion— a  want  so  exceedingly  common,  especially  amongst 
those  whose  minds  have  been  long  immersed  in  physical 
studies  only. 

"  The  theist,  having  arrived  at  his  theistic  convictions  from 
quite  other  sources  than  a  consideration  of  zoological  or 
botanical  phenomena,  comes  to  the  consideration  of  such 
phenomena  and  views  them  in  a  theistic  light,  without,  of 
course,  asserting  or  implying  that  such  light  has  been  derived 
from  them"  f 

The  only  part  that  irrational  nature  can  be  reasonably 
railed  upon  to  play  in  this  matter  is  the  part  of  a  test  as  to 
the  validity  of  our  conceptions  concerning  the  First  Cause 
derived  from  a  contemplation  of  nature  as  a  whole  and 
primarily  of  our  own  human  nature. 

Let  us  apply  then  this  test  to  the  first  of  the  five  objec- 


*  '  Lectures  on  Metaphysics  and  Logic,"  vol.  i.    Lccturo  ii.  p.  40. 
f  '  Genesis  of  Spcciea,'  2nd  edition,  p.  29(J. 


360  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  XII. 

lions  above  mentioned,  namely,  that  to  our  conception  of 
First  objco  "  wisdom  "  and  "  purpose  "  as  attributes  of  the  First 
gai"typofdNa-  Cause.  As  has  been  said,  these  objections  are  often 
drawn  from  nature's  seemingly  blind  prodigality, 
when  "  of  a  thousand  seeds  she  often  brings  but  one  to  bear." 
Mr.  Lewes,  with  this  idea  in  his  mind,  asks  *  whether  wo 
should  consider  that  man  wise,  who  spilt  a  gallon  of  wine  in 
order  to  fill  a  wine-glass  ? 

To  this  sort  of  objection  it  may  be  replied  that  even  man  has 
often  several  distinct  intentions  and  motives  for  a  single  act ; 
and  any  one  who  believes  in  God  can  have  no  difficulty  in 
supposing  that  the  purpose  of  any  natural  process,  as  it  is 
apparent  to  the  human  observer,  may  be  but  an  exceedingly 
subordinate  one  out  of  an  infinite  number  of  motives  in  the 
Divine  mind.  Baden  Powell  has  well  asked :  f  "  How  can 
we  undertake  to  affirm,  amid  all  the  possibilities  of  things  of 
which  we  confessedly  know  so  little,  that  a  thousand  ends 
and  purposes  may  not  be  answered,  because  we  can  trace 
none,  or  even  imagine  none,  which  seem  to  short-sighted 
faculties  to  be  answered  in  these  particular  arrangements  ?" 

But  even  we  are  often  able  to  detect  utilities  which  become 
apparent  long  after  events,  which  at  first  were  apparently 
purposeless,  have  taken  place.  As  an  illustration  of  long 
latent  utility,  the  immense  coal  deposits  may  bs  cited.  On 
this  subject  Professor  Huxley  remarks  :  "  Let  us  suppose  that 
one  of  the  stupid  salamander-like  Labyrinthodonts,  which 
pottered  with  much  belly  and  little  leg,  like  Falstaff  in  his 
old  age,  among  the  coal-forests,  could  have  had  thinking 
power  enough  in  his  small  brain  to  reflect  upon  the  showers 
of  spores  which  kept  on  falling  through  years  and  centuries, 
while  perhaps  not  one  in  ten  million  fulfilled  its  apparent 
purpose,  and  reproduced  the  organism  which  gave  it  birth." 
And  the  writer  goes  on  to  imagine  the  creature  "  moralising 
upon  the  thoughtless  and  wanton  extravagance  which  nature 
displayed  in  her  operations!"  Yet  this  " thoughtless  extrn- 

*  '  Fortnightly  Review,'  July  1807,  p.  100. 
t  '  Unity  of  Worlds,'  Essay  ii.  p.  2GO. 


CHAP.  XII.]  CAUSES.  367 

vagance  "  has  resulted  in  providing  us  with  our  coal  treasure 
— a  worthy  gift  of  thoughtful  and  provident  beneficence. 

But  the  idea  of  God  implies  the  one  cause  of  all  the  pro- 
cesses of  nature.  He  wills  and  intends  them  all,  and  there- 
fore whatever  results  must  be  a  fulfilment  of  His  intention. 
When  the  matter  of  the  artist's  or  the  philosopher's  brain 
comes  to  feed  worms,  it  fulfils  God's  purpose  no  less  than 
when  it  energises  in  creations  of  genius  or  of  wisdom.  It  is 
as  impossible  for  any  accident  to  defeat  the  purpose  of  Him 
whose  will  ordains  every  process,  as  it  is  for  the  irreligious 
man,  by  his  voluntary  revolt  and  anti-religious  efforts,  to  do 
other  than  stultify  himself  by  hastening  on  the  fulfilment  of 
God's  own  purpose. 

It  may  not  be  uninteresting  to  some  of  my  readers  to  see 
how  clearly  this  conception,  which  seems  so  to  escape  An  old  m. 
the  grasp  of  our  modern  "  advanced  "  thinkers,  was  swer> 
a  familiar  idea  in  the  thirteenth  century.  St.  Thomas 
Aquinas  *  on  this  matter  says  :  "  Quod  si  aliqua  causa  parti- 
cularis  deficiat  a  suo  effectu,  hoc  est  propter  aliquam  causam 
particularem  impediantem  qua3  continetur  sub  ordine  causae 
universalis.  Unde  effectus  ordinem  causze  universalis  nullo 
modo  potest  exire."  .  .  . .  "  Sicut  indigestio  contingit  praeter 
ordinem  virtutis  nutritive  ex  aliquo  impedimento,  porta  ex 
grossitie  cibi,  quam  necesse  est  reducere  in  aliam  causam,  et 
sic  usque  ad  causam  primam  universalem.  Cum  igitur  Deus 
sit  prima  causa  universalis  non  unius  generis  tantum,  sed 
universaliter  totius  cutis,  impossibile  est  quod  aliquid  contiu- 
gat  practer  ordinem  divinfe  gubernationis ;  sed  ex  hoc  ipsc 
quod  aliquid  ex  una  parte  videtur  exire  at  ordine  divinao 
providentia?,  quo  consideratur  secundam  aliquam  particula- 
rem causam,  necesse  est  quod  in  eundem  ordinem  relabatur 
secundum  aliam  causam." 

The  second   objection  (that  to  the  Omnipotence  of  the 
First  Cause),  in  so  far  as  it  relates  to  failure  of  second 
purpose,  has  been  answered  in  answering  the  first  tlon- 

*  'Surama  Thcol.,'  p.  i.  Q.  19,  A.  G,  and  Q.  103,  A.  1. 


338  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  XII. 

objection ;  in  so  far  as  it  relates  to  the  wide  diffusion  of  suf- 
fering, it  may  be  answered  in  answering  that  which  follows. 
Third  objec-  The  third  objection,  then,  that  to  God's  goodness, 
death.  made  partly  on  account  of  the  pain  and  death 
diffused  through  the  world,  and  partly  on  account  of  the 
seeming  unworthiness  of  some  natural  products,  may  now  be 
considered. 

As  regards  the  sufferings  of  living  men  and  women,  a  belief 
in  the  immortality  of  the  soul  (which,  as  we  shall  see,  follows 
as  one  of  the  consequences  of  the  propositions  the  truth  of 
which  is  supported  in  this  and  in  the  preceding  chapters)  suf- 
ficiently does  away  with  the  force  of  the  objection  in  then 
regard.  Granted  a  Deus  unus  et  remunerator  together  with 
this  immortality,  and  it  becomes  readily  conceivable  that  the 
sufferings  of  this  life  may  be  hereafter  looked  upon  by  us  as" 
truly  blessings  in  disguise.  Indeed,  paradoxical  as  the  ques- 
tion may  sound,  it  may  be  asked,  Could  we,  even  apart  from 
these  beliefs,  afford  to  lose  pain  and  suffering  altogether  ? 
All  that  is  most  admirable  and  beautiful  in  human  life  and 
character  would  be  lost  were  there  no  opportunities  or  occa- 
sions for  generous  self-denial,  loving  pity,  tender  compassion, 
and  ardent  philanthropic  effort. 

The  difficulty  then  lies  in  the  sufferings  of  the  brute 
sufferings  of  creation,  and  this  is  a  difficulty  now  felt  very 
brutes.  widely  and  with  extreme  acuteness  by  those  who 
possess  the  tenderest  hearts  and  natures  the  most  worthy  of 
our  esteem  and  regard. 

Nevertheless,  I  believe  that  the  difficulty  felt  is  mainly 
owing  to  a  misconception,  namely,  to  that  inverted  anthro- 
pomorphism (treated  of  in  Chap.  VII.)  which  makes  men 
and  women  so  generally  attribute  experiences  like  their 
own  to  brute  animals.  But  even  in  men  and  women  suffer- 
ing depends  mainly  on  the  mental  state  of  the  sufferer. 
Only  during  consciousness  does  it  exist  at  all,  and  only  in 
the  most  highly-organized  men  does  it  reach  its  acme. 
Savages  seem  generally  to  have  far  less  sensitiveness  to 
pain  than  have  cultivated  and  refined  human  beings.  The 


CHAP.  XII.]  CAUSES.  369 

direness  of  pain  consists  in  the  knowledge  of  it ;  in  that  in- 
tellectual agony  which  recollects  past  moments  and  anti- 
cipates the  future  ones — a  condition  necessarily  existing  in 
a  being  capable  of  "  looking  before  and  after."  As,  again, 
our  nature  is  an  intellectual  one,  that  nature  enters  into 
all  our  feelings,  and  therefore  we  cannot  argue  with  any 
exactness  from  our  feelings  to  those  of  brutes,  because  we 
cannot  imagine  what  feelings  altogether  devoid  of  intellect 
can  be.  And  though,  of  course,  animals  feel,  they  do  not 
Jcnow  that  they  feel,  nor  reflect  upon  the  sufferings  they  have 
had  or  will  have  to  endure.  And  if  even  the  lowest  races  of 
men  feel  less  physical  pain  than  we  do,  how  much  less  may 
be  the  physical  suffering  of  even  the  highest  brutes  than  that 
of  the  lowest  men  ?  Tears,  cries,  writhings,  and  other  signs, 
such  as  are  normally  in  us  the  expressions  of  suffering,  are 
not  necessarily  such  even  in  ourselves,  as  in  the  case  of  the 
lady's  finger  before  referred  to.*  They  may  be,  and  often 
are,  the  mere  accompaniments  of  reflex  nervous  action,  and 
may,  in  brutes,  even  when  accompanying  feelings,  accompany 
feelings  widely  different  from  our  own. 

Who  that  has  seen  how  a  daddy-long-legs  returns  again 
and  again  to  a  lighted  candle,  after  first  one  leg  and  then 
another  has  been  burnt  in  the  flame,  can  think  that  the 
creature  really  suffers  ?  And  if  this  spectacle  does  not  con- 
sole the  compassionate  observer,  let  him  reflect  that  if  a  wasp, 
when  enjoying  a  meal  of  honey,  has  its  slender  waist  suddenly 
snipped  through  and  its  whole  abdomen  cut  away,  it  does  not 
allow  such  a  trifle  to  interrupt  for  a  moment  its  pleasurable 
repast,  but  it  continues  to  rapidly  devour  the  savoury  food, 
which  escapes  as  rapidly  from  its  mutilated  thorax. 

That  portion  of  the  present  objection  to  God's  goodness 
which  reposes   on  the  supposed    unworthiness  of  Apparently 
certain  natural  actions  and  productions  is  also  due  phenomena. 
in  part  to  inverted  anthropomorphism,  in  part  to  anthropo- 
morphism itself. 

*  See  ante  p.  221. 
17 


370  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  XII. 

If  we  alone  of  all  animals  are  endowed  with  a  moral 
nature,  the  due  exercise  of  that  nature  is,  of  course,  the  one 
thing  for  us.  But  we  have  already  considered  how  actions 
may  be  materially  moral  yet  formally  immoral  (as  an  act  of 
kindness  done  for  a  base  end),  or  materially  immoral  yet 
formally  moral  (as  when,  a  false  .conscience  having  been 
formed,  an  act  really  wrong  is  believed  by  the  doer  to  be  a 
right  act).  Creatures  that  have  not  a  moral  nature  at  all  can 
of  course  do  nothing  either  "  moral "  or  "  immoral."  Thus 
ants  that  make  slaves,  or  insects  which  lay  their  eggs  in  the 
bodies  of  other  insects,  do  nothing  wrong.  Nor  is  there  any- 
thing really  cruel  in  the  bloodthirstiness  of  a  tiger  or  really 
impure  in  the  apparent  lasciviousness  of  an  ape.  It  follows 
therefore  that  those  who  believe  in  the  existence  of  angelic 
beings  may  conceive  such  beings  as  looking  on  with  perfect 
complacency  at  brutes  performing  actions  which  in  us  would 
be  the  expression  of  the  last  degree  of  vileness,  filthiness,  or 
cruelty,  and  which  naturally  cannot  be  contemplated  ly  us 
without  disgust  because  of  their  unconscious  association  by 
us  with  analogous  imaginary  human  actions.  Such  actions 
would  he  thus  complacently  contemplated  by  immaterial  in- 
telligences, because  such  actions  in  brutes  are  not  and  can- 
not be  either  vile,  filthy  or  cruel,  seeing  the  performers  are 
but  sentient  automata  and  the  actions  themselves  blameless 
apart  from  rational  will. 

Yet,  as  just  said,  such  actions  tend  to  be  regarded  by  us  as 
really  disgusting  or  wrong  in  themselves,  because  we  habitually 
and  naturally  regard  them  from  the  human  point  of  view. 
It  is  this  which  causes  a  difficulty  to  exist  in  some  persons' 
minds  in  believing  certain  productions  to  be  expressly  willed 
by  the  First  Cause,  because  such  persons  unconsciously 
attribute  to  that  Cause  the  human  point  of  view.  The 
structure  of  certain  parts  of  some  of  the  apes,  both  of  the  old 
and  the  new  world,  and  the  forms  assumed  by  certain  fungi, 
may  serve  as  examples.  But  the  feelings  which  arise  in  us, 
the  sentiments  inspired  by  the  aspect  of  such  parts  or  forms, 
are  essentially  human  and  human  only.  In  themselves,  ob- 


CHAP.  XII.]  CAUSES.  371 

jectively,  they  Lave  doubtless  beauty  and  perfection  such  as 
we  elsewhere  readily  recognise,  though  such  qualities  are  dis- 
guised from  us  by  our  human  prejudices.  It  is  surely  quite 
conceivable  that  even  to  us,  as  disembodied  spirits,  such 
actions  and  productions  as  those  referred  to  may  appear 
in  an  altogether  different  light,  and  we  may,  so  to  speak, 
smile  at  the  childishness  of  the  notion  that  there  could  be 
anything  worthy  of  even  the  faintest  disapproval  in  that 
which  has  really  no  moral  character  whatever,  but  which 
to  us  as  men  is  revolting  or  disgusting.  Yet  our  intellect 
sees  no  difficulty  in  at  once  believing  that,  under  certain  con- 
ditions, what  is  disgusting  to  us  may  be  really  most  admir- 
able, e.g.,  that  a  filthy  mendicant,  loathsome  with  cutaneous 
disease  and  intolerable  to  smell  as  much  as  to  sie;ht  but 

o 

with  a  will  most  rightly  directed,  may  really  be  one  of  the 
noblest  and  most  glorious  objects  which  the  whole  material 
universe  presents  to  its  Divine  Author,  and  that  angels  would 
turn  away  with  indifference  from  what  men  most  admire  to 
contemplate  such  a  spectacle. 

Can  there,  then,  be  any  real  difficulty  in  accepting  the 
belief  that  the  whole  material  Universe,  and  all  the  actions 
(apart  from  human  volition)  performed  by  it,  are  really 
beautiful,  from  the  superhuman  point  of  view,  however  much 
the  one-sidedness  of  our  view  of  part  of  it  (through  the 
associations  of  purely  human  feeling)  may  disguise  the  beauty 
of  such  part  from  us  ? 

The  fourth  objection,  that  as  to  the  conflict  between  the 
ideas  of  "evolution"  and  "creation,"  has  been  Fourth  oitfoc- 
specially  treated  of  in  the  last  chapter  of  the  t!on'npga-u 
'  Genesis  of  Species.'  Here  I  will  but  reaffirm  that  turn. 
the  distinction  between  primary  creation  and  secondary  or 
derivative  creation,  entirely  does  away  with  the  difficulty. 
If,  with  the  great  St.  Augustine,  we  believe  that  the  whole 
material  universe  was  created  in  one  instant,  and  further 
accept  the  view  that  all  its  organisms  were  then  created  not 
actually  but  potentially  (to  be  subsequently  evolved  into 
actual  existence  at  due  times  and  seasons  when  the  conditions 


372  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUBE.  [CUAP.  XII. 

originally  intended  and  decreed  should  arise),  it  is  obvious 
that  the  difficulty  disappears.  As  to  original  or  primary 
creation,  science  can  say  absolutely  nothing  against  it.  That 
it  is  " conceivable"  is  proved  by  the  fact  that  it  is  widely,  not 
only  conceived  but  believed.  That  it  is  "  unimaginable " 
necessarily  follows  from  its  being  an  action  which,  by  the 
hypothesis,  is  utterly  beyond  experience. 

Mr.  Lewes,  on  this  subject,  remarks :  *  "  When  therefore 
it  is  argued  that  the  creation  of  Something  from  Nothing,  or 
its  reduction  to  Nothing  is  unthinkable,  and  is  therefore 
peremptorily  to  be  rejected,  the  argument  seems  to  me 
defective.  The  process  is  thinkable  but  not  imaginable, 
conceivable  but  not  provable." 

But  we  have  to  a  certain  extent  an  aid  to  the  thought  of 
absolute  creation  in  our  own  free  volition,  which,  as  absolutely 
originating  and  determining,  may  be  taken  as  a  type  to  us  of 
the  creative  act  It  is  a  perception  of  this  analogy  which  led 
Gioberti  to  affirm  that  the  intellect  sees,  as  a  necessary  truth, 
that  an  absolute  Being  must  be  the  creator  of  all  secondary 
existences,  which  he  expressed  in  his  primary  affirmation, 
"  Ens  creat  existentias."  If  the  doctrine  of  creation  be  once 
received,  the  fact  of  our  free-will  acquires  new  significance. 
For  Omnipotence  to  create  a  being  capable  of  opposing  itself 
is  perhaps  one  of  the  most  awe-inspiring  aspects  in  which  the 
First  Cause  can  be  contemplated. 

The  fifth  and  last  objection  is  that  made  to  the  notion  of  a 
Fifth  objec-  personal  God  as  being  necessarily  Anthropomorphic, 
tbrV^mor-  an^  as  contradicted  by  the  phenomena  of  a  world 
i>hism.  -which  is  evidently  not  governed  by  an  Anthropo- 
morphic Deity. 

And  here,  again,  I  must  refer  the  reader  to  the  last  chapter 
of  my  '  Genesis  of  Species,'  where  this  question  is  considered. 
It  may,  however,  be  here  remarked  that  both  the  difficulties 
contained  in  this  fifth  objection  may  be  met  by  the  adoption 
of  that  mode  of  regarding  the  Almighty  which  is  traditional 


*  '  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,'  vol.  ii.  p.  292. 


CHAP.  XII.]  CAUSES.  373 

in  the  Church's  teaching.  I  mean  the  teaching  that  though 
there  is  an  analogy  between  the  attributes  of  God  and  human 
qualities  (so  that,  e.g.,'  to  call  Him  "  good  "  is  neither  false 
nor  unmeaning),  yet  that  the  disparity  being  infinite  no  term 
whatever,  not  even  that  denoting  mere  existence,  can  be  applied 
in  the  same  very  sense  to  God  and  to  any  creature.  Thus 
after  exhausting  ingenuity  in  striving  to  arrive  at  the  loftiest 
possible  conceptions  in  order  to  apply  them  to  God,  we  must 
yet  declare  them  to  be  utterly  inadequate  ;  that,  after  all,  they 
are  but  accommodations  to  human  infirmity ;  that  they  are 
in  a  sense  objectively  false  (because  of  their  inadequacy), 
though  subjectively  and  very  practically  true.  But  the 
difference  is  vast  between  this  view  and  that  which  would 
simply  deny  to  God  attributes  analogous  to  human  qualities. 
That  denial  is  practically  atheism;  while  the  assertion 
defended  here,  maintains  that  our  conceptions  only  err  in  not 
being  true  enough,  i.e.,  in  their  impotence  to  attain  the  in- 
comprehensible reality  which,  nevertheless,  really  is  all  that 
can  be  conceived,  plus  an  inconceivable  infinity  beyond. 

That  this  view  is  the  old  and  traditional  one  may  be  made 
manifest  by  the  following  quotation  : — 

"  Dens  in  hac  vita  non  potest  a  nobis  videri  per  suam  essentiam,  sod 
cognoscitur  a  nobis  ex  creatnris  secundum  habitudinem  principis,  et 
per  modum  excellontiae  et  remotionis  :  Sic  igitur  potest  nommari  a  nobis 
ex  creaturis :  non  tamen  ita,  quod  nomen  significans  ipsum  exprimat 
divinam  essentiam  secundum  quod  est.  Sicut  ut  hoc  nomen  exprimit 
sua  significatione  essentiam  hominis  secundum  quod  est." — St.  Thomas, 
Summa,  Pars  I.  q.  xiii.  art.  1. 

"  Cum  hoc  nomen  sapiens  de  homine  dicitur,  quodammodo  describit, 
ct  comprehendit  rem  significatam,  non  autem,  eum  dicitur  de  Deo 
relinquit  rem  significatam,  ut  incomprehensam,  et  excedentem  nominis 
significationem,  undo  patet,  quod  non  secundum  eandem  rationem  hoc 
nomen  sapiens  de  Deo,  et  do  homine  dicitur.  Et  eadem  ratio  non  est 
de  aliis.  Undo  nullum  nomen  univoce  de  Deo,  et  creaturis  prcedicatur.  .  .  . 
Dicendum  est  igitur,  quod  cujusmodi  nomina  dicuntur  do  Deo,  et 
creaturis  secundum  analogiam,  id  est,  proportionem." — St.  Thomas,  loc. 
cit.  art.  5. 

This  conception  of  the  merely  analogous  resemblance 
between  terms  as  applied  to  God  and  to  creatures  thoroughly 


374  LESSONS  FKOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  XII. 

agrees  with  the  assertion  "that  His  ways  are  not  as  our 
ways,"  and  prepares  us  to  expect  a  priori  that  the  material 
world  would  not  exhibit  the  characters  of  a  piece  of  human 
workmanship.  Thus  considered,  and  with  these  limitations 
and  explanations,  it  can  hardly  be  denied  that  the  action 
which  we  discover  immanent  in  the  material  universe  may  be 
rationally  taken  to  be  from  God.  In  that  universe  we  find 
an  action  the  results  of  which  harmonise  with  man's  reason, 
which  is  orderly,  which  disaccords  with  the  action  of  blind 
chance  and  with  the  "  fortuitous  concourse  of  atoms "  of 
Democritus ;  but  at  the  same  time,  an  action  which  ever,  in 
part  and  in  ultimate  analysis,  eludes  our  grasp,  and  the 
modes  of  which  are  different  from  those  by  which  we  should 
have  attempted  to  accomplish  such  ends.  The  inconsistency 
is  surely  very  great  of  those  who  assert  that  all  our  know- 
ledge comes  from  experience,  and  at  the  same  time  affirm 
that "  creative  action  "  is  incredible  because  nature  affords  no 
evidence  of  it.  It  is  so  great  because  that  action  must 
necessarily  be  unperceived  and  uncomprehended  by  us,  since 
of  creative  action  we  have  and  can  have  no  experience 
whatever.  The  action  of  God  therefore  must  necessarily 
be  unimaginable  by  us  in  its  fulness,  but  its  reality  and 
efficiency  can  be  very  clearly  conceived  as  incessant  and 
universal  in  every  form  of  being  known  to  us,  and  in  the 
far  greater  number  of  entirely  unknown  forms.  God  is  thus 
neither  withdrawn  from  nor  identified  with  His  material  crea- 
tion, and  no  part  of  it  is  left  devoid  of  meaning  or  of  purpose. 
The  poet's  plaint  as  to  the  flower  "  born  to  blush  unseen,  and 
waste  its  sweetness  on  the  desert  air,"  is  thus  manifestly  quite 
uncalled  for;  every  creature  of  every  order  of  existence  being 
ever,  while  its  existence  is  sustained,  so  complacently  con- 
templated by  God  that  the  intense  and  concentrated  attention 
of  all  men  of  science  together  upon  it  could  but  form  but  an 
utterly  inadequate  symbol  of  such  divine  contemplation. 
Mr.  Darwin  asks  *  (in  reference  to  the  Duke  of  Argyll's 


*  '  Descent  of  Man,'  vol.  ii.  p.  230. 


CHAP.  XII.]  CAUSES.  375 

observation  "  that  variety  must  be  admitted  to  be  an  aim  in 
nature ")  the  following  remarkable  question :  "  I  wish  the 
Duke  had  explained  what  he  here  means  by  nature.  Is  it 
meant  that  the  Creator  of  the  universe  ordained  diversified 
results  for  His  own  satisfaction  or  for  that  of  man  ?  The 
former  seems  to  me  as  much  wanting  in  due  reverence  as  the 
latter  in  probability."  To  this  it  may  be  replied  that,  grant- 
ing the  validity  of  the  deductions  of  our  reason  as  to  the 
First  Cause,  then  God,  as  at  once  the  Sustainer  of  the  universe, 
concurs  by  His  action  in  every  natural  phenomenon,  and  has 
an  infinite  complacency  in  each.  But  there  is  a  due  because 
rational  order  in  such  complacency ;  and  since  we  see  clearly 
that  "  goodness  "  is  the  highest  of  all  qualities,  an  important 
consequence  follows.  Let  us  endeavour  to  bring  home  to 
ourselves  the  fact  that  -the  existence  of  a  countless  multi- 
tude of  actions  and  interactions  is  revealed  to  us  in  every 
department  of  science.  Let  us  consider  the  series  of  such  in 
the  physical,  chemical,  and  biological  sciences;  in  the  rise 
and  fall  of  states,  and  the  manifestations  of  art  in  all  its 
branches.  Let  us  contemplate  the  physical  possibilities  of 
being  in  the  vast  fields  of  stellar  space,  receding  from  us  on 
all  sides  into  unfathomable  abysses  and  for  incalculable  ages, 
and  then  try  to  realise  the  thought  that  the  Divine  com- 
placency in  all  such  phenomena  is  as  nothing  compared  with 
that  complacency  with  which  He  regards  one  single  act  of 
man's  free-will  directed  in  harmony  with  a  moral  perception, 
even  though  it  be  a  mistaken  one. 

If  then  the  reasoning  contained  in  this  chapter  is  good 
and  valid,  the  last  and  the  highest  lesson  which 
nature  (considered  as  a  whole,  i.e.,  as  both  rational 
and  sentient)  .teaches  us  is  that  the  Great  First  Cause  has 
attributes  of  such  a  nature  that  the  terms  "  power,"  "  know- 
ledge," "goodness,"  "purpose,"  and  "will"  are  those  least 
inadequate  to  convey  to  our  minds  a  practical  conception 
and  belief  concerning  them.  Of  such  a  Cause  the  word 
"  personality,"  in  a  similarly  analogous  sense,  can  not  only 
be  fitly  used,  but  must  be  positively  affirmed,  since  not  to 


376  LESSONS  FKOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  XII. 

affirm  is  in  fact  (1)  to  deny  to  the  First  Cause  the  necessary 
adequacy  for  producing  the  effects  we  see,  and  (2)  to  en- 
deavour to  degrade  Him  to  an  order  of  existence  lower  even 
than  that  of  mere  man,  since  whatever  has  knowledge  and 
will  has  personality.  In  a  word,  we  learn  that  we  and  all 
the  beings  we  see  around  us  have  for  our  origin,  our  sus- 
tentation,  and  our  end,  one  only  being — GOD. 


CHAPTER  XIII. 

CONSEQUENCES. 

"  The  consequences  which  flow  from  the  acceptance  or  rejection  of 
the  teaching  here  advocated  are  and  must  be  most  momentous  both 
to  individuals  and  the  community.  Those  who  reject  it  are  logically 
driven  into  extreme  and  irrational  negation.  Its  bearing  upon  conduct 
is  direct,  and  must  of  necessity  powerfully  affect  the  future  condition 
of  society  through  popular  education.  Such  consequences  may  ra- 
tionally serve  to  reinforce  conclusions  before  arrived  at  on  other 
grounds." 

HAVING  learned  from  Nature   the   lesson  just  deduced  — 
that  as  to  her  first  and  final  causes,  we  may  now,  Varlons  con. 
in  tne  last  place,  consider  certain  "  consequences  "  l^"^™ 
—consequences  of  several  kinds.  and  practical. 

First,  we  may  consider  the  consequences  resulting  from 
our  acceptance  of  the  teaching  of  rational  nature  as  to  the 
intellect  and  will  (resulting,  as  we  have  seen,  in  Theism), 
and  in  connexion  therewith,  our  own  immortality  :  secondly, 
the  consequences  of  the  rejection  of  that  teaching  (in  the 
form  of  Atheism  and  Pantheism),  noting  the  extremes  to 
which  logic  drives  those  who  thus  reject  it:  thirdly  and 
lastly,  the  necessary  consequences  of  such  rejection  as 
regards  conduct,  i.e.,  the  practical  tendencies  which  thence 
arise. 

Glancing  retrospectively  over  the  consequences  of  the 
various  controversies  which  have  come  under  our 


.  i  ,-T  \  •  i       T-I  quences  of 

observation  about  (1.)  our  own  existence  —  the  .hgo  ;  controversies 
(II.)  about  the  Will,  and  (III.)  lastly  about  God,  ttc^?m 
we  may  see  that  the  efforts  which  have  been  made  to  impugn 
these  truths  seem  likely  to  have  as  their  consequences  the 


378  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CuAp.  XIII. 

strengthening  and  wider  diffusion  in  a  more  developed  form 
of  those  very  beliefs  which  such  efforts  were  designed  to 
uproot.  To  make  manifest  the  reinvigorating  effect  of  these 
hostile  efforts  we  must  briefly  traverse  again  some  of  the 
ground  we  have  gone  over. 

I.  As  regards  the  Ego,  the  persistence  with  which  our 
AS  to  the  knowledge  of  it  has  been  denied,  and  the  arguments 
by  which  such  denial  has  been  supported,  serve  to 
bring  out  the  supreme  importance  of  our  recognition  of  our 
own  self-consciousness  and  all  that  our  knowledge  of  the 
Ego  implies  and  contains.  Each  man  who  for  the  first 
time  has  his  eyes  opened  to  the  marvellous  nature  of  his 
present  knowledge  of  his  own  past  existence,  will  see  in  the 
necessarily  postulated  "  veracity  of  memory "  the  evidence 
of  his  possession  of  real  objective  truth  and  of  knowledge 
other  than  phenomenal.  In  recognising  his  own  self-con- 
sciousness he  must  also  recognise  that  his  mind  declares 
certain  truths  (e.g.,  that  what  thinks,  exists)  to  be  absolutely 
and  universally  true.  He  must,  on  introspection,  further 
see  that  such  truths  are  not  passively  apprehended  by  him, 
through  his  impotence  to  think  the  contrary,  but  are  actively 
apprehended  and  seen  to  be  truths  positively  necessary  and 
universal,  and  in  this  way  his  mind  will  again  be  carried  by 
its  own  force  from  subjectivity  to'  objectivity.  The  validity 
of  the  declarations  of  his  intellect,  and  consequently  of  its 
logical  processes,  being  thus  rendered  unassailable  except  at 
the  price  of  absolute  intellectual  paralysis,  its  declarations 
as  to  "  causation  "  and  "  morality  "  gain  at  once  a  recognised 
validity.  That  phenomenal  conditional  changes,  even  if 
ranging  in  cycles  through  a  past  eternity,  must  require  a 
real,  absolute,  eternal  Cause,  will,  as  we  have  seen  in  the  last 
chapter,  be  apparent  to  him,  while  the  absolute  declarations 
of  the  intellect  in  the  sphere  of  morality  will  necessarily 
lead  to  the  attribution  to  that  cause  of  "  a  goodness  "  har- 
monising with,  however  immeasurably  exceeding,  his  own. 
In  other  words,  the  widespread  propagation  of  the  absurd 
denial  of  our  own  self-knowledge  is  an  antecedent  condition 


CHAP.  XIIL]  CONSEQUENCES.  379 

to  a  more  thorough  and  complete  appreciation  of  that  self- 
knowledge  and  of  all  that  is  made  known  to  us  thereby,  than 
any  other  cause  (save  such  denial)  could  well  be  conceived 
as  producing.  The  supreme  importance  of  the  Delphic 
inscription  acquires  a  fresh  significance.  In  knowing  "  our- 
selves "  we  come  to  know,  with  a  supreme  degree  of  certainty, 
a  whole  sphere  of  objective  truths  which  the  intellect  is  seen 
to  have  the  wonderful  faculty  of  perceiving  together  with 
the  very  light  by  which  those  truths  manifest  themselves  to 
it — namely,  their  objective,  necessary,  and  universal  truth. 

The  facts  here  referred  to  may  be  recapitulated  and 
summed  up,  in  other  words,  as  follows : — 

The  consideration  of  our  own  continued  existence  reveals 
to  us  objective  truth  and  our  possession  of  it. 

Our  self-consciousness  also  reveals  to  us  that  there  are 
universal,  objectively  necessary  truths  (as  e.g.,  "  what  thinks 
exists"),  and  that  we  can  know  them. 

Similarly  our  intellect  shows  us  the  validity  of  our  own 
reason  and  the  objective  validity  of  the  syllogism  which 
renders  implicit  truth  explicit  to  us. 

Hence  we  learn  the  validity  of  our  inference  as  to  the 
existence  of  a  First  Cause  of  the  universe  known  to  us, 
and  of  a  possible  indefinitely  vast  universe  beyond  our 
knowledge. 

From  this  Cause,  which  our  reason  tells  us  must  be  greater 
and  higher  than  we  can  conceive,  we  rationally  infer  "  order." 
Therefore  there  must  be  a  purpose  in  all  that  such  Cause 
produces,  since  "order"  and  "purpose"  exist  in  human 
actions  and  are  recognised  by  the  human  intellect,  which  is 
one  amongst  the  effects  of  such  First  Cause. 

Such  are  the  consequences  which  spring  from  the  denial 
of  and  consequent  controversy  about  our  knowledge  of  our 
own  continued  existence. 

II.  With  respect  to  "  Will,"  the  passionate  obstinacy  with 
which  the  declarations  of  the   common  sense  of  A8tothe 
mankind  are  contested  and  every  fragment  of  free  wil1' 
self-determining   power  denied,  serves  to   bring  out  inoro 


380  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  XIII. 

emphatically  than  before  the  marvellous  and  isolated  character 
of  that  power  of  choice  which  all  unprejudiced  men  know 
that  they  possess.  When  it  comes  to  be  fully  appreciated, 
amongst  the  many,  how  rigid  law  rules  not  only  all  living  as 
well  as  inanimate  irrational  creatures,  but  how  even  the 
immense  majority  of  our  own  actions  are  simply  automatic, 
the  wonderful  character  of  our  power  of  (in  certain  cases) 
voluntarily  choosing  the  less  attractive  of  two  competing 
objects  will  be  less  inadequately  estimated.  Moreover,  the 
recognition  in  our  own  being  of  this  power,  beyond  anything 
else  in  nature,  renders  supernatural  action  external  to  us  not 
only  credible  but  to  be  anticipated  a  priori.  Creative  action 
and  absolute  annihilation,  miracle,  response  to  prayer,  and 
the  apportionment  in  another  world  of  rewards  and  chastise- 
ments according  to  the  exercise  in  this  of  meritorious  voli- 
tions, or  of  the  reverse,  harmonise  thoroughly  with  that 
philosophy  which  asserts  the  freedom  of  the  will.  That  they 
do  so  harmonise,  the  very  objections  of  our  modern  Deter- 
minists  serve  to  demonstrate ;  and  it  is  daily  becoming  more 
apparent  that  to  deny  these  is  by  implication  to  deny  the 
existence  of  virtue,  to  uproot  every  possible  basis  of  morality, 
and  even,  as  we  shall  see,  to  eliminate  from  the  social 
organism  those  legal  sanctions,  and  even  those  modes  -of 
speech,  the  reasonableness  of  which  depends  upon  the  real 
existence  of  "  rights  "  and  "  duties  "  as  ordinarily  understood. 
The  bitter  hostility  which  exists  to  the  doctrine  of  man's  free- 
will is  not  difficult  to  understand.  It  is  impossible  to  assert 
it  without  implicitly  asserting  religion ;  and  it  is,  in  one  aspect 
at  least,  a  trial  to  pride.  It  is  indeed  no  small  trial  to  the 
pride  of  a  highly-cultured  man  of  powerful  intellect  to  feel 
that  the  poorest  peasant  is  fully  as  capable  as  himself  of 
performing  the  highest  actions — those  which  are  the  special 
prerogative  of  man — namely,  the  exercise  of  rational  meri- 
torious volition  and  choice.  If  there  is  such  a  thing  as 
morality,  it  is  beyond  comparison  as  to  value  with  mere 
intellectual  culture  or  capacity,  and  it  necessarily  follows 
that  a-poor  paralysed  old  woman  sitting  in  a  chimney-corner 


CHAP.  XIII.]  CONSEQUENCES. 

may,  by  her  good  aspirations  and  volitions,  be  repeatedly 
performing  mental  acts  compared  with  which  the  discovery 
by  Newton  of  the  law  of  gravitation  is  as  nothing. 

Again,  in  free-will  and  morality,  we  have  that  which 
cannot  be  the  result  of  mere  brute  inheritance.  Conceptions 
of  time  and  space  may  be  plausibly  represented  as  structural 
results  of  a  practically  infinite  brute  ancestry  which  has 
been  submitted  to  conditions  of  time  and  space,  but  at  any 
rate  such  ancestry  was  never  submitted  to  conditions  of 
moral  responsibility.  Thus  the  recognition  of  the  human 
will  renders  absurd  the  conception  that  man  can  have 
developed  from  a  brute. 

III.  We  come  now  to  the  last  and  supremely  important  of 
the  many  consequences  resulting  from  recent  contro- 
versies— we  mean  the  vividness  with  which  they  force 
on  the  many  a  recognition  of  the  awful,  the  unapproachable 
majesty  of  God  under  the  foolish  term  of  "  the  Unknowable." 
Of  course  there  is  nothing  said  upon  this  subject  by  Mr. 
Spencer,  or  any  other  writer,  which  has  not  been  said  scores 
of  times  by  mediseval  and  other  theologians.  It  is  somewhat 
amusing  to  read  Mr.  Spencer's  objection  to  the  term  "  per- 
sonality," as  applied  to  God,  because  "  inadequate  and  below, 
rather  than  above,  the  unspeakable  reality  " — as  if  every  tyro 
in  theology  did  not  know,  as  has  been  shown,  that  the 
common  teaching  of  the  Church  is  that  not  even  "being" 
can  be  predicated  univocally  of  God  and  of  any  creature,  and 
as  if  the  term  hyperhypostasis  was  not  a  familiar  one  to 
denote  the  absolute  personality  as  distinguished  from  every 
dependent  one.  Yet  it  is  none  the  less  true  that  grossly 
inadequate  and  absurdly  anthropomorphic  conceptions  of 
God  are  widely  spread,  and  that  the  incautious  and  inac- 
curate language  of  popular  pious  writers  is  likely  to  spread 
further  and  deeper  such  grossness  and  absurdity.  Of  course, 
after  all,  the  difference  between  our  highest  attainable  con- 
ception of  God  and  that  of  the  rudest  boor  is  as  nothing 
compared  with  the  difference  between  that  highest  concep- 
tion and  the  Divine  reality.  Nevertheless,  quoad  nos,  it  is  a 


382  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUEE.  [CHAI>.  XUI. 

great  gain  to  have  a  somewhat  higher  notion  more  widely 
spread,  and  the  general  dissemination  of  controversy  respect- 
ing "  the  Unknowable "  cannot  fail  to  spread  wider,  concep- 
tions of  a  higher  character.  Not  but  that  "  the  Unknowable," 
as  represented  by  Mr.  Spencer,  devoid  of  personality,  is,  in 
reality,  lower  instead  of  higher  than  the  popular  conception 
of  God  ;  but  at  the  same  time,  while  those  who  are  indis- 
posed to  Theism  may  thus  be  confirmed  in  their  negations, 
those  who  are  Theists  cannot  but  have  their  Theism  improved 
and  their  conceptions  raised  by  a  careful  and  detailed  con- 
sideration of  the  hopeless  inadequacy  of  all  symbols  to  convey 
to  us  a  knowledge  of  our  Creator  as  He  is. 

Another  consequence  that  follows  from  the  foregoing  con- 
TUeimmor-  sideration  is  that  the  doctrine  of  the  continued 
souif  °  existence  of  the  soul  after  death  is  true.  If  the 
universe  is  governed  by  a  just  God  who  is  also  all-wise 
and  all-powerful,  it  follows  that  each  man  must  meet  with 
reward  or  chastisement  according  to  his  deserts.  But  that 
such  is  not  the  case  in  this  life  it  needs  but  a  small 
knowledge  of  history,  or  indeed  experience  of  the  world, 
in  order  to  perceive.  There  are,  it  is  true,  some  writers 
(mostly  possessed  of  a  good  share  of  this  world's  advan- 
tages) who,  owing  to  the  exigencies  of  their  philosophical 
position,  venture  to  assert  that  each  man  during  this  life 
receives  minute  and  exact  retribution  for  every  act,  word, 
and  thought.  Such  a  doctrine,  however,  is  a  mere  gra- 
tuitous and,  indeed,  superstitious  dogma,  utterly  incapable 
of  proof,  opposed  to  the  almost  universally  expressed  con- 
viction of  mankind,  and  opposed  also  to  the  moral  conscious- 
ness of  many  as  to  the  events  of  their  own  lives.  Our 
perception  of  what  is  just  demands  then  for  us,  as  moral 
beings,  an  existence  after  death.  But  does  physical  science, 
especially  physiology,  negative  this  belief?  If  so,  in  the 
presence  of  conflicting  truths  we  are  reduced  to  scepticism. 
But  in  fact  no  refinement  of  modern  science  affects  it  one 
jot  or  tittle  more  than  does  the  fact  known  to  every  savage, 
"  that  when  the  brains  were  out  the  man  would  die."  We 


CHAP.  XIII.]  CONSEQUENCES.  383 

have,  however,  seen  iii  preceding  chapters  that  Reason 
gives  us  cause  to  believe  that  structure  and  function  are 
different  aspects  of  one  whole  ;  that  the  force  of  any  acting 
body  (a  steam-engine,  an  electrifying  machine,  a  stinging- 
nettle,  or  a  gorilla)  is  not  something  really  distinct  from  the 
material  thing  and  inhering  in  it,  but  is  the  thing  itself 
acting — the  dynamical  aspect  of  the  one  cohering,  living  or 
sentient  whole.  Deeply  considered,  the  difference  between 
modern  phraseology  and  that  of  an  older  school  of  Two  phrase- 
philosophy  may  be  said  to  be,  that  while  for  both  Ol°61es- 
schools  matter  and  form  (or  force)  are  two  sides  of  one  whole, 
the  modern  school  seems  to  consider  the  material  side  as  the 
more  important,  and  as  determining  the  dynamical  and 
formal  side ;  while  the  older  school  regarded  the  dynamical 
and  formal  side  as  determining  the  material  side.  In  this 
the  older  school  seems  to  me  to  have  the  advantage,  for  how 
can  the  essentially  statical  part  dominate  and  determine  the 
essentially  dynamical  part  ?  Even  Mr.  Lewes  would  regard 
the  material  side  as  the  statical  side  or  aspect  of  the  whole 
unity !  It  may  be  replied  that  actions  performed  on  living 
bodies  abundantly  demonstrate  that  the  state  of  the  material 
part  determines  the  dynamical  part.  But,  in  the  first  place, 
it  is  impossible  to  act  on  the  mere  material  of  a  living  body, 
since  everywhere  you  find  both  matter  and  form ;  and, 
secondly,  it  is  not  only  the  matter,  but  the  dynamical  action 
of  other  bodies  which  operate  upon  the  living  body  supposed, 
and  no  one  denies  the  mutual  action  of  the  dynamic  powers 
of  bodies. 

This,  however,  is  but  a  remark  made  by  the  way,  set-ing 
that  whichever  be  the  dominant  side  or  aspect  it  is  con- 
ceded that  in  brutes  the  two  arise,  vary,  and  disappear 
simultaneously.  Why  then  is  it  not  absolutely  necessary 
that  the  single  force,  form,  or  soul  of  man  (which  is  with  the 
body  one  unity  as  is  the  soul  of  a  brute  with  its  body)  should 
similarly  be  annihilated  with  the  structural  change  of  death  ? 
The  answer  to  this  question  has  been  prepared  in  the  seventh 
chapter,  wherein  it  was  sought  to  make  plain  how  vast  is  the 


384  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  XIII. 

difference  between  the  single,  rational  activity,  force,  or  form 
which  acts  in  each  living  man — his  soul — from  the  activity, 
force,  or  soul  which  shows  itself  in  every  living  beast.  The 
vastness  of  this  difference  becomes  evident  when  we  reflect 
on  the  fact  that  the  human  soul,  as  we  experience  it,  here 
and  now,  is,  in  a  sense,  out  of  both  time  and  space ;  that  it 
exists  now  in  the  past  or  in  the  future  as  well  as  in  the 
present ;  that  it  can  think  of  both  before  time  was,  and 
after  time  shall  end  in  eternity ;  that  it  can  discuss  the 
question  as  to  the  infinity  or  finitude  of  space,  and  consider 
the  world  of  possibility  as  well  as  that  of  actuality ;  that 
though  existing  amidst  a  constant  succession  of  changing 
conditions,  it  can  think  the  eternal,  unchanging  absolute ; 
that  it  knows  itself  as  looking  before  and  after,  and  as  that 
which  thinks  and  yet  endures ;  that  its  self-conscious  exist- 
ence really  persists  in  these  conditions  for  years,  i.e.,  that 
it  is  a  spiritual  substance ;  above  all,  that  it  can  appreciate 
moral  worth  and  elect  to  follow  the  less  attractive  of  two 
competing  motives,  and  so  dominate  and  control  the  chain  of 
physical  causation  by  its  free-will.  All  these  considerations 
show  that  its  nature  is  far  more  widely  removed  from  the 
activity  of  an  ape  than  is  that  of  an  ape  from  the  activity  of 
a  magnet.  And  as  the  soul  or  activity  of  an  ape  differs  in 
kind  from  the  activity  of  a  magnet,  so  the  activity  or  soul  of 
a  man  differs  yet  more  in  kind  from  that  of  an  ape.  It  is  by 
no  means  inconceivable  therefore  that  the  formal  or  dy- 
namical element  in  the  rational  man  may  persist  in  another 
form  after  the  dissolution  of  the  body  in  a  condition  which 
we  cannot  of  course  imagine ;  indeed,  as  a  spiritual  substance, 
the  inference  is  that  it  does  so  persist.  Not  only  feeling, 
however,  but  memory,  will,  and  even  knowledge  must  of 
course  cease  to  exist  as  we  experience  them,  and  herein 
lies  the  truth  hidden  in  the  assertions  of  those  who  deny  the 
immortality  of  the  soul.  But  because  they  will  cease  as  we 
experience  them,  there  is  no  need  to  think  they  do  not  persist 
in  any  form  at  all,  especially  if  upon  other  grounds  there  is 
reason  to  think  they  do  persist ;  and  such  reasons  we  have 


CHAP.  XHL]  CONSEQUENCES.  385 

found  in  the  demands  of  justice,  in  the  power  the  soul  pos- 
sesses of  transcending  even  here  and  now  the  limits  of  time, 
space,  and  physical  causation,  and  in  the  pel-durability  of 
mind. 

We  may  now  pass  to  the  second  set  of  consequences  which 
it  is  proposed  to  consider  here,  namely,  those  which  co^. 
follow  the  rejection  of  the  positive  beliefs  which  ?^Sgof 
nature,  through    reason,    it   is    here    maintained,  T 
assures  us  are  true  with  respect  to  the  first  and  final  causes. 

If  these  beliefs  be  rejected,  then  either  the  mind  must 
endeavour  to  sustain  itself  in  the  unstable  equilibrium  of  a 
scepticism  constantly  tending  to  the  stable  conditions  of 
affirmation  or  negation,  and  which  position  is  practically 
already  negative;  or  it  must  accept  the  negative  position, 
whether  in  its  Atheistic  or  its  Pantheistic  forms.  As  Mr. 
Spencer  says  ('  Psychology,'  vol.  i.  p.  466)  :  "  The  neutral  state 
of  having  no  hypothesis,  can  be  completely  preserved  only  so 
long  as  the  conflicting  evidences  appear  exactly  balanced : 
such  a  state  is  one  of  unstable  equilibrium,  which  can  hardly 
be  permanent."  Accordingly,  the  creeds  commonly  propa- 
gated (rather  through  insinuations,  implications,  and  sug- 
gestions, than  through  direct  and  unequivocal  assertions) 
by  public  opponents  of  the  religious  conceptions  generally 
received  amongst  us  to-day  are  of  a  more  or  less  distinctly 
negative  character. 

However  much  we  may  regret  the  necessity,  it  is  never- 
theless simply  impossible  to  note  the  existing  phenomena  of 
public  opinion  with  truth  and  justice  without  making  refer- 
ences of  the  kind  which  follow.  For  it  is  a  fact  that  the 
Theistic  conception  (the  belief  in  a  personal  God)  is  that 
which  is  now  (sometimes  openly,  but  more  generally  by  im- 
plication) the  main  object  of  attack  by  means  of  a  Mate- 
rialistic or  Pantheistic  Propaganda,  of  which  physical-science 
teaching  is  made  the  vehicle. 

However  dissonant  in  detail  may  be  the  opinions  professed 
or  the  amount  of  reticence  practised  by  the  several  indi- 
vidual teachers,  a  concordant  harmony  results  from  the 


386  LESSONS  FEOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  XIII. 

general  character  of  their  utterances.  With  a  loud  profession 
of  man's  necessary  ignorance  is  joined  a  confident  assertion  as 
to  the  course  which  would  be  pursued  by  a  being  of  infinite 
power,  wisdom,  and  goodness,  did  such  a  being  exist,  with  an 
implicit  or  explicit  denial  of  such  existence. 

Let  us  then  note  certain  utterances  of  popular  teachers  of 
high  standing  which  appear  to  have  met  with  a  very  wide 
acceptance. 

Professor  Tyndall,  in  his  treatise  on  '  The  Constitution  of 
Professor  Nature '  (reprinted  in  his  collected  essays),  to  the 

Tymlall's  .          V,  Wr  •-,-,- 

teaching.  question,  "  Was  space  furnished  at  once,  by  the 
fiat  of  Omnipotence,  with  these  burning  orbs  ?"  replies ; — 

"  To  this  question  the  man  of  science,  if  he  confine  himself  within 
his  own  limits,  will  give  no  answer,  though  it  must  be  remarked,  that 
in  the  formation  of  an  opinion  he  has  better  materials  to  guide  him  than 
anybody  else." — Fragments  of  Science,  p.  6. 

In  his  address  to  the  students  of  University  College,  he 
tells  them  that  the  poet  of  the  future  • 

"ought  to  be  the  interpreter  of  that  power  which,  as  'Jehovah, 
Jove,  or  Lord/  has  hitherto  filled  and  strengthened  the  human  heart." — 
Ibid.  p.  106. 

Again,  in  his  paper  on  '  Vitality '  he  remarks : — 

"The  most  advanced  philosophers  of  the  present  day  declare  that 
they  ultimately  arrive  at  a  single  source  of  power,  from  which  all  vital 
energy  is  derived ;  and  the  disquieting  circumstance  is  that  this  source  is 
not  the  direct  fiat  of  a  supernatural  agent,  but  a  reservoir  of  what,  if  we 
do  not  accept  the -creed  of  Zoroaster,  must  be  regarded  as  inorganic 
force."— Ibid.  p.  436. 

Moreover,  all  this  dogmatism  is  unaccompanied  by  one 
word  of  explanation  as  to  the  absence  of  any  real  necessary 
conflict  between  the  action  of  evolution  itself  and  the  con- 
ception of  its  results  being  absolutely  and  primarily  due  to 
the  "  fiat  of  a  supernatural  agent." 

Once  more,  in  his  little  work  on  the  '  Use  and  Limit  of 
the  Imagination  in  Science,'  he  expresses  himself  thus  : — 

"  Whence  come  we ;  whither  go  we  ?  The  question  dies  without  an 
answer — without  even  an  echo — upon  the  infinite  shores  of  the  Unknown. 


CHAP.  XIII.]  CONSEQUENCES.  387 

Let  us  follow  matter  to  its  utmost  bounds ;  let  us  claim  it  in  all  its 
forms  to  experiment  with  and  to  speculate  upon.  Casting  the  term 
'  vital  force '  from  our  vocabulary,  let  us  reduce,  if  we  can,  the  visible 
phenomena  ef  life  to  mechanical  attractions  and  repulsions.  Having 
thus  exhausted  physics,  and  reached  its  very  run,  the  real  mystery 
still  looms  beyond  us.  We  have,  in  fact,  made  no  step  towards  its 
solution.  And  thus  it  will  ever  loom — even  beyond  the  bourne  of 
knowledge — compelling  the  philosophies  of  successive  ages  to  confess 
that 

" '  We  are  such  stuff 

As  dreams  are  made  of,  and  our  little  life 

Is  rounded  with  a  sleep.' " 

Finally,  the  Professor  says  of  the  theory  of  evolution : — 

"  Many  who  hold  it  would  probably  assent  to  the  position  that  at  the 
present  moment  all  our  philosophy,  all  our  poetry,  all  our  science,  and 
all  our  art — Plato,  Shakspeare,  Newton,  and  Raphael— are  potential  in 
the  fires  of  the  Sun.  We  long  to  learn  something  of  our  origin.  If 
the  Evolution  hypothesis  be  correct,  even  this  unsatisfied  yearning 
must  have  come  to  us  across  the  ages  which  separate  the  unconscious 
primeval  mist  from  the  consciousness  of  to-day." — Ibid.  p.  163. 

No  one  can  have  more  esteem  for  Professor  Tyndall  when 
teaching  us  concerning  those  coexistences  and  sequences  of 
phenomena  which  his  genius,  energy,  and  perseverance  have 
detected,  than  has  the  present  writer.  But  Professor  Tyn- 
dall, as  a  metaphysician,  must  be  understood  to  court  cri- 
ticism by  the  authoritative  and  didactic  tone  which  he  has 
adopted  in  a  field  of  battle  he  has  gone  out  of  his  own 
special  line  to  seek.  It  may  then  well  be  asked,  what  is 
the  creed,  what  are  the  lessons  likely  to  be  learned  by  young 
or  inquiring  minds  from  this  scientific  catechism?  What 
will  be  gathered  from  such  passages  as  those  referred  to 
(which  are  not  elsewhere  retracted  or  explained  away  by 
their  author),  from  that  which  they  inevitably  imply,  as  well 
as  from  that  which  they  actually  express?  For  while  re- 
ligious belief  retains  its  social  power  in  any  country,  those 
who  attack  it  will  generally,  more  or  less,  veil  their  hostility, 
and  seek  by  implication,  insinuation,  or  studied  silence,  to 
produce  an  effect  far  exceeding  that  openly  aimed  at  by  their 
express  words.  As  far  as  I  understand  Professor  Tyndall, 


388  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  XIII. 

and  I  am  anxious  to  state  his  views  with  the  utmost  fairness, 
the  following  are  the  conclusions  at  which  he  arrives  : — 

I.  It  is  professors  of  physical  science  who  in  the  future 
are  to  be  the  supreme  Pontiffs,  better  qualified  "  than  any- 
body else  "  to  judge  the  highest  questions  of  philosophy  and 
religion,  though  the  actual  interpreters  of  the  unknowable 
are  to  be  the  poets. 

•  II.  It  is  doubtful  whether  the  duly  instructed  can  longer 
have  their  "  hearts  strengthened  "  by  the  conception  of  the 
First  Cause  as  "  Jehovah,"  or  even  as  "  Lord." 

III.  The   Patres    Conscripti,    or    rather    the  Pontifices 
Maximi,  have  dogmatically  defined  and  decreed,  that  there 
is  one  "  single  source  of  power  from  which  all  vital  energy 
is  derived" — an  "inorganic  force." 

IV.  The  inquiry  as  to  the  origin  and  the  end  of  human  life 
is  fruitless,  and,  therefore,  the  effort  to  discover  our  proper 
aim  is  an  endeavour  to  solve  what  is  hopelessly  insoluble. 

V.  Nevertheless  we  do  come  from  a  fire,  such  as  that  of 
the  sun ;  and  love,  charity  which  "  thinketh  no  evil,"  hu- 
mility, piety,  and  holiness  are  essentially  derived  from  the 
heat,  and  are  merely  different  "  modes  of  motion." 

Let  us  now  turn  to  the  teaching  of  "  our  great  philoso- 
Mr.  spencer's  pher,"  as  Mr.  Darwin  styles  him.  Mr.  Herbert 
teaching.  Spencer,  in  his  '  First  Principles,'  distinctly  tells  us, 
that  Theism  is  not  only  incredible  but  inconceivable  (p.  43), 
and  that  "  every  form  of  religion  "  is  not  "  even  thinkable  " 
(p.  46). — In  the  place  of  God  we  are  presented  with  "  the 
unknowable  /"  To  the  very  natural  objection  that  thus  an 
emotionless  and  "  unthinkable  abstraction  "  (p.  114)  is  offered 
to  us,  "  instead  of  a  power  which  we  can  regard  as  having 
some  sympathy  with  us,"  we  are  quietly  and  coolly  told, 
"  this  kind  of  protest  of  necessity  accompanies  every  change 
from  a  lower  creed  to  a  higher;"  "No  mental  revolution 
can  be  accomplished  without  more  or  less  of  laceration  " 
The  same  writer,  in  an  article  in  the  '  Fortnightly  Eeview,'  * 

*  For  April  1871. 


CHAP.  XIII]  CONSEQUENCES.  389 

makes  clear  his  belief  that  our  highest  aspirations  after  holi- 
ness, and  love  of  eternal  goodness  and  beauty,  are  nothing 
but  modified  brutal  instincts  of  the  lowest  kind,  developed 
by  experience  and  utility.  Altogether,  the  teaching  of  this 
philosopher,  comprises  the  following  dogmas  : — 

I.  Theism  is  false  and  absurd. 

II.  Kevvards  and  punishments   in   a   future  life   are  the 
delusions  of  superstition. 

III.  Prayer  is  an  absurdity,  as  there  is  no  God  having  any 
personal  sympathy  with  us. 

IV.  There  is  no  difference  of  kind,  but  only  of  degree, 
between  the  intellect  of  a  sage  or  the  emotions  of  a  saint, 
and  the  psychical  faculties  of  a  mud-fish. 

V.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  free-will.     No  man  havin^ 

o  o 

any  more  real  option  as  to  his  thoughts  and  intentions  than 
has  a  leaf  to  resist  the  action  of  the  wind. 

If  Mr.  Spencer  is  more  or  less  extensively  esteemed  as  a 
teacher,  a  far  wider  acceptance  is  enjoyed  by  the  Professor 
eminent  naturalist  Professor  Huxley,  who  has  of  teaching, 
late  wandered  beyond  his  special  subjects  of  exposition,  into 
the  wider  fields  of  ethics,  politics,  and  metaphysics.  It  is 
difficult  to  exaggerate  the  importance  of  a  teaching,  followed 
and  accepted  with  so  much  avidity  by  a  large  section  of  the 
middle  and  lower  classes,  and  it  will  be  well  to  consider 
carefully  the  dicta  put  forth  by  so  popular  an  authority — 
an  authority,  moreover,  by  no  means  relying  upon  the  power 
of  persuasion  or  the  force  of  truth,  but  ready,  as  soon  as 
practicable,  to  call  in  the  aid  of  the  "  secular  arm  "  to  give 
effect  to  the  anathemas  of  a  "  scientific  syllabus." 

In  Professor  Huxley's  *  Lay  Sermons,'  the  following  pas- 
sages occur : — 

"  I  say  that  natural  knowledge,  seeking  to  satisfy  natural  wants,  has 
found  the  ideas  which  can  alone  still  spiritual  cravings." — p.  11. 

The  Gospel  enunciated  by  this  Evangelist,  is,  after  all, 
anything  but  "  good  tidings."  The  Professor  tells  us : — 
"  In  this  sadness,  this  consciousness  of  the  limitation  of  man, 
this  sense  of  an  open  secret  which  he  cannot  penetrate,  lies 


390  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  XIII. 

the  essence  of  all  religion "  (p.  15).  The  familiar  phrase 
"  serious  views,"  is  very  inadequate  to  express  the  deep 
depression  of  the  creed  proposed  to  us  in  place  of  that  which 
tells  us,  "  Rejoice  always,  and  again  I  say  unto  you  rejoice." 
Mr.  Spencer's  expression  for  first  cause  is  fully  accepted,  as 
we  are  told,  as  to  the  Unknowable  that  we  "  know  (!),  to 
our  cost,  that  he  never  overlooks  a  mistake,  or  makes  the 
smallest  allowance  for  ignorance  "  (p.  36).  Again  we  read  : — 

"  Were  mankind  deserving  of  the  title  'rational,'  which  they  arrogate 
to  themselves,  there  can  be  no  question  that  they  would  consider,  as  tie 
most  necessary  of  all  branches  of  instruction  for  themselves  and  for  their 
children,  that  which  professes  to  acquaint  them  with  the  conditions  of 
the  existence  they  prize  so  highly — which  teaches  them  how  to  avoid 
disease,  and  to  cherish  health  in  themselves,  and  those  who  are  dear 
to  them." — p.  98.  "  It  becomes  clear  that  all  living  powers  are  cog- 
nate, and  that  all  living  forms  are  fundamentally  of  one  character." - 
p.  142. 

"  Even  those  manifestations  of  intellect,  of  feeling,  and  of  will,  which 
we  rightly  name  the  higher  faculties,  are  ....  to  every  one  but  the 
subject  of  them,  known  only  as  transitory  changes  in  the  relative 
positions  of  parts  of  the  body." — p.  135. 

•In  the  first  place  we  should  be  glad  to  know,  on  what 
principle  Professor  Huxley  considers  one  human  mental 
manifestation  "  higher  "  than  another ;  but  letting  this  pass, 
surely  "  known  ly  means  of  changes  of  position  "  would  be 
the  more  correct  form  of  expression.  Yet  sometimes  the 
Professor  does  not  scruple  to  go  beyond  the  facts  of  phe- 
nomena into  the  regions  of  abstractions  and  occult  causes  as 
freely  as  his  neighbours.  Thus  he  tells  us : — "  We  do  not 
hesitate  to  believe  that,  in  some  way  or  another,"  the  proper- 
ties of  water  "  result  from  the  properties  of  the  component 
elements  of  water"  (p.  150).  It  is  difficult  to  understand 
this  bold  assertion  on  Professor  Huxley's  own  principles.  At 
other  times  he  does  not  scruple  to  ignore,  and  practically 
deny,  what  is  evident  to  the  reason,  though  hidden  from  the 
sense,  as  when  he  tells  us  that : — 

"  A  nucleated  mass  of  protoplasm  turns  out  to  be  what  may  be 
termed  the  structural  unit  of  the  human  body.  As  a  matter  of  fact, 
the  body,  in  its  earliest  state,  is  a  mere  multiple  of  such  units ;  and,  in 


CHAP.  XIII.]  CONSEQUENCES.  39 1 

its  present  condition,  it  is  a  multiple  of  such  units,  variotisly  modified." 
—p.  140. 

Yet  who  can  doubt  that  iu  the  living  body  there  is  a  latent, 
active  principle  wanting  in  the  recent  corpse,  though  com- 
posed of  the  same  identical  masses  of  nucleated  protoplasm  ? 

The  Professor  has  of  late  become  the  expositor  of  the 
idealist  philosophy,  according  to  which  mental  phenomena 
are  to  each  individual  most  unquestionably  the  primary 
objects  of  knowledge,  and  yet  he  tells  us  "it  is  obvious 
that  our  knowledge  of  what  we  call  the  material  world,  is, 
to  begin  with,  at  least  as  certain  and  definite  as  that  of  the 
spiritual  world  "  (p.  155).  And  more  recently  *  he  has  said, 
as  to  "  psychoses  "  and  "  neuroses,"  "  The  right  view  is  that 
they  are  connected  together  in  the  relation  of  cause  and 
effect,  psychoses  being  secondary,  and  following  on  neuroses !" 

We  next  meet  with  the  following  passage  : — 

"  If  a  man  asks  me  what  the  politics  of  the  inhabitants  of  the  moon 
are,  and  I  reply  that  I  do  not  know ;  that  neither  I,  nor  any  one  else, 
have  any  means  of  knowing ;  and  that,  nnder  these  circumstances,  I 
decline  to  trouble  myself  about  the  subject  at  all ...  in  replying  thus, 
I  conceive  that  I  am  simply  honest  and  truthful,  and  show  a  proper 
regard  for  the  economy  of  time.  So  Hume's  strong  and  subtle  intellect 
takes  up  a  great  many  problems  about  which  we  are  naturally  curious, 
and  shows  us  that  they  are  essentially  questions  of  lunar  politics,  in 
their  essence  incapable  of  being  answered,  and  therefore  not  worth  the 
attention  of  men  who  have  work  to  do  in  the  world." — p.  158. 

He  then  quotes  Hume  saying : — 

"  If  we  take  in  hand  any  volume  of  divinity,  or  school  metaphysics, 
for  instance,  lot  us  ask,  Does  it  contain  any  abstract  reasoning  concerning 
quantity  or  number  f  No.  Does  it  contain  any  experimental  reasoning 
concerning  matter  of  fact  and  existence  f  No.  Commit  it  then  to  the 
flames,  for  it  can  contain  nothing  but  sophistry  and  illusion." — p.  159. 

Professor  Huxley  adds  : — 

"  Permit  me  to  enforce  this  most  wise  advice.  Why  trouble  ourselves 
alxnit  matters  of  which,  however  important  they  may  be,  we  do  know 
nothing,  and  can  know  nothing  ?  " — p.  159. 


*  In  his  last  lecture  at  the  Fiusbury  Institution,  given  in  the  winter  of 
1872. 


392  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  XIII. 

This  amounts  to  a  deliberate  advice  and  injunction  to  his 
hearers  to  cast  aside  every  thought  or  care  respecting  God, 
their  own  souls  or  a  future  existence.  It  is  noteworthy  that 
this  dogmatic  statement,  this  certainty  as  to  what  is  possible 
to  our  faculties,  is  put  forth  by  one  who  also  tells  us  that 
even  "  of  the  existence  of  self"  we  have  not,  nor  "  can  wo 
by  any  possibility  have,"  the  highest  degree  of  certainty 
(p.  359). 

Finally,  in  his  address  to  the  members  of  the  Midland 
Institute  he  remarks  : — 

"  I  take  it  that  the  good  of  mankind  means  the  attainment,  by  every 
man,  of  all  the  happiness  which  he  can  enjoy,  without  diminishing  tho 
happiness  of  his  fellow-meu." 

And, 

"  If  we  inquire  what  kinds  of  happiness  come  under  this  definition, 
we  find  those  derived  from  the  sense  of  security  or  peace ;  from  wealth, 
or  commodity,  obtained  by  commerce ;  from  art ;  from  knowledge,  or 
science ;  and,  finally,  from  sympathy  or  friendship." 

And  here  we  must  remark,  in  spite  of  his  contact  with 
many  working  men,  how  utter  must  be  the  Professor's  lack 
of  acquaintance  with  the  real  life  of  the  poor,  thus  com- 
pletely to  exclude  from  the  catalogue  of  human  happiness 
all  considerations  of  religion,  its  hopes,  its  stimulus,  its 
consolations.  Had  he  but  practised  that  profession  which 
counts  him  amongst  its  members,  he  could  hardly  have  failed 
to  encounter  amongst  the  sick  and  suffering  some  poor  souls 
whose  one  stay  and  consolation,  amidst  a  crushing  accumula- 
tion of  earthly  woe,  has  been  a  trustful  belief  in  a  heavenly 
Father's  love,  and  the  prospect  of  a  supernatural  union  with 
Him  in  the  life  beyond  the  grave. 

As  before,  we  may  lay  down  the  following  propositions  as 
the  summary  of  Professor  Huxley's  moral  and  religious 
teaching : — 

I.  Physical    science  is  the  one  only    fountain   at   which 
spiritual  thirst  can  be  quenched. 

II.  Sadness  is  of  the  essence  of  religion. 


CHAP.  XIII.]  CONSEQUENCES.  393 

III.  The  First  Cause  is  inexorable  and  pitiless. 

IV.  It  looks  with  favour  on  the  learned  Dives,  not  on  the 
poor  and  ignorant  Lazarus. 

V.  Physical   welfare    and    happiness    aie    the    summum 
lonum. 

VI.  Security,  wealth,  culture,  and  sympathy  are  the  only 
rational  objects  of  pursuit. 

VII.  All  aspirations  or  efforts  after  Divine  things — the 
love  of  God  or  beatitude  in  a  future  life — are  simple  waste  of 
time,  if  not  worse,  and  are  fit  only  for  lunatics. 

VIII.  Knowledge  of  all  such  subjects  is  impossible  to  us. 
If  we  were  to  pursue  the  inquiry  from  the  pontiffs  down 

to  the  acolyths  and  ostiarii  of  the  non-theistic  other  decia- 
hierarchy,  far  more  exaggerated  expressions  could  rations- 
easily  be  produced,  tending  to  drive  further  home  the  prin- 
ciples insinuated  by  their  leaders.  Thus  Mr.  Barratt,  in  his 
'Physical  Ethics,'  tells  us  nakedly  that  "  no  pleasure  is  bad, 
except  when  it  means  pain,"  and  that  "  the  good  is  plea- 
sure." Mr.  Winwood  Eeade,  a  friend  and  ardent  disciple 
of  Mr.  Darwin,  very  pithily  states  the  ultimate  conclusions 
of  his  recent  work,  which  deals  with  so  wide  a  field,  and  is 
entitled  the  '  Martyrdom  of  Man.'  He  therein  tells  us : 
"  God-worship  is  idolatry ;  prayer  is  useless  ;  the  soul  is  not 
immortal;  there  are  no  rewards,  and  there  are  no  punish- 
ments in  a  future  state."  Of  course  Mr.  Eeade  fully  adopts 
Mr.  Darwin's  views  as  to  the  bestiality  of  man  ;  and  indeed 
almost,  though  quite  involuntarily,  caricatures  the  teaching 
of  his  master  regarding  our  ape-origin. 

Such  crude  views,  " le  rationalism* grassier"  and  its  gro- 
tesque pretensions  to  intellectual  eminence,  have  been  thus 
characterised  by  Mr.  James  Stirling:* 

"  *  There  was  a  time/  says  Hegel, '  when  a  man  who  did  not  believo 
in  ghosts  or  the  devil  was  named  a  philosopher !'  But  an  '  advanced 
tli inker/  to  these  distinctions  negative  of  the  unseen,  adds — what  is 
positive  of  the  seen—an  enlightened  pride  in  his  father  the  monkey  ! 


*  Sec  '  Fortnightly  Review,'  for  November  1871,  p.  53!). 
18 


394  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  XIII. 

Ho  may  enjoy,  perhaps,  a  well-informed  satisfaction  in  contemplating 
mere  material  phenomena  that  vary  with  conditions,  as  the  all  of  this 
universe,  or  he  may  even  experience  an  elevation  into  the  moral  sub- 
lime when  he  points  to  his  future  in  the  rock,  in  the  form  of  those 
bones  and  other  remains  of  a  Pithecus  intelligens,  which,  in  all  proba- 
bility (he  reflects),  no  subsequent  intelligence  will  ever  handle — but 
monkey  is  the  pass- word !  Sink  your  pedigree  as  man,  and  adopt  for 
family  tree  a  procession  of  the  skeletons  of  monkeys — then  superior 
enlightenment  radiates  from  your  very  person,  and  your  place  is  fixed 
— a  place  of  honour  in  the  acclamant  brotherhood  that  names  itself 
'  advanced ' !  So  it  is  in  England  at  present ;  this  is  the  acknowledged 
pinnacle  of  English  thought  and  English  science  now.  Just  point  in 
these  days  to  the  picture  of  some  huge  baboon,  and  suddenly — before 
such  enlightenment— superstition  is  disarmed,  priests  confess  their 
imposture,  and  the  Church  sinks— beneath  the  hippocampus  of  a 
gorilla." — The  Secret  of  Hegel,  Preface,  p.  xxxi. 

These  words  express  truly  enough  a  state  of  opinion  still 
but  too  widely  prevalent  in  England.  We  need  not  be 
without  hope,  hovvever,  that  ere  long  a  more  general  dif- 
fusion of  a  truer  philosophy  will  cause  the  essential  differ- 
ence between  the  psychical  natures  of  man  and  of  brutes 
to  be  more  clearly  apprehended.  Then  a  belief  in  the 
bestiality  of  man  will  very  soon  pass  away  into  the  limbo 
of  discarded  physical  superstitions. 

It  would  indeed  be  well  if  some  of  those  who  so  reck- 
lessly advocate  popular  teaching,  such  as  that  we  have  called 
attention  to,  would  ponder  over  the  utterances  of  continental 
infidels,  in  order  that  they  might  see  the  logical  outcome 
of  those  same  popular  teachings ;  for  it  is  continental  writers 
who  most  fearlessly  develop  their  principles  to  their  full 
results. 

Guillauine  Marr,  a  journalist  of  Lausanne,  in  a  general 
report  addressed  to  the  Conseil  d'Etat  some  years  ago,  dared 
to  assert  as  follows : — 

"  Faith  in  a  personal  and  living  God  is  the  origin  and  the  funda- 
mental cause  of  our  miserable  social  condition The  true  road  to 

liberty,  to  equality,  and  to  happiness,  is  atheism.  No  safety  on  earth, 
so  long  as  man  holds  on  by  a  thread  to  Heaven.  Let  nothing  hence- 
forward shackle  the  spontaneity  of  the  human  kind.  Let  us  teach 
man  that  there  is  no  other  God  than  himself;  that  he  is  the  Alpha 


CHAP.  XIIL]  CONSEQUENCES.  395 

and  the  Omega  of  all  things,  the  superior  being,  and  the  most  real 
reality." 

Again,  Caro  observes  : — 

"  Science  conducts  God  with  honour  to  its  frontiers,  thanking  him 
for  his  provisional  services." — L'Idee  de  Dieu,  p.  47. 

Feuerbach  tells  us  plainly  : — 

"  Les  antichretiens,  les  athees,  les  humanistes  (qui  ne  reconnaissent 
d'autre  Dieu  quo  1'humanite)  aujourd'hui  sont  bien  maltraites ;  mais 
ayons  lx)n  courage ;  1'atheisme  humanitairo  n'est  plus  dans  les  cama- 
rillas des  grands  seigneurs  riches  et  faineants,  comme  an  xviii"  siecle,  il 
est  descendu  dans  le  coeur  des  travailleurs  qui  sont  pauvrcs,  des  tra- 
vaiUeurs  d'esprit  comme  des  travailleurs  de  bras;  il  aura  sous  pen  le 
fjouverntment  du  globe." — Qu'est-ce  que  la  Religion  ?  p.  586. 

Another  writer  of  the  same  school  remarks : — 

"  Les  feuilletonistes  francais  qui  pretendent  attaquer  les  momes,  ne 
voient  pas  qu'ils  font  cause  commune  avec  eux,  puisqu'ils  admcttent, 
comme  eux,  1'article  fondamental,  la  notion  de  conscience  morale  et  la  dis- 
tinction du  bien  et  du  mal.  Le  plus  celebre  d'entre  eux  n'est  lui-memo 
qu'un  poete  jesuitique.  Les  seuls  opposant  veritable  &  1'imposture 
religieuse,  c'est  nous  et  nos  doctrines  purement  et  radicalement  nega- 
tives."— GKATRY,  Une  Elude  sur  la  Sophistique  contemporaine,  p.  153. 

Keturning  to  our  English  physical  expositors  before  quoted, 
we  may  now  sum  up  the  teaching  in  which  they  General  re- 
appear to  concur,  or  at  least  the  teaching  which  is  8ultl 
the  ultimate  and  logical  outcome  of  their  expositions — the 
dogmas  which  can  hardly  fail  to  impress  themselves  upon 
the  minds  of  their  disciples  who  follow  them  with  so  simple 
and   unhesitating   a    trust.      They   may   be   drawn   up    as 
follows : — 

I.  Temporal  happiness  is  the  one  rational  aim  of  life. 

II.  A  positive  belief  in  God  and  a  future  life  is  an  un- 
warrantable superstition. 

III.  Virtue  and  pleasure  are  synonymous,  for  in  root  and 
origin  they  are  identical. 

IV.  Men  are  essentially  but  brutes,  no  differences  of  kind 
dividing  them. 


396  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  XIII. 

V.  The  cause  of  all  things  has  not  personality,  and  con- 
sequently neither  feeling,  nor  intelligence,  nor  will. 

VI.  All  who  pretend  to  teach  religion  are  impostors  or  dupes. 

VII.  Our  physical-science  teachers  are  the  supreme  expo- 
nents of  all  truth,  and  the  ultimate  arbiters  of  all  actions. 

VIII.  There  is  no  such  thing  as  real  merit  or  demerit,  as 
all  our  actions  are  absolutely  determined  for  us,  and  free-will 
is  the  most  baseless  of  delusions. 

It  is  possible  that  one  or  other  of  the  writers  here  noticed 
may  object  to  what  has  been  said  on  the  ground  that  their 
words  may  be  understood  in  some  other  sense,  and  that  some 
other  passages  of  their  writings  may  be  taken  as  having 
another  meaning.  But  if  it  be  conceded  only  that  it  is  pos- 
sible that  God  exists,  then  in  the  presence  of  such  possibility 
men  are  bound  not  so  to  write  as  to  be  readily  understood  as 
opposing  theism,  while  contenting  themselves  with  having 
somewhere  emitted  a  sentence  of  less  equivocal  tendency.  As 
well  might  men  leave  bottles  of  strychnine  arid  prussic  acid 
about  in  an  infant  school  and  excuse  themselves  because  they 
had  labelled  each  bottle  with  the  word  "  poison,"  in  Greek. 
If  God  exists  at  all,  He  is  manifestly  not  to  be  patronised 
by  a  few  obscure,  ambiguous  phrases  which  writers  may  con- 
descend to  accord  Him;  and  such  writers,  if  they  really 
believe  in  Him,  are  bound  to  declare  their  conviction  with  no 
uncertain  sound. 

The  doctrines  just  passed  in  review  acquire  an  additional 
importance  from  another  characteristic  of  the  anti-religious 
school,  which  is  rapidly  becoming  more  manifest — prudential 
disguise  being  discarded,  as  no  longer  necessary. 

A  short  time  ago  it  might  have  been  contended  that  these 
inioir-rance  speculations,  however  calculated  to  damage  indi- 

of  mode  rn  .  -,       •,  •  -,• 

infidels.  viduals,  were  not  of  immediate  political  importance. 
The  unsuspecting  might  have  contended  that  these  physical 
dogmatists  were  all  "liberals,"  and  that  therefore  no  hin- 
drance to  free  inquiry,  or  the  untrammelled  propagation  of 
truth,  need  ever  be  apprehended  at  their  hands,  and  that  with 
a  fair  field  and  no  favour  truth  must  prevail. 


CHAP.  XIII.]  CONSEQUENCES.  337 

Indeed,  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer*  speaks  of  "  That  spirit  of 
toleration  which  is  so  marked  a  characteristic  of  modern 
times,  and  is  daily  growing  more  conspicuous,"  and  says : — 

"  Our  toleration  should  be  the  widest  possible ;  or  rather,  we  should 
aim  at  something  beyond  toleration,  as  commonly  understood.  In 
dealing  with  alien  beliefs  our  endeavour  must  be,  not  simply  to  refrain 
from  injustice  of  word  or  deed,  but  also  to  do  justice  by  an  open  recog- 
nition of  positive  worth.  We  must  qualify  our  disagreement  with  as 
much  as  may  be  of  sympathy." — Ibid,  p.  122. 

These  are  sentiments  which,  were  they  universal,  would 
make  such  considerations  as  we  are  attempting  to  bring 
forward  in  this  article  less  imperative.  It  is  greatly  to  be 
feared,  however,  that  this  benevolent  prediction  as  to  the 
increase  of  toleration  has  as  little  foundation  in  truth  as  had 
the  philanthropic  anticipations  that  war  was  at  an  end  when 
the  first  International  Exhibition  of  1851  was  opened.  The 
acts  of  the  Commune  do  not  certainly  breathe  a  very  tolerant 
spirit,  to  say  nothing  of  "  sympathy  with  opposite  opinions  ;" 
and  sentiments  kindred  to  those  of  the  French  Communists 
are  now  being  sown  broadcast  not  only  over  the  continent 
of  Europe,  but  even  in  our  own  country  also.  Apart,  however, 
from  political  convulsions  and  popular  passions,  the  writings 
of  recent  or  existing  physical  teachers  contain  enough  to  warn 
the  Christian  world  to  prepare  in  time  for  the  advent  of  an 
atheistic  persecution.  Thus  Comte,  in  his  'Philosophic 
Positive,'  gives  utterance  to  principles  of  persecution  suffi- 
ciently unmistakable.  He  tells  us  : — 

"  II  n'y  a  point  do  liberte  de  conscience  en  astronomic,  en  physique, 
en  chimio,  en  physiologic  meme,  en  ce  sens  quo  chacun  trouverait 
ubsurde  de  ne  pas  croire  de  coufiancc  aux  principes  etablis  dans  les 
sciences  par  les  hommcs  competents." 

Professor  Huxley,  who  quotes  these  words,  speaks  of  the 
organised  spiritual  power  which,  according  to  Comte,  was  to 
have  supreme  control  over  education  in  each  nation,  as  most 


'  First  Principles,'  p.  120. 


398  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  XIII. 

"  completely  sacerdotal "  and  "  entirely  anti-scientific,"  and 
adds*  that  "the  logical,  practical  result  of  this  part  of  his 
doctrine  would  be  the  establishment  of  something  corre- 
sponding with  that  eminently  Catholic,  but  admittedly  anti- 
scientific,  institution — the  Holy  Office."  ('  Lay  Sermons,' 
p.  190.) 

Another  utterance  comes  from  France  with  a  warning  in 
the  same  direction,  and  from  one  whose  orthodoxy  cannot  be 
suspected  of  having  sharpened  his  apprehensions  as  to  the 
future.  M.  Ernest  Renan  f  speculates  as  to  whether  "  1'avenir 
ne  ramenera  pas  quelque  chose  d' analogue  a  la  discipline 
ecclesiastique  que  le  liberalisrne  moderne  a  si  jalousement 
supprimee." 

The  Duke  of  Argyll*!  commenting  on  Mr.  Lewes's  dictum 
that  "  whatever  is  inaccessible  to  reason  should  be  strictly  in- 
terdicted by  reason,"  observes :  "  Here  we  have  the  true  ring 
of  the  old  sacerdotal  interdicts.  Who  is  to  define  beforehand 
what  is,  or  what  is  not,  '  inaccessible  to  reason '  ?" 

The  same  intolerance  of  freedom,  even  in  the  region  of 
pure  speculation,  is  shown  by  a  writer  in  the  '  Westminster 
Eevievv '  (for  October  1873,  p.  398),  who,  speaking  of  the 
modem  man  of  science,  tells  us :  "  Above  all  things  he  is 
silent  in  the  presence  of  truths  (or  falsehoods)  which  he  has 
ascertained  to  be  beyond  HIS  reach.  And  he  COMMANDS 
equally  in  respect  to  these  silence  on  all  others  of  mankind." 
These  Agnostics,  in  their  hostility  to  those  whose  vision  is 
less  limited,  recall  the  complaint  of  Boranger's  Owl  as  to 
the  enmity  he  innocently  excited  :  "  Parceque  fy  wis  clair 
la  nuit" 

But  the  most  portentous  phenomenon  of  this  kind  is  the 
open  avowal  of  intolerance,  and  the  direct  advocacy  of  per- 

*  Professor  Huxley  adds  the  singular  remark  that  "  tho  great  teaching  of 
science—  the  great  use  of  it  as  an  instrument  of  mental  discipline — is  its  con- 
stant inculcation  of  the  maxim,  tliat  the  sole  ground  on  which  any  statement  has 
a  right  to  be  believed  is  the  impossibility  of  refuting  it !"  According  to  this, 
we  have  ground  for  believing  that  a  green  dragon  inhabits  the  sun,  since  such 
a  proposition  it  is  quite  impossible  to  refute. 

t  '  S.  Paul,'  p.  3-J2. 

t  « Primeval  Man,'  pp.  21-23. 


CHAP.  XIII.]  CONSEQUENCES.  399 

secution  of  religious  opinions  by  no  less  a  "  liberal "  than 
Professor  Huxley,  whose  reprobation  of  the  very  same  views 
as  expressed  by  Comte  we  have  just  quoted.  Indeed,  he  has 
repudiated  that  reprobation  and  distinctly  contradicted  his 
previously  expressed  views,  in  his  address  to  the  Midland 
Institute,  wherein  he  has  quoted  both  Comte  and  Plato 
approvingly,  and  speaks  with  scorn  of  that  "pet  doctrine  of 
modern  liberalism,"  that  "  toleration "  is  "  a  good  thing  in 
itself,  and  ought  to  be  reckoned  among  the  cardinal  virtues."* 
He  has  added  the  remarkable  words :  "  I  do  not  see  how  any 
limit  whatever  can  be  laid  down  as  to  the  extent  to  which, 
under  some  circumstances,  the  action  of  government  may  be 
rightfully  carried ; "  and  has  asked  the  question :  "  Are  we 
not  bound  to  admit,  with  Locke,  that  it  [i.e.  the  State]  may 
have  right  to  interfere  with  '  popery  and  atheism,'  if  it  be 
really  true  that  the  practical  consequences  of  such  beliefs 
can  be  proved  to  be  injurious  to  civil  society?" t 

A  deprecation  of  any  opposition  to  this  intolerance  on  the 
ground  that  the  suppression  of  only  that  which  is  "  demon- 
strably  "  injurious  is  thereby  justified  cannot  be  admitted.  It 
cannot  be  admitted,  because  the  mere  fact  of  theological 
opinions  being  opposed  to  the  Professor's  own  may  be  quite 
enough  to  render  them,  in  his  eyes,  "  demonstrably  inju- 
rious," and  thus  justify  their  forcible  repression.  In  principle 
this  carries  equally  with  it  the  right  of  the  State  to  persecute 
T  heists. 

\Yo  have  seen  that,  according  to  the  teaching  Professor 
Huxley  favours,  all  religious  speculation  and  action  is  but 
waste  of  thought  and  effort.  It  cannot  be  for  the  advantage 
of  the  State  that  time  and  endeavour  should  be  thrown  away 
in  a  manner  worthy  only  of  lunatics ;  consequently  all  who 
would  promote  such  loss  should  be  discouraged  and  put  down. 
u  The  logical,  practical  result "  (to  quote  Professor  Huxley's 
words  respecting  Auguste  Comte)  "of  this  part  of  the  doctrine 
would  be  "  what  he  invidiously  calls,  "  the  establishment  of 

*  Soe  '  Fortnightly  Koviow,'  for  November  1871,  p.  532. 
f  Ibid.  p.  538. 


400  LESSONS  FKOM  NATUKE.  [CHAP.  XIII. 

something  corresponding  with  the  Holy  Office" — in  fact,  a 
Star-chamber  of  physically  scientific  inquisitors  sitting  in 
judgment  on,  and  condemning,  parents  who  had  dared  in 
private  secretly  to  teach  their  children  to  worship  God. 

The  naked  avowal  of  the  principle  of  thorough-going  perse- 
Atheism  in-  cution  by  so  prominent  a  "  liberal  "  has  surprised 
wlth'toi"™-  many,  but,  in  truth,  we  think  the  Professor  has 
tion.  nere  snown  himself  to  be  both  logical  and  rational. 

Except  upon  a  basis  of  intuitive  morality  and  the  relation  of 
the  conscience  to  God,  there  is  and  can  be  no  solid  basis  on 
which  the  rights  of  minorities  can  securely  repose.  The 
natural  and  necessary  alliance  between  atheism  and  the  most 
extreme  and  hardest  form  of  despotism — a  despotism  like 
that  of  the  Pagan  empire,  ignoring  conscience  altogether — 
was  empirically  manifested  in  France  in  1793  and  1870 ; 
and  it  is  a  characteristic  circumstance  that  Professor  Huxley 
refers  to  and  quotes  the  congenial  authority  of  Hobbes,  who, 
"  with  a  true  instinct,  would  have  laid  deep  the  foundations 
of  atheism  and  despotism  together,  resolving  all  right  into 
might,  and  not  merely  robbing  men,  if  he  could,  of  the  power, 
but  denying  to  ihem  the  duty,  of  obeying  God  rather  than 
man."*  Christianity  and  Judaism,  by  preferring  martyrdom 
to  apostasy,  first  taught  men  the  rights  of  conscience,  and 
may  be  destined  to  repeat  the  lesson  a  second  time  in  opposi- 
tion to  a  revived  paganism,  and  as  a  result,  of  a  new  tempo- 
rary persecution  by  it  of  the  Christian  Church. 

We  may  now  turn  to  the  consideration  of  the  third  set  of 
Practical  consequences,  namely,  the  practical  tendencies 
quinces.  resulting  from  the  reception  of  a  Non-theistic 
Philosophy. 

But  here  the  objection  may  be  made  that  science  and 
philosophy  have  no  concern  for  consequences.  Professor 
Huxley,  at  Belfast,  has  proclaimed  that  he  does  not  care  for 
them ;  and  physical  philosophers  generally  protest  that  they 
care  only  for  "  truth,"  which  at  all  hazards  must  unhesitat- 


*  Archbishop  Trench :  '  The  Study  of  Words,'  p.  171. 


CHAP.  XIII.]  CONSEQUENCES.  401 

ingly  be  investigated  and  pursued.  Now  such  a  protest  and 
declaration  is  reasonable  enough  in  the  mouths  of  those  who 
accept  the  philosophy  here  advocated.  We  can  reasonably 
proclaim  the  supreme  importance  of  truth  and  the  expe- 
diency of  its  unhesitating,  continuous,  and  unlimited  pursuit, 
because  of  the  conviction  that  the  universe  is  the  work  of  a 
good  God.  But  it  would  be  interesting  to  know  on  is  truth  ne- 

,  .  -11-11  i  cessarily  de- 

what  rational  grounds  philosophers  who  oppose  sirabie? 
Theism  could  support  their  conviction  that  truth  is  necessa- 
rily a  good — how  they  can  logically  assert  this  without  the 
belief  that  the  Cause  of  all  things  is  necessarily  a  God  of 
truth.  Experience  may  show  that  truth  has  been  generally 
beneficial,  but  it  can  never  make  its  beneficence  axiomatic, 
or  render  it  impossible  that  in  certain  cases  "ignorance" 
may  not  be  bliss,  "  wisdom "  "  folly,"  and  "  deceitfulness  ' 
expedient. 

Theists  may,  indeed,  confidently  exclaim — 

"  Magna  est  veritas  et  i>revalebit;" 

but  the  experiences  which  history  makes  known  to  us  amply 
support  the  declaration — 

"  Magnum  est  mcnducium  ct  prevaluit" 

Nor  can  the  merely  temporary  nature  of  its  prevalence  be 
logically  maintained  as  a  certain  truth  by  any  non-theist. 

Certainly,  if  such  views  as  those  of  Mr.  Mill,  Mr.  Spencer, 
and  Professor  Huxley  as  to  the  impotence  of  the  humau 
will  were  true,  the  only  hope  of  humanity  would  be  that  it 
should  "  believe  a  lie."  For  as  human  moral  progress  has 
been  effected  hitherto  under  the  belief  in  moral  responsibility, 
it  is  unquestionable  that  were  men  universally  convinced  and 
able  fully  to  realise  that  such  responsibility  is  a  delusion, 
and  that  their  every  thought  is  absolutely  predetermined,  a 
general  paralysis  of  moral  effort  must  necessarily  ensue. 

It  is  undeniable  then  that  all  non-theists  who  wish  well 
to  their  fellows  need  to  examine  with  scrupulous  anxiety 


402  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUKE.  [CHAP.  Xffl. 

and  care  the  tendencies  and  probable  consequences  of  their 
utterances,  however  convinced  they  may  be  that  such  utter- 
ances are  true. 

But  let  us  look  a  little  closer  at  some  modern  teaching 
likely  to  affect  conduct.     Dr.  Lewins  tells*  us: — 

some  pro-  t 

StthrtUcai  "  Earth  is  Paradise  if  the  healthy  operation  of  every 
applications,  anatomical  structure  could  be  preserved.  .  .  .  All 
that  is  fabled  by  poets,  saints,  martyrs,  founders  of  sects  and 
systems,  under  the  term  Saturnian,  or  Golden  Age,  Kingdom 
of  Heaven,  Paradise,  &c.,  is  comprehended  in  that  supreme 
lien  etre  which  results  from  the  equilibrium  of  the  bodily 
functions."  Harmonizing  with  such  declarations  and  with 
that  exaggerated  estimate  of  brute  existence  now  so  popular, 
is  the  teaching  of  Professor  Ed.  V.  Hartmann.  This  ex- 
positor of  science,  impregnated  with  antichristian  philosophy, 
teaches t  as  follows: — "It  is  important  to  make  beast  life 
better  known  to  youth  as  being  the  truest  source  of  pure 
nature,  wherein  they  may  learn  to  understand  their  true 
being  in  its  simplest  form,  and  in  it  rest  and  refresh  them- 
selves after  the  artificiality  and  deformity  of  our  social  con- 
dition." Again  he  tells  $  us : — "  The  individuals  of  the  lower 
and  poorer  classes  and  rough  savages,  are  happier  than  the 
instructed  and  well-to-do  classes."  And  he  goes  on  to  affirm 
that  similarly  brutes  are  happier  than  men ;  ending  with  the 
remarkable  sentence :  "  Let  us  only  think  how  agreeably  an 
ox  or  a  ling  lives,  almost  as  if  he  had  learned  to  do  so  from 
Aristotle."  Here  we  have  an  actual  modern  resurrection  of 
that  old  Pagan  frame  of  mind  satirized  by  Dr.  Newman  in 
the  soliloquy  of  Jucundus  :§ — 

"  Enjoyment's  the  great  rule :  ask  yourself,  have  I  made 
the  most  of  things  ?  .  .  .  I've  often  thought  the  hog  is  the 
only  really  wise  animal.  We  should  be  happier  if  we  were 
all  hogs.  Hogs  keep  the  end  of  life  steadily  in  view." 


*  '  Life  and  Mind,'  by  Robert  Lewins,  M.D. 
t  '  Pb.ilosopb.ie  des  Unbewussten,'  p.  359. 
t  Op.  cit.  p.  712. 
§  « Callista,'  pp.  48,  49. 


CHAP.  XIII.]  CONSEQUENCES.  403 

One  of  the  greatest  of  the  achievements  of  the  last  two 
thousand  years  has  been  the  successful  promulga-  Purit  ofin 
tion  of  the  doctrine  that  purity  of  intention,  and  tention- 
not  success,  is  that  which  is  really  deserving  of  esteem.  Yet 
the  essential  heartlessness  of  Non-theism  is  showing  itself, 
every  now  and  then,  in  its  true  colours.  To  show  this  the 
more  clearly,  we  may  quote  the  words  of  one  who,  in  so 
many  ways,  contrasts  favourably  with  other  members  of  that 
school  of  thought.  The  exigencies  of  his  philosophical  posi- 
tion have  betrayed  even  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer  into  speaking* 
of  the  "  Worthy  "  and  the  "  Unworthy  "  as  synonymous  with 
the  "  well "  and  the  "  ill-to-do  ;"  and  he  does  not  guard  him- 
self from  being  understood  to  call  the  poor  and  the  un- 
successful by  the  opprobrious  epithet,  "  good-for-nothings." 

Another  phenomenon  of  the  last  eighteen  hundred  years 
has  been  the  establishment  of  at  least  a  pure  theory  s,.xl]al  rila. 
of  the  sexual  relations,  and  the  protection  of  the  tion3p 
weaker  sex  against  the  selfishness  of  male  concupiscence. 
Now,  however,  marriage  is  the  constant  object  of  attack,  and 
unrestrained  licentiousness  theoretically  justified.  The  pro- 
miscuous intercourse  of  some  degraded  tribes  is  often  spoken  of 
under  the  term  "  communal  marriage"  and  the  cause  of  "  free- 
love  "  is,  of  course,  directly  promoted  by  every  phrase  which 
tends  to  assimilate  in  terms  the  two  very  distinct  states,  and  so 
pave  the  way  for  their  legislative  assimilation.  And  it  is  very 
natural  it  should  be  so.  Cumbrous  and  involved  must  be  the 
reasoning  of  any  one  who,  while  denying  (as  the  advocates  of 
the  bestiality  of  man  must  deny)  any  real  distinction  between 
duty  and  pleasure,  would  at  the  same  time  seek  to  maintain 
the  stringency  of  existing  sexual  customs  on  the  basis  of  mere 
expediency.  Once  admit  this  expediency,  i.e.,  the  promotion 
of  the  physical  welfare  of  the  race,  to  be  the  one  only  rule  of 
conduct,  and  the  door  is  opened  for  the  free  ingress  of  the 
strangest  propositions.  Once  deny  the  distinction  between 
material  and  formal  morality — once,  that  is,  identify  in  essence 


*  •  Contemporary  Review,'  August  1873,  p.  339. 


404  LESSONS  FROM  KATUEE.  [CHAP.  XIII. 

and  origin  duty  with  pleasure — and  the  social  maxims  which 
may  be  put  forward  and  defended  are  somewhat  startling. 

I  am  myself  acquainted  with  a  gentleman  of  very  high 
culture  and  very  advanced  views,  who  deliberately  main- 
tains (although  his  own  life  is  like  that  of  other  Englishmen) 
that  it  would  be  a  great  benefit  to  propagate  in  modern 
society  customs  of  Pagan  Greece  and  Rome  which  are  gene- 
rally looked  upon  as  specially  revolting,  advocating  them  on 
strictly  utilitarian  principles. 

The  justice  of  such  remarks  as  these  is  sometimes  very  irra- 
Gmduct  in  tionally  disputed  on  account  of  the  personal  virtues 
uSs  influen-  of  men  who  may  profess  Anti-theistic  views.  But  if 
twchtog.  leaders  or  propagators  of  the  Non-theistic  philosophy 
are  men  who  lead  a  life  materially  moral,  it  is  only  so  much 
the  worse.  It  is  so  much  the  worse,  because  such  a  life  is  the 
means  of  giving  far  greater  currency  to  dangerous  views,  the 
very  dangers  of  which  such  a  life  more  or  less  disguises.  Of 
two  men,  one  leading  a  life  of  this  moral  kind,  but  infiu- 
entially  propagating  the  Agnostic  philosophy,  and  another 
simply  leading  a  grossly  sensual  one,  which  does  the  most 
harm  to  others  ?  There  cannot  be  a  moment's  dispute  about 
it.  The  most  profligate  of  men  can  by  his  personal  conduct 
corrupt  but  a  few ;  but  the  Agnostic  who,  by  his  publications, 
tends  to  sap  the  basis  of  all  morality  spreads  corruption  far 
and  wide,  not  only  in  his  own,  but  in  succeeding  generations 
also.  However  warm  may  be  our  personal  regard  for  such 
an  Agnostic,  however  much  we  may  enjoy  his  society,  or 
appreciate  his  warm-heartedness,  we  must  none  the  less  con- 
fess that,  absolutely  and  in  fact,  he  is  one  of  the  worst 
enemies  of  the  human  race.  Regret  it  as  we  may,  there  is 
no  ratioual'way  of  avoiding  such  a  judgment. 

Again,  let  us  suppose,  for  argument's  sake,  that  Christianity 
is  true ;  let  it  be  granted  for  the  same  reason,  per  impossibile 
or  per  dbsurdum,  that  there  is  a  living  personification  of  the 
principle  of  evil.  Would  such  a  being  for  a  moment  allow 
serious  temptation  to  come  in  our  Agnostic  philosopher's 
way?  Would  he  not  scrupulously  guard  him  from  any 


re- 
ins i Hi 


CIIAP.  XIII.]  CONSEQUENCES.  405 

such  peril,  lest  perchance  a  shameful  fall  might  develop 
some  latent  germ  of  humility  in  him,  the  existence  of 
which  might  be  discernible  by  such  preternaturally  acute 
vision  ? 

With  respect  to  proposed  restrictions  on  the  marriage  of 
those  who  cannot  bring  proofs  of  freedom  from  disease  An  obicclion 
not  only  in  themselves  but  in  their  ancestors,  some 
remarks  made  by  Dr.  Samuel  Wilks,  F.R.S.,  may  muTia8e- 
be  quoted.  They  are  on  the  study  of  the  human  mind 
from  a  physiological  view,  and  appeared  in  the  January 
number  of  the  '  Journal  of  Mental  Science '  for  1 875.  He 
there  says : — 

"  Has  the  time  arrived  in  which  we  could  adopt  any  of  those  rules 
in  the  choice  of  marriages  which  can  be  followed  in  the  breeding  of 
animals,  as  is  suggested  in  '  Lothair  ?'  '  It  is  the  first  duty  of  the  State 
to  attend  to  the  health  and  frame  of  the  subject.  The  union  of  the 
races  concerns  the  welfare  of  the  commonwealth  much  too  nearly  to  be 
intrusted  to  individual  arrangement.'  The  subject  has  been  lately 
developed  in  one  or  two  essays,  and  more  especially  in  reference  to  the 
mixture  of  the  insane  element  into  human  society.  In  reference  to  this  it 
must  be  said,  that  at  the  present  time  we  have  not  sufficient  knowledge 
of  temperaments,  under  what  conditions  they  arise,  and,  in  fact,  how 
they  are  produced ;  nor  do  we  know,  when  regarding  certain  tempera- 
ments, how  the  good  and  bad  are  intermingled ;  that  is,  how  with  what 
we  call  morbid  tendencies  there  may  not  be  important  bodily  and  mental 
characteristics  and  activities  of  great  value.  One  kind  of  person  whom 
England  is  apt  to  produce  some  would  purposely  avoid  as  being  liable 
to  gout,  with  all  its  attendant  evils ;  and  yet,  though  gouty,  he  is  a 
vigorous,  active,  independent  man.  Another  kind  of  person,  whom  we 
call  consumptive,  and  which  England  is  also  especially  apt  to  produce, 
would  be  avoided ;  and  yet  there  is  in  him  often  a  wonderful  activity. 
Then  again,  if  the  person  inclined  to  insanity  is  the  one  above  all  to  be 
shunned  in  a  marriage  connection,  it  might  turn  out  that  we  were 
losing  some  of  the  best  blood  of  the  country.  It  is  no  doubt  fearful  to 
think  of  a  man  or  woman  marrying  with  a  strong  taint  of  insanity, 
and  bringing  into  the  world  a  family  of  lunatics;  but  it  docs  not  follow 
that  an  infusion  of  the  insane  blood  may  not  be  desirable." 

And  he  tells  us : — 

"  I  believe  Dr.  Maudsley  has  also  expressed  this  opinion.  I  think 
it  might  easily  be  shown  that  such  infusion  has  given  genius  to  a 


400  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  XIII. 

whole  family;  it  has  leavened  the  whole  mass.  There  may  be  an 
intellectual  element  which  in  moderation  is  good,  and  in  excess  is  none 
other  than  madness,  in  the  same  way  that  common  sense  may  find  its 
acme  in  an  inactive  dolt.  It  is  this  very  case  of  the  supposed  value  of 
getting  rid  of  the  insane  element  in  society  that  would  make  me  hesi- 
tate before  I  offered  any  restrictions  to  marriage,  or  dared  to  dictate  to 
my  fellow-creatures  as  to  the  impropriety  or  otherwise  of  mixing 
certain  temperaments." 

Amongst  important  practical  consequences  of  the  spread  of 
conse-  such  non-tlieistic,  i.e.,  irreligious  views  as  those 
ilgTrds88  noticed  in  this  chapter,  is  the  eager  demand  for 
cation.  "secular  education,"  in  what  is  the  present  real 
signification  of  that  term. 

The  current  of  popular  feeling  which  now  runs  in  favour 
of  State  education  is  as  yet  too  strong  to  allow  anything  like 
a  fair  hearing  to  the  weighty  arguments  by  which  Mr. 
Herbert  Spencer  disputes  the  justice  and  denies  the  expe- 
diency of  any  such  State  action  at  all.  Nevertheless,  only  a 
very  small  minority  will  probably  persist  in  advocating  the 
education  of  all  poor  children  at  the  expense  of  parents 
generally  in  the  tenets  and  dogmas  of  one,  as  yet,  very  in- 
considerable sect — that  of  the  Secularists — when  once  they 
fully  understand  that  this  is  the  result  of  "secular"  or 
"unsectarian  education."  At  some  future  day  it  may, 
indeed,  hardly  be  deemed  credible  that  attempts  should  have 
been  made  in  England,  in  the  middle  of  the  nineteenth 
century,  to  force  a  majority  of  Englishmen  to  pay  for  the 
education  of  their  children  in  a  creed  utterly  hostile  to  that 
which  their  parents  profess,  and  this  too  in  the  name  of 
"  freedom." 

It  is  not  here  contended,  however,  that  truly  "  secular  " 
instruction  cannot  fairly  and  innocently  enough  be  one  day 
given.  But  whether  it  can  be  so  given  or  not  will  depend 
upon  the  question  whether  the  influence  of  the  non-theistic 
philosophy  is  at  the  time  dominant.  What  is  contended  is 
that  existing  conditions  do  not  admit  of  such  a  process,  and 
that  to  attempt  it  is  to  attempt  a  most  gross  and  flagrant 
injustice. 


CUAP.  XIII.]  CONSEQUENCES.  407 

Mr.  Henry  Holbcach  may  be  cited  as  an  unprejudiced 
witness  in  this  matter.  He  tells  *  us  : — 

"  The  great  majority  of  scientific  men  at  the  present  time  pursue  a 
purely  positive  method,  and  the  primary  assumptions  of  that  method 
are  fatal  to  all  theological  conceptions.  It  should  not  need  much  argu- 
ment to  show  that  they  are,  at  lowest,  fatal  to  any  theological  concep- 
tions such  as  those  upon  which  Christianity  as  a  system  is  necessarily 
engrafted.  Now  a  professor  might  preach  an  orthodox  sermon  every 
Sunday,  subscribe  Sir  Eoundell  Palmer's  pledge  ex  animo,  and  have 
Christian  prayers  before  and  after  class,  and  yet,  if  he  taught  science 
after  the  manner  of  BUchner,  he  would  be  opposing  not  only  Chris- 
tianity, but  Theism,  with  the  whole  stress  of  his  mind,  and  his  pupils 

would,  at  the  best,  turn  out  sceptics Those,  if  any,  who 

imagine  that  these  characteristic  features  cannot  and  would  not  of 
necessity  be  introduced  into  the  '  secular '  teaching  of  the  young  under 
State  sanction — who  think  that  an  anti-theological  animus  cannot  be 
made  effective  in  the  instruction  given  to  children — are  very  much 

mistaken But  besides  all  this,  it  is  certain  that  the  scientific 

teaching  all  over  the  world  is  so Vain  is  it  to  reply,  these 

are  not  questions  brulantes.  They  are  not,  and  they  are ;  and  if  they 
are  decided  in  favour  of  state-applied  education  on  the  secular  basis, 
they  simply  introduce  the  thin  edge  of  the  wedge ;  and  after  the  whips 
will  come  the  scorpions ;  after  the  deeds  in  the  green  tree  the  deeds  in 
the  dry.  And  we  should  have,  already,  this  state  of  things  : — Paid  for 
in  part  by  the  religious  classes,  compulsory  secular  teaching,  that  is 
necessarily  pervaded  by  a  spirit  which  they  regard  as  anti-religious." 

An  attempt  has  recently  been  made  to  meet  this  difficulty 
by  the  Rev.  William  Mackintosh,!  who  proposes  The  Rev. 

J  ,  ,  P  William 

the  introduction  of  an  ethical  teaching  apart  from  Mackintosh, 
religion — a  moral  catechism  divorced   from  theology.      He 
indeed  throws  overboard  the  absurd  notion  of  teaching  the 
Christian  religion  in  general,  but  no  special  form  of  it  in 
particular.    He  says : — 

"  If  by  way  of  removing  all  ground  of  complaint  and  offonce  we 
eliminate  from  the  teaching  of  Christianity  all  debatable  matter  con- 
cerning which  the  sects  take  different  views,  there  remains  little  to  be 

communicated  in  the  name  of  religion It  would  be  easy  to 

demonstrate  that  the  chimerical  character  of  so-called  unsectarian,  or 
undenominational  teaching  cinnot  be  remedied  by  leaving  its  ad- 
ministration to  the  discretion  of  the  teachers,  as  has  been  proposed." 


*  '  Contemporary  Review,'  April  1872 

t  See  '  Contemporary  Review,"  January  1874. 


408  LESSONS  FKOM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  XIII. 

He  proposes  *  a  manual  to  inculcate  "  the  common, 
universal,  personal  and  social  duties  ....  and  that  other 
doctrine  of  an  Unseen  Power  which  presides  over  all  .... 
Such  a  manual,"  he  says,  "  would  lead  up  to  religion,  or  place 
the  children  in  its  vestibule,  but  take  them  no  further." 

Now  doubtless  such  a  course  as  that  proposed,  if  really 
practicable,  might  have,  in  our  religiously  divided  condition, 
certain  advantages,  and  it  is  by  no  means  impossible  that 
in  the  future  something  of  the  kind  may  be  attained,  but  it 
will  not  be  by  the  exclusion  of  religion,  which  is  unconsciously 
deluded  by  Mr.  Mackintosh,  while  attempting  actually  to 
exclude  it — the  above-quoted  phrase,  "an  Unseen  Power 
which  presides  over  all,"  means  either  nothing,  or  it  means  a 
whole  system  of  profound  dogmatic  theology.  This  phrase 
seems  to  be  a  concession  to  the  nonsense  of  Mr.  Matthew 
Arnold  about  "  a  stream  of  tendency,"  "  an  Eternal,  not  our- 
selves, making  for  righteousness."  As  to  which  Mr.  Henry 
Dunn  |  exclaims :  "  *  We  ought  not  to  speak  of  God  as  a 
Person,  one  who  thinks  and  loves,'  says  Mr.  Arnold,  for 
this  tends  to  make  us  think  of  G-od  '  as  if 'He  were  a  magnified 

and  non-natural  man  in  the  next  street.' But  how, 

except  it  be  under  human  conditions,  can  I  know  what  is 
meant  by  the  '  Eternal,  not  ourselves,  making  for  righteous- 
ness' ?  ....  I  am  told  I  must  not  talk  of  God  as  one  who 
loves,  because  the  relation  of  God  to  man,  so  understood,  is 
not  verifiable  ....  Quite  as  verifiable,  I  think,  as  are  the 
statements  that  'the  enduring  power  around  us  makes  for 
righteousness,  &c.' " 

Mr.  Mackintosh,  of  course,  does  not  propose  that  the 
children  shall  repeat  the  phrase,  "  an  Unseen  Power  which 
presides  over  all,"  without  attaching  any  meaning  to  their 
articulations.  Mr.  Mackintosh  means  by  it,  of  course,  God  as 
understood  by  natural  theology.  A  "  Power "  which  can 
neither  know  the  children  nor  be  known  by  them,  which 
must  therefore  be  supposed  destitute  of  every  really  moral 


*  Lnc.  cit.  p.  261. 

t  '  Brief  Note  s  on  Mr.  Matthew  Arnold's  Literature  and  Dogma.' 


CHAP.  XIII.]  CONSEQUENCES.  409 

attribute  (presiding  over  the  universe  as  the  sun  presides 
over  the  solar  system),  can  have  no  moral  influence  on  their 
minds,  and  might  as  well  be  altogether  omitted. 

It  is  impossible  to  avoid  theology.  A  man  must  either 
believe  that  God  exists,  or  that  He  does  not  exist,  or  that 
His  existence  is  unknowable,  or  possibly  knowable,  but  to 
him.  unknown;  and  each  one  of  these  beliefs  is  in  fact  a 
dogma,  pregnant  with  the  most  momentous  consequences. 
Similarly,  as  regards  a  future  life,  a  man  must  hold  either 
that  he  has,  or  that  he  has  not,  grounds  sufficient  for  acting 
in  this  life  with  a  direct  view  to  the  next.  One  of  these  two 
beliefs  is  just  as  dogmatic  as  the  other,  both  will  be  fruitful 
in  effects ;  while  to  bring  up  children  in  silence  as  regards  a 
future  life  is  equivalent  to  teaching  them  that  the  second 
belief  is  the  true  one. 

Then  as  to  mere  morals,  what  would  Mr.  Mackintosh  have 
the  children  taught  as  to  their  duties  to  this  Unseen  Power 
itself?  If  they  are  taught  nothing,  no  irreverence  need 
surprise  us  :  why  should  they  reverence  anything  indefinitely 
leneath  themselves  ? 

Here,  as  in  so  many  other  lines  of  thought,  Mr.  Herbert 
Spencer's  declarations  boldly  oppose  popular  superstition, 
llidiculing  the  prevalent  educational  notions  on  this  subject, 
he  exclaims :  *  "  See  here  the  proposals  and  the  implied 
beliefs.  Teaching  by  clergymen  not  having  had  the  desired 
effect,  let  us  try  teaching  by  schoolmasters.  Bible-reading 
from  a  pulpit,  with  the  accompaniment  of  imposing  archi- 
tecture, painted  windows,  tombs,  and  '  dim  religious  light,' 
having  proved  inadequate,  suppose  we  try  Bible-reading  in 
rooms  with  bare  walls,  relieved  only  by  maps,  and  drawings 

of  animals Certainly,  such  influence  as  may  be 

gained  by  addressing  moral  truths  to  the  intellect  is  made 
greater  if  the  accompaniments  arouse  an  appropriate  emotional 
excitement,  as  a  religious  service  does;  while,  conversely, 
there  can  be  no  more  effectual  way  of  divesting  such  moral 


'  Coutemporary  Review '  for  September  1873,  p.  517. 


410  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  XIII. 

truths  of  their  im press! veness  than  associating  them  with  the 
prosaic  and  vulgarizing  sounds  and  sights  and  smells  coming 
from  crowded  children." 

It  is  here  contended,  then,  that  Mr.  Mackintosh  is  both 
A  positive  light  and  wrong :  right,  in  advocating  a  common 
compromise.  ethjca|  teaching ;  wrong,  in  wishing  to  exclude 
theology.  What  many  persons  believe  would  be  far  better 
than  a  mere  colourless  hazy  system  of  Bible-reading  and 
vague  insinuation  of  nebulous  doctrines  would  be  a  clear, 
sharp,  distinct,  and  positive  inculcation  of  natural  religion 
apart  from  any  teaching  of  revealed  religion.  The  inculca- 
tion, that  is,  of  a  belief  in  a  Personal  and  Holy  God,  moral 
responsibility,  and  rewards  and  punishments  in  an  immortal 
state  of  future  individual  existence. 

Such  teaching,  and  a  manual  framed  to  convey  it,  some 
think  might  give  satisfaction  to  all  but  the  small  sect  of 
Antitheists.  All  Christian  bodies,  all  Unitarians  and  Deists 
even,  might  acquiesce  in  such  teaching,  since  the  foundation 
for  all  would  here  be  laid,  while  the  rights  of  none  would  be  en- 
croached on.  The  special  superstructure  of  each  might  then 
well  be  added  by  the  purely  religious  teaching  which  each 
would  bring  to  bear  upon  the  children  under  their  influence. 

Ethics  would  come  to  repose  on  a  secure  basis,  for  although 
moral  precepts  do  not  depend  upon  the  will  of  God,  yet 
apart  from  Him  they  can  have  no  stable  existence. 

But  it  is  not  only  the  teaching  of  children  that  has  to 
Need  of  a  be-  be  considered.  In  the  face  of  the  prosperity  of 

liefin  future        .  ,      ,  /•          •!      i       •  i   •    i  n 

rewards  and  vice  and  the  success  ot  evil  designs,  which  so  often 
meats.  dazzle  the  eyes  of  those  under  temptation,  what 
rational  motive  can  be  presented  to  the  will  of  even  adults, 
to  induce  them  to  repress  a  wrong  desire,  which  he  who  feels 
it  thinks  he  may  safely  indulge,  apart  from  the  existence  of  a 
good  God  and  a  future  life  ?  All  men  are,  of  course,  more  or 
less  influenced  by  kind-hearted  and  generous  feelings,  and  a 
sensible  pleasure  in  different  degrees  generally  attends  the 
performance  of  good  actions,  but  by  no  means  always  so 
— sometimes  they  are  most  painful. 


CHAP.  XHL]  CONSEQUENCES.  411 

But  the  question  is  how  to  influence  the  will  towards  a 
good  action  painful  to  the  performer,  and  for  which  he  sees 
no  prospect  of  present  or  future  advantage  to  himself.  Mr. 
Lewes  admits*  the  impotence  of  his  philosophy  in  this 
matter.  He  says :  "  If  a  man  is  insensible  to  the  welfare  of 
others,  we  can  no  more  convince  him  he  ought  to  feel  for 
them  than  we  can  convince  the  blind  man  that  he  ought  to 
see  the  glories  of  colour."  Why  should  such  a  one  try  to 
acquire  an  inclination  to  good  which  he  does  not  now  possess  ? 
We  are  rational  beings,  and  clearly  see  that  that  which  gives 
us  happiness  is  worthy  of  regard  and  pursuit.  The  Agnostic 
philosopher,  the  disciple  of  Spencer,  Huxley,  Lewes,  Mill,  or 
Bain,  who  should  really  simply  deprive  himself  of  a  pleasure, 
would  be  acting  irrationally.  If  he  felt  pleasure  in  the  self- 
denying  action,  he  would  of  course  naturally,  and  rationally 
on  his  own  principles,  perform  it,  but  certainly  not  if  he  felt 
no  such  pleasure  ;  if  he  then  did  it,  he  would  simply  be  a  fool. 
Let  us  grant  for  argument's  sake  that  moral  perception  is 
really  but  the  inherited  naturally  selected  tendency  to  benefit 
one's  tribe.  Can  any  rational  man  be  expected,  as  soon  as 
he  awakes  to  a  sense  of  the  delusion  he  has  been  un'ler,  not 
to  regulate  his  actions  accordingly?  His  rational  nature 
cannot  but  despise  (avowedly  or  secretly)  modes  of  action 
which  have  no  intelligible  basis.  And  this  remark  applies 
to  the  humanitarian  religion,  which  would  have  us  toil,  not 
for  any  happiness  to  ourselves  or  those  dear  to  us  (another 
form  of  self-gratification),  but  for  a  remote  posterity  which  is 
to  flourish  for  an  instant  before  the  great  final  lapse  into 
annihilation  of  all  mankind.  On  this  matter  Mr.  Mott  well 
observes  :f — 

"The  hope  of  progress,  to  have  any  powerful  influence  upon  us, 
must  be  the  hope  of  sometliing  in  which  we  ourselves,  or  those  who 
arc  really  dear  to  us,  can  share ;  not  the  hope  that  a  higher  race  of 
beings  will  inhabit  the  earth  long  after  we  have  done  with  it.  If  I 
heard  that  the  Emperor  of  China  was  a  much  better  and  nobler  being 
than  myself,  I  do  not  feel  that  I  should  be  much  elated  by  the  news. 

*  '  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,'  voL  i.  p.  457. 
t  'Origin  of  Savuge  Lift-,'  p.  4o. 


412  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  XIII. 

Even  if  I  congratulated  himself  and  his  subjects,  my  personal  feelings 
would  be  rather  grim.  In  like  manner,  the  knowledge  that  my  own 
lot,  and  the  lot  of  those  I  love,  was  a  very  miserable  one  compared 
with  what  my  descendants  would  inherit  a  thousand  years  hence, 
could  not  give  me  a  very  cheerful  view  of  life  in  general.  Nor  is  there 
any  selfishness  in  this,  for  selfishness  does  not  consist  in  highly  valuing 
our  own  happiness — this  is  surely  what  the  angels  do — but  in  being 
willing  to  sacrifice  the  happiness  of  others  in  order  to  secure  our  own. 
"  The  hope  of  improving  the  condition  of  others  in  whom  our  affec- 
tions are  interested  is  indeed  one  of  the  highest  motives  for  exertion ; 
but  to  suppose  that  we  can  carry  such  affection  forward  to  far  distant 
generations  is  to  misinterpret  human  nature.  The  feeling  which  is 
mistaken  for  such  transcendental  love  is  a  sentimental  product  of  the 
imagination,  which  seeks  to  render  the  hope  of  individual  immortality 
unnecessary  to  our  happiness,  by  persuading  us  to  forget  the  individual 
and  to  think  only  of  the  race.  The  feeling  is  false  to  nature,  and  can 
never  be  a  real  power  in  the  world." 

Before  quitting  finally  the  question  of  public  education 
Twoambi-  we  may  notice  an  ambiguity  lurking  in  the  term 
guities.  «  sectarian  education." 

In  the  first  place,  what  is  "  sectarianism"  ?  There  are 
people  who  seem  to  imagine  that  an  opinion  may  be  an 
"  opinion  in  general."  But,  in  fact,  each  opinion  must  have 
a  definite  existence,  just  as  no  man  in  -general  exists,  but 
only  definite  individual  men.  Every  man,  as  certainly  as  he 
has  eyes  of  a  definite  colour,  and  a  nose  of  a  definite  form, 
must  have  definite  opinions  on  the  subjects  which  occupy  his 
thoughts,  even  though  it  be  the  sceptical  one  that  certainly 
has  not  been,  and  cannot  be  attained.  Thus  with  regard  to 
philosophy  and  religion,  to  bring  up  men  without  attempting 
to  give  them  definite  teaching  on  such  subjects,  is  the  same 
thing  as  directly  teaching  them  that  philosophy  and  religion 
are  unimportant  matters,  possessing  no  certainty  whatever. 
This  view  is  just  as  definite,  just  as  sectarian  as  any  other ; 
and  those  who  hold  it  will  tend  to  sympathise  with  and  aid 
each  other,  just  as  will  the  holders  of  any  other  philosophical 
or  religious  opinion. 

A  similar  ambiguity  to  that  which  clings  to  the  word 
"  sectarianism  "  attends  the  popular  use  of  the  term  "  educa- 
tion "  itself.  Education  means  the  cultivation  of  the  whole 


CHAP.  XIII.]  CONSEQUENCES.  413 

man,  body  and  soul,  and  the  latter  in  its  entirety ;  emotion 
and  will,  as  well  as  sense  and  intellect.  No  one  can  deny 
that  religious  dogmas  have  often  a  powerful  effect  for  good 
or  ill  in  stimulating  the  emotions  and  the  will.  No  one, 
therefore,  can  deny  that  education  without  religious  dogmas 
is  necessarily  defective  and  imperfect,  though  each  may  have 
his  view  as  to  what  those  dogmas  should  be. 

As  regards  the  intellect  itself,  no  education  can  be  regarded 
as  satisfactory  which  does  not  tend  to  stimulate  its  ja^aon 
highest  powers.  But  education  mainly  carried  on  1^"'^'^ 
by  physical  science,  tends  to  an  undue  preponderance  est  P°wer8- 
of  the  senses,  that  is  to  say,  of  the  lowest  faculties  of  the 
soul.  The  highest  intellectual  activity — philosophical  science 
— cannot,  of  course,  be  directly  taught  in  poor  schools. 
Nevertheless,  it  is  difficult  to  see  why  the  highest  results  of 
philosophical  science  should  not  be  imparted  as  well  as  the 
results  of  other  sciences,  e.g.,  astronomy.  No  one  would 
deprecate  the  imparting  to  poor  children  rational  conceptions 
of  the  starry  heavens,  on  the  ground  that  they  cannot  be 
taught  to  examine  and  calculate  for  themselves,  so  as  to 
have  an  independent  knowledge  of  astronomical  laws  and 
phenomena.  Now  religion  brings  down  to  the  popular  appre- 
hension, and  embodies  the  highest  results  of  philosophy. 
Those,  therefore,  who  would  exclude  it  from  our  schools 
would  deprive  the  masses  of  such  share  as  is  open  to  them  of 
the  highest  truth. 

A  parallel  folly  would  be  to  insist  on  each  man  working 
out  for  himself  his  own  astronomy.  As  religion,  however, 
has  infinitely  more  to  do  with  practical  life  than  has  astro- 
nomy, it  is  plain  that  to  exclude  it  is  an  infinitely  more 
momentous  matter. 

Thus  the  movement  in  favour  of  education — in  the  abstract 
most  admirable — tends  in  the  concrete  to  be  perverted,  with 
calamitous  effect,  through  misapprehension  of  the  true  mean- 
ing of  the  word ;  and  in  this  way  aspirations  worthy  of  all 
praise,  and  a  zeal  which  cannot  bo  too  much  commended, 
run  the  risk  of  producing  effects  the  very  opposite  to  those 


414  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUKE.  [CiiAr.  XIII. 

really  aimed  at  by  the  great  body  of  those  so  interested  in 
the  cause  we  are  discussing. 

All  who  have  at  heart  the  welfare  of  their  country  must 
desire  the  wide  diffusion  of  a  spirit  of  self-control  and  rational 
subordination,  and  the  depression  of  the  more  selfish  and 
brutal  instincts  of  our  nature. 

Men  are  moved  to  action  by  a  variety  of  motives,  such  as, 
Motives  1,  their  admiration  of  what  is  virtuous;  2,  their 
meu  to  act.  admiration  for  what  is  beautiful ;  3,  their  admiration 
for  what  is  true ;  4,  their  sympathy  for  some  or  all  of  their 
fellow-men ;  5,  the  desire  of  their  own  greatest  good ;  6,  the 
hope  of  reward;  7,  the  fear  of  punishment;  and  8,  the 
gratification  of  their  instincts  and  passions. 

This  being  so,  let  us  see  what  is  likely  to  be  the  effect  of 
a  wide-spread  belief  that  an  absolutely  perfect,  omnipresent, 
omnipotent,  all-holy  God  will  distribute  to  every  one  in  a 
future  life  rewards  and  punishments  exactly  proportionate  to 
every  deed,  word,  and  thought,  for  which  in  this  life  their 
will  is  responsible,  that  will  having  the  power  of  self-deter- 
mination:— 

1.  The  admiration  of  virtue,  goodness,  and  truth,  is  inten- 
sified and  rationalised  as  of  the  essence  of  the  ALL-PERFECT — 
a  reasonable  object  for  our  utmost  love. 

2.  Sympathy  for  our  fellows  acquires  a  basis  which  else  it 
lacks,  and  this  belief  can  never  be  the  reason  of  that  sympathy 
resulting  in  an  unjust  action,  as,  under  the  governance  of  an 
all-holy  God,  we  cannot  really  benefit  a  friend  by  any  evil, 
though  kindly-intentioned  act. 

3.  The  natural  desire  for  our  own  greatest  good  is  thus 
seen  to  coincide  absolutely  with  the  law  of  "  right." 

4.  The  hope  of  reward  and  fear  of  punishment  are  inten- 
sified and  again  directed  to  a  coincidence  with  the  same  law 
of  "  right." 

5.  The  gratification  of  our  instincts  and  passions,  in  con- 
travention of  the  law  of  right,  is  impeded  by  the  influence  of 
motives,  which  are  at  once  the  highest  and  the  most  powerful. 

On  the  other  hand,  if  we  are  so  unhappy  as  to  disbelieve* 


CHAP.  XIII.]  CONSEQUENCES.  415 

in  God  and  a  future  life,  we  then  have  but  a  subjective 
support  for  our  intuitions  of  truth,  goodness,  and  beauty,  and 
no  certainty  that  we  cannot  benefit  those  we  love  by  evil 
actions,  if  such  appear  desirable  to  us;  moreover,  we  then 
have  no  motive  for  loving  our  neighbour,  or  forgiving  our 
enemy,  beyond  what  our  spontaneous  disposition  prompts  us 
to  love  or  to  forgive.  In  the  same  way,  such  disbelief 
deprives  us  of  any  certainty  that  "  the  right "  is  "  necessarily 
our  greatest  happiness,"  rewards  and  punishments  become 
confined  to  this  world,  and  merely  such  as  we  may  hope  to 
obtain  without  real  merit,  or  to  evade.  In  the  same  way, 
again,  we  cease  to  have  any  motive  to  restrain  our  instincts 
and  passions  beyond  the  degree  to  which  selfish  considerations 
prompt  us  to  restrain  them. 

Place  two  men,  in  all  things  equal,  save  that  one  accepts, 
and  the  other  rejects  the  belief  referred  to.  Let  them  be 
exposed  to  temptations.  It  is  as  certain  as  any  mathematical 
truth  that  such  beliefs  will  operate  in  promoting  virtue,  and 
in  repressing  vice  in  the  one  who  accepts  them. 

AY  hat  then  must  be  the  effect  of  education  in  which  these 
supreme  truths  are  ignored  ?  What  must  be  the  effect  of  an 
<;  amelioration  "  of  the  condition  of  the  masses  which  should, 
at  first,  give  them  increased  physical  comfort  indeed,  but 
which  should  tend  to  make  such  considerations  as  temporal 
welfare  the  all-important  or  primary  one  ? 

As  to  the  consequences  of  the  wide  acceptance  of  his,  Mr. 
Herbert  Spencer's,  views,  that  writer  himself  admits : — 

"  Few,  if  any,  aro  as  yet  fitted  wholly  to  dispense  with  such  [reli- 
gious] conceptions  as  are  current.  The  highest  abstractions  take  so 
great  a  mental  power  to  realise  with  any  vividness,  and  are  so  inopera- 
tive upon  conduct  unless  they  are  vividly  realised,  that  their  regulative 
effects  must  for  a  long  period  to  come  bo  appreciable  on  but  a  small 

minority Those  who  relinquish  the  faith  in  which  they  have 

been  brought  up,  for  this  most  abstract  faith  in  which  science  and 
religion  unite,  may  not  uncommonly  fail  to  act  up  to  their  convictions. 
Left  to  their  organic  morality,  enforced  only  by  general  reasonings 
imperfectly  wrought  out  and  difficult  to  keep  before  the  mind,  their 
defects  of  nature  will  often  come  out  more  strongly  than  they  would 
have  done  under  their  previous  creed.'' — /•'/',*/  I'riudplts,  p.  117. 


416  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CnAr.  XIII. 

These  a  priori  teachings  as  to  the  necessary  tendencies  of 
religious  convictions  are  supported  by  many  a  posteriori  con- 
siderations. It  is  a  widely  spread  notion  that  ignorance  and 
crime  go  hand  in  hand;  but  the  most  notorious  and  con- 
spicuous criminals  of  late  years  have  been  far  from  unedu- 
cated men.  Eush,  Palmer,  Pritchard,  Watson,  Traupmann, 
Wainwright,  occur  to  the  mind  at  once ;  and  it  is  un- 
questionable that  the  educated  classes  in  this  country  and 
France  furnish  a  fair  percentage  of  the  criminal  population. 
If  we  take  cases  in  which  crime  is  connected  with  political 
passions,  France,  from  1789  to  the  present  day,  proclaims 
loudly  how  little  guarantee  intellectual  culture  offers  against 
the  most  lamentable  and  criminal  aberrations. 

A  rational  self-control,  due  subordination,  and  a  proper 
repression  of  selfish  passions  often  enough  fail  to  be  exercised, 
even  with  the  aid  of  religious  training ;  but  it  is  inevitable 
that  such  training  should  tend  to  such  repression ;  while  that 
the  absence  of  religion  tends  to  occasion  effects  of  an  opposite 
character,  is  not  only  plain  to  the  reason  a  priori,  but  is 
made  manifest  by  conspicuous  examples. 

These  truths  have  lately  strongly  impi'essed  themselves 
on  the  minds  of  some  of  our  impulsive  neighbours  on  the 
other  side  of  the  Channel.  We  might  have  expected  a  more 
important  reformatory  action  in  France  than  there  yet  appears 
to  be  any  evidence  of ;  but  the  mischief  has  been  too  deeply 
ingrained  by  the  calamity  of  a  century  of  corrupting  influences. 
It  is  consoling,  however,  that  here  and  there  we  find  evidences 
of  a  clear  perception  of  the  fundamental  and  most  important 
truth  which  we  are  now  endeavouring  to  inculcate. 

M.  Le  Play,  in  a  recent  pamphlet,  recalls  his  fellow- 
countrymen  to  the  practice  of  obeying  the  ten 
commandments  as  the  only  safe  and  sure  road  to 
national  prosperity,  and  he  laments  how — 

"  la  nation  se  persuade,  depuis  longtemps,  qu'ello  s'est  assuree  1'admi- 
ration  et  le  succes  par  les  revolutions  qui  n'ont  fait  qu'aggraver  les 
maux  de  la  monarchic  absolue,  qui  n'ont  produit  au  dedans  quo  la 
decadence,  et  qui  n'ont  suscite  ait  deliors  que  le  mepris." 


CHAP.  XIII.]  CONSEQUENCES.  417 

M.  Le  Play  *  H  a  highly  original  worker  and  author  far 
too  little  known  or  appreciated  in  this  country,  where  the 
eminently  practical  and  positive  character  of  his  researches 
should  be  especially  appreciated.  His  publications  on  social 
matters  do  not  repose  on  a  mere  collection  of  the  observations 
of  others.  He  has  spent  years  in  not  only  visiting  different 
countries,  from  England  and  Portugal  to  Tartary  and  Arabia, 
but  he  has  actually  resided  in  the  houses  and  families  of 
working  men  of  different  kinds  in  all  these  different  countries, 
observing  with  his  own  eyes  the  practical  results  of  the  dif- 
ferent political,  racial,  geographical,  and  climatic  conditions 
of  the  subjects  of  his  prolonged  and  exhaustive  inquiries. 

But  yet  another  consequence  remains  to  be  noticed  in 
connection  with  conduct.  If  the  lessons  herein- 


before  deduced  from  nature  are  correctly  deduced,  ucteacuers. 
and  if  the  consequences  of  the  acceptance  or  rejection  of 
such  teaching  be  such  as  here  represented,  a  specially  awful 
responsibility  must  surely  rest  upon  men  of  any  social 
influence  —  a  responsibility  both  as  regards  their  fellow-men 
and  themselves.  But  a  very  small  degree  of  human  kind- 
ness and  sympathy  must  be  requisite  to  bring  Lome  to  such 
men  the  need  and  duty  of  attaining  a  distinct  certainty  both 
of  the  non-existence  of  God  and  the  mortality  of  the  soul 
before  they  venture  to  advise  their  fellow-men  to  discard 
from  their  thoughts  and  actions  all  reference  to  either. 

As  regards  themselves,  if  God  exists  —  if,  that  is,  there  is 
a  Being  of  Absolute  Beauty  and  Holiness  —  it  follows  as  a 
strictly  logical  consequence  that  there  cannot  be  any  evil  for 
a  moment  comparable  with  that  of  a  voluntary  denial  of 
worship  or  of  any  other  conscious-  rebellion  against  Him.  It 
also  becomes  manifest  that  if  there  be  a  personal  embodiment 
of  evil  the  one  motto  of  such  a  being  must  be  the  proud  one, 
"  Non  serviam."  It  necessarily  follows  that  those  who  con- 
sciously or  unconsciously,  avowedly  or  practically  adopt  his 
motto  must,  however  good-natured  or  fascinating  in  manner, 

*  Author  of  '  Lcs  Ouvriers  europceiw,'  and  ollur  works,  and  founder  of  the 
Union  tie  la  1'aix  tociale. 
19 


418  LESSONS  FKOM  NATURE.  [CnAr.  XITL 

or  however  materially  moral,  be  absolutely  and  in  fact  the 
very  worst  men  the  world  contains  as  long  as  they  continue 
to  act  according  to  that  motto.  Moreover,  not  only  the 
supreme  vice  but  the  unspeakable  folly  of  such  a  line  of 
conduct  must  become  plain,  and  the  truth  of  the  dictum 
"  initium  sapientise  timor  Domini?  be  one  of  the  most  certain 
of  all  truths. 

Let  us  then  contrast  the  characters  presented  by  the 
Agnostic  philosophy  with  those  presented  by  that  system 
which  (as  here  contended)  is  the  direct  teaching  of  nature. 

Of  the  Agnostic  philosophy  it  may  be  affirmed : — 
characters  of      1.  It  fails  to  account  for  or  harmonize  with  the 

the  Agnostic     , .  „  .  ,  ,  •    i-          •     i 

philosophy,  dicta  oi  consciousness  as  to  the  substantiality  and 
persistence  of  the  Ego. 

2.  It  fails  correctly  to  interpret  the  ultimate  and  funda- 
mental declarations  of  consciousness  as  to  necessary  truth. 

3.  It  denies  the  validity  of  that  power  of  intensifying  a 
motive  by  a  voluntary  act  of  selective  attention  of  which 
power  our  own  minds  are  conscious. 

4.  It  does  not  accept  as  valid  the  principle  of  contradiction, 
deprived  of  which  our  intellectual  state  becomes  necessarily 
chaotic. 

5.  It  negatives  the   declarations  of  idealist  philosophers 
upon  grounds  which  would  justify  the  popular  beliefs  as  to 
objectivity,  and  yet  it  denies  to  such  beliefs  all  truth  and 
reality. 

6.  It  makes  no  essential  distinction  between  the  self-con- 
scious intellect  of  man,  manifested  by  a  language  expressing 
general  conceptions,  and  the  association  of  sensible  percep- 
tions, as  cognized  by  the  sentient  faculties  of  brutes,  capable 
of  expressing  themselves  by  emotional  signs  only. 

7.  It  takes  no  cognizance  of  our  perceptions  of  truth,  good- 
ness, and  beauty,  as  such,  nor  of  our  apprehension  of  the 
relatedness  of  relations. 

8.  It  is  absolutely  fatal  to  every  germ  of  morality. 

9.  It  absolutely  negatives  every  form  of  religion. 

TO.  It  absolut-  ly  stultifies  itself  by  proclaiming  its  own 


CHAP.  XIII.]  CONSEQUENCES  4.19 

untruth,  as  included  in  its  assertion  that  all  our  knowledge 
is  but  phenomenal  and  relative. 

The  theory  of  Evolution  has  now  become  of  the  very  essence 
of  this  philosophy.  Seeing,  then,  the  wide-spread  acceptance 
of  the  evolutionary  theory,  it  may  well  be  asked,  is  there 
any  necessary  connection  between  that  theory  and  such 
philosophy  ?  Do  such  philosophical  consequences  necessarily 
follow  from  that  theory,  however  understood,  or  are  they 
confined  to  the  Spencerian  and  Darwinian  forms  of  it  ? 

It  is,  indeed,  certain  that  any  view  of  Evolution  which 
should  deny  every  distinction  of  kind  between  the  mind  of 
man  and  the  psychical  faculties  of  brutes  would  necessarily 
involve  all  the  consequences  here  deprecated.  But  no  such 
bar  exists  to  the  acceptance  of  evolution  as  applied  to  the 
"  unfolding  "  from  potential  into  real  existence  of  constantly 
new  forms  of  animals  and  plants.  Even  the  actualisation 
(upon  the  occurrence  of  the  requisite  conditions)  of  latent 
life  and  sentiency  in  inorganic  matter — so  far  as  such  life 
and  sentiency  be  conceived  as  depending  upon  and  con- 
sequently united  with  material  substance — may  be  affirmed 
without  involving  the  results  objected  to. 

Such  a  theory  of  Evolution  perfectly  harmonizes  with  the 
presence  in  man  of  that  substantial  and  persistent  soul  which, 
as  we  have  seen,  the  voice  of  consciousness  agrees  with  those 
of  reason  and  volition  in  demanding. 

In  contrast  with  the  Agnostic  philosophy,  that  which  it  is 
here  contended  may  be  gathered  from  Nature  presents  the 
following  characters.  Of  such  philosophy  it  may  be  affirmed : 

1.  It  accounts  for  and  harmonizes  with  the  dicta  of  con- 
sciousness as  to  the  Ego. 

2.  It  readily  accepts  the  declarations  of  reason  as  to  ulti- 
mate and  necessary  truths. 

3.  It  asserts  that  power  of  election  which  our  reason  and 
perception  of  responsibility  make  known  to  us. 

4.  It,  of  course,  fully  accepts  the  principle  of  contradic- 
tion, and  thereby  induces  order  into  our  intellectual  cog- 
nitions. 


420  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CiiAr.  XIII. 

5.  It  accords  with  the  teaching  of  common  sense  without 
being  bound  down  within  its  limits. 

6.  It  establishes  the  distinction  between  reason  and   in- 
stinct, and  between  language  and  emotional  expressions. 

7.  It  takes  cognizance  of  our  highest  perceptions,  includ- 
ing those  of  truth,  goodness,  and  beauty  as  such. 

8.  It  supports  and  enforces  moral  teaching. 

9..  It  harmonizes  with  the  declarations  of  religion,  both 
natural  and  revealed. 

10.  It  asserts  its  own  truth  in  affirming  the  validity  of  our 
primary  intuitions. 

What,  then,  can  be  the  motive  for  rejecting  a  philosophy 
which  accords  with  the  facts  of  experience,  co-ordinates  and 
explains  them,  and  for  accepting  one  so  laboured  yet  so 
inadequate  as  the  one  here  criticised  ?  It  is  much  to  be 
feared  that  with  many  the  objection  lies  in  the  last  point 
but  one  enumerated  by  us  in  its  favour.  If  so,  the  sting  must 
lie  in  the  fact  of  its  harmony  with  religion.  A  passionate 
hatred  of  religion,  however  discreetly  or  astutely  veiled,  lies 
at  the  bottom  of  much  of  the  popular  metaphysical  teaching 
now  in  vogue. 

A  belief  in  the  necessary  inconsistency  of  science  with 
Dislike  of  re-  religion  is  therefore  persistently  propagated  amongst 

ligionsome-       ,        '  .      ,  r  Ji     V  •  1-1 

umesinduces  the  public  by  writings  and  lectures  in  which  more 
anceofit.  is  implied  than  asserted.  In  such  lectures  attempts 
have  again  and  again  been  made  to  strike  theology  through 
physical  science,  to  blacken  religion  with  coal-dust,  or  to  pelt 
it  with  fragments  of  chalk,  or  to  smother  it  with  sub-atlantic 
mud,  or  to  drown  it  in  a  sea  of  protoplasm. 

Delenda  est  Carthago  !  No  system  is  to  be  tolerated  which 
will  lead  men  to  accept  a  personal  God,  moral  responsibility, 
and  a  future  state  of  rewards  and  punishments.  Let  thesj 
unwelcome  truths  be  once  eliminated,  and  no  system  is 
deemed  undeserving  of  a  candid,  if  not  a  sympathetic,  con- 
sideration, and,  cseieris  paribus,  that  system  which  excludes 
them  the  most  efficaciously  becomes  the  most  acceptable. 

The  appeal  here   made,  however,  is  not  to  religion  but 


CHAP.  XIII.]  CONSEQUENCES.  421 

to  reason,  not  to  authority  but  to  intelligence,  not  to 
any  dogmatic  system  but  to  the  pure,  unadulterated,  and 
unprejudiced  human  reason  if  haply  anywhere  it  may 
be  obtained  for  our  use.  By  that  we  must  be  prepared 
to  stand  or  fall. 

The  consequences  then  \\hich  have  been  here  put  forward, 
merit,  if  they  have  been  rightly  represented,  the 

.  „  J  if  .         i    Conclusion. 

attention  ot  every  man  who  becomes  acquainted 
with  them.  Though  such  considerations,  if  taken  alone,  may 
be  insufficient  to  determine  the  judgment,  they  may  suffice 
to  accentuate  propositions  the  truth  of  which  has  been 
established  from  other  sources.  Though  inconclusive  atone, 
their  corroborative  efficacy  may  well  be  considerable. 


CHAPTER  XIV. 

A  POSTSCRIPT. 

"  This  postscript  is  called  for  by  an  unamended  republication  by  Pro- 
fessor Huxley  of  his  criticism  on  the  '  Genesis  of  Species/  of  which  he  in 
part  misapprehends,  in  part  misrepresents  the  arguments.  A  Theist 
should  anticipate  a  revelation.  The  Christian  revelation  asserts  crea- 
tion, but  at  the  same  time  lays  down  principles  which  so  harmonize 
with  Evolution  that  no  contradiction  can  arise  in  this  respect  between 
its  doctrines  and  physical  science.  This  harmony  must  be  preordained." 

^VITH  the  preceding  chapter  the  argument  followed  in  this 
This  post-  book  comes  to  its  natural  close,  but  a  circumstance, 
anryp<LikdCi"  t°  be  presently  adverted  to,  seems  to  render  it 
desirable  to  extend  our  survey  one  step  further. 

We  have  gathered  from  Nature  in  the  foregoing  chapters 
the  supreme  lesson  of  the  existence  of  a  personal  First 
Cause  of  infinite  power  and  wisdom  and  absolute  goodness. 
Reason  ex-  Beyond  this,  however,  reason  is  unable  to  proceed 
tiou.  unaided,  though  it  shows  us  clearly  that  a  revela- 

tion as  to  the  nature  of  God,  and  concerning  our  relations  with 
and  duties  towards  Him,  is  what  is  to  be  a  priori  expected 
from  a  being  of  absolute  goodness  and  power.  This  expectant 
attitude  is  that  which  philosophy  ought  rationally  to  assume. 

The  course,  however,  which  modern  philosophy  has  taken, 
Modem  pw-  though  for  a  time  seeming  to  tend  towards  the 

losophy  Has  .    .         .  „  ,      .  .  .         .„    . 

diverged  anticipation  ot  revelation  (one  justifying  an  ex- 
Juitude.  pectant  attitude  towards  it),  has  diverged  remark- 
ably in  the  opposite  direction. 

The  secular  dispute  between  those  who  assert  and  those 
who  deny  that  all  our  ideas  are  modified  sensations  and  no 
more  has  undergone  a  stranire  transformation  within  the  last 


CUAP.  XIV.]  A  POSTSCRIPT.  423 

quarter  of  a  century  and  \vith  this  transformation  we  witness 
a  strange  reaction. 

The  ambiguity  of  Locke  caused  his  system  to  be  developed 
by  Hume,  through  Berkeley,  into  scepticism,  and  by  Con- 
dillac  into  unmitigated  materialism.  These  results  were  the 
occasion  of  that  Kantian  resurrection  hailed  throughout  the 
Continent  as  a  philosophical  system  finally  and  triumphantly 
refuting  the  school  of  empiricism.  They  were  also  the 
occasion  of  the  parallel  movement  in  Great  Britain  of  Eeid 
and  his  followers — a  movement  less  developed  and  less  con- 
spicuous than  was  the  reaction  under  Kant  on  the  European 
mainland 

The  event  has  shown,  however,  that  sensationalism  was 
scotched,  not  killed.  In  spite  of  Eoyer-Collard,  Maine-de- 
Biran,  Jouffroy,  and  Cousin,  the  grossest  sensationalism  has 
reappeared  in  France  through  Auguste  Comte. 

In  Britain  the  successors  of  Eeid — Sir  William  Hamilton, 
Mansel,  and  McCosh — have  all  been  unsuccessful  in  exor- 
cising the  sensational  spirit;  and  though  Mr.  John  Stuart 
Mill  (as  almost  a  pure  Lockian)  may  be  regarded  as  an 
instance  of  philosophical  "  survival,"  yet  Hume  lives  again 
in  Huxley  and  in  Lewes;  and  indeed  (however  they  may 
differ  as  to  subordinate  questions)  Messrs.  Spencer,  Baiu, 
Mill,  Comte,  Huxley,  and  Lewes,  unite  in  an  essential  and 
fundamental  agreement  with  the  great  sceptic  of  Scotland. 

Thus,  though  fifty  years  ago  the  world  of  thought  pro- 
nounced Hume  for  ever  defeated  by  Kant,  we  find  Hume 
once  more  in  possession  of  the  field ;  and  even  the  extreme 
sensationalism  of  Condillac  is  justified,  nay  demonstrated  to 
be  inevitable  truth,  by  Mr.  Herbert  Spencer.  Indeed  that 
author  may,  in  a  certain  sense,  be  deemed  the  legitimate 
descendant  and  representative  of  Locke,  as  understood  by 
those  who  refuse  to  attribute  to  the  term  "reflexion,"  as 
used  by  him,  a  meaning  which  would  stultify  him  as  to  his 
whole  philosophical  position. 

An  inquiry  into  the  causes  of  this  untoward  resurrection 
would  be  full  of  interest,  but  cannot,  as  too  remote  from  the 


421  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUKE.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

matter  in  hand,  be  here  pursued.  The  mere  existence,  how- 
ever, of  such  a  revival  would  seem  to  demonstrate  that  the 
Professor  of  Konigsburg  did  cot  dig  deeply  enough  in  his 
attempted  process  of  eradication. 

But  Mr.  Spencer,  whose  philosophy  may  be  taken  as 
Mr.  spencer  the  most  complete  expression  of  modern  views, 

andEvolu-        ..*-,.  .  f    -^ 

tion.  is  iar  irom  being  a  mere  reviver  or  Hume,  ot 

Locke,  or  of  any  other  philosopher.  Indeed,  he  differs  from 
Locke  in  admitting,  in  a  certain  sense,  "  innate  ideas,"  while 
he  combats  Hume  with  vigour  and  efficiency,  and  may  not 
improbably  quite  repudiate  the  imputation  of  being  a  dis- 
ciple of  the  philosopher  last  named. 

It  is  as  the  philosophical  embodiment  of  modern  physical 
science  that  Mr.  Spencer  is  pre-eminently  distinguished. 
Science  has  indeed  made  vast  acquisitions  since  the  time  of 
Hume,  and  the  stored-up  accumulation  of  its  facts  contains 
materials  calculated  to  affect  powerfully  the  imagination  of 
mankind.  Now  Mr.  Spencer's  philosophy  is  replete  with 
conceptions  and  inferences  derived  from  that  accumulated 
treasure. 

It  is  by  such  scientific  progress,  by  the  indirect  influences 
of  physical  science  on  philosophy,  that  this  development  of 
reactionary  sensationalism  must  be  explained.  New  issues 
have  been  joined,  and  the  point  of  view  having  been  shifted, 
controversies  deemed  closed  have  to  be  reconsidered.  This 
reconsideration  has  become  requisite,  not  through  want  of 
conclusiveness  in  the  earlier  replies  to  the  argument  as  then 
conducted,  but  through  the  fresh  lights  now  let  in  at  aper- 
tures in  dividing  walls  which  then  seemed  of  unbreachable 
solidity,  and  which  give  to  old  facts  a  quite  new  aspect. 

The  dispute  as  to  our  possession  of  ideas  and  conceptions 
which  no  experience  of  any  single  life,  however  prolonged, 
can  explain — the  existence  that  is  of  an  a  priori  element  in 
our  knowledge — may  be  considered  to  have  ended  in  the 
nineteenth  century  with  the  triumphant  refutation  of  thoss 
sensationalists  who  denied  the  existence  of  such  an  element. 

This  refutation  Mr.  Spencer  not  only  fully   accepts  as 


CHAP.  XIV.]  A  POSTSCRIPT.  425 

valid,  but  he  actively  co-operates  in  demonstrating  the  ab- 
surdity of  the  belief  that  the  mental  phenomena  of  any  one 
life,  however  prolonged,  are  sufficient  to  account  for  such  con- 
ceptions as  extension,  causation,  objectivity,  and  existence. 

The  opponents  of  sensism,  however,  must  be  prepared  to 
take  small  comfort  from  such  acceptance  and  seeming  aid, 
for  Mr.  Spencer  is  really  one  of  their  most  formidable 
enemies ;  and  he  claims  to  have  demonstrated  by  a  com- 
bined system  of  a  priori  and  a  posteriori  proof  that  sen- 
sation and  all  intellectual  action  are  fundamentally  one 
and  the  same,  and  that  (sense  being  primary)  every  idea 
is  made  up  of  transformed  sensations.  This  demonstration 
is  accomplished  by  means  of  the  doctrine  of  evolution,  which 
has  of  late  attained  so  wide  a  currency  and  such  general 
acceptance.  According  to  this  doctrine  all  the  varied  or- 
ganisms inhabiting  this  planet  have  been  gradually  pro- 
duced one  from  another  by  merely  natural  processes,  and, 
as  Mr.  Darwin  would  fain  have  us  believe,  mainly  by  the 
action  of  "Natural  Selection."  In  this  way  Mr.  Spencer 
conceives  that  what  is  a  priori  to  the  individual  is  but  a 
posteriori  to  the  race,  and  he  thus  claims  to  have  reconciled 
the  two  schools  of  thought,  namely,  those  who  assert  and 
those  who  deny  the  derivation  of  all  our  ideas  exclusively 
from  sensation  and  experience.  As  is  manifest,  however,  he 
gives  the  substantial  victory  entirely  to  the  sensists,  and 
denies  to  all  ideas  any  higher  origin  than  mere  incipient 
sentiency.  It  is  plain  then  that  the  old  battle  has  to  be 
fought  again  on  new  ground,  and  no  argument  can  be  hence- 
forth admitted  as  valid  until  it  has  stood  the  test  of  examina- 
tion in  the  light  of  the,theory  of  evolution. 

The  effect  which  this  theory  has  had  on  philosophy  is 
small  compared  with  that  which  may  be  yet  to  come. 
Its  most  modern  advocates,  such  as  Dr.  'Bastian,  are  not 
content  with  driving  back  "experience"  to  the  lowest 
forms  of  animal  or  even  of  vegetable  life,  but  teach  that 
one  physical  process  of  change — redistribution  of  matter 
and  motion — results  successively  in  chemical  integration 


426  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [Ciur.  XIV. 

and  aggregation,  the  formation  of  organisms,  life,  feeling, 
thought,  memory,  love,  and  will.  Even  Professor  Tyndall, 
in  spite  of  his  opposition  to  Dr.  Bastian,  is  fundamentally  at 
one  with  him,  and,  as  we  have  seen,  speaks  of  the  genius  of 
Plato,  Shakespeare,  Newton,  and  Raffaele,  as  latent  an:l 
potentially  existing  in  the  fires  of  the  Sun,  and  being  the 
ultimate  outcome  of  an  unconscious  primeval  mist. 

It  is  not  surprising  then  that  all  those  who,  for  whatever 
Evoiuiion  reason,  are  really  hostile  to  the  Christian  revelation 
anu-oiris-by  took  especial  comfort  from  this  result  and  outcome 
tians.  (which  appeared  to  them  to  be  the  necessary  out- 

come) of  the  theory  of  Evolution. 

This  is  abundantly  manifest  in  the  writings  of  Strauss, 
Vogt,  Haeckel,  and  Biichner,  and  even  in  our  own  country 
signs  of  a  similar  spirit  in  leading  evolutionists  have  been 
shown  in  no  equivocal  manner.  We  have  indeed  been  ac- 
customed to  hear  again  and  again  the  assertion  that  men 
of  science  differ  from  the  devotees  of  theology,  in  that  they 
enter  on  their  inquiries  sequo  animo,  free  from  prejudice,* 
and  desirous  only  of  truth.  Believers  have  been  warned, 
usque  ad  nauseam,  that  a  wish  to  believe  vitiates  all  their  ar- 
guments. But  what  weight  can  we  attach  to  conclusions  such 
as  those,  e.g.,  of  Professor  Huxley,  who  tells  us  with  regard  to 
the  doctrine  of  Evolution  that  "  the  position  of  complete  and 
irreconcilable  antagonism  which,  in  his  opinion,  it  occupies 
to  the  Church,  is  '  one  of  its  greatest  merits  in  my  eyes  T  "  A 
similar,  though  less  striking,  theological  prejudice  is  also 
exhibited  by  Mr.  Darwin  himself.  He  tells  us  himself,  in 
his  *  Descent  of  Man,'  that  in  his  *  Origin  of  Species '  his  first 
object  was  "  to  show  that  species  had  not  been  separately 
created ;"  and  he  consoles  himself  for  admitted  error  by  the 
reflection  that  "  I  have  at  least,  as  I  hope,  done  good  service 
in  aiding  to  overthrow  the  dogma  of  separate  creations."  f 

*  Professor  Tyndall  in  bis  'Fragments  of  Science,*  p.  167,  observes: 
"  They  have  but  one  desire — to  know  the  truth.  They  have  but  one  fear — to 
believe  a  lie." 

t  I  am  indebted  to  Mr.  Chauncey  Wright  for  calling  my  attention  to  this 
remark,  which  had  escaped  my  notice. 


CHAP.  XIV.]  A  POSTSCRIPT.  427 

Now,  inasmuch  as  revelation  supposes  the  validity  of  and 
addresses  itself  to  human  reason,  it  would  of  course  3ai]aM!i 
be  disproved  did  it  contradict  absolutely  anything  •t^of 
which   human    reason    absolutely   affirmed— such  £|$^ 

i  systems. 

dicta  acting  as  our  only  tests. 

Let  us  then  suppose  a  man  who,  by  the  exercise  of  his 
reason,  has  arrived  at  that  theistic  belief  and  willing  anticipa- 
tion of  a  revelation  which  is  here  maintained  to  be  rational. 

Looking  abroad  upon  the  world  as  he  finds  it  to-day,  he  can 
hardly  hesitate  as  to  the  revelation  into  the  claims  of  which 
he  is  morally  bound  to  inquire  with  reverent  candour.  This 
revelation  is  that  which  the  Christian  Church  alone  affirms 
itself  to  possess  infallibly  and  to  put  before  unbelievers  for 
their  acceptance.  If  such  a  man  finds  that  the  doctrines  of 
the  Church  contradict  what  his  reason  positively  affirms,  he 
must,  of  course,  reject  it ;  but  he  is  bound  to  accept  it  if  he 
finds  its  teaching  harmonize  with  his  reason  and  with  his 
conscience.  As  a  fact,  the  Christian  revelation  Christianity 
asserts  "  Creation ;"  and  Mr.  Darwin  and  Professor  turn. 
Huxley  were  right  in  thinking  that  to  disprove  "  Creation  " 
was  to  disprove  Christianity. 

Our  supposed  inquirer  is  manifestly  bound  to  carry  on 
such  inquiry  not  only  with  a  candid  spirit,  but  with  a  desire 
to  find  such  asserted  revelation  to  be  true.  He  is  so  bound, 
since  no  one  who  has  arrived  at  a  philosophic  contemplation 
of  the  Infinite  Majesty  and  absolute  holiness  and  beauty  of 
the  God  whose  existence  is  made  known  to  us  by  Nature,  can 
rationally  do  other  than  most  earnestly  desire  a  revealed 
knowledge  of  Him,  if  haply  such  may  be  found. 

It  is  thus  that  a  moral  element  may  plainly  enter  into  the 
acceptance  or  rejection  of  revelation.  That  it  is  congruous 
it  should  do  so  is  evident  from  what  we  see  as  to  the  natural 
religion  we  gather  from  Nature.  There,  again,  it  has  evi- 
dently not  been  the  intention  of  the  First  Cause  to  make  the 
evidence  of  his  existence  so  plain  that  its  non-recognition 
would  be  the  mark  of  intellectual  incapacity. 

Conviction  as  to  Theism  is,  as  we  see,  not  forced  upon  men, 


428  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

willing  and  unwilling,  as  is  the  conviction  of  the  existence  of 
the  sun  at  noonday.  The  natural  revelation  appeals  to  and 
puts  to  probation  the  whole  of  man's  nature ;  it  might  there- 
fore be  expected  a  priori  that  a  revelation  from  the  Author 
of  Nature  would  have  a  similar  probationary  action. 

That  inclination  warps  judgment  is  a  trite  remark.  As 
51  r.  Lewes  says  :  *  "  The  psychological  law  that  we  only  see 
what  interests  us,  and  only  assimilate  what  is  adapted  to  our 
condition,  causes  the  mind  to  select  its  evidence."  Again, 
speaking  of  a  man  who  has  been  subjected  to  a  special  kind, 
of  prejudice,  he  observes :  f  "In  truth  his  mind  has  received 
a  deep  impression ;  a  conception  has  been  fixed  there,  and 
his  feelings  keep  it  supplied  with  energy  sufficient  to  bear 
down  any  opposing  conception."  The  same  writer,  again, 
says  \  that  he  himself  only  hopes  for  converts  to  his  own 
system  from  those  "  who,  by  previous  culture  and  native  dis- 
position, have  been  prepared  for  a  sympathetic  attitude;  these 
are  the  conditions  which  determine  the  acceptance  of  new 

truths Unless  the  attitude  of  mind  be  sympathetic, 

there  will  be  stubborn  resistance  to  what  otherwise  would  be 
clearest  evidence." 

Professor  Tyndall  observes :  §  "  The  desire  to  establish  or 
avoid  a  certain  result  can  so  warp  the  mind  as  to  destroy  its 
power  of  estimating  facts.  I  have  known  men  to  work  for 
years  under  a  fascination  of  this  kind." 

Again,  Mr.  Lecky  remarks :  ||  "  Every  moral  disposition 
brings  with  it  an  intellectual  bias,  which  exercises  a  great 
and  often  a  controlling  and  decisive  influence  even  upon  the 
most  candid  inquirer." 

The  doctrine  of  Creation  then  being  a  part  of  the  Chris- 
tian revelation,  and  this  doctrine  being  made  in  the  present 
day  a  special  object  of  attack,  an  inquiry  into  its  exact 
meaning  came  to  have  a  special  interest. 

*  '  Problems  of  Life  and  Mind,'  vol.  i.  p.  467. 

t  Op.  cit.  p.  461. 

j  Op.  cit.  vol.  ii.  p.  505. 

§  '  Fragments  of  Science,'  p.  47. 

||  '  Morals,'  vol.  ii,  p.  204. 


CHAP.  XIV.]  A  POSTSCRIPT.  -129 

Accordingly,  in  my  book  on  the  '  Genesis  of  Species'  I  had 
in  view  two  main  objects.  My  first  was  to  show  xheGenpsis 
that  the  Darwinian  theory  is  untenable,  and- that  ofSPecies- 
"  Natural  Selection  "  is  not  the  origin  of  species.  My  second 
was  to  demonstrate  that  nothing  even  in  Mr.  Darwin's  theory 
(as  put  forth  before  the  publication  of  his  'Descent  of  Man'), 
and,  a  fortiori,  nothing  in  Evolution  generally,  was  necessarily 
antagonistic  to  Christianity. 

I  did  so  by  distinguishing  between  .primary  and  derivative 
creation,  and  by  showing  that  the  distinction,  far  from  being 
a  novel  subtlety  of  my  own  devising,  had  been  discussed,  and 
the  principles  on  which  it  reposed  accepted,  by  distinguished 
theologians  centuries  before  Evolution  was  heard  of. 

It  was,  no  doubt,  a  great  surprise  and  disappointment  to 
Professor  Huxley  to  find  it  clearly  demonstrated  AndProfe8_ 
that  his  favourite  doctrine  of  Evolution,  far  from  BorHuxl>'y- 
being  in  "  unmistakable  antagonism "  with  Christianity,  ac- 
tually harmonized  with  it,  thus  altogether  losing  what  he 
tells  us  he  deemed  to  be  *•'  one  of  its  greatest  merits." 

Accordingly  he  combated  my  arguments  in  a  paper 
which  appeared  in  the  '  Contemporary  Review '  for  November 
1871.  This  attack  he  has  since  republished,  and  I  will 
therefore  restate  here  my  reply  to  it,  first  noticing  the  rea- 
sonings offered  by  my  opponent,  and  afterwards  saying  some 
words  as  to  his  mode  of  conducting  the  controversy. 

As  I  have  said,  my  second  object  in  my  'Genesis  of 
Species'  was  to  demonstrate  that  there  is  no  necessary  anta- 
gonism between  the  Christian  revelation  and  evolution. 

In  meeting  me  on  this  ground  (to  discuss  what  seems  na- 
turally to  have  interested  the  Professor  more  than  anything 
else  in  my  book),  he  endeavours  to  create  a  prejudice  against 
my  arguments,  and  to  narrow  my  base,  by  representing  me 
a>  ;i  mere  advocate  for  specially  Catholic  doctrine.* 


*  At  p.  454,  Professor  Huxley  gives  the  words  "  Catholic  theology  "  with 
marks  of  quotation  as  if  mine,  though  in  fact  they  were  nut  so.  This  typo- 
graphical error  does  not  misrepresent  my  substantial  meaning,  but  it  none 
the  less  tends  to  create  a  prejudice  against  my  statements  in  the  miud  of  the 

public. 


430  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

I  altogether  decline  to  allow  the  issue  to  be  thus  limited. 
I  decline  it  because  neither  did  I  intend  such  limitation,  nor 
do  any  words  of  mine  justify  such  a  construction  of  my  pur- 
pose. I  took  up,  and  I  take  up,  only  the  ground  common  to 
me  and  to  all  who  hold  the  Christian  religion  as  expressed 
in  the  Apostles'  Creed,  or  who  maintain  the  inspiration  of 
Scripture.  The  better  to  make  sure  of  my  position  I  made 
use  of  an  extreme  case,  knowing  that  if  I  could  maintain 
even  that,  then  all  within  that  extreme  term  could  not  cer- 
tainly be  questioned.  Purposely  then  I  set  out  to  show,  and 
I  did  show,  that  the  strictest  Ultramontane  Catholics  are 
perfectly  free  to  hold  the  doctrine  of  evolution,  thereby 
making  evident  that  with  regard  to  Christians  in  general 
there  could  not  be  a  doubt  as  to  their  freedom  in  the  matter. 
For  this  end  I  expressly  selected  just  such  persons  as  would 
commonly  be  supposed  not  to  be  those  from  whom  (in  Pro- 
fessor Huxley's  words)  "  modern  science  was  likely  to  receive 
a  warm  welcome,"  and  amongst  others  the  Spanish  Jesuit, 
Father  Suarez,  precisely  because,  as  Professor  Huxley  says, 
"  the  popular  repute  of  that  learned  theologian  and  subtle 
casuist  was  not  such  as  to  make  his  works  a  likely  place  of 
refuge  for  liberality  of  thought." 

My  critic  shows  how  he  misapprehends  my  aim  and  inten- 
A  misappre-  tion  when  he  speaks  of  "  Mr.  Mivart  citing  Father 
Suarez  as  his  chief  witness  in  favour  of  the  scientific 
freedom  enjoyed  by  Catholics."  Had  he  been  such  a  witness 
I  should  not  for  one  moment  have  thought  of  citing  him  ;  it 
was  precisely  as  one  of  the  most  rigid  theologians,  and  of 
"  unspotted  orthodoxy"  (as  Professor  Huxley  justly  remarks), 
that  I  called  him  into  court,  where  he  testifies  so  completely 
to  my  satisfaction. 

The  success  of  my  mode  of  procedure  is,  I  confess,  gratify- 
Hia  astonish-  mg  to  me-  Not  only  was  my  argument. "most  in- 
teresting "  to  Professor  Huxley,  but  he  tells  us  his 
"  astonishment  reached  its  climax,"  and  that  he  shall  "  look 
anxiously"  for  additional  references  "in  the  third  edition  of 
the  '  Genesis  of  Species.' "  Fortunately  I  have  no  need  to 


CHAP.  XIV.]  A  POSTSCRIPT.  431 

keep  the  Professor  waiting,  but  shall  shortly  proceed  to  give 
him  these  additional  references  at  once. 

Let  it  be  borne  in  mind  that  in  view  of  the  popular  con- 
ceptions current  in  England  on  the  subject,  my  argument 
was  that  if  even  those  who  receive  the  teaching  of  St.  Thomas 
Aquinas  and  the  Jesuits,  and  who  look  to  Eome  for  doctrinal 
decisions — if  even  those  are  free  to  accept  evolution,  then, 
a  fortiori,  other  Christians,  supposed  to  be  comparatively 
untrammelled,  need  not  hesitate  as  to  the  harmony  and 
compatibility  of  Christianity  and  evolution. 

Of  all  I  said  in  my  book  on  the  subject  I  have  nothing  to 
retract ;  but  I  repeat  yet  more  confidently  than  before  that 
"evolution  is  without  doubt  consistent  with  the  strictest 
Christian  theology  ;"  that  "  it  is  notorious  that  many  distin- 
guished Christian  thinkers  have  accepted,  and  do  accept,  both 
ideas ;"  that  "  Christian  thinkers  are  perfectly  free  to  accept 
the  general  evolution  theory ;"  and,  finally,  that  « it  is  evident 
that  ancient  and  most  venerable  theological  authorities  dis- 
tinctly assert  derivative  creation,  and  thus  their  teachings 
harmonize  with  all  that  modern  science  can  possibly  require." 
The  point  I  had  to  prove  was,  that  the  assertion  of  the 
evolution  of  new  species  (whether  by  Mr.  Darwin's  "  natural 
selection"  or  according  to  my  hypothesis)  was  in  no  oppo- 
sition to  the  Christian  faith  as  to  the  creation  of  the  organic 

world. 

In  order  to  prove  this  I  had  to  consider  the  meaning  of  the' 
word  "creation,"  and  I  found  that  it  might  be  taken  in  three 
senses,  with  only  two  of  which,  however,  we  had  to  do. 

The  first  of  these  was  direct  creation  out  of  nothing,  of 
both  matter  and  form  conjoined— absolute  creation  such  as 
must  have  taken  place  when  the  earliest  definite  kind  of 
matter  appeared. 

The  second  was  derivative  or  potential  creation :  the  crea- 
tion by  God  of  forms  not  as  existing,  but  in  potentia,  to  be 
subsequently  evolved  into  actual  existence  by  the  due  con- 
currence and  agency  of  the  various  powers  of  nature. 

Searchin^  for  information  on  the  subject,  I  found  to  my 


4^2  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUEE.  [CIIAP.  XIV. 

surprise  that  the  regular  teaching  of  theology  adopted  this 
view,  which  was  maintained  by  a  complete  consensus  of 
authorities.  Of  these  I  purposely  chose  but  a  few  telling 
ones  as  types ;  and,  amongst  the  rest,  Suarez,  who,  without 
any  doubt,  and  as  I  shall  proceed  to  demonstrate  more  at 
length,  is  a  thorough -going  supporter  of  it. 

Professor  Huxley  has  quite  misapprehended*  my  meaning, 
Another  hence  the  disappointment  he  speaks  of.  What  he 

misipprc- 

hensiun.  did  not  find,  I  never  said  was  to  be  found.  What 
he  actually  did  find  is  what  everybody  knew  before,  but  is  a 
matter  totally  different  from  and  utterly  irrelevant  to  the 
point  I  maintained. 

My  critic  fails  to  distinguish  between  the  question  as  to 
the  nature  of  creation  as  an  act,  and  that  concerning  the/aci 
of  creation. 

Now,  what  my  intention  was  is  plainly  shown  by  the  words 
tl  used.  I  said :  "  Considering  how  extremely  recent  are 
these  biological  speculations,  it  might  hardly  be  expected  a 
priori  that  writers  of  earlier  ages  should  have  given  ex- 
pression to  doctrines  harmonizing  in  any  degree  with  such 
very  modern  views ;  nevertheless,  this  is  certainly  the  case." 
And  so  it  is. 

Of  Suarez  I  said,  he  opposes  those  who  maintain  the 
absolute  creation  of  substantial  forms,  and  he  distinctly 
asserts  derivative  (potential)  creation.  And  this  is  true. 

Although  Professor  Huxley  has  conveyed  the  impression 
that  I  adduced  Suarez  as  a  -witness  to  evolution,  I  cannot 
think  he  intended  so  to  do.  He  surely  could  not  have 
imagined  me  so  -absurd  as  to  maintain  that  ancient  writers 
held  that  modern  view  ;  to  attribute  to  them  the  holding  of 


*  Not  only  this,  but  he  has  even  misrepresented  my  words.  He  says 
(p.  445):  "According  to  Mr.  Mivart,  the  greatest  and  most  orthodox  au- 
thorities upon  matters  of  Catholic  doctrine  agree  in  distinctly  asserting 
'  derivative  creation '  or  '  evolution ' " — as  if  "  derivative  creation "  and 
"  evolution  "  were  the  same  thing.  Having  thus  made  me  enunciate  what  I 
never  thought  of,  consequences  are  deduced  which,  of  course,  are  not  of  my 
deducing.  Derivative  or  potential  creation  such  authorities  do  assert, :  evolu- 
tion of  species,  however,  was  no  more  thought  of  in  their  days  than  the 
electric  telegraph. 


CHAP.  XIV.]  A  POSTSCRIPT.  433 

such  a  conception  would  be  to  represent  them  as  nothing  less 
than  inspired.  For  certainly  no  notion  of  the  kind  could 
have  been  present,  even  in  a  dream,  to  the  minds  of  sucli 
thinkers.  In  their  eyes  (as  in  the  eyes  of  most  till  within 
the  last  century)  scientific  facts  nfust  have  seemed  to  tell  in 
the  opposite  direction. 

All  I  maintained,  and  all  that  I  thought  any  one  could  have 
supposed  me  to  maintain,  was  that  these  writers  Anfxplana. 
asserted  abstract  principles  such  as  can  perfectly  Uon- 
harmonise  with  the  requirements  of  modern  science,  and  have, 
as  it  were,  provided  for  the  reception  of  its  most  advanced 
speculations. 

My  words  were:  "The  possibility  of  such  phenomena, 
though  by  no  means  actually  foreseen,  has  yet  been  fully 
provided  for  in  the  old  philosophy  centuries  before  Darwin." 
And  that  this  is  the  case  can  be  proved  to  demonstration. 
The  really  important  matter,  however,  is  not  what  were  my 
expressions,  but  icliat  is  the  fact  as  to  the  compatibility  of 
evolution  with  the  strictest  orthodoxy  ?  We  shall  see  how, 
by  Professor  Huxley's  very  fortunate  misapprehension  of  my 
meaning,  this  truth  will  be  brought  out  more  clearly  than 
before. 

Far  from  maintaining  that  Suarez  was  a  teacher  of 
development  or  evolution,  what  I  quoted  him  for  was 
this : — 

I.  As  an  opponent  of  the  theory  of  a  perpetual,  direct 
creation  of  organisms  (which  many  held,  and  still  hold). 

II.  To   show  that  the  principles  of  scholastic  theology 
are  such  as  not  to  exclude  the  theory  of  development,  but, 
on  the  contrary,  to  favour  it,  even  before  it  was  known  or 
broached. 

What  Professor  Huxley  quotes  in  his  article  amply 
confirms  my  position.  For  if  there  are  innumerable  sub- 
stantial forms  in  the  potentia  of  matter,  which  are  evolved 
according  to  the  proximate  capacity  of  matter  to  receive 
such  forms,  it  is  evident  that  if  the  organization  of  matter, 
through  chemical  or  other  causes,  progresses  by  the  ever- 


434  LESSONS  FROM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

increasingly  complex  reactions  between  bodies  and  their  en- 
vironment, then  it  necessarily  follows  that  new  and  higher 
substantial  forms  may  be  evolved,  and  consequently  new 
and  higher  forms  of  life. 

Such  a  principle,  firmly  established  against  opponents, 
becomes  applicable  to  the  evolution  of  new  species,  as  soon 
as  ever  physical  science  shows  good  reason  to  regard  the 
origin  of  species  not  as  simultaneous  but  successive. 

It  may  be  objected  that  Suarez,  in  the  passage  referred  to, 
only  adverts  to  new  individuals  of  known  kinds  in 

Suarcz. 

the  ordinary  course  of  nature.  Professor  Huxley 
says :  "  How  the  substantial  forms  of  animals  and  plants 
primarily  originated,  is  a  question  to  which,  so  far  as  I  am 
able  to  discover,  he  does  not  so  much  as  allude  in  his 
'  Metaphysical  Disputations.' "  Most  certainly,  in  his  day,  no 
one  entertained  the  modern  notion  as  to  the  origin  of  species ; 
and  it  was  hardly  to  be  expected  that  Suarez  should  say 
anything  directly  in  point.  That  he  should  establish  the 
needful  principle  was  all  we  could  reasonably  demand  or 
expect. 

Nevertheless,  in  a  remarkable  manner,  even  Father  Suarez 
does  refer  to  the  origination  of  certain  kinds  of  animals,  and 
admits  their  actual  evolution  by  natural  causes.  These  are 
partly  exceptional  forms  such  as  hybrids,  and  partly  such 
as  were  believed  to  originate  by  cosmical  influences  direct 
from  the  inorganic  world,  or  through  the  agency  of  putre- 
faction. 

In  lib.  ii.  de  Opere  Sex  Dierum,  c.  x.  n.  12,  speaking  of 
such  animals  as  the  mule,  leopard,  lynx,  &c.,  after  stating  the 
opinion  that  individuals  of  their  kinds  must  have  been  created 
from  the  beginning,  he  says,  "nihilominus  contrarium  censeo 
esse  probabilius ;"  and  he  gives  his  reason, "  quia  hujusmodi 
species  animalium  sufficienter  continebantur  potentialiter  in 
illis  individuis  diversarum  specierum  ex  quorum  conmixtione 
generantur ;  et  ideo  non  fuit  necessarium  aliqua  eorum  in- 
dividua  ab  auctore  naturae  immediate  produci."  This  in 
principle  is  absolutely  all  that  can  be  required,  for  it  reduces 


CHAP.  XIV.]  A  POSTSCRIPT.  435 

the  matter  simply  to  a  question  of  fact.  He  asserts  the 
principle  that  those  kinds  of  animals  which  are  potentially 
contained  in  nature  need  not  be  supposed  to  be  directly  and 
immediately  created.  In  determining  what  kinds  were  or 
were  not  so  contained,  he  followed  the  scientific  notions  of 
his  time  as  he  understood  them.  He  would  have  written 
according  to  the  exigencies  of  science  now. 

But  this  matter  is  really  unmistakable.  For  so  far  was 
Suarez  from  teaching  that  all  life  requires  direct  creative 
action,  that  he  speaks  of  certain  creatures,  "quae  per  in- 
fluentiam  coelorum  ex  putrida  materia  teme  aut  aqua 
generari  solent."  (Ibid.  n.  10.) 

It  is  also  interesting  to  see  that  (in  n.  11)  he  positively 
asserts  the  improbability  and  incredibility  that  certain  kinds 
of  animals  now  living  were  actually  created  at  first  at  all : 
"  Alias  dicendum  esset  in  omnibus  speciebus  quantutnvis  im- 
perfectis  aliqua  individua  in  principle  fuisse  facta  quia  non 
est  major  ratio  de  quibusdam  quam  de  aliis.  Consequens  est 
incredibile"  He  then  instances  certain  insects,  but  as  far  as 
the  principle  of  evolution  in  itself  is  concerned  he  might  as 
well  have  selected  crocodiles. 

Moreover,  with  respect  to  certain  vegetable  productions, 
he  says  (ib.  c.  vi.  n.  1),  "  an  vero  hujusmodi  herbse  sint'factce 
hoc  die  tantum  in  potentia  vel  etiam  in  actu  magis  dubitari 
pot  est."  Finally,  even  with  regard  to  the  production  of 
animals  altogether,  he  tells  us  that  it  was  not  a  real  creation 
(c.  x.  n.  3),  "  sed  ex  praejacente  materia  modo  tamen  proprio 
auotoris  naturae."  It  is  strange  that  Professor  Huxley  should 
have  overlooked  these  passages  which  so  directly  contradict 
his  assertions. 

Nevertheless  these  passages  are  not,  let  it  be  recollected, 
adduced  to  show  that  Suarez  held  the  doctrine  of  evolution, 
or  that  he  maintained  as  a  fact  that  species  were  evolved, 
except  in  peculiar  cases,  or  that  he  took  St.  Augustin's  view 
as  to  the  fact  of  creation ;  but  to  demonstrate  that  he  di- 
tinctly  admits  principles  compatible  with  evolution,  and  that 
even  where  he  asserts  direct  and  immediate  divine  action, 


430  LESSONS  FKOM  NATUEE.  [CiiAP.  XIV. 

yet  that  even  there  the  exceptions  he  admits  bring  out  still 
more  clearly  how  completely  I  was  justified  in  adducing  him 
as  a  witness  to  the  compatibility  of  evolution  with  the 
principles  of  the  scholastic  philosophy. 

So  much  then  for  the  teaching  of  Suarez  as  to  the  nature 
of  the  creative  act  and  the  admission  of  the  evolution  of  even 
certain  new  organic  forms  by  natural  causes. 

Let  us  turn  now  to  a  much  more  important  subject. 

Besides  and  in  addition  to  this  view  it  is  a  most  remark  - 
Thefactof  a^e  circumstance  that  ideas  should  have  been 
creation.  expressed  of  a  distinctly  evolutionary  character  by 
the  highest  theological  authority,  even  as  regards  the  very 
fact  of  creation,  as  an  historical  event. 

Few  things  seem  to  me  more  striking  than  that  such  an 
anticipation,  as  it  were,  should  have  been  enunciated  by  one 
of  the  greatest  teachers  the  Church  has  ever  known,  a  doctor 
the  authority  of  whose  writings  is  not  surpassed  by  that  of 
any  of  the  Fathers — I  mean  St.  Augustin.  As  I  said  in  my 
book,  "it  must  be  borne  in  mind  that  no  one  had  disputed 
the  generally  received  belief  as  to  the  small  age  of  the  world, 
or  of  the  kinds  of  animals  and  plants  inhabiting  it."  Never- 
theless, as  I  have  shown,  the  teaching  of  St.  Augustin  was 
distinct  with  respect  to  the  potential  creation  of  animals  and 
plants.  That  great  source  of  Western  theology  held  that  the 
whole  creation  spoken  of  in  Genesis  took  place  in  x>ne  instant ; 
that  all  created  things  were  created  at  once,  ?' potentialiter 
atque  causaliter,"  so  that  it  accords  with  his  teaching  if  we 
believe  in  the  gradual  development  of  species,  the  slow  evolu- 
tion, "  per  temporum  moras,"  into  actual  existence  of  what 
God  created  potentially  in  the  beginning. 

Now  the  greatest  representatives  of  Catholic  theology  are 
unquestionably  St.  Augustin  and  St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  and  this 
being,  as  almost  every  one  knows,  the  case,  it  is  inconceivable 
how  a  teacher  like  Professor  Huxley  could  write  as  he  has 
done  regarding  the  consequences  of  a  divergence  of  Suarez 
from  their  expressed  opinions. 

If,  as  Suarez  suggests,  St.  Thomas  followed  St.  Augustin 


CIIAI>.  X  V.]  A  POSTSCEIPT.  437 

f 

ratlier  througli  deference  than  from  identity  of  opinion,  it 
would  only  bring  out  more  strongly  the  paramount  authority 
of  the  latter.  But  in  fact  Suarez  was  here  mistaken,  for  we 
have  St.  Thomas's  own  words  as  to  the  matter,  where,  speak- 
ing of  St.  Augustin's  view,  he  tells  us,  "  et  htec  opinio  plus 
milii  placet "  (2  Sent.  Diot.  12,  qusest.  1,  a.  2). 

Here  it  may  be  well  to  explain  (as  Professor  Huxley  seems 
quite  to  have  misapprehended  me),  that  when  I  Another  mis- 

•      '  »>       r>    ci  i       x>   aPPrehen- 

spoke  of  the  "  wide  reception     of  buarez,  and  of  sion. 
his  being  "  widely  venerated  "  and  of  "  unquestioned  ortho- 
doxy," I  never  thought  of  placing  him  on  a  level  with  St. 
Thomas  and  St.  Augustin.     Moreover,   "wide  veneration"' 
and  "orthodoxy  "  by  no  means  imply  authority  in  the  sense 
of  binding  consciences.     Many  Catholic  teachers  altogether 
reject    the    teaching   of   Suarez  on  certain  points,  though 
they  none  the  less  consider  him  an  authority  to  be  respect- 
fully consulted,  indeed,  but  by  no  means  to  be  necessarily 
followed. 

Multitudes  of  teachers,  all  agreeing  in  matters  of  faith,  yet 
belong  to  very  different  theological  schools,  and  the  idea 
that  any  one  of  them  can  bind  the  others  is  simply  laughable 
to  those  who  know  anything  of  the  matter. 

Professor  Huxley  seems  to  imagine  in  showing  that  Suarez 
(like  most  teachers  of  his  day,  Catholic  or  not,  e.g.  Tycho 
Brahe)  adopts  an  extreme  literalism  of  Scripture  interpreta- 
tion, he  has  made  a  notable  discovery.  But  (as  before  re- 
marked) I  referred  to  Suarez  for  principles  of  interpretation 
with  regard  to  derivative  creation^  and  his  views  as  to  the 
historical  facts  of  Genesis  are  quite  beside  the  question. 
St.  Thomas  explains  the  diversity  of  opinion  among  theo- 
logians in  a  way  which  exactly  meets  my  purpose :  "  Quoad 
mundi  principium,  aliquid  est  quod  ad  substantiam  fidei  per- 
tinet  scilicet  mundum  incepisse  creatum  et  hoc  omnes  sancti 
concorditer  dicunt.  Quo  autem  modo  et  ordine  factus  sit 
non  pertinet  ad  fidem  nisi  per  accidens,  in  quantum  in  Scrip- 
tura  traditur,  cujus  veritatem  diversa  expositione  sancti  sal- 
vantes  diversa  tradiderunt "  (2  Sent.  Dist.  12,  q.  1,  a.  2). 


438  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CiiAr.  XIV 

My  critic  also  appears  to  think  that  because  one  side  of  a 

want  of  ac-    question  is  perfectly  orthodox,  that  its  contradictory 

luffi?"     cannot  also  be  so.   If  he  knew  the  A  B  C  of  Catholic 

doctrine,  he  would  know  that  in  open  questions  it  is 

perfectly  allowable  to  maintain  either  side. 

Professor  Huxley  says,  that  Suarez  in  this  question  (as  in 
other  matters)  is  in  opposition  to  St.  Augustin.  He  is  so ; 
but  other  theologians  of  equal  weight  severely  took  him  to 
task  for  his  expressions  on  this  subject,  as  I  shall  proceed  to 
show,  and  there  is  not  the  slightest  difficulty  in  bringing 
forward  many  theological  authorities,  both  before  and  since 
the  time  of  Suarez,  who  approve  or  positively  affirm  the 
position  which  St.  Augustin  took.  Therefore,  even  if  I  had 
made  the  mistake  which  Professor  Huxley  supposes  I  had,  it 
would  not  be  of  the  slightest  moment,  and  my  thesis  could 
repose  as  securely  on  the  support  of  other  theologians. 

Thus  I  may  mention  St.  Thomas,  St.  Bonaventure,  Albertns 

Magnus,   Denis  the   Carthusian  (1470),   Cardinal 

Cajetan   (1530),   Melchior   Canus  (1560),   Bannes 

(1580),  Vincentius  Contenson  (1670),  Macedo  and  Cardinal 

Noris  (1673),  Tonti  (1714),  Serry  (1720),  Berti  (1740),  and 

others  down  to  the  present  day. 

St.  Bonaventure  calls  St.  Augustin's  exposition,  "  Multum 
rationabilis  et  valde  subtilis,"  and  speaks  of  his  method  as  a 
"  via  philosophica ;"  nay,  he  calls  the  contrary  opinion 
"  minus  rationabilis  quam  alia  "  (Librum  secund.  Sent.  Dist. 
12,  qua3st.  2,  art.  1  conclusio). 

St.  Thomas,  as  I  have  shown,  supports  and  approves  St. 
Augustin,  but  he  even  admits  ('  Summ.'  par.  i.  qu£est.  73, 
art.  1,  ad.  3)  the  possibility  of  new  species  himself.  He 
says :  "  Species  etiam  novas  si  quse  apparent,  prasextiterunt 
in  quibusdam  activis  virtutibus  sicut  et  animalia  ex  putre- 
factione  generata  producuntur  ex  yirtutibus  stellarum  et 
elementorum  quas  a  principio  acceperunt,  etiam  si  novoe 
species  talium  animalium  producuntur." 

Professor  Huxley  will  hardly  dispute  the  weight  and  sig- 
nificance, in  this  controversy,  of  the  distinct  adoption  of  St* 


CHAP.  XIV.]  A  POSTSCEIPT.  439 

Augustin's  view  by  an  eminent  Roman  Car.linal  of  the  latter 
part  of  the  seventeenth  century. 

Yet  Cardinal  Noris  ('  Vindiciae  Angus.'  c.  iv.  §  ix. ;  see 
Migne's  '  Patrologia  Cursus  Completus,'  torn,  xlvii.  p.  719) 
speaks  in  the  following  uncompromising  words  : — 

"Hie  etiam  recentiorum  querelse,  imo  censurse,  quibus  insignem 
Sancti  Doctoris  interpretationem  in  cap.  i.  Geneseos  excipiunt,  refel- 

lendfe  sunt Augustinus,  quod  videbat  sex  priores  dies  queis 

Moyses  inundum  a  Deo  creatum  scribit,  si  litteraliter  accipiantur, 
gravissimis  difficultatibns  subjici,  quas  ipsemet  in  libris  de  Genesi  ad 
litteram  proponit,  subtilem  prorsus  ac  se  dignam  sententiam  ex- 
cogitavit,  nempe  dies  illos  intelligendos  esse  mystice,  juxta  cogni- 
tionem  angelicam  de  rebus  in  Deo,  et  in  proprio  genere,  et  juxta 
ordinem  rerum  simul  a  Deo  creatarum,  dierum  etiam  ordinem  in 

angelorum  mente  designavit Ex  nostris  scriptoribus  Magister 

Emmanuel  Cerda  Lusitanus,  publicus  in  Academia  Conimbricensi 
theologies  professor,  in  suis  Quodlibetis  theologicis,  acerrime  contra 
recentiorum  impetum  Magni  Parentis  sententiam  propugnat,  eorumque 
et  in  censurando  audaciam,  et  in  impugnando  debilitatem  ostendit; 
idem  quoque  prsestitit  Carolus  Moreau,  noster  Bituricensis  in  vindiciis 
pacificis." 

Speaking  of  Cornelius  a  Lapide,  he  adds  :— 

"  Yerum  Augustino  consentit  Albertus,  qui  ob  multiplicem  ac  mira- 
bilem  litteraturam  Magni  cognomento  insignitus  fuit,  his  plane  verbis  ; 
sine  pwejudicio  sententise  melioris  videtur  Augustino  consentiendum. 
Pars  I.  Summae  q.  12,  de  quatuor  coscvis.  Addit  Sanctus  Thomas 
proximo  laudatus :  ILsec  opinio  (Augustini)  PLUS  MIHI  PLACET.  Itane 
Cornell  sententia  ilia,  quam  Albertus  Magnus  ac  Sanctus  Thomas, 
Scholasticorum  lumina  ac  columnse,  probant  et  sequuntur,  hac  setate 
erronea  evasit?  Qusenam  illam  Synodi,  qui  Eomani  prsesules,  qusB 
doctorum  academise  proscripsere  ?  An  quia  tibi  tuisque  displicet 
erronea  censenda  est?  .  .  .  .  Nse  Sanctus  Thomas,  Albertus  Magnus, 
Sanctus  Bonaventura,  et  ^gidius  Eomanus  inter  accuratiores  theologos 
minime  recensendi  sunt  ?  Erunt  ne  illi  de  ultima  theologorum  plebe, 
Scnatores  vero  Suarez,  Molina  et  Martinon  ?  Imo  omnium  nobilissimi 
illi  sunt  quibus  et  Suarez  et  Molina  assurgant,  Martinon  vero  nee 
eadem  cum  illis  di6  nominetur." 

Berti,  who  was  Assistant-General  of  his  order,  who  pub- 
lished his  book  at  Home,  and  belongs  to  a  period  more 
than  half  a  century  later  than  Cardinal  Noris,  proposes 


440  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

the  following  thesis   ('De  Theologicis   Disciplini?,'  lib.  xi. 
c.  ii.) : — 

"Propositio  I.  Audacia)  potius  et  Mentise  vitio,  quam  doctrinpe 
laude  debent  notari,  qui  maledico  dente  carpunt  Augustianam  de 
simullanea  creatione  sententiam. 

"Proposilio  II.  Augustini  de  simultanea  creatione  sententia  non 
solum  ab  omni  animadversione  immunis  cst,  verum  etiam  probabilis  ct 
prope  certa." 

And  in  n.  9  he  says  : — 

"  Quare  in  distribution^  operum  Dei  omnia  quidem  spectant  ad  illos 
dies  invisibiles  in  quibus  creavit  omnia  simul,  videlicet  ad  diversas 
cognitiones  angelorum ;  sed  plura,  hoc  est,  quse  primum  in  rationibus 
seminalibus,  deinde  visibiliter  facta  sunt,  si  accipiantur.  secundum 
priorem  conditionem,  pertinent  ad  dies  intelligibiles,  et  unico  momento 
fuerunt  et  ipsa  producta;  si  vero  inspiciantur,  ut  in  propria  forma 
aspectabili  constitute,  istorum  creatio  perficitur  in  tempore,  et  post  sex 
illos  dies  invisibiles;  spectatque  ad  dies  naturales  in  quibus  Deus 
operatur  quotidie,  quidquid  ex  illis  tanquaui  involucris  primordialibus 
in-  tempore  evolvitur.  Sed  legite  S.  Patrem  Lit.  v.  de  Gen.  ad  lit." 

But  now,  coming  down  to  our  own  day,  the  same  com- 
plete refutation  of  Professor  Huxley's  position  is  most  easily 
effected. 

Father  Pianciani,  a  Jesuit,  was  president  of  the  College  of 
Philosophy  in  the  Koman  University.  His  work,  '  Cosmo- 
gonia  Naturale  comparata  al  Genesi/  was  published  at  Rome 
in  1862,  at  the  press  of  the  '  Civilta  Cattolica.'  Professor 
Huxley  will  hardly  dispute  as  to  his  orthodoxy.  This  author, 
in  his  '  Historia  Creationis  Mosaicae '  (published  at  Naples 
as  long  ago  as  1851),  p.  29,  shows  that  the  whole  of  the  first 
chapter  of  Genesis  must  be  read  as  a  most  sublime  and 
magnificent  poetical  description.  Concerning  St.  Augustin's 
special  view,  he  tells  us  (p.  15), "  Ejus  doctrina  ad  hscc  capita 
revocatur :" — 

"1°  Omnia  simul  a  Deo  fuisse  producta:  2°  Cijm  ipsa  ita-disponi 
queant,  ut  infimum  gradum  materia  elementaris,  supremum  puri 
spiritus  occupent,  interjectos  et  medios  turn  mixta,  seu  chimica  com- 
posita,  turn  corpora  physice  composita,  ut  saxa,  turn  praBcipue  corpora 
organica.  Hinc  quse  ad  infimum,  supremumque  gradum  spectant  et  si 
quse  alia  sunt,  quee  naturae  viribus  neque  nunc  producuntur,  plene  ct 


CHAP.  XIV.l  A  POSTSCRIPT.  441 

perfects  tune  fuisse  pioducta;  quse  .vero  interjectis  gradibus  con- 
tinentur  et  mine  naturae  viribus  producuntur,  virtute  duntaxat  et 
seminaliter  seu  causaliter,  tune  Dei  imperio  extitisse.  Augustini 
opinio,  semper  ab  errore  immunis  habiia  pluribus  placuit  theologis  quos 
inter  Alberto  Magno.  S.  Thomas  in  Summa,  p.  1,  q.  74,  a.  2— earn 
reveretur,  et  nee  ipsi  ncc  vulgari  doctrinse  prsejudicandum  censet." 
—pp.  15, 16. 

No  liberal-minded  man  can  see  with  anything  but  regret 
how — though  no  intelligent  man  can  fail  to  understand  why 
—Professor  Huxley  so  eagerly  endeavours  to  restrict  within 
the  narrowest  limits  the  faith  of  the  greater  part  of  the  Chris- 
tian world,  saying,  "  I,  for  one,  shall  feel  bound  to  believe 
that  the  doctrines  of  Suarez  are  the  only  ones  which  are 
sanctioned  by  authority,"  &c. 

But  the  attempt  to  represent  that  such  literalism  is  binding 
on  Catholics  is  simply  preposterous.  There  is  no  need  for  the 
present  Cardinal  Archbishop  of  Westminster  to  give  any  such 
permission  as  Professor  Huxley  speaks  of  (as  to  the  six  days), 
because  such  freedom  existed  long  before  His  Eminence 
occupied  the  see,  and  was  accepted  by  his  predecessor,  Car- 
dinal Wiseman.  It  would  be  restriction,  not  freedom,  which 
could  alone  require  him  to  make  any  declaration  on  the 
subject. 

We  might  really  suppose  that  at  this  day  it  would  be  super- 
fluous to  assert  that  Catholics  are  free  and  unembarrassed  in 
their  geology  and  palaeontology.  But  that  I  may  not  seem 
to  shirk  a  point  on  which  the  Professor  lays  such  stress, 
namely,  the  "  six  days  "  of  creation,  I  will  say  a  few  words  as 
to  the  position  of  Catholics  with  regard  to  this  matter. 

Now,  authorities  showing  the  freedom  of  Catholics  in  this 
respect  are  so  numerous,  that  it  is  only  difficult  to  choose. 
In  the  first  place  we  have  St.  Augustin  and  his  many  fol- 
lowers, also  St.  Hildegard,  Bertier,  Berchetti,  Ghici,  Bobe- 
bacher,  and  Bossuet.  Cardinal  Cajetan  says  distinctly  that 
the  six  days  were  not  real  days,  but  meant  to  indicate  order. 
And  I  may  cite  also  Cardinal  Gousset, '  Theol.  Dogmatique,' 
t.  i.  p.  103,  seq. ;  Frayssinous,  '  Defense  du  Christianisme,' 
conf.  'Mois-e,  Historien  des  Temps  primitifs;'  Perrone,  S.J., 
20 


4-12  LESSONS  FEOM  NATUEE.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

'  Prselect.  Theol.,'  vol.  i.  p.  678  (edit.  Migne,  1842).  But  it 
is  really  needless  to  speak  of  writers  during  the  last  few 
years,  for  books  are  daily  printed  at  Rome  with  the  permis- 
sion of  authority  such  as  Perrone,  just  mentioned,  also  Ton- 
giorgi  and  Pianciani  ('  Cosmogonia  Naturale,'  p.  24),  before 
referred  to.  In  English  we  have  Cardinal  Wiseman's  '  Science 
and  Eevealed  Religion,'  Lectures  v.  and  vi.,  and  only  last 
year  a  similar  work  was  published  in  London  by  the  Rev. 
Dr.  Gerald  Molloy. 

So  much  for  the  question  of  the  six  days.  But  before 
An  utter  leaving  the  subject  of  Christianity  and  evolution, 
mistake.  there  is  yet  one  more  point  which  it  may  be  well 
to  notice.  With  respect  to  the  hypothesis  I  advanced  that 
Adam's  body  might  have  been  formed  by  evolution  like  those 
of  other  animals,  the  soul  being  subsequently  infused.  Pro- 
fessor Huxley  remarks : — 

"  If  Suarez  is  any  authority,  it  is  not  Catholic  doctrine.  '  Nulla  est 
in  homine  forma  educta  de  potentia  materise '  is  a  dictum  which  is 
absolutely  inconsistent  with  the  doctrine  of  the  natural  evolution  of 
any  vital  manifestation  of  the  human  body.  Moreover,  if  man  existed 
as  an  animal  before  he  was  provided  with  a  rational  soul,  he  must,  in 
accordance  with  the  elementary  requirements  of  the  philosophy  in 
which  Mr.  Mivart  delights,  have  possessed  a  distinct  sensitive  and 
vegetative  soul  or  souls.  Hence,  when  the  '  breath  of  life'  was  breathed 
into  the  man-like  animal's  nostrils,  he  must  have  already  been  a  living 
and  feeling  creature.  But  Suarez  particularly  discusses  this  point, 
and  not  only  rejects  Mr.  Mivart's  view,  but  '  adopts  language  of  very 
theological  strength  regarding  it.' " 

Professor  Huxley  then  quotes  from  Suarez  a  passage  end- 
ing "  ille  enim  spiritus,  quern  Deus  spiravit,  anima  rationalis 

fuit,   et  PER   EAMDEM   FACTUS   EST   HOMO   VIVENS,   ET    CONSE- 

QUENTEE,  ETIAM  SENTIENS,"  and  a  conciliar  decree  con- 
demning the  assertion  of  the  existence  of  two  souls  in  man. 

It  is  surely  not  less  prudent  than  it  is  just  to  refrain  from 
speaking  authoritatively  of  that  which  we  have  not  studied 
and  do  not  comprehend.  The  fact  is  that  Professor  Huxley 
has  completely  misapprehended  the  significance  of  the  pas- 
sages he  quotes.  No  wonder  if  reasoning  perfectly  lucid 


CHAP.  XIV.]  A  POSTSCEIPT.  443 

to  those  who  have  the  key  appears  a  mere  "  darkening  of 
counsel "  to  those  who  have  not  mastered  the  elements  of  the 
systems  they  criticise. 

To  say  that  Syarez  "  rejects  Mr.  Mivart's  view  "  is  absurd, 
because  no  such  view  could  by  any  possibility  have  been 
present  to  the  mind  of  any  one  of  his  day.  To  say  that  any- 
thing in  the  passage  quoted  is,  even  in  the  faintest  degree, 
inconsistent  with  that  view,  is  an  utter  mistake.  This  is 
plain,  from  the  doctrine  as  to  the  infusion  of  every  soul  into 
every  infant,  which  was  generally  received  at  the  period 
when  Suarez  wrote. 

This  doctrine  was  that  the  human  foetus  is  at  first  animated 
by  a  vegetative  soul,  then  by  a  sentient  soul,  and  only  after- 
wards, at  some  period  before  birth,  with  a  rational  soul.  Not 
that  two  souls  ever  coexist,  for  the  appearance  of  one  coin- 
cides with  the  disappearance  of  its  predecessor — the  sentient 
soul  including  in  it  all  the  powers  of  the  vegetative  soul,  and 
the  rational  soul  all  those  of  the  two  others.  The  doctrine 
of  distinct  souls,  which  Professor  Huxley  attributes  to  me  as 
a  fatal  consequence  of  my  hypothesis,  is  simply  the  doctrine 
of  St.  Thomas  himself.  He  says  (qusest.  Ixxvi.  art.  3,  ad.  3)  : 
"  Dicendum  quod  prius  embryo  habet  animam  quse  est  sensi- 
tiva  tantum,  qua  ablata  advenit  perfectior  anima  quse  est 
simul  sensitiva  et  intellectiva  ut  infra  plenius  ostendetur." 
Also  (qujBst.  cxviii.  art.  2,  ad.  2) :  "  Dicendum  est  quod 
anima  praexistit  in  embryone,  a  principle  quidem  nutritiva, 
postmodum  autem  sensitiva  et  tandem  intellectiva." 

He  then  answers  the  objection  that  we  should  thus  have 
three  souls  superposed,  which,  he  says,  is  false  because— 

"Nulla  forma  substantial  accipit  majus  aut  minus,  sed  superadditio 
majoris  pcrfectionis  facit  aliam  spccicm  sicut  additio  unitatia  facit 
aliara  speciem  in  numero.  .  .  .  Idco  dicendum  quod  cum  gencratio 
unius  sit  corruptio  altcrius,  nccesse  est  diccre  quod  tarn  in  homino 
quara  in  animalibus  aliis,  quando  perfectior  forma  advenit  fit  corruptio 
prioris,  ita  tamcn  quod  sequens  forma  habet  quidquid  habebat  prima  et 
iidlmc  amplius.  ...  Sic  igitur  dicendum  quod  anima  intellectiva 
crcatur  a  Deo  in  fine  generationis  humanrc  qiue  simul  est  et  sonsitiva 
rt  nntritivii.  corrupt  in  formis  pricoxistentibus." 


444  LESSONS  FROM  NATURE.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

Now  I  am  not  saying  anything  about  the  truth  of  this 
doctrine,  but  only  that  it  perfectly  harmonizes  with  the  hypo- 
thesis thrown  out ;  while  that  it  was  the  doctrine  generally 
held  in  Suarez's  day  should  be  known  to  every  one  who  writes 
upon  such  a  subject  at  all.  This  agreement  between  the 
doctrine  and  the  hypothesis  will  readily  be  apprehended,  for 
if  Adam  was  formed  in  the  way  of  which  I  suggested  the 
possibility,  he  would,  till  the  infusion  of  the  rational  soul, 
be  only  animal  vivens  et  sentiens,  and  not  "homo"  at  all. 
But  when  the  rational  soul  was  infused,  he  thereby,  as  Suarez 
justly  says,  "  factus  est  homo  vivens,  et  consequenter,  etiam 
sentiens." 

The  dictum,  "  Nulla  est  in  homine  forma  educta  de 
potentia  materia3,"  is  nothing  to  the  point,  because  I  never 
supposed  that  the  "  forma  rationalis  "  was  in  potentia  materiae, 
but  only  the  "  forma  sentiens,"  which  would  disappear  and 
become  non-existent  as  soon  as  the  "  animal,"  by  the  infused 
rationality,  becomes  "  homo."  Thus,  so  far  from  being  incon- 
sistent with  my  hypothesis,  it  supports  it;  for  the  dictum 
must  have  been  applied  by  Suarez  to  every  child,  the  "  forma 
sentiens  "  of  which  he  must  have  allowed  to  be  "  educta  de 
potentia  materiae,"  although  the  "  forma  rationalis "  in  his 
doctrine,  as  in  my  hypothesis,  is  directly  created  by  God, 
and  is  in  no  way  "  educta  de  potentia  materise."  Profe^or 
Huxley  has  read  Suarez  ad  hoc,  and  evidently  without  the 
guidance  of  any  one  familiar  with  that  author,  or  with 
his  philosophy,  and  the  natural  consequence  of  writing 
on  such  a  subject  under  such  circumstances  follows  of 
course. 

I  think  that  it  must  now  be  plain  to  all  readers,  from  the 
passages  referred  to,  that  there  is  perfect  freedom  for  even  the 
very  strictest  Christians,  not  only  as  regards  the  question  of  the 
six  days,  but  also  with  respect  to  the  full  doctrine  of  Evolution. 
Professor  Huxley,  indeed,  must  know  well  that,  in  addition 
<,,-,'  to  the  authority  of  approved  writers  of  ancient  and 

Smcitur  ant-  • 

fruiando.       modern  times,  there  is  a  living  authority  in  the 
Church.     That  authority,  moreover,  is  ready  at  any  moment 


CHAP.  XIV.]  A  POSTSCEIPT.  445 

to  condemn  heresy  in  tlie  public  expressions  of  any  of  her 
children,  and  certain  to  detect  it ;  the  question  as  to  such  views 
as  evolution  being  tenable  solvitur  anibulando.  The  Professor 
congratulates  himself  prematurely  on  the  "  spontaneous  retreat 
of  the  enemy  from  nine-tenths  of  the  territory  which  he 
occupied  ten  years  ago."  Not  one  step  backwards  has 
been  taken  by  the  enemy  Professor  Huxley  seems  to  detest 
above  all.  In  proof  of  this  I  can  refer  to  the  '  Kambler ' 
of  March  1860,  wherein  a  position  was  at  once  taken  up, 
which  is  substantially  identical  with  that  which  I  maintain 
now. 

Christians  owe  a  debt  of  gratitude  to  Professor  Huxley  for 
calling  forth  more  clearly  the  certainty  that  their  Christianity 
religion  has  nothing  to  fear  from  the  doctrine  of  andKeas<fi 
evolution.  It  is,  however,  Catholic  Christians  who  are  pre- 
eminently beholden  to  him  for  occasioning  a  fresh  demon- 
stration of  the  wonderful  way  in  which  their  greatest  teachers 
of  bygone  centuries,  though  imbued  with  the  notions  and 
possessing  only  the  rudimentary  physical  knowledge  of  their 
days,  have  yet  been  led  to  emit  fruitful  principles  by  which 
the  Church  is  prepared  to  assimilate  and  harmonize  even  the 
most  advanced  teachings  of  physical  science. 

Professor  Huxley  indulges  in  rhetorical  declamation  as  to 
a  "  blind  acceptance  of  authority ;"  but  such  acceptance  is 
as  much  repudiated  by  me  as  by  Professor  Huxley.  The 
Church,  in  addressing  unbelievers,  appeals  to  "  reason  "  and 
"  conscience "  alone  for  the  establishment  of  that  Theistic 
foundation  on  which  she  reposes,  and  no  acceptance  of 
authority' can  be  called  "blind"  which  results  from  a  clear 
perception  both  of  its  rational  foundation  and  of  the  harmony 
of  its  dogmas  and  precepts  with  those  highest  faculties  of  our 
nature,  reason  and  conscience. 

I  confess  myself  weary  of  these  tedious  declamations  as  to 
the  incompatibility  of  science  with  Christianity  on  the  one 
side,  as  also  of  timid  deprecations  on  the  other.  The  true 
position  of  these  two  powers  justifies  neither  such  hopes  nor 
such  i'ear.s ;  for,  in  truth,  no  possible  development  of  physical 


446  LESSONS  FEOH  NATUEE.  [CuAP.  XIV. 

science  (and  as  to  Biology  I  claim  to  speak  with  some  slight 
knowledge)  can  conflict  with  Christian  dogma,  and  there- 
fore every  attempt  to  attack  from  that  basis  is  necessarily 
futile. 

On  the  other  hand,  so  far  from  the  Christian  religion  tend- 
ing to  cramp  or  fetter  intellectual  development,  it  is  notorious 
that  some  of  the  profoundest  thinkers  of  recent  as  of  more 
ancient  times  have  been  believers  in  Christianity,  and  I 
am  convinced  that  every  man  who  rejects  that  belief  is 
ipso  facto  condemned  not  only  to  a  moral,  but  also,  and 
as  inevitably,  to  an  intellectual  inferiority  as  compared 
with  what  he  might  attain  did  he  accept  that  system 
in  its  fulness.  The  Christian  creed  has  long  been  before 
the  world.  I  would  invite  Professor  Huxley  to  formulate 
his  system  in  distinct  propositions,  that  it  also  may  be  tested 
by  our  supreme  and  ultimate  standards — "  reason "  and 
"  conscience." 

It  remains  now  but  to  say,  in  conclusion,  a  few  words 
Mode  of  con-  respecting  the  mode  in  which  Professor  Huxley  has 
troversy.  thought  proper  to  conduct  this  controversy. 

I  have  already  adverted  (1)  to  the  unfairness  of  reproach- 
ing me  with  an  ethical  error  which,  I  was  so  far  from  falling 
into  that  it  was  specially  pointed  out  by  the  Quarterly 
Reviewer,  whom  he  well  knew  to  be  none  other  than  myself. 

(2)  To  his  misrepresentation  of  my  words  (as  p.  445),  in 
that  he  has  made  me  appear  to  declare  that  the  theologians 
referred  to  asserted  "  evolution,"  which  he  makes  synony- 
mous with  "  derivative  creation." 

(3)  To  his  positive  misquotation,  words  being  placed  be- 
tween inverted  commas  as  if  mine,  though  I  never  wrote  or 
published  them. 

The  remarkable  circumstance  however  is,  that  all  these 
tliree  errors,  though  I  called  attention  to  them  in  my  reply, 
are  precisely  reproduced  in  Professor  Huxley's  volume,  en- 
titled '  Critiques  and  Addresses.'  The  fact  of  such  republi- 
cation  is  the  one  adverted  to  in  the  opening  sentence  of 
this  chapter,  as  determining  the  publication  of  this  Post- 


CHAP.  XIV.]  A  POSTSCRIPT.  447 

script.  In  that  republication  Professor  Huxley,  disregard- 
ing my  exposure  of  his  misrepresentations  as  to  my 
arguments,  and  his  misquotation  even  of  my  very  words, 
attempts  adroitly  to  shift  the  issue,  and  to  represent  that  I 
have  maintained  that  which  I  never  said,  whicji  was  never 
present  to  my  mind,  and  which  is  manifestly  absurd.  Most 
willingly  do  J  leave  the  "  issue  alone  to  the  judgment  of  the 
public,"  taking  the  liberty  on  my  part  however  RegtatemCnt 
to  state  once  more  what  is  the  true  point  at  issue.  Ol 
I  had  maintained,  and  do  maintain,  that  "  ancient  and  most 
venerable  theological  authorities  distinctly  assert  derivative 
creation,  and  thus  their  teachings  harmonize  with  all  that 
modern  science  can  possibly  require."  In  reply  to  this  Pro- 
fessor Huxley  has  shown,  what  no  one  dreamed  of  denying, 
that  Suarez  rejected  St.  Augustin's  view  as  to  the  fad  of 
creation ;  but  in  the  first  place  that  does  not  even  tend  to 
disprove  what  I  alleged,  namely,  that  ancient  and  most 
venerable  authorities  did  assert  derivative  creation ;  nor  does 
it  render  the  testimony  of  Suarez  himself  one  bit  less  valuable 
as  to  the  validity  of  the  principles  on  which  the  doctrine  of 
derivative  creation  reposes,  principles  explicitly  stated  by 
himself.  On  the  contrary,  his  testimony  in  this  respect  is 
all  the  more  valuable  as  such  principles  could  not  have  been 
laid  down  to  serve  any  special  theory  of  his  own  which  he 
desired  to  maintain. 

The  "  ignorantia  elenchi"  of  Professor  Huxley's  reply  was 
so  obvious  that  it  is  difficult  indeed  to  credit  one  so  ready 
wilted,  with  an  honest  blindness  to  its  defects.  The  result  of 
the  issue  which  I  raised,  and  Professor  Huxley  accepted,  is 
so  palpable,  that  I  may  well  cite  his  own  words  addressed  by 
him  *  to  Professor  Owen  in  another  controversy: — 

"The  question  has  thus  become  one  of  personal  veracity.  For 
myself  I  will  accept  no  other  issue  than  this,  grave  as  it  is,  to  the 
present  controversy." 

*  'Man's  Place  in  Nature/  p.  118. 


4J8  LESSONS  FKOM  NATUKE.  [CHAP.  XIV. 

There  are  yet  other  words  written  by  him  *  which  may 
not  inaptly  be  also  here  quoted : — 

"  If  a  man  elect  to  become  a  judge  of  these  grave  questions ;  still 
more,  if  he  assume  the  responsibility  of  attaching  praise  or  blame  to 
his  fellow-men  for  the  conclusions  at  which  they  arrive  touching  them, 
he  will  .commit  a  sin  more  grievous  than  most  breaches  of  the  Deca- 
logue, unless  he  avoid  a  lazy  reliance  upon  the  information  that  is 
gathered  by  prejudice  and  filtered  through  passion,  unless  he  go  back 
to  the  prime  sources  of  knowledge — the  facts  of  Nature,  and  the 
thoughts  of  those  wise  men  who  for  generations  past  have  been  her 
best  interpreters." 

Leaving,  however,  the  heat  and  turmoil  of  mere  personal 
A  retrospect  disputes  and  literary  controversies  of  our  own  day, 

and  conclu-       .....  . 

siou.  let  us,   m   imagination,   turn  into  the    cool    and 

peaceful  shade  of  the  old  Cathedral  of  San  Stefano  at  Pavia 
where  repose  the  ashes  of  the  once  fervid  African,  the 
large-souled  Bishop  of  Hippo.  As  we  stand  in  contempla- 
tion before  that  venerable  shrine,  it  seems  to  speak  to  us 
with  silent  but  persuasive  eloquence  of  the  Church's  unity, 
and  of  that  continuity  by  which  it  responds  in  time  to  the 
eternal  unchangoableness  of  its  Author.  Venerated  now,  as 
in  early  and  long  past  ages,  it  is  nevertheless  with  the  pro- 
fuse carving  of  the  later  or  medieval  period  that  that 
shrine  is  decorated ;  just  as  the  great  thoughts  of  the  soul, 
the  remnants  of  whose  earthly  tabernacle  it  shelters,  were 
accepted,  revered,  and  set  forth  in  fresh  colours  to  the  medi- 
aeval world  by  his  great  follower  St.  Thomas. 

In  the  presence  of  those  justly-revered  relics,  can  any 
thoughtful  mind  fail  to  be  struck  with  awe  as  he  ponders  on 
the  pregnant  fact  that  by  the  agency  of  such  minds  as  those 
of  St.  Augustin  and  St.  Thomas  the  Church  should  have 
unconsciously  provided  for  the  reception  of  modern  theories 
by  the  emission  of  fruitful  principles  and  far-reaching  defi- 
nitions, centuries  before  such  theories  were  promulgated, 
and  when  views  directly  contradicting  them  were  held  uni- 
versally, and  even  by  some  of  those  very  men  themselves 


Fortnightly  Review '  for  November  1874,  p.  580. 


CHAP.  XIV.]  A  POSTSCRIPT.  4-19 

who  laid  down  the  principles  and  definitions  referred  to  ? 
Circumstances  so  remarkable,  such  undesigned  coincidences 
which,  as  facts,  cannot  be  denied,  must  be  allowed  to  have 
been  "  preordained  "  by  all  those  who,  being  Theists,  assert 
that  a  "  purpose  "  runs  through  the  whole  process  of  evolu- 
tion. Such  Theists  must  admit  that,  however  arising  or  with 
whatever  end,  a  prescience  has  watched  over  the  Church's 
definitions,  and  that  she  has  been  so  guided  in  her  teaching 
as  to  be  able  to  harmonize  and  assimilate  with  her  doctrines 
the  most  modern  theories  of  physical  science. 


INDEX. 


Abdomen  of  wasp,  369 
Absolute  scepticism,  8,  23 
Abstinence  from  marriage,  edicts  of, 

326 

Abstractions,  343 
Absurdity  of  prayer  taught,  389 

• of  scepticism,  8 

Abyssinian  Christians,  156 
Acanthometrae,  264 
Accessory  hypotheses,  302,  329 
Accident  and  design,  341 
Accidental  phenomena,  300 

,  the  word,  342 

Action,  motives  determining,  414 

of  God,  374 

Activity  of  modern  speculation,  2 

Adam,  157 

Adam's  body,  442 

Adaptive  modifications,  sudden,  339 

Agnostic  philosophy,  6 

,  its  characters,  418 

Agnosticism,  18,  21 

,  logically  dumb,  22 

,  self-destructive,  13, 17 

Agnostics,  6,  15,  22,  404 
Agrionida?,  318 
Agrogonus,  316 
Ahts,  161 

Albertus  Magnus,  433 
Alison,  Dr.,  222 
Americans,  333 
Amphioxus,  273,  274 


Analogous  parts,  256 

Analogy,  373 

Anatomy  of  man,  167 

Ancien  regime,  142 

Ancient  Egyptians,  163 

Andaman  Islanders,  138 

Anecdotes  of  brute  "reason,"  205. 

206,  208-211,  213 
Animality  of  man,  295 
Animals,  their  stupidity,  241 
Annulose  animals,  259 
Anthropomorphism,   199,  364,   3G9, 

372 

Anti-Christians  and  Evolution,  426 
Anti-impulsive  effort,  121 
Ants,  181,  183,  214,  250,  370 
Ape  colours,  308 
Apes,  370 

,  man's  resemblance  to,  17 1 

characters  of,  172, 173 

Apostles'  Creed,  430 

Apparently     unworthy    phenomena, 

369 

Aquinas,  St.  Thomas,  367 
Archetypal  skeleton,  255 

vertebras,  255 

Argyll,  Duke  of,  143,  374,  398 
Aristotle,  30,  80,  270 
Arithmetical  power,  161 
Articulate  sounds,  83,  88 
Association  and  reasoning,  50 
Assyrian  glass,  152 


452 


INDEX. 


Astronomy  and  religion,  413 
Atavism,  175 
Atheism,  377,  399 

and  despotism,  400 

Attention,  121 

Attraction,  343 

Augustin,  St.,  435,  436,   438,  441, 

447, 449 

Australians,  92,  140,  163 
Authority  and  philosophy,  4 
Automatic  faculties,  125 

memory,  229 

Automatism,  223 

,  human,  231 

Axiom  of  causation,  356 
Axolotl,  272 

Baboons,  205,  206 

Baden  Powell,  366 

Bagrus,  272 

Bailey,  90 

Baime,  142 

Bain,  Prof.,  6,  10,  47,  56,  57,  411, 

423 

Baker,  Sir  Samuel,  138 
Balmes,  33 
Bamboo  insects,  246 
Bannes,  438 
Barratt,  Mr.,  393 
Bastian,  Dr.,  2,  353,  425,  426 
Bates,  245 
Beauty,  324 
Bee,  358 

orchis,  250 

Belfast,  meeting  at,  3,  400 
Bell-bird,  312 
Bence  Jones,  Dr.,  2 
Bennett,  Mr.  A.  W.,  249 
Beranger's  owl,  398 
Berchetti,  441 
Berkeley,  56,  58,  78,  423 
Berti,  438,  439 
Bertier,  441 

Bewilderment  from  conflict,  5 
Bias,  93 
Bichat,  222 


Bilateral  symmetry,  257 
Biological  Anthropomorphism,  200 
Birds  of  Paradise,  311 
— — ,  sexual  characters  of,  309 

,  singing  of,  312 

sitting,  201 

Blackbird,  317 
Blenkiron,  Mr.,  307 
Body  of  Adam,  442 
Bojanus,  254 
Bombycidae,  306 
Bond  of  mind  and  matter,  82 
Booted  birds,  265 
Bossuet,  441 
Brazil,  157 
Bricks,  152 
Bronze  period,  161 
Brutes,  192 

sufferings  of,  368 

actions  non-moral,  370 

Buchner,  2, 143 
Bugs,  305 
Buist,  306 
Bullfinch,  314 
Burt  Wilder,  Prof.,  265 
Burton,  Captain,  324 
Butterflies,  305,  318,  322 
Butterfly  mimicking,  245 
Bynoe,  Mr.,  99 

Cacti,  249 

Cajetan,  Cardinal,  438,  441 
Calvin,  232 
Capercailzie,  309 
Cardinal  Cajetan,  438,  441 

Gousset,  441 

Manning,  441 

Noris,  438-440 

Wiseman,  441 

Caro,  395 
Carpenter  bee,  202 

,  Dr.,  2, 120,  299 

Carrier  pigeons,  304 

Carrion  plant,  201 

Carus,  Prof.,  253, 254  , 

Cashmere  sheep,  339 


INDEX. 


453 


Catalogue  of  Homologies,  262 
Caterpillars,  315,  316 
Cathedral  of  Pavia,  448 
Cats,  242 
Cat's  tail,  349 
Causality,  final,  358 
Causation,  378 

,  axiom  of,  356 

,  physical,  341 

Causes,  356 

Ceroxylus  laceratus,  247 

Certainty,  18,  32 

possible,  29 

Characters  of  the    Agnostic  Philo- 
sophy, 418 

philosophy  of  nature,  419 

Charlevoix,  Father,  148 
Chauncey  Wright,  Mr.,  332 
Cheadle,  Dr.,  148 
Chorda  dorsalis,  271 
Christian  Church,  427 

Creed,  the,  446 

Christianity  and  Creation,  427,  428 

and  Judaism,  400 

and  Reason,  445 

— —  and  Science,  445 

Christians  of  Abyssinia,  156 

Claims  of  Mr.  Wallace,  296 

Classification,  252 

Clifford,  Prof.,  4,  40 

Coal,  366 

Cobbe,  Miss,  223 

Cobra,  hood  of,  350 

Colours  of  apes,  308 

Communists,  397 

Community  of  Nature,  100,  165 

Comte,  397,  399,  423 

Conceptions,  articulable  if  distinct,  11 

•,  moral,  95 

Conscience,  112 
Conscious  automata,  231 
Consciousness,  368 

,  a  starting-point,  3 

,  states  of,  15 

,  threads  of,  14,  57 


Consequences,  377,  385 

Constitution  of  Nature,  386 

Consumption  and  marriage,  405 

Continuity  of  the  Church,  448 

Contradiction,  principle  of,  47 

Contrivance,  354 

Cornelius  &  Lapide,  439 

Cosmos,  357 

Counting,  91,  98,  99,  101 

Cousin,  423 

Crabs,  212 

Cranial  vertebra;,  254,  271 

Creation,  364,  371,  372 

,  fact  of,  436 

,  primary  and  derivative,  429 

and  Christianity,  427,  428 

in  potentia,  431 

Creator,  364 
Cruelty,  103 
Crustacea,  306 
Crystals,  343-345 
Cure  for  doubt,  4 
Cycads,  249 

Daddy-long-legs,  369 

Darwin,  2,  25,  85-89,  93,  99,  107- 
109,  113,  118,  123,  127,  133,  134, 
144,  154,  166, 167,  169, 170,  174, 
177-187,  199,  200,  203-205,  207- 
215,  255,  281-290,  293-300,  302- 
336,  337-342,  349,  350,  353,  354, 
363,  374,  388,  393,  425-427 

Deaf-mutes,  89 

Death,  368 

De  Blainville,  M.,  253,  254 

Deceptive  aspect  of  ape  tricks,  214 

Definition  of  instinct,  239 

of  morality,  96 

of  truth,  20 

Degradation,  154 

Delphic  inscription,  379 

Democritus,  333,  341 

Demonstration,  29,  33 

Denis  the  Carthusian,  438 

Dependence,  363 


454 


INDEX. 


Derivation,  293 
Derivative  creation,  429,  431 
Descartes,  19,  55,  200 
Descent  of  Man,  180,  184 
Deserted  fires,  201 
Design  and  accident,  341 
Despotism  and  atheism,  400 
Determinism,  232 
Deus  analogus,  199 

asquivocus,  199 

Development,  176,  229,  268,  272 

Difference,  relations  of,  72 

Disciplina,  157 

Dislike  of  religion,  420 

Display,  311,  313 

Dissociation,  42 

Distinct  conception  articulable,  1 1 

Dives,  393 

Divine  First  Cause,  364,  365 

Divorce,  156 

Dogmatism,  4 

Doubt,  its  cure,  4 

,  universal,  6 

Doubts  merely  verbal,  10 

Draco-volans,  256 

Dragon-flies,  318 

Dualistic  hypothesis,  129 

'  Dublin  Review,'  23,  22  i 

Duke  of  Argyll,  143 

Dunn,  Mr.  Henry,  408 

Duties,  380 

Duty,  95 

Dynamic  aspect  of  organisms,   270, 

383 
Dysteleology,  267 

Each  organism  a  unity,  238 

Easter  Island,  149 

Education,  406,  413 

Effects  of  abstinence  from  marriage, 

326 

Ego,  20,.  359,  377,  378 
Elephant,  242 

Embryonic  development,  168 
Emotion  and  doubt,  5 


Emotional  language,  82,  87,  229 

sensibility,  229 

Emotions  and  music,  325 

Empedoclcs,  341 

Energy  of  matter,  239 

Ens  creat  existentias,  372 

Entozoa,  304 

Errors  of  Professor  Huxley,  430,  432, 
437,  442,  446 

Esquimaux,  98,  132, 159 

Eternity  of  Universe,  357 

Eucalypti,  249 

Euphorbias,  249 

Every  philosophy  must  assume  know- 
ledge, 6 

Evil,  embodiment  of,  417 

Evolution,  129,  371,  419 

and  anti-Christians,  426 

,  key  of,  359 

Existence,  16 

Experience,  23,  425 

Experimental  philosophy,  341,  314 

External  world,  55 

Fact  of  Creation,  436 

Faculties  of  mind,  highest,  48 

Fallacy,  a  remarkable,  23 

Falstaff,  366 

Fanny  Elsler,  362 

Fatalists,  122 

Feeling,  human,  misleading,  370 

,  used  mislcadingly,  10 

Feelings,  31,  32 

Fernando  Po,  133 

Ferns,  249 

Feuerbach,  395 

Final  causality,  358 

Fire  making,  155 

First  Cause,  356-359,  361,  364-367, 

370,  372,  375,  376,  379,  393 
First  truths,  29 

,  undemonstrable,  33',  34 

Florida,  137 
Fly-catchers,  317 
Foetus,  doctrine  of,  443 


INDEX. 


455 


Force  or  form,  383 

,  vital,  352 

Fork,  1G3 
Form  or  force,  383 
Frayssinous,  441 
Free-will,  120,  187,  389 
Frogs,  221 
Fuegians,  133,  455 
Fundamental  truth,  18 

Galagos,  260 

Galton,  F.,  200,  326,  342 

Geiger,  86 

General  homologues,  264 

Genesis  of  species,  342, 355,  362, 364, 

371,  429 

Genius,  intellectual,  346 
Geoffrey  St.  Hilaire,  253,  254 
Gestures,  83,  91 
Ghici,  441 
Giraffe's  neck,  347 
Glow-worm,  305 
God,  359,  376,  377,  381 

,  the  idea  of,  367 

God's  action,  374 

goodness,  368 

Goethe,  253,  254 
Goodness,  48,  375 
Goodsir,  254 
Gousset,  Cardinal,  441 
Gratitude,  363 
Gravity,  346 
Grcenlanders,  99 
Gregarious  habits,  208 
Grote,  115 
Grouse,  318 

Growth  of  plants,  351,  352 
Gunther,  Dr.,  307 

Habits  of  mind,  346 
Haeckel,  Prof.,  426 
Hairlessness,  323 
Half-apes,  172 
'  Hamburg  fowls,  304,  311 
Hamilton,  Sir  William,  6,  216,  365, 
423 


Hartmann,  2,  402 

Hegel,  219,  393 

Hell,  105 

Hellenic  beauty,  324 

Helmholtz,  39,  40 

Herbert  Spencer,  Mr.,  6,  10,  15,  23- 
26,  30,  34-38,  40,  43-48,  56-60, 
62-64,66-77,  79,  80,  93, 101, 103, 
122,  123-127,  153, 162,  203,  216, 
232,  233,  235,  255,  259,  267,  268, 
280,  359,  361,  362,  381,  382,  385, 
388,  390,  397,  401,  403,  406,  409. 
411,  415,  423-425 

Heron,  Sir  E.,  309 

Hieroglyphics,  151 

Higher  mental  powers,  197 

Highest  faculties  of  mind,  48 

Hobbes,  400 

Holbeach,  Mr.,  407 

Holy  Office,  398,  400 

Homo  sylvaticus,  129,  131,  158, 167 

Homogen,  261 

Homogeny,  261 

Homologies,  catalogue  of,  262 

Homologous  parts,  256 

Homology,  276 

Homoplasts,  261 

Homoplasy,  261 

Homunculus,  176 

Honour,  113 

Hood  of  cobra,  350 

Hooker,  Dr.,  297 

Hope,  363 

Hornbill,  311 

Horns,  304 

Hottentots,  137 

Howling  monkeys,  313 

Human  automatism,  231 

feeling  misleading,  370 

kingdom,  183 

Humboldt,  W.  von,  86 

Hume,  56,  58,  110,  391,  423,  424 

Hutton,  116, 187 

Huxley,  Prof.,  2,  3,  6,  12-14, 17,19, 
23,  25,  57,  90,  93, 102,  103,  117- 
120,  126, 127,  199,  215,  217,  231- 


456 


INDEX. 


233,  268,  273,  293-296,  338,  362, 
366,  389,  390,  397-401,  411,  423, 
426,  427,  429,  430,  432,  434-438, 
440-447 

Huxley's  defence  of  Darwin,  289 

Hygrogonus,  316 

Hyperhypostasis,  381 

Ice  mosses,  343 

Idealism,  57 

Ignorantia  elenchi,  447 

Immortality  of  the  soul,  382 

Implications  of  Agnosticism,  21 

— —  of  man's  animality,  295 

Impotencies,  mental,  36,  50 

Inconceivability,  36,  38 

Inconceivable  prpposition,  indefen- 
sible, 9 

Incredibility,  36 

Independent  similarities,  260 

Indian  butterfly,  245 

Inductive  philosophy,  345 

Inference,  50 

"  Inflexible,"  the  word,  340 

Influence  of  environment,  258 

Innate  force,  345 

Insects,  181,  305,  318 

Instances  of  brute  "morality,"  109, 
111 

Instinct,  192-194 

an  abstraction,  237 

,  definition  of,  239 

,  lapsed  intelligence,  233 

,  what  it  is,  236 

Intellect,  ultimate,  32 

Intellectual  genius,  346 

— —  paralysis,  5 

Intention,  106 

,  purity  of,  403 

,  the  word,  354 

Internal  force,  276,  280,  319 

Intestinal  worms,  304 

Intimius  principium,  351 

Intolerance,  396,  399 

Introspection,  194 

,  its  unfamiliarity,  5 


Intuitive  morality,  basis  of  liberty, 

400 

Inventio,  157, 158 
Inverse  ratio  between  sensation  and 

perception,  230 
Ionian  philosophy,  301 
Isolation,  157 

Jaeger,  Dr.,  310 

Jehovah,  388 

Jouffroy,  423 

Jucundus,  402 

Judaism  and  Christianity,  400 

Judgment,  21,  216 

Justice,  382 

Kaffir  washings,  155 
Kant,  58,  232,  423 
Key  of  Evolution,  359 
Khonds,  140 
Kingdom  of  man,  183 
Knowledge,  375 

assumed  by  every  philosophy,  6 

of  pain,  369 

,  relativity  of,  6,  7 

Know-nothings,  6 
Kunge,  249 


Labyrinthodonts,  366 
Lady's  finger,  221 
Lamarck,  93 
Laminae  dorsales,  271 
Lancelot,  273 
Land-snails,  213 
Language,  82, 165, 197 
Lankester,  Kay,  Prof.,  261 
Lapsed  intelligence,  233 
Latency,  230 
Lateral  homology,  257 
'  Lay  Sermons,'  389 
Lazarus,  393 
Lecky,  Mr.,  102,  428 
Leech,  260 
Lemars,  172 


INDEX 


457 


Lesson,  the  first,  28 

Lewes,  Mr.,  6,  32,  38,  40,  47,  49-51, 
77-80,  1C3,  218,  219,  233,  234, 
236,  241,  251,  252,  277,  278,  231, 
362,  372,  383,  398,  411,  428 

I.ewins,  Dr.,  402 

Liberty  reposes  on  intuitive  mora- 
lity, 400 

Likenesses,  244 

uninherited,  257 

Living  authority  of  the  Church,  444 

Lizards,  316 

Locke,  55,  399,  423 

Logomachy,  11 

Lophiomys,  260 

Love,  363 

Lower  psychical  powers  of  man, 
221,  228" 

Lubbock,  Sir  John,  93,  98,  100-102, 
143, 156, 157, 159-161, 164, 166 

Lunatics,  393,  399 

Macedo,  438 

Macintosh,  Rev.  Wm.,  407,  408 

Maclise,  254 

Macroscelides,  260   . 

Madness  and  marriage,  405 

Maine-de-Biran,  423 

Malebranche,  232 

Mammce  erraticce,  287 

Man,  128 

Man's  anatomy,  167 

lower  psychical  powers,  221,228 

origin,  177, 185 

resemblance  to  apes',  171 

Mansel,  6 

Marr,  Guillaume,  394 

Marriage,  403,  405 

Martincau,  42,  55,  57 

Martyrdom,  400 

Matcria  prima,  250 

Material  and  formal  morality,  106 

Materialism,  385 

Materialists,  142 

Matter,  energy  of,  239 


Matthew  Arnold,  Mr.,  408 
Maudsley,  Dr.,  405 
Meaning  of  truth,  20 
Mediterranean  oyster,  339 
Meeting  at  Belfast,  33 
Melchior  Canus,  438 
Memory,  196, 197,  378 

,  trustworthiness  of,  23,  24 

Menobranchus,  269 

Mental    equality    between    different 

animals,  21 

impotcncies,  36,  44 

powers,  higher,  197 

• states,  17 

Mercer,  Mr.,  90 

Merit  and  demerit,  396 

Midland  Institute,  392,  399 

Mill,  6, 10,  14, 16,  38,  42,  45,  46,56, 

57,  63,  97, 103-105,  109-112,  122, 

216,  232,  401,  411 

,  John  Stuart,  423 

Milton,  Lord,  148 
Mimicry,  244 

in  plants,  249 

Mimosas,  249 

Mind,  as  a  symbol,  301 

,  habits  of,  346 

,  highest  faculties  of,  48 

,  its  bond  with  matter,  82 

,  modifications  of,  27 

,  states  of,  27 

,  study  of,  experimental,  4 

,  substance  of,  25 

to  be  studied  first,  29 

Mirabeau,  324 

Misleading  eflccts  of  feeling,  370 

use  of  term  "  feeling,"  10 

Misrepresentation,  118 
Modern  intolerance,  396 

passion  for  nature,  1 

philosophy,  422 

speculative  activity,  2 

Modes  of  plants'  growth,  351,  352 
Modifications  of  mind,  27 
Molloy,  Dr.  Gerald,  442 


458 


INDEX. 


Monistic  hypothesis,  129 
Monkeys,  172 
Moral  conceptions,  95 
— —  judgments,  102 

responsibility,  187 

Morality,  364,  378 

,  definition  of,  96 

implicitly  denied,  103 

Mosely,  Mr.,  259 
Moths,  305 
Motives,  414 
Mott,  Mr.,  42,  148,  411 
Mounds,  150 
Miiller,  John,  219,  220 
Murphy,  Mr.,  343-345 
Music,  325 

,  playing,  223 

Musical  feelings,  63 

sounds,  186 

Myliobatis,  260 

Noris,  Cardinal,  438,  439 

Oken,  253,  254 
Oldfield,  Mr.,  160 
Omnipotence,  364,  367,  372 
Ontological  order,  76 
Organic  volition,  229 
Origin  of  man,  177,  185 
of  right,  105 

—  of  species,  281,  291 
Original  view  of  Mr.  Darwin,  282 
Orthodoxy,  its  meaning,  437 
Orycteropus,  260 
Oscar  Schmidt,  86 
Ouzel,  318 
Owen,  Prof.,  253,  254,  256,  267,  268, 

273,  293,  335,  448 
Owl  of  Beranger,  398 

Paget,  Sir  James,  266 

Pain,  368,  369 

Palmer,  416 

Pangenesis,  255 

Pantheism,  357,  365,  377,  385 


Pantheistic  First  Cause,  357 

Paralysis  (intellectual),  5 

Parker,  Prof.,  261,  268    . 

Parry,  Captain,  159 

Parsons,  Professor,  282,  342 

Passion,  modern,  for  nature,  1 

Pathology,  266 

Pavia,  Cathedral  of,  448 

Peacock,  309,  310 

Pelobates,  260 

Perfect  adjustment,  235 

Permanence,  15 

Permanent  possibilities  of  sensation, 

57 

Perrone,  441,  442 
Persecution,  400 

Personal  embodiment  of  evil,  417 
Personality,  361,  375 . 
Petitio  principii,  298 
Pfeiffer,  Madame,  90 
Pheasants,  310 
Phenomena,    apparently     unworthy, 

369 

Philanthropy,  368 
Philosophical  anatomy,  253,  267,  274, 

276 

inquiry  needs  stimulation,  5 

Philosophy  (Agnostic),  6 

and  authority,  4 

,  experimental,  341,  344 

,  inductive,  345 

,  modern,  422 

of  nature,  its  characters,  419 

Phraseologies,  modern  and  mediajval, 

383 
Physical  causation,  341 

science,  385,  392,  396 

-welfare,  393 

Pianciani,  Father,  440 

Pigeons,  311 

Pipe-fishes,  316 

Pipes,  150 

Planariffi,  259 

Planets,  352 

Plants,  modes  of  growth,  351,  352 


INDEX. 


459 


Plants,  mimicry  in,  249 

Play,  M.  Le,  416,  417 

Pleasure,  95 

Plumage,  309,  317 

Poisonous  snakes,  349 

Polarity,  345,  346 

Popular  education,  406 

Portugal,  157  I 

Positively  necessary  propositions,  36, 
42,  50 

Possibility  of  certainty,  29 

Postscript,  422 

Potential  creation,  371,  431 

Power,  375 

of  song,  325 

Prayer,  389^ 

Prejudices,  136,  321 

Preliminary  truths,  8 

Preyer,  Professor,  179,  287 

Primary  knowledge,  17 

Primeval  man,  88 

Principle  of  contradiction,  47 

Principles  harmonizing  with  Evolu- 
tion, 433 

Pritchard,  416 

Proboscis,  339 

Profligacy  and  Agnosticism,  404 

Progress,  146 

Propositions,  four  orders  of,  37 
'  Prototypal  ideas,  275,  279 

Proverb,  133 

Psychology,  an  experimental  science,  4 

Psychoses,  391 

Puerile  hypotheses,  300 

Purity  of  intention,  403 

Purpose,  354,  358,   360,   364,  367, 
375 

Qualities,  secondary,  69 

'  Rambler,'  the,  445 
Ratiocination,  its  validity,  49 
Rational  language,  82,  89 
Realism  transfigured,  57,  59 
Reason,  193, 194,  197 
and  Christianity,  4 15 


Reason  and  failure  of  instinct,  235 

and  revelation,  422 

not  blind  like  instinct,  235 

Reasoning,  215 

and  association,  50 

,  its  validity,  49 

Reflex  actiob,  221,  228,  369 
Reid,  423 
Relation,  48 
Relations,  253 

of  difference,  72 

of  sequence,  70 

Relativity  of  knowledge,  6,  7 

of  relations    between  feelings, 

69 

Relics  of  St.  Augustin,  448 
Religion,  135,  165,  362 

result  of  dislike  of,  420 

Religious  consolation,  392 
Remarkable  fallacy,  23 
Renan,  Ernest,  398 
Responsibility  of  public  teachers,  417 
Results  of  introspection,  194 
Retribution,  382 
Retrieving,  104,  217 
Retrogression,  146,  148,  153,  165 
Revelation  and  Reason,  422 

and  Theism,  427 

Reverence,  363 

Reversion,  175, 178 

Revival  of  sensism,  425 

Rewards  and  punishments,  332,  389, 

410 

Rhesus  monkey,  308 
Right,  95,  97 
Rights,  380 
Robebacher,  441 
Rollcston,  Prof.,  101,  102 
Royer-Collard,  423 
Rupicola  crocea,  312 
Rush,  416 

Sacrifice,  145 

Sadness  in  religion,  389,  392 
St.  Augustin,  232,  371,  435,  43C, 
438,  441,  447,  449  * 


•160 


INDEX. 


St.  Bonaventure,  438 

St.  Hildegard,  441 

St.  Thomas  Aquinas,  367,  373,  431, 

436-438,  448,  449 
Salmon,  306 
Salvado,  141 
San  Stefano,  448 
Savage  faiths,  139 
Savages,  90 
Scepticism,  4,  31 

,  absolute,  8,  23 

— ,  absurd,  8 

Schism,  157 

Schmidt,  Oscar,  86 

Scholastic  and 'modern  phraseologies, 

383 

Schroeder,  175 
Science  and  Christianity,  445 
Secondary  qualities,  69 
Sectarianism,  412 
Secular  education,  406 
Secularists,  406 
Seeley,  Prof.,  255 
Selection,  346 
Self,  12,  13,  17, 19 
Self-consciousness,  12,  17,  25-27,  33, 

197 

Self-existence,  17,  18 
Self-refutation,  by  Mill,  105 

of  Agnosticism,  7 

Kemnopithecus  nasatis,  339 
Sense-perception  and  thought,  224 
Senses  trustworthy,  80 
Sensible  perception,  222,  228 
Sensism,  its  revival,  425 
Sequence,  relations  of,  70 
Serial  homology,  257,  258 
Series,  a,  15,  16 
Serry,  438 
Sexual  characters  of  birds,  309 

colouring,  305 

•  relations,  403 

selection,  302,  319,  323,  331 

Shame,  113 

Shooting  fish,  204 

Shrine  of  St.  Augustin,  448 


Sidgwick,  Mr.,  60,  64,  65 
Similarities,  independent,  260 
Singing  of  birds,  312 
Sioux,  100 
Sitaris  beetle,  269 
Sitting  bird,  201 
Six  days  of  Creation,  441 
Skeleton,  development  of,  272 
Snakes,  poisonous,  349 
Social  instinct,  108-110 
Solenostoma,  316 
Song,  power  of,  325 
Sonorous  vibrations,  63 
Soul,  277 

,  immortality  of,  382 

of  foetus,  443 

Sound,  62,  67 
Sounds,  83 

,  musical,  186 

Space  of  2  or  4  dimensions,  40 

Sparrow,  317 

Special  homologues,  263 

Species,  origin  of,  281,  291 

Specific  genesis,  291,  292 

Speculative  activity  of  our  age,  2 

Speech,  82,  84 

Sphex,  202 

Spix,  253,  254 

Stag's  voice,  313 

Stainton,  Mr.,  322 

Stallions,  307 

Standard  of  morality,  113 

Star-chamber,  406 

Starting-point,  need  of  a  good  one,  3 

State  education,  406 

States  of  consciousness,  15 

of  mind,  27 

Stirling,  Mr.,  57,  393 
Strauss,  2, 143,  426 
Stupidity  of  animals,  241 
Style  of  Mr.  Darwin,  297,  327 
Suarez,  430,  432-434,  436-438,  442- 

445,  447 

Substance  of  mind,  25,  27 
Succession,  15 
Sudden  adaptive  modifications,  339 


INDEX. 


4(11 


Suffering,  368 
Summum  bomim,  393 
Swallows,  111,  201 
Swedish  lakes,  339 

Teachers,  their  responsibility,  417 
Teleology,  358 
Temporal  happiness,  395 
Teratology,  265  * 

Test  of  ultimate  truths,  36 
Theism,  362,  389 

and  revelation,  427 

"  Therefore,"  49 
Things  in  themselves,  79 
Thomson,  Sir  William,  353 
Thought,  20,  31,  32 

,  fundamental,  33 

,  power  of,  22 

Threads  of  consciousness,  14,  57 

Thrush,  318 

Tierra  del  Fuego,  99 

Timbre,  63 

Toads,  307 

Toleration,  397,  399 

Tone,  musical,  63 

Tonti,  438 

Tortoiseshell  cats,  304 

Touch,  69 

Trabecula;  cranii,  255 

Tragopans,  304 

Transfigured  realism,  57,  5!>,  77 

Traupmann,  416 

Truth,  20,  21,  48 

,  is,  necessarily  a  good  ?  40 1 

Truths,  first,  29 

,  necessary,  21. 

Turkey,  309 

Tycho  Brahe,  437 

Tylor,  Mr.,  85,  89-93,  99-101,  133, 

137-140,  142,  143,  145-148,  155, 

157,  159, 162-166, 198 
Tyndall,  Prof.,  2,  26,  57,  103,  344, 

386, 387,  42G,  428 
Tyrol,  158 

Ultimate  criterion  of  truth,  45,  47 


Ultimate  test  of  truth,  32 
Ultramontane  Catholics,  43 
Umbrella  bird,  312 
Unfamiliarity  of  introspection,  5 
Ungulates,  350 
Unity  of  man,  184 
Unimaginable  propositions,  37 
Universal  doubt,  6 
—  terms,  373 
Universe,  an  eternal,  357 
.  Unknowable,  the,  361-363,  381, 382, 

388,  390 

Unsectarian  education,  406 
Unworthy  phenomena,  369 

Validity  of  reasoning  process,  49 

Van  der  Kolk,  175 

Variability,  346 

Variations,  184 

Veddahs,  90, 159 

Verbal  doubts,  10 

Verbum  corporis,  83 

mentale,  83,  91,  105,  170 

oris,  83,  165 

Vertebral  artery,  261 
Vertical  homology,  257 

symmetry,  257 

Vibrations,  sonorous,  63 
Vincentius  Contcnson,  438 
Vital  force,  352 

Vogt,  Prof.,  2,  85,  103,  143,  426 
Voice,  312  . 

of  stag,  313 

Vrolik,  Prof.,  175 

Wainwright,  416 

Wallace,  Mr.,  2, 147,  IF 6,  245,  240, 

296,  297,  300,  306;  3 14-318,  320, 

325 

Wallace's  view  as  to  colour,  315 
Wasp,  abdomen  of,  369 
Water  worship]  ers,  350 
Watson,  Dr.,  416 
Weir,  Mr.  Harrison,  242 
,  Mr.  J.,  314 


402 


INDEX. 


Whewell,  38 

Wilkcs,  324 

Wilks,  Dr.  S.,  405 

Will,  197,  358,  375,  377,  379 

Winged  fruits,  249 

Winwood  Reade,  Mr.,  103,  325,  393 

Wisdom,  364,  366 

Woodpeckers,  323 


Woolner,  1G9 

World,  external,  55 

Worship,  362 

Wright,  Mr.  Chauncey,  332 

Wrong,  95 

Zoological  classification,  252 
Zulus,  92, 145 


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Illustrations.  Price,  $1.50. 

No.  16.  THE  LIFE  AND  GROWTH  OF  LANGUAGE.     By  Prof. 

W.  D.  WHITNEY,  of  Yale  College.     Price,  $1.50. 
No.  17.  MONEY  AND   THE   MECHANISM   OF   EXCHANGE. 

By  W.  STANLEY  JEVONS,  M.  A.,  F.  R.  S.,  Professor  of  Logic  and  Politi- 
cal Economy  in  the  Owens  College,  Manchester.     Price,  $1.75. 

No.  18.  THE  NATURE  OF  LJGHT,  with  a  General  Account  of  PhysicM 
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f  Erlangen.     With  188  Illustrations  and  a  Plate  of  Spectra  in  Chromo. 
lithography.     Price,  $2.00. 

No.  19.  ANIMAL  PARASITES  AND  MESSMATES.  By  Monsieur 
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